Are people excessive or judicious in their egocentrism? A modeling approach to understanding bias and accuracy in people's optimism

People are often egocentric when judging their likelihood of success in competitions, leading to overoptimism about winning when circumstances are generally easy and to overpessimism when the circumstances are difficult. Yet, egocentrism might be grounded in a rational tendency to favor highly reliable information (about the self) more so than less reliable information (about others). A general theory of probability called extended support theory was used to conceptualize and assess the role of egocentrism and its consequences for the accuracy of people's optimism in 3 competitions (Studies 1-3, respectively). Also, instructions were manipulated to test whether people who were urged to avoid egocentrism would show improved or worsened accuracy in their likelihood judgments. Egocentrism was found to have a potentially helpful effect on one form of accuracy, but people generally showed too much egocentrism. Debias instructions improved one form of accuracy but had no impact on another. The advantages of using the EST framework for studying optimism and other types of judgments (e.g., comparative ability judgments) are discussed.     

Mixed- versus strong right-handedness is associated with biases towards "remember" versus "know" judgements in recognition memory: role of interhemispheric interaction

Growing evidence supports the hypothesis that episodic versus semantic memories rely primarily on interhemispheric versus intrahemispheric processing, respectively. For example, a recent study found that individuals with presumed greater interhemispheric interaction were superior in episodic recall but inferior at semantic word fragment completion; however, tests of recognition memory yielded no group differences. Interestingly, recognition memory can be based on either explicitly remembering a stimulus or implicitly knowing that a stimulus had been presented. The current experiments administered recognition memory tests to strongly versus mixed handed participants who judged for each recognised item whether their response was based on remembering (episodic memory) or knowing (semantic memory) (Tulving, 1983). Results indicate that strong versus mixed handers are biased towards basing recognition responses on judgements of knowing versus remembering, respectively. As strong versus mixed handedness is associated with greater versus lesser interhemispheric processing, the results support the original hypothesis.     

Set-size and Frequency-of-occurrence Judgements in Young and Older Adults: The Role of the Availability Heuristic

Two experiments examined the cognitive processes underlying judgements of set size and judgements of frequency of occurrence in young (Experiments 1 and 2) and older (Experiment 2) adults. Previous research has implicated the availability heuristic in set-size judgements, whereas an automatic processing mechanism has been implicated in judgements of frequency of occurrence. In the current experiments, path analysis was employed to investigate the role of an availability bias in performance on the judgement tasks. In Experiments 1 and 2, both types of judgement were influenced by repetition frequency of words independent of the availability (recall) of specific exemplars. Experiment 2 extended the investigation to include age differences. Although older adults' recall performance was poorer overall, the availability bias was age invariant, and there were no age differences in either set-size or frequency-of-occurrence judgements. Our results indicate that both set-size and frequency-of-occurrence judgements are independent of the availability bias evident in recall, and they support the notion that an automatic processing mechanism underlies both types of judgement.     

Effects of stimulus order on discrimination processes in comparative and equality judgements: Data and models

In typical discrimination experiments, participants are presented with a constant standard and a variable comparison stimulus and their task is to judge which of these two stimuli is larger (comparative judgement). In these experiments, discrimination sensitivity depends on the temporal order of these stimuli (Type B effect) and is usually higher when the standard precedes rather than follows the comparison. Here, we outline how two models of stimulus discrimination can account for the Type B effect, namely the weighted difference model (or basic Sensation Weighting model) and the Internal Reference Model. For both models, the predicted psychometric functions for comparative judgements as well as for equality judgements, in which participants indicate whether they perceived the two stimuli to be equal or not equal, are derived and it is shown that the models also predict a Type B effect for equality judgements. In the empirical part, the models' predictions are evaluated. To this end, participants performed a duration discrimination task with comparative judgements and with equality judgements. In line with the models' predictions, a Type B effect was observed for both judgement types. In addition, a time-order error, as indicated by shifts of the psychometric functions, and differences in response times were observed only for the equality judgement. Since both models entail distinct additional predictions, it seems worthwhile for future research to unite the two models into one conceptual framework.     

Metacomprehension judgements reflect the belief that diagrams improve learning from text

In two experiments we systematically explored whether people consider the format of text materials when judging their text learning, and whether doing so might inappropriately bias their judgements. Participants studied either text with diagrams (multimedia) or text alone and made both per-paragraph judgements and global judgements of their text learning. In Experiment 1 they judged their learning to be better for text with diagrams than for text alone. In that study, however, test performance was greater for multimedia, so the judgements may reflect either a belief in the power of multimedia or on-line processing. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also included a third group that read texts with pictures that did not improve text performance. Judgements made by this group were just as high as those made by participants who received the effective multimedia format. These results confirm the hypothesis that people's metacomprehension judgements can be influenced by their beliefs about text format. Over-reliance on this multimedia heuristic, however, might reduce judgement accuracy in situations where it is invalid.     

