Individualism and Collectivism

Psychologists have long portrayed the mind “as a machine or computer that is the same in all times and places, while only the raw materials processed by the machinery or the data in the computer vary” (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998, p. 918). This state of affairs changed dramatically over the last decade and a rapidly growing body of experimental research documents profound cultural differences in basic psychological processes. To date, much of this work has addressed the influence of individualism or collectivism, often framed in terms of independent vs. interdependent self‐construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; for a comprehensive review, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Other dimensions of culture, which figured prominently in Hofstede's (1980) groundbreaking analysis, received less attention. In this issue's Research Dialogue, Shavitt, Lalwani, Zhang, and Torelli (2006) draw attention to one of these dimensions, namely the distinction between horizontal and vertical cultural orientations, which value equality or emphasize hierarchy, respectively. They review the importance of this distinction for understanding personal values, advertising and consumer persuasion, self‐presentational patterns, and gender differences, noting that the influence of horizontal/vertical orientations is often obscured by their conflation with differences in individualism and collectivism. Commentaries by Aaker (2006), Meyers‐Levy (2006), and Oyserman (2006) elaborate on their analysis and suggest additional avenues for future research. In combination, this set of papers makes a compelling case for extending the analysis of cultural differences in cognition, emotion, motivation, and behavior beyond the individualism/collectivism distinction that has captured the lion's share of recent attention.     

A Quantitative Estimate of Schema Abnormality in Socially Anxious and Non‐Anxious Individuals

Although cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that anxious individuals are characterized by abnormal threat‐relevant schemas, few empirical studies have estimated the nature of these cognitive structures using quantitative methods that lend themselves to inferential statistical analysis. In the present study, socially anxious (n = 55) and non‐anxious (n = 62) participants completed 3 Q‐Sort tasks to assess their knowledge of events that commonly occur in social or evaluative scenarios. Participants either sorted events according to how commonly they personally believe the events occur (i.e. “self” condition), or to how commonly they estimate that most people believe they occur (i.e. “other” condition). Participants' individual Q‐Sorts were correlated with mean sorts obtained from a normative sample to obtain an estimate of schema abnormality, with lower correlations representing greater levels of abnormality. Relative to non‐anxious participants, socially anxious participants' sorts were less strongly associated with sorts of the normative sample, particularly in the “self” condition, although secondary analyses suggest that some significant results might be explained, in part, by depression and experience with the scenarios. These results provide empirical support for the theoretical notion that threat‐relevant self‐schemas of anxious individuals are characterized by some degree of abnormality.     

“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation

Kant argued that individuals should be punished “proportional to their internal wickedness,” and recent work has demonstrated that essentialism—the notion that observable characteristics reflect internal, biological, unchanging “essences”—influences moral judgment. However, these efforts have yielded conflicting results: essentialism sometimes increases and sometimes decreases moral condemnation. To resolve these discrepancies, we investigated the mechanisms by which essentialism influences moral judgment, focusing on perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior, the target of essentialism (particular behaviors vs. actors’ character), and the component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). Participants punished people described as having a criminal essence more than those with a non-criminal essence or no essence. Probing potential mechanisms underlying this effect, we found a mediating role for perceptions of control and weak influences of essentialism focus (behavior vs. character) and component of essentialism (biology vs. immutability). These results extend prior work on essentialism and moral cognition, demonstrating a causal link between perceptions of “internal wickedness” and moral judgment. Our findings also resolve discrepancies in past work on the influence of essentialism on moral judgment, highlighting the role that perceptions of actors’ control over their behavior play in moral condemnation.     

Officer attitudes towards adult male prisoners who self-harm: development of an attitudinal measure and investigation of sex differences

Purpose: The aim of the current study was to explore attitudes towards self‐harm in a sample of prison officers, with subsidiary aims of assessing if these attitudes alter as a function of the prisoner's behavior and the sex of the participant. Method: One hundred and sixty‐two officers (100 men and 62 women) completed a general measure of their attitudes towards prisoners and one designed to assess Attitudes towards Prisoners who Self‐Harm (APSH). Participants rated their perceptions of two adult male prisoners depicted in vignettes. The vignettes depicted identical types of self‐harm but varied the behavioral characteristics of the prisoners involved, with one depicted as “well‐behaved” and the other as “disruptive”. Results: Women were more likely than men to report positive attitudes towards self‐harm and in particular were less likely than men to endorse negative myths regarding self‐harm. The prisoner depicted as “disruptive” invoked increased negative attitudes than the “well‐behaved” prisoner. This finding was consistent across sex. Conclusion: The current study indicates that APSH are comprised of a number of components that were influenced by the sex of the participant and the behavioral characteristics of the prisoners depicted. The implications of these findings to practice are discussed. Aggr. Behav. 33:63–72, 2007. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

