Same-different judgments with words and nonwords: The differential effects of relative size

Words were paired with words and nonwords with nonwords in a simultaneous matching task requiring a same-different judgment. A difference in size slowed “same” RTs for both words and nonwords, while “differ” RTs for both words and nonwords were unaffected. These results do not support Bruder and Silverman’s 1974 conclusion that the word processing system filters size. The effects of relative size differences were discussed in terms of (a) normalization procedures and (b) changes in states of evidence leading to alterations in a response selection stage.     

Instructional and probability manipulations of bias in multiletter matching

Ratcliff (1985) performed fits of his diffusion model to the results of multiletter-matching experiments conducted by Ratcliff and Hacker (1981) and Proctor, Rao, and Hurst (1984), in which bias to respond "same" or "different" was manipulated by instructions and probabilities, respectively. The fits showed that both bias manipulations affected settings of a goodness-of-match criterion, whereas instructions also affected sensitivity. Evaluations of the experimental procedures and of Ratcliff's model-fitting procedures were performed in the present study. Three experiments showed that instructions and probabilities had similar effects, regardless of whether the different pairs were blocked or randomized according to the number of mismatching positions. The most salient feature of the results--that "same" reaction times were traded off more than were "different" reaction times, with no corresponding asymmetry in the error rates--was evident in all situations. The evaluation of Ratcliff's model-fitting procedures indicated that the apparent influence of instructions on sensitivity likely is an artifact of unequal variance for the sets of same and different pairs. Moreover, the effects of bias can be explained in terms of settings of response criteria, rather than of the goodness-of-match criterion, as in Ratcliff's fits.     

Distinctive feature control of decision time: Same-different judgments of simultaneously heard phonemes

Ss decided whether dichotically presented consonant or vowel phonemes were “same” or “different” in a reaction time (RT) task. Results indicated that “different” responses were made on the basis of a serial, self-terminating scan of distinctive feature differences between phonemes. “Same” responses were considered too fast to be accounted for by this process and were discussed as a separate parallel process. Recognition of dichotically presented syllables appears to involve a third process in which phonemes are also identified in terms of their distinctive features.     

A positional discriminability model of linear-order judgments

The process of judging the relative order of stimuli in a visual array was investigated in three experiments. In the basic paradigm, a linear array of six colored lines was presented briefly, and subject decided which of two target lines was the leftmost or rightmost (Experiment 1). The target lines appeared in all possible combinations of serial positions and reaction time (RT) was measured. Distance and semantic congruity effects were obtained, as well as a bowed serial position function. The RT pattern resembled that observed in comparable studies with memorized linear orderings. The serial position function was flattened when the background lines were homogeneously dissimilar to the target lines (Experiment 2). Both a distance effect and bowed serial position functions were obtained when subjects judged which of two target lines was below a black bar cue (Experiment 3). The results favored and analog positional discriminability model over a serial ends-inward scanning model. The positional discriminability model was proposed as a "core model" for the processes involved in judging relative order or magnitude in the domains of memory and perception.     

Separating bias and sensitivity in judgments of associative memory

Ratings of the degree of association between words are linearly related to normed associative strengths, but the intercept is high, and the slope is shallow (the judgments of associative memory [JAM] function). Two experiments included manipulations intended to decrease the intercept and increase the slope. Discrimination training on many pairs of words and constraining ratings to sum to a constant both reduced the intercept but failed to change the slope. The intercept of the JAM function appears to contain a bias component that can be manipulated independently of the slope, which reflects sensitivity to associative strengths.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Implicit sources of bias in employment interview judgments and decisions

This study empirically examined implicit sources of bias in employment interview judgments and decisions. We examined two ethnic cues, accent and name, as sources of bias that may trigger prejudicial attitudes and decisions. As predicted, there was an interaction between the applicant name and accent that affected participants’ favorable judgments of applicant characteristics. The applicant with the ethnic name, speaking with an accent, was viewed less positively by interviewers than the ethnic named applicant without an accent and non-ethnic named applicants with and without an accent. Furthermore, modern ethnicity bias had a negative association with the favorable judgments of the applicants, which, in turn, affected hiring decisions. Implications of the results, limitations of the study, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Syntactic frame and verb bias in aphasia: plausibility judgments of undergoer-subject sentences

This study investigates three factors that have been argued to define "canonical form" in sentence comprehension: Syntactic structure, semantic role, and frequency of usage. We first examine the claim that sentences containing unaccusative verbs present difficulties analogous to those of passive sentences. Using a plausibility judgment task, we show that a mixed group of aphasics performed significantly better on unaccusatives than on passives. We then turn to the observation that passives are generally harder than actives for aphasics. We show that this effect is modulated by lexical bias, i.e., the likelihood that a verb appears in a given syntactic structure: Passives of passive-bias verbs were significantly easier than passives of active-bias verbs. More generally, sentences whose structure matches the lexical bias of the main verb are significantly easier than sentences in which structure and lexical bias do not match. These findings suggest that "canonical form" reflects frequency and lexical biases.     

Discrimination of spatial and temporal intervals defined by three light flashes: Effects of spacing on temporal judgments and of timing on spatial judgments

Observers were presented stimulus patterns consisting of a sequence of three laterally displaced light flashes, which defined two spatial intervals and two temporal intervals. The position and time of the second flash were varied factorially, and observers were asked to make relative judgments of either the two spatial intervals or the two temporal intervals. “Induction” effects of stimulus timing on spatial judgments and of stimulus spacing on temporal judgments were both found; however, the directionality of these effects differed between subjects. The results are inconsistent with the hypothesis, derived from previous findings, that such effects are determined primarily by a tendency toward perceiving constant velocity of apparent motion; it is proposed that the directionality of the induction effects is determined largely by the strategy adopted by the observer for combining spatial and temporal stimulus information.     

Performance bias: Why judgments of learning are not affected by learning

Past research has shown a performance bias: People expect their future performance level on a task to match their current performance level, even when there are good reasons to expect future performance to differ from current performance. One explanation of this bias is that judgments are controlled by what learners can observe, and while current performance is usually observable, changes in performance (i.e., learning or forgetting) are not. This explanation makes a prediction that we tested here: If learning becomes observable, it should begin to affect judgments. In three experiments, after practicing a skill, participants estimated how they performed in the past and how they expected to perform in the future. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants knew they had been improving, as shown by their responses, yet they did not predict that they would improve in the future. This finding was particularly striking because (a) they did improve in the future and (b) as Experiment 3 showed, they did hold the conscious belief that past improvement predicted future improvement. In short, when learning and performance are both observable, judgments of learning seem to be guided by performance and not learning.     

Working memory and spatial judgments: Cognitive load increases the central tendency bias

Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the distribution of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, people underestimate values greater than the distribution’s average and overestimate values smaller than the average. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In largely separate literature, cognitive load (CL) experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe the effect on choice or judgments. In two experiments, we demonstrate that participants under high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias not described previously.