Critical ethnography and subjective experience

Conclusion I began this essay by advancing three claims with respect to conducting ethnographic research: the analyst should be disposed to engage Other in a genuinely dialogic fashion so as to produce shared understanding; provision should be made for the analyst to disengage from the dialogue for purposes of self-reflection; and there should be some justificatory grounds for ideology critique. At the same time, I noted the problematic status of these claims on conceptual and methodological grounds and pointed to a need for taking account of the analyst as a subject whose being in the world impinges upon the analysis at each stage of research. This awareness, it seems to me, calls for an ethnography which is phenomenologically instigated. This is to say that the ethnographer needs to be no less sensitive to his or her own subjectivity than to the meanings of Other.In order to get clearer as to what might be involved in making the above claims, I discussed critically Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Although Gadamer is to be commended for his philosophical inquiry into the bases of self-understanding, we saw that his phenomenological hermeneutics suffered a number of limitations, all of which being linked to his inability to adequately free the subject from the limits of self-understanding. Thus, Gadamer's subject-as-analyst is restricted as a participant in dialogue with Other; engages in self-reflection without a firm footing; and is unable thus to mount a justifiable critique either of Other or the subject's own tradition/culture.This critique of Gadamer suggests that once the phenomenological turn is taken, it then requires an additional turn which joins the subject with Other in shared understanding. In this regard I suggested the possible directions that some conceptual emendations of Gadamer's thesis might take us, and gave special reference to the ways in which such emendations might be implemented in ethnographic work. Both my critique and emendation were meant to underscore the need for a joining of subject and Other not merely as this might represent an occasion for understanding Other, nor merely for the understanding of self, but for a shared understanding that opens up a newly formed terrain upon which self-reflection and ideology critique may find suitable and just intersubjective grounding.     

Sometimes less is more: the role of subjective task experience in self-generated value interventions

Interventions that prompt learners to generate their own ideas about how material is valuable are promising for inspiring engagement. Drawing from research on the availability bias, we investigated how the learners’ subjective experience of generating ideas about the value of a domain (i.e., ease of coming up with ideas) affects perceptions of the content. In both studies, we manipulated the number of value statements participants generated, and then measured subjective task experience and perceived value of the content. Both studies’ results showed that the relationship between the number of value statements and perceived value became stronger when subjective task experience was added as an intervening variable. This pattern is suggestive of a positive direct effect of value statements on perceived value as well as a negative indirect effect of subjective task experience. Implications are discussed.     

Two conceptions of subjective experience

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.     

The psychological unconscious. Found, lost, and regained.

In response to Greenwald's article on contemporary research on unconscious mental processes, the authors address three issues: (a) the independence of much recent research and theory from psychodynamic formulations; (b) the broad sweep of the psychological unconscious, including implicit perception, memory, thought, learning, and emotion; and (c) the possibility that the analytic power of unconscious processing may depend both on the manner in which mental contents are rendered unconscious and the manner in which they are to be processed.     

The unconscious pursuit of emotion regulation: Implications for psychological health

Because of the central involvement of emotion regulation in psychological health and the role that implicit (largely unconscious) processes appear to play in emotion regulation, implicit emotion-regulatory processes should play a vital role in psychological health. We hypothesised that implicitly valuing emotion regulation translates into better psychological health in individuals who use adaptive emotion-regulation strategies. A community sample of 222 individuals (56% women) who had recently experienced a stressful life event completed an implicit measure of emotion regulation valuing (ER-IAT) and reported on their habitual use of an important adaptive emotion-regulation strategy: cognitive reappraisal. We measured three domains of psychological health: well-being, depressive symptoms, and social adjustment. As hypothesised, individuals who implicitly valued emotion regulation exhibited greater levels of psychological health, but only when they were high in cognitive reappraisal use. These findings suggest that salutary effects of unconscious emotion-regulation processes depend on its interplay with conscious emotion-regulation processes.     

The unconscious pursuit of emotion regulation: implications for psychological health

Because of the central involvement of emotion regulation in psychological health and the role that implicit (largely unconscious) processes appear to play in emotion regulation, implicit emotion-regulatory processes should play a vital role in psychological health. We hypothesised that implicitly valuing emotion regulation translates into better psychological health in individuals who use adaptive emotion-regulation strategies. A community sample of 222 individuals (56% women) who had recently experienced a stressful life event completed an implicit measure of emotion regulation valuing (ER-IAT) and reported on their habitual use of an important adaptive emotion-regulation strategy: cognitive reappraisal. We measured three domains of psychological health: well-being, depressive symptoms, and social adjustment. As hypothesised, individuals who implicitly valued emotion regulation exhibited greater levels of psychological health, but only when they were high in cognitive reappraisal use. These findings suggest that salutary effects of unconscious emotion-regulation processes depend on its interplay with conscious emotion-regulation processes.     