“Here we're all in the same boat” – a qualitative study of group based rehabilitation for sick‐listed citizens with chronic pain

Musculoskeletal pain impacts upon everyday life. A degree of chronicity may pose an increased risk of sickness absence. One of two rehabilitative interventions, “Tailored Physical Activity” or “Chronic Pain Self‐Management Program”, was offered to sick‐listed citizens who experienced pain. The objectives of this paper were to: (1) Assess what factors are experienced as problematic for sick‐listed citizens in everyday life with chronic pain, and (2) Evaluate the significance of two distinct rehabilitative interventions on the future everyday lives of sick‐listed citizens. Seven semi‐structured interviews with sick‐listed citizens were analyzed using a phenomenological‐hermeneutical approach. Results were discussed by applying the theoretical framework of Antonovsky's salutogenetic model and Yaloms principles for group psychology. The potential for development of citizen's coping is evaluated based on Roessler's notion of progression. The analysis revealed four main themes: (1) Living with pain and unemployment; (2) “Putting my foot down” and “asking for help”; (3) Significance of the group, including instructors, and; (4) Aspects significant to progression. Unemployment is a major life event that promotes stress and can be accompanied by problems related to depressed mood, acceptance of the life situation, feelings of not being useful, feelings of losing control and identity conflicts. Group characteristics that gave a significant basis for progression in the self‐management program are both emotional and instrumental, while the physical training program offers a “here‐and‐now”‐experience and motivation to participate. This study indicates that the self‐management program could potentially improve coping while the physical activity program revealed one example of a means of progression.     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children's beliefs about self‐disclosure of performance failure and success

Self‐disclosure of performance information involves the balancing of instrumental, learning benefits (e.g., obtaining help) against social costs (e.g., diminished reputation). Little is known about young children's beliefs about performance self‐disclosure. The present research investigates preschool‐ and early school‐age children's expectations of self‐disclosure in different contexts. In two experiments, 3‐ to 7‐year‐old children (total N = 252) heard vignettes about characters who succeeded or failed at solving a puzzle. Both experiments showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose positive than negative performances, and Experiment 2 showed that children across all ages reasoned that people are more likely to self‐disclose both positive and negative performances in a supportive than an unsupportive peer environment. Additionally, both experiments revealed changes with age – Younger children were less likely to expect people to withhold their performance information (of both failures and successes) than older children. These findings point to the preschool ages as a crucial beginning to children's developing recognition of people's reluctance to share performance information.     

Personal attitudes toward time: The relationship between temporal focus,space‐time mappings and real life experiences

What influences how people implicitly associate “past” and “future” with “front” and “back?” Whereas previous research has shown that cultural attitudes toward time play a role in modulating space‐time mappings in people's mental models (de la Fuente, Santiago, Román, Dumitrache & Casasanto, 2014), we investigated real life experiences as potential additional influences on these implicit associations. Participants within the same single culture, who are engaged in different intermediate‐term educational experiences (Study 1), long‐term living experiences (Study 2), and short‐term visiting experiences (Study 3), showed their distinct differences in temporal focus, thereby influencing their implicit spatializations of time. Results across samples suggest that personal attitudes toward time related to real life experiences may influence people's space‐time mappings. The findings we report on shed further light on the high flexibility of human conceptualization system. While culture may exert an important influence on temporal focus, a person's conceptualization of time may be attributed to a culmination of factors.     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self‐awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body‐ness” or “mine‐ness” but not a sense of “I‐ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self‐awareness have wide‐ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.     

Future Selves and Self-Control Motivation

Self-control is well established as a predictor of crime and deviance. Little is known, however, about the motivation to exert self-control, or the degree to which individuals perceive self-control to be relevant or necessary. This is because the “self” in self-control theory is under-theorized. We argue that self-control over criminal and deviant behavior is influenced by the desired and feared conceptions people have of themselves in the future. We argue that people's projections of their future selves engender commitments to lines of action, which mobilize the motivation to exercise self-control. By developing a more detailed conception of the “self” in self-control theory, we hope to orient criminology more fully to the importance of individuals' projected future selves and intended lines of action for understanding the relationship between self-control and criminal behavior.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Prejudice in person memory: Self‐threat biases memories of stigmatized group members

The present research investigated whether self‐threat biases memory via retrieval‐induced forgetting. Results show that people under self‐threat whose goal is to restore their self‐worth by making prejudicial judgments that deprecate others are more likely to exhibit an enhanced RIF effect for positive items and a reduced RIF for negative items ascribed to a stereotyped target (i.e., homosexual). Overall, the present findings are consistent with the view that motivation can affect the magnitude of RIF effects in person memory and that, in turn, they can serve as mechanisms for justifying desired conclusions.     