The influence of egocentrism and focalism on people's optimism in competitions: when what affects us equally affects me more

Six experiments investigated people's optimism in competitions. The studies involved hypothetical and real competitions (course grades in Experiments 1 and 2, a trivia game in Experiments 3-5, and a poker game in Experiment 6) in which the presence of shared adversities and benefits (factors that would generally hinder or help the absolute performance of all competitors) was manipulated. Shared adversities tended to reduce people's subjective likelihoods of winning, whereas shared benefits tended to increase them. The findings suggest that when people judge their likelihood of winning, their assessments of their own strengths and weaknesses have greater impact than their assessments of their competitors' strengths and weaknesses. We identify egocentrism and focalism as two causes of the bias. The experiments revealed moderators of this bias, but also illustrated its robust nature across a variety of conditions.     

Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism: when what happens frequently is "more likely to happen to me"

Three studies investigated the role of nonmotivated egocentric processes in comparative optimism (and pessimism). According to an egocentric-processes account, when people judge their comparative likelihood of experiencing an event (e.g., "Compared to the average person, how likely are you to become wealthy?"), they consider their own chances of experiencing the event more so than the referent's chances. This should produce higher comparative estimates when an event's absolute frequency is high rather than low-a prediction supported in Study 1, which manipulated event frequency through a novel, time frame manipulation. Study 2 empirically distinguished egocentrism from a related focalism account. In Study 3, comparative estimates were related to the perceived frequency of events, independent of the events' perceived desirability and controllability. Path analyses provided additional support for egocentrism, and systematic cases of comparative pessimism were observed as predicted by the egocentric-processes account.     

Remembering is in the details: Effects of test-list context on memory for an event

We examined how recognition judgements for a set of event details are influenced by the relative difficulty of the other details included on the test. Participants viewed a crime event and then assigned remember/know judgements to details on a recognition test. In Experiment 1, details of medium difficulty were more likely to be classified as remembered when mixed with hard details rather than easy details. Similarly, in Experiment 2, medium details presented in blocked format were more likely to be classified as remembered when preceded by a block of hard details rather than a block of easy details. The test-list context thus appears to influence how participants define remembering. In Experiment 3, informing participants of the relative difficulty of the upcoming block of details eliminated the blocking effect. Implications for accounts of remember/know judgements and for conducting memory interviews are discussed.     

Remembering is in the details: effects of test-list context on memory for an event

We examined how recognition judgements for a set of event details are influenced by the relative difficulty of the other details included on the test. Participants viewed a crime event and then assigned remember/know judgements to details on a recognition test. In Experiment 1, details of medium difficulty were more likely to be classified as remembered when mixed with hard details rather than easy details. Similarly, in Experiment 2, medium details presented in blocked format were more likely to be classified as remembered when preceded by a block of hard details rather than a block of easy details.The test-list context thus appears to influence how participants define remembering. In Experiment 3, informing participants of the relative difficulty of the upcoming block of details eliminated the blocking effect. Implications for accounts of remember/know judgements and for conducting memory interviews are discussed.     

Are comparative risk judgements consistent across time and events?

Research reveals pervasive optimism in people's comparative risk judgements such that people believe they are less likely than others to experience negative events. Two studies explored the extent to which people are consistent in their comparative risk judgements across time and events. Both studies found strong evidence for consistency across time and some evidence for consistency across events. The consistency across time and events was moderated by experience. Specifically, when viewed together, the studies suggest that experience produces an initial decrease in the consistency of comparative judgements (Study 2), followed by greater consistency in subsequent judgements (Study 1). The discussion focuses on reconciling evidence demonstrating consistency with evidence demonstrating variability.     

