Children's Understanding of the Instrumental Value of Products and Brands

Gelman and Echelbarger (2019—this issue) provide a valuable discussion about children's understanding of the inferred or nonobvious features of objects, which has implications for how children value products. We further this conversation by examining how children value products and brands as a means for meeting important goals, which we refer to as instrumental valuation. Specifically, we examine developmental trends in instrumental valuation for three goals—self‐concept development, self‐presentation, and happiness. Across these areas, we find that children place greater value on products and brands for meeting these goals as they grow older, particularly during late childhood and early adolescence. We conclude with a discussion of how age differences in instrumental valuation add to the general conversation about how children of different ages value objects.     

Young children combine sensory cues with learned information in a statistically efficient manner: But task complexity matters

Human adults are adept at mitigating the influence of sensory uncertainty on task performance by integrating sensory cues with learned prior information, in a Bayes‐optimal fashion. Previous research has shown that young children and infants are sensitive to environmental regularities, and that the ability to learn and use such regularities is involved in the development of several cognitive abilities. However, it has also been reported that children younger than 8 do not combine simultaneously available sensory cues in a Bayes‐optimal fashion. Thus, it remains unclear whether, and by what age, children can combine sensory cues with learned regularities in an adult manner. Here, we examine the performance of 6‐ to 7‐year‐old children when tasked with localizing a ‘hidden’ target by combining uncertain sensory information with prior information learned over repeated exposure to the task. We demonstrate that 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds learn task‐relevant statistics at a rate on par with adults, and like adults, are capable of integrating learned regularities with sensory information in a statistically efficient manner. We also show that variables such as task complexity can influence young children's behavior to a greater extent than that of adults, leading their behavior to look sub‐optimal. Our findings have important implications for how we should interpret failures in young children's ability to carry out sophisticated computations. These ‘failures’ need not be attributed to deficits in the fundamental computational capacity available to children early in development, but rather to ancillary immaturities in general cognitive abilities that mask the operation of these computations in specific situations.     

Imitation and representational development in young children with Down syndrome

Competence in object search and pretend play are argued to reflect young children's representational abilities and appear delayed in children with Down syndrome relative to social and imitative skills. This paper explores the effects on object search and play of this social strength in children with Down syndrome. Three experiments compared performance on traditional tasks with modified tasks designed to assess the role of imitation in object search and pretend play. Children with Down syndrome, relative to typically‐developing children, were able and willing to imitate hiding actions when no object was hidden (Experiment 1). When imitation was prevented in object search, children with Down syndrome searched less effectively than typically‐developing children (Experiment 2). In play, children with Down syndrome expressed more willingness to imitate a counter‐functional action, modelled by the experimenter, despite apparent competence in spontaneous functional play (Experiment 3). These findings indicate that object search and play behaviours of children with Down syndrome rely more heavily on imitation than is the case for typically‐developing children. The implications for the development of children with Down syndrome and models of representational development are discussed.     

Two‐year‐olds use adults' but not peers' points

In the current study, 24‐ to 27‐month‐old children (N = 37) used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding places, children used adults’ pointing to find a hidden toy significantly more often than they used peers’. In interaction with peers, children's choice behavior was at chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe informative value to adults’ but not peers’ pointing gestures, and highlight the role of children's social expectations in their communicative development.     

Gesture for generalization: gesture facilitates flexible learning of words for actions on objects

Verb learning is difficult for children (Gentner, 1982 ), partially because children have a bias to associate a novel verb not only with the action it represents, but also with the object on which it is learned (Kersten & Smith, 2002 ). Here we investigate how well 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children (N = 48) generalize novel verbs for actions on objects after doing or seeing the action (e.g., twisting a knob on an object) or after doing or seeing a gesture for the action (e.g., twisting in the air near an object). We find not only that children generalize more effectively through gesture experience, but also that this ability to generalize persists after a 24‐hour delay.     