Settling on what we are: The central place of the sense‐of‐self in education,and the implication of the concepts of the teleon and telentropy for the development of the sense‐of‐self

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the centrality of the development of a person's sense‐of‐self in his or her personal growth, and so to justify why educators should deliberately focus the attention of learners on the development of their own senses‐of‐self.

We describe the sense‐of‐self as a person's working hypothesis of what he or she is, as a functioning being. (This is in contrast to the notion of self‐concept, which is composed of the beliefs and evaluations that one has about oneself as a person in a social context.)

To illustrate the centrality of the sense‐of‐self we introduce two associated concepts—the teleon and telentropy. Teleons are “purposeful action patterns,” which may be regarded as the defining characteristic of any living system, including human beings.

Telentropy is similar to entropy (encountered in physics and chemistry), but instead of dealing with the level of disorder in externally described systems, it represents the level of informational confusion existing within an organism regarding its own true nature.

We discuss the implications of the concepts “teleon” and “telentropy” for a person's educability, using examples from daily life and educational institutions.

We provide a number of suggestions for the revising of educational practice to foster the development of the sense‐of‐self in learners. This we demonstrate to have potentially beneficial effects of the general stress levels of society.     

The determinants of parents' beliefs about the intelligence their children: A study from Hong Kong

One hundred and ninety‐three Hong Kong parents (mean age 42.2 years) were given a structured interview / questionnaire concerning their own and their children's self‐estimated overall and multiple intelligence. Previous research suggested that males tend to give higher overall “g” estimates to their children and themselves than do females, as well as higher scores on mathematical and spatial intelligence (Furnham, 2001). Further, studies in the West suggest that parents think their children are significantly brighter than they are and that their sons are brighter than their daughters. Estimates were lower than those found in Western populations but, even so, males rated their own mathematical and spatial intelligence higher than did females. Hong Kong Chinese parents did not think their sons were brighter than their daughters. The seven multiple intelligences factored into three clear factors for self and children, and regressions indicated that it was “academic” intelligence (verbal, mathematical, spatial) that was most “g” loaded. The child's age and the self‐rated overall IQ of both the parents were the best predictors of the child's overall estimated IQ. Less than a third of the parents had taken an IQ test or believed they measured IQ very well. Those who were more likely to be better educated, had taken an IQ test, and believed intelligence was inherited were more likely to award themselves higher overall IQ scores. Results are compared with the British studies in the same area.     

Experience and the Absolute other

In Experience and the Absolute (2004) and other works, Jean‐Yves Lacoste develops a phenomenology of a way of life he calls “liturgy,” in which one refuses one's being‐in‐the‐world in favor of a more basic form of existence he calls “being‐before‐God.” In this essay I argue that if there is indeed such a thing as being‐before‐God, Lacoste has not sufficiently considered the possibility that it is characterized in part by a disturbance of one's being‐in‐the‐world similar to, or perhaps even identical with, the disruptive encounter with the human other that constitutes the self as responsible according to Levinas's unique notion of ethics. Lacoste's dismissal of Levinas, evidently based on a misunderstanding of what Levinas means by the word “ethics,” leads him to overlook the potential relevance of Levinas's ideas to his phenomenological project at a number of significant points in his work.     

Comment on “The Self‐Care of Psychologists and Mental Health Professionals” (Dattilio, 2015)

Professor Frank Dattilio's article “The Self‐care of Psychologists and Mental Health Professionals” provides an overview of stress and related mental health problems among psychologists, and a proposition that psychologists are not vigilant in regard to self‐care. Dattilio offers a range of self‐care strategies and recommendations, and highlights self‐care practices within various psychology frameworks, and concludes with some “healthy tips” for managing stress. In my commentary I underscore Dattilio's message that self‐care is of critical importance in psychology practice, given the responsibility of caring for others inherent in the work psychologists undertake. However, I raise additional points of consideration and suggest an alternative approach to addressing the self‐care needs of the profession. My commentary makes the following points: (a) the need to distinguish between psychology trainees and practising qualified psychologists when addressing stress and self‐care requirements in the profession; (b) the importance of developing a culture of self‐care among psychologists by providing self‐care instruction during training; (c) the need to temper research findings on stress and mental health among psychologists by the methodological weakness of the studies in this area; (d) adhering to the recent call from colleagues to shift from a focus on pathology and punishment to a positive acceptance, mindfulness, and values‐based approach for encouraging self‐care among psychologists; (e) the use of a systematic framework for organising the presentation of self‐care strategies that makes them more accessible; and (f) an appeal to professional bodies to take their responsibility in promoting self‐care in the profession.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.