Lost properties? Retrieval differences between name codes and semantic codes for familiar people

Summary Two experiments compared decision times for matching tasks involving the names and faces of familiar people. In Experiment 1 category and property judgements were compared when subjects were asked to respond to simultaneously presented stimuli: blocks of either faces or surnames. The results showed that the advantage known to exist for category statements extended to these types of materials. In Experiment 2 the same type of property judgement was compared with a first-name-matching task. The finding was that forename judgements required a longer decision time than property judgements when faces were the presented stimuli, bot not when surnames were used. This result lends further support to the Bruce and Young (1986) model of face recognition. It is additional evidence for sequential access to identity-specific codes and name codes from faces and for the functional separation of these two types of information.Robert Johnston is supported by a grant from the Science and Engineering Research Council     

Organization Of Stimulus Events And Remembered Apparent Duration

Two experiments, using Bransford and Johnson's (1972) paradigm, investigated the relationship between the degree of organization of the stimulus events occurring during the interval and the remembered apparent duration of the interval. Experiment 1 used the method of estimation and Experiment 2 the method of comparative judgement to assess the remembered duration of the interval. In both experiments the events were sentences which, depending on the provision of thematic information, could be organized either into a meaningful whole or as a sequence of semantically unrelated sentences. While the experimental manipulation affected memory and comprehension measures there was no effect on judgements of duration. The results are discussed in the context of Ornstein's (1969) memory store size model and Block's (1979) contextual change model of remembered duration.     

Individual differences in stroop and local-global processing: a possible role of interhemispheric interaction

Two experiments are reported examining individual differences in the processing of centrally presented stimuli containing two dimensions of information lateralized to opposite cerebral hemispheres. Left-handers, arising from (a) their lesser degree of functional lateralization and (b) their greater degree of callosal connectivity, were hypothesized to exhibit greater interdimensional (and presumably interhemispheric) interaction. Experiment 1 utilized local-global stimuli, and left-handers were found to be impaired at keeping the two dimensions independent and superior at integrating the two dimensions. Experiment 2 used Stroop stimuli, and left-handers again were impaired at keeping the two dimensions independent (i.e., showed greater Stroop interference). Correlational analyses indicated that the mechanisms of interdimensional integration versus independence are at least partially independent from one another. Results suggest that aspects of interhemispheric interaction can be addressed via the use of nonlateralized input.     

Visual perception and gaze control in judging versus producing phase relations

We studied visual perception and gaze control in nine participants while they judged the relative phase between two oscillating stimuli (Experiment 1), and while they moved their hand--and therewith a concurrent feedback signal--in-phase or in antiphase with an oscillating stimulus (Experiment 2). As in previous studies, the mean relative phase judgements in Experiment 1 corresponded to the presented phase relations (0 degree, 45 degrees, 90 degrees, 135 degrees, and 180 degrees), whereas their standard deviations followed an inverted U-function of relative phase. The relative phase judgements were hardly affected by the degree of visibility (fully visible, inner parts occluded, outer parts occluded) and the amplitude (5 degrees, 10 degrees, and 20 degrees) of the stimuli. Stimulus-gaze coupling decreased as relative phase increased, and its variability correlated with that of the relative phase judgements. Taken together, task performance and gaze behaviour suggested that the judgement of relative phase might be flexibly based on different variables, rather than a single variable like relative direction of motion. In Experiment 2, the production of the antiphase relation was less stable than that of the in-phase relation. Performance deteriorated when the outer parts of the signals were occluded and when their amplitudes were reduced. Stimulus-gaze coupling was stronger during in-phase than during antiphase tracking and weaker when the signals were partially occluded and when their amplitudes were reduced. Stimulus-gaze coupling at 0 degrees and 180 degrees was stronger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, suggesting that the visual perception of relative phase may benefit from its active production. Overall, the results clearly indicated that visual perception of relative phase and the corresponding gaze control are strongly task-dependent.     

The effect of question order on evaluations of test performance: Can the bias dissolve?

Question difficulty order has been shown to affect students’ global postdictions of test performance. We attempted to eliminate the bias by letting participants experience the question order manipulation multiple times. In all three experiments, participants answered general knowledge questions and self-evaluated their performance. In Experiment 1, participants studied questions and answers in easy–hard or hard–easy question order prior to taking a test in the same order. In Experiment 2, participants took the same test twice in the opposite question order (easy–hard then hard–easy, or hard–easy then easy–hard). In Experiment 3, participants took two different tests in the opposite question order (easy–hard then hard–easy, or hard–easy then easy–hard). In all three experiments, we were unable to eliminate the bias, which suggests that repeated exposure is insufficient to overcome a strong initial anchor.     