Person‐centred positive emotions,object‐centred negative emotions: 2‐year‐olds generalize negative but not positive emotions across individuals

Prior work suggests that young children do not generalize others' preferences to new individuals. We hypothesized (following Vaish et al., 2008, Psychol. Bull., 134, 383–403) that this may only hold for positive emotions, which inform the child about the person's attitude towards the object but not about the positivity of the object itself. It may not hold for negative emotions, which additionally inform the child about the negativity of the object itself. Two‐year‐old children saw one individual (the emoter) emoting positively or negatively towards one and neutrally towards a second novel object. When a second individual then requested an object, children generalized the emoter's negative but not her positive emotion to the second individual. Children thus draw different inferences from others' positive versus negative emotions: Whereas they view others' positive emotions as person centred, they may view others' negative emotions as object centred and thus generalizable across people. The results are discussed with relation to the functions and implications of the negativity bias.     

Developing symbolic capacity one step at a time

The present research examines the ability of children as young as 4 years to use models in tasks that require scaling of distance along a single dimension. In Experiment 1, we found that tasks involving models are similar in difficulty to those involving maps that we studied earlier (Huttenlocher, J., Newcombe, N., & Vasilyeva, M. (1999). Spatial scaling in young children. Psychological Science, 10, 393-398). In Experiment 2, we found that retrieval tasks, where children indicate the location of a hidden object in an actual space are substantially more difficult than placement tasks, where children put a visible object in a particular location in an actual space. We discuss possible implications of the differential difficulty of retrieval and placement tasks for the understanding of symbolic development.     

How should we question young children's understanding of aspectuality?

In two experiments, we investigated whether 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children's ability to demonstrate their understanding of aspectuality was influenced by how the test question was phrased. In Experiment 1, 60 children chose whether to look or feel to gain information about a hidden object (identifiable by sight or touch). Test questions referred either to the perceptual aspect of the hidden object (e.g., whether it was red or blue), the modality dimension (e.g., what colour it was), or the object's identity (e.g., which one it was). Children who heard the identity question performed worse than those who heard the aspect or dimension question. Further investigation in Experiment 2 (N= 23) established that children's difficulty with the identity question was not due to a problem recalling the objects. We discuss how the results of these methodological investigations impact on researchers’ assessment of the development of aspectuality understanding.     

Domestic horses (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Equus ferus caballus</Emphasis>) fail to intuitively reason about object properties like solidity and weight

From early infancy, humans reason about the external world in terms of identifiable, solid, cohesive objects persisting in space and time. This is one of the most fundamental human skills, which may be part of our innate conception of object properties. Although object permanence has been extensively studied across a variety of taxa, little is known about how non-human animals reason about other object properties. In this study, we therefore tested how domestic horses (Equus ferus caballus) intuitively reason about object properties like solidity and height, to locate hidden food. Horses were allowed to look for a food reward behind two opaque screens, only one of which had either the proper height or inclination to hide food rewards. Our results suggest that horses could not intuitively reason about physical object properties, but rather learned to select the screen with the proper height or inclination from the second set of 5 trials.     

The social unconscious in persons,groups and societies,volume 1: Mainly theory,edited by Earl Hopper and Heim Weinberg

This paper looks at some instances of young children learning in a school setting, and suggests that ‘emotional learning’ is an integral part of the apparently ‘cognitive’ learning that takes place in school. The paper uses object relations psychoanalysis in order to explore some of the more-or-less hidden emotional states of mind that accompany difficulties and successes with school learning. Three extracts are presented from observations of young children coming to terms with reading and writing. Each of these is then discussed, with the aim of showing how learning always takes place in a dynamic, relational emotional context. From the theoretical perspective outlined in this article, all learning involves unconscious ‘object relating’. Things to be learnt about, and people requiring learning, or assisting with it, are the bearers of the learner's vivid unconscious ‘transferences’. Such transferences colour the learner's emotional experience of the people and things around him or her, constituting a dynamic, internally experienced, ‘emotional context’ for learning. While this emotional context may be partly subjective, it is also more or less affected by others' feeling states, pulling the learner into a shared learning environment which is emotionally complex and inter-subjective.     