The subjective experience of retrieval-induced forgetting

The objective was to examine whether the lower accessibility of studied items (Rp?) that follows retrieval practice with studied items from the same category (Rp+; retrieval-induced forgetting) is correctly monitored by our cognitive system. If monitored, lower confidence for Rp? items would be expected which, in turn, would allow the control of the retrieval-induced forgetting through the report option. In Experiment 1 the standard retrieval-practice paradigm with categorised word lists was followed by a recognition test with confidence rating and the option to report or withhold the answer. Accuracy showed retrieval-induced forgetting, but there were no differences in confidence. The report option did not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. The confidence–accuracy dissociation could be due to a correct monitoring of the retrieval-induced forgetting joined with a factor that incorrectly increases confidence for Rp? items. Familiarity with the practised category was proposed as this factor and tested in Experiment 2. Despite presenting the categories more times during the retrieval-practice phase to increase their familiarity, confidence ratings were unaffected. In conclusion, this research suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting was not monitored, giving rise to a confidence–accuracy dissociation.     

The subjective experience of committed errors and the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis

In routine sequential behavior, we sometimes become aware of having committed an error. However, often we do not. Here, we investigated the processes underlying conscious error detection within a typing paradigm. Our assumption according to the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis is that the (explicit) judgment of having made an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between expected and actually experienced performance which then is attributed to an error. In 4 experiments, participants were instructed to type single words without seeing what they were typing and, afterwards, to judge whether typing was correct. Experiments 1 through 3 tested the assumption that conscious awareness about an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between an expectation and the experienced performance. Experiment 4 investigated the assumption of a separate attribution process triggered by the perceived discrepancy. The results support the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis and argue for a two-stage model of conscious error detection.     

Daily mental lapses and the subjective experience of true self-alienation

The current research drew upon cross-sectional evidence that feelings of being disconnected from one’s “true” self (true self-alienation) covary with tendencies to become mentally detached from present environmental stimuli (mind wandering). Two longitudinal studies tested the prospective associations between true self-alienation and mind wandering. Study 1 found evidence for a positive association between true self-alienation and mind wandering at the trait level only. Study 2, which employed a more optimal design, revealed reciprocal positive prospective associations between with-in person fluctuations in “true” self-alienation and mind wandering. Our results provide new evidence for the association between true self-alienation and mind wandering and suggest that basic aspects of conscious experience are prospectively linked to feelings of self-alienation.     

The subjective and irreproducible character of direct experience

Summary The author discusses the subjective and irreproducible character of the method of direct experience, which is the ground of the acceptance of observation statements. It is also shown how this method forms a part of the method of arriving at universal statements on the basis of experience without depriving the latter of its intersubjective and reproducible character.     

On the possibility of universal neural coding of subjective experience

Various neurophysiological experiments have revealed remarkable correlations between cortical neuronal activity and subjective experiences. However, the mere presence of neuronal electrical activity does not appear to be sufficient to produce these experiences. It has been suggested that the explanation for the neural basis of consciousness might lie in understanding the reason that some types of neuronal activity possess subjective correlates and others do not. Here I propose and develop the idea that this difference may be caused by the existence of an elementary nonarbitrary linkage between temporal or spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity and their subjective attributes. I also show how cortical neural circuits capable of generating experience-coding patterns could emerge during evolution and brain development, due to the presence of spontaneous stochastic neuronal activity and activity-dependent synaptic plasticity. This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions, principal among which is the idea that the neural correlates of consciousness are essentially innate and universal.     

Stimulus control depends on the subjective value of the outcome

Stimuli that provide information about likely future reinforcers tend to shift behavior, provided a reliable relation between the stimulus and the reinforcer can be discriminated. Stimuli that are apparently more reliable exert greater control over behavior. We asked how the subjective value (measured in terms of preference) of reinforcers associated with stimuli influences stimulus control. Five pigeons worked on a concurrent chains procedure in which half of all trials ended in a smaller reinforcer sooner, and the other half in a larger reinforcer later. In Signaled trials, the color and flash duration on the keys in the initial link signaled the outcome of the trial. In Conflicting probe trials, the color and the flash duration signaled conflicting information about the outcome of the trial. Choice in Signaled trials shifted toward the signaled outcome, but was never exclusive. In Conflicting probe trials, control was divided idiosyncratically between the 2 stimulus dimensions, but still favored the outcome with the higher subjective value. Thus, stimulus control depends not only on the perceived reliability of stimuli, but also on the subjective value of the outcome.     

Substantive unconscious and adjective unconscious: the contribution of Wilfred Bion

The author first provides her readers with a brief summary of some of Freud's ideas, as found throughout his work, on the notion of 'unconscious'. The notion of unconscious as noun is contrasted to the idea of unconscious as adjective, this latter being proposed as a quality, or a state, ever temporary, dynamic, and subject to the constant changes going on in the individual's internal psychic world, as well as to external conditions. After presenting some considerations, the author then contrasts the Kleinian model of the mind to the Freudian, and Wilfred Bion's contribution is discussed at some length. Within Bion's conception of psychic functioning, the model of 'dream' is highlighted and, in this regard, clarifications are sought regarding Bion's view of the unconscious. To conclude, a brief and superficial approximation to the work of Carl Jung is touched upon, although the author admits to knowing little of Jung's positions.