Inferring social attributes from different face regions: Evidence for holistic processing

Two experiments investigated the role that different face regions play in a variety of social judgements that are commonly made from facial appearance (sex, age, distinctiveness, attractiveness, approachability, trustworthiness, and intelligence). These judgements lie along a continuum from those with a clear physical basis and high consequent accuracy (sex, age) to judgements that can achieve a degree of consensus between observers despite having little known validity (intelligence, trustworthiness). Results from Experiment 1 indicated that the face's internal features (eyes, nose, and mouth) provide information that is more useful for social inferences than the external features (hair, face shape, ears, and chin), especially when judging traits such as approachability and trustworthiness. Experiment 2 investigated how judgement agreement was affected when the upper head, eye, nose, or mouth regions were presented in isolation or when these regions were obscured. A different pattern of results emerged for different characteristics, indicating that different types of facial information are used in the various judgements. Moreover, the informativeness of a particular region/feature depends on whether it is presented alone or in the context of the whole face. These findings provide evidence for the importance of holistic processing in making social attributions from facial appearance.     

Inferring social attributes from different face regions: evidence for holistic processing

Two experiments investigated the role that different face regions play in a variety of social judgements that are commonly made from facial appearance (sex, age, distinctiveness, attractiveness, approachability, trustworthiness, and intelligence). These judgements lie along a continuum from those with a clear physical basis and high consequent accuracy (sex, age) to judgements that can achieve a degree of consensus between observers despite having little known validity (intelligence, trustworthiness). Results from Experiment 1 indicated that the face's internal features (eyes, nose, and mouth) provide information that is more useful for social inferences than the external features (hair, face shape, ears, and chin), especially when judging traits such as approachability and trustworthiness. Experiment 2 investigated how judgement agreement was affected when the upper head, eye, nose, or mouth regions were presented in isolation or when these regions were obscured. A different pattern of results emerged for different characteristics, indicating that different types of facial information are used in the various judgements. Moreover, the informativeness of a particular region/feature depends on whether it is presented alone or in the context of the whole face. These findings provide evidence for the importance of holistic processing in making social attributions from facial appearance.     

Cross-domain Repetition Priming in Person Recognition

Three experiments examining repetition priming of personal names are reported. In each experiment, faces are used as prime stimuli and people's names as the test stimuli. Experiment 1 fails to demonstrate priming from faces to names when the same task-a familiar/ unfamiliar judgement-is made in prime and test phases. Experiment 2 shows that priming is observed when the same semantic judgement (British/ American) is made in prime and test phases. Experiment 3 shows that priming is observed when different semantic judgements (dead/ alive, British/ American) are made at prime and test phase. These results suggest that transfer appropriate processing cannot provide the sole account of repetition priming in person recognition. Instead, the results are interpreted in terms of a structural account of priming, embedded within an interactive activation and competition model of person recognition.     

Factors that affect action possibility judgements: recent experience with the action and the current body state

It has been suggested that action possibility judgements are formed through a covert simulation of the to-be-executed action. We sought to determine whether the motor system (via a common coding mechanism) influences this simulation, by investigating whether action possibility judgements are influenced by experience with the movement task (Experiments 1 and 2) and current body states (Experiment 3). The judgement task in each experiment involved judging whether it was possible for a person's hand to accurately move between two targets at presented speeds. In Experiment 1, participants completed the action judgements before and after executing the movement they were required to judge. Results were that judged movement times after execution were closer to the actual execution time than those prior to execution. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the effects of execution on judgements were not due to motor activation or perceptual task experience-alternative explanations of the execution-mediated judgement effects. Experiment 3 examined how judged movement times were influenced by participants wearing weights. Results revealed that wearing weights increased judged movement times. These results suggest that the simulation underlying the judgement process is connected to the motor system, and that simulations are dynamically generated, taking into account recent experience and current body state.     

Factors that affect action possibility judgements: Recent experience with the action and the current body state

It has been suggested that action possibility judgements are formed through a covert simulation of the to-be-executed action. We sought to determine whether the motor system (via a common coding mechanism) influences this simulation, by investigating whether action possibility judgements are influenced by experience with the movement task (Experiments 1 and 2) and current body states (Experiment 3). The judgement task in each experiment involved judging whether it was possible for a person's hand to accurately move between two targets at presented speeds. In Experiment 1, participants completed the action judgements before and after executing the movement they were required to judge. Results were that judged movement times after execution were closer to the actual execution time than those prior to execution. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the effects of execution on judgements were not due to motor activation or perceptual task experience—alternative explanations of the execution-mediated judgement effects. Experiment 3 examined how judged movement times were influenced by participants wearing weights. Results revealed that wearing weights increased judged movement times. These results suggest that the simulation underlying the judgement process is connected to the motor system, and that simulations are dynamically generated, taking into account recent experience and current body state.