Memory load affects object individuation in 18-month-old infants

Accurate representation of a changing environment requires individuation-the ability to determine how many numerically distinct objects are present in a scene. Much research has characterized early individuation abilities by identifying which object features infants can use to individuate throughout development. However, despite the fact that without memory featural individuation would be impossible, little is known about how memory constrains object individuation. Here, we investigated infants' ability to individuate multiple objects at once and asked whether individuation performance changes as a function of memory load. In three experiments, 18-month-old infants saw one, two, or three objects hidden and always saw the correct number of objects retrieved. On some trials, one or more of these objects surreptitiously switched identity prior to retrieval. We asked whether infants would use this identity mismatch to individuate and, hence, continue searching for the missing object(s). We found that infants were less likely to individuate objects as memory load grew, but that infants individuated more successfully when the featural contrast between the hidden and retrieved objects increased. These results suggest that remembering more objects may result in a loss of representational precision, thereby decreasing the likelihood of successful individuation. We close by discussing possible links between our results and findings from adult working memory.     

The role of competition in word learning via referent selection

Previous research suggests that competition among the objects present during referent selection influences young children’s ability to learn words in fast mapping tasks. The present study systematically explored this issue with 30‐month‐old children. Children first received referent selection trials with a target object and either two, three or four competitor objects. Then, after a short delay, children were tested on their ability to retain the newly fast‐mapped names. Overall, the number of competitors did not affect children’s ability to form the initial name–object mappings. However, only children who encountered few competitors during referent selection demonstrated significant levels of retention. Results and implications are discussed in terms of the role of competition in studies of children’s fast mapping. The relationship between referent selection and full word learning is also discussed.     

It's Taking Shape: Shared Object Features Influence Novel Noun Generalizations

Children's early noun vocabularies are dominated by names for shape‐based categories. However, along with shape, material and colour are also important features of many early categories. In the current study, we investigate how the number of shared features among objects influences children's novel noun generalizations, explanations for these generalizations and spontaneous speech. Preschool children and adults were presented with test objects that shared only one feature (e.g. shape) or that shared two features (e.g. material and colour). After each trial, participants were asked, ‘how did you know that was your [novel name]?’ Overall, participants generalized novel names on the basis of shape more when objects shared shape and a second feature with the exemplar. All participants provided shape‐based explanations of their choices, but explanations were increasingly more abstract across development. Finally, children's spontaneous speech was dominated by references to the objects' shape, and this did not change across development or number of shared features. Overall, these data demonstrate that the shape bias is enhanced when objects share shape and a second feature but weakened for 3‐year‐old children when objects share two non‐shape features. These findings have implications for our understanding of how children learn names for objects that belong to multiple categories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Peering into the opaque mind

Abstract

Carolyn Saarni’s pioneering research showed that young children learn how to hide their feelings—to conceal disappointment with a smile or to conceal amusement with a neutral expression. By 6 years of age, children understand the implications of such concealment. They can distinguish between: (i) an individual’s true but hidden emotion; (ii) the emotion that the individual overtly expresses; and (iii) the emotion that other people might mistakenly attribute to the individual. Effectively, young children grasp that the mind is opaque. Its contents can remain hidden from others. We examine two issues raised by this important conceptual insight. First, we ask how it emerges in young children—what experiences lead them to acknowledge the mind’s opacity? Second, in light of Saarni’s emphasis on the impact of cultural beliefs and practices, we discuss anthropological evidence that in certain cultures the mind’s opacity is regarded as a social desideratum so that enquiries into, or speculations about, a person’s private mental states are regarded as inappropriate. We consider the understanding of hidden emotion that children will acquire if they grow up in such a culture. We propose—paradoxically—that they will readily differentiate between what is actually felt and what is overtly expressed. We conclude by reviewing recent cross-cultural evidence lending initial support to that prediction.     

Something old,something new: a developmental transition from familiarity to novelty preferences with hidden objects

Novelty seeking is viewed as adaptive, and novelty preferences in infancy predict cognitive performance into adulthood. Yet 7‐month‐olds prefer familiar stimuli to novel ones when searching for hidden objects, in contrast to their strong novelty preferences with visible objects ( Shinskey & Munakata, 2005 ). According to a graded representations perspective on object knowledge, infants gradually develop stronger object representations through experience, such that representations of familiar objects can be better maintained, supporting greater search than with novel objects. Object representations should strengthen with further development to allow older infants to shift from familiarity to novelty preferences with hidden objects. The current study tested this prediction by presenting 24 11‐month‐olds with novel and familiar objects that were sometimes visible and sometimes hidden. Unlike 7‐month‐olds, 11‐month‐olds showed novelty preferences with both visible and hidden objects. This developmental shift from familiarity to novelty preference with hidden objects parallels one that infants show months earlier with perceptible stimuli, but the two transitions may reflect different underlying mechanisms. The current findings suggest both change and continuity in the adaptive development of object representations and associated cognitive processes.     

Level 1 perspective‐taking at 24 months of age

The current study sought to determine the age at which children first engage in Level 1 visual perspective‐taking, in which they understand that the content of what another person sees in a situation may sometimes differ from what they see. An adult entered the room searching for an object. One candidate object was out in the open, whereas another was visible for the child but behind an occluder from the adult's perspective. When asked to help the adult find the sought‐for object, 24‐month‐old children, but not 18‐month‐old children, handed him the occluded object (whereas in a control condition they showed no preference for the occluded toy). We argue that the performance of the 24‐month‐olds requires Level 1 visual perspective‐taking skills and that this is the youngest age at which these skills have been demonstrated.     

Transfer of learning between 2D and 3D sources during infancy: Informing theory and practice

The ability to transfer learning across contexts is an adaptive skill that develops rapidly during early childhood. Learning from television is a specific instance of transfer of learning between a two-dimensional (2D) representation and a three-dimensional (3D) object. Understanding the conditions under which young children might accomplish this particular kind of transfer is important because by 2 years of age 90% of US children are viewing television on a daily basis. Recent research shows that children can imitate actions presented on television using the corresponding real-world objects, but this same research also shows that children learn less from television than they do from live demonstrations until they are at least 3 years old; termed the video deficit effect. At present, there is no coherent theory to account for the video deficit effect; how learning is disrupted by this change in context is poorly understood. The aims of the present review are: (1) to review the conditions under which children transfer learning between 2D images and 3D objects during early childhood and (2) to integrate developmental theories of memory processing into the transfer of learning from media literature using Hayne’s (2004) developmental representational flexibility account. The review will conclude that studies on the transfer of learning between 2D and 3D sources have important theoretical implications for general developmental theories of cognitive development, and in particular the development of a flexible representational system, as well as policy implications for early education regarding the potential use and limitations of media as effective teaching tools during early childhood.     

How do young children determine location? Evidence from disorientation tasks

Previous studies show that following disorientation children use the geometry of an enclosed space to locate an object hidden in one of the corners [e.g. (Hermer, L., & Spelke, E. (1996). Modularity and development: A case of spatial reorientation. Cognition, 61, 195-232)]. These studies have used a disorientation procedure that involves rotating the viewer (with eyes closed). Here, we examine 18- to 25-month-olds' spatial coding in two disorientation tasks--involving either viewer or space rotation. Importantly, the rotational movements in both tasks could not be visually tracked. Children were tested in either task (viewer- or space-movement) from either inside or outside a triangular (isosceles) space (with one unique and two equivalent corners). In the viewer-movement task, performance was above chance, regardless of which corner contained the object. In the space-movement task, performance was above chance at only the unique corner. On both tasks, performance was better from inside the space than from outside. The implications for how children determine location are discussed.