Teleological epistemology

Philosophical Studies - It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding (to name a few). These are states it’s...     

Decision-theoretic epistemology

In this paper, I examine the possibility of accounting for the rationality of belief-formation by utilising decision-theoretic considerations. I consider the utilities to be used by such an approach, propose to employ verisimilitude as a measure of cognitive utility, and suggest a natural way of generalising any measure of verisimilitude defined on propositions to partial belief-systems, a generalisation which may enable us to incorporate Popper's insightful notion of verisimilitude within a Bayesian framework. I examine a dilemma generated by the decision-theoretic procedure and consider an adequacy condition (immodesty) designed to ameliorate one of its horns. Finally, I argue in a sceptical vein that no adequate verisimilitude measure can be used decision-theoretically.I am grateful to Philip Percival for his very useful comments and criticism on earlier drafts. This paper was written with the support of a Scheuer fellowship, for which I am most thankful.     

Utilitarian epistemology

Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility.     

Turtle epistemology

In “Justification Without Awareness”, Michael Bergmann divides internalist epistemologies into those with a strong awareness requirement and those with a weak awareness requirement; he presents a dilemma, hoisting the “strongs” on one horn, and the “weaks” on the other. Here I reply on behalf of the strong-awareness view, presenting what I take to be a more satisfactory, and more fundamental, reply to Bergmann than I believe has been offered by his other critics, and in particular by Rogers and Matheson in their “Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists,” with which I am in partial agreement.     

Interdisciplinary epistemology

In commemorating Piaget we should not remember his psychology alone. He hoped for a biologically grounded epistemology, which would require interdisciplinary effort. This paper mentions some recent research in biology, embryology, and philosophy that is consonant with Piaget's epistemological aims. The authors do not cite Piaget as a prime intellectual influence, there being no distinctive Piagetian methodology outside psychology. But they each mention him as someone whose work is relevant to theirs and whose interdisciplinary aims will be achieved only if studies like these can be integrated in the future.This paper originally appeared as a chapter in the 1983 book Jean Piaget: An Interdisciplinary Critique, edited by Sohan Modgil, Celia Modgil, and Geoffrey Brown, and published by Routledge & Kegan, Paul, London.     

Market epistemology

Synthese - According to Margaret Gilbert’s collective epistemology, we should take attributions of beliefs to groups seriously, rather than metaphorically or as reducible to individual...     

Anti-luck epistemology

In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.     

Group virtue epistemology

Synthese - According to Sosa (A virtue epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Knowing full well, Princeton University...     

Noncomparabilism in epistemology

Contemporary epistemologists assume a view I call ‘comparabilism.’ They do not, however, argue for this view. I claim that noncomparabilism is a viable alternative. I further argue that noncomparabilism has advantages over comparabilism. An ancestor of this paper was included as a chapter in my dissertation, which was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree at the University of Arizona in November of 2001. I am grateful for discussions of this material with audiences at the University of Arizona and Iowa State University; for comments from an anonymous referee; for comments, discussion, and encouragement from Tom Christiano, Heimir Geirsson, Scott Hendricks, Kristen Hessler, Keith Lehrer, Bill Robinson, Holly Smith, Peter Vranas and especially Alvin Goldman.

---

A platonist epistemology

A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical objects by simply explaininghow they can do this. My argument is based upon the adoption of a particular version of platonism — full-blooded platonism — which asserts that any mathematical object which possiblycould exist actuallydoes exist.I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Arnold Koslow, Hartry Field, Jerrold Katz, Michael Resnik, Elliott Mendelson, Charles Landesman, Stephen Schiffer, Adam Vinueza, David Pitt, Jody Azzouni, David MacCallum, Colin McLarty, Tom Slaughter, Henry Mendell, Penelope Maddy, Michael Liston, Ricardo Gomez, Seth Crook, Stuart Cornwell, and various people at the University of Colorado, Boulder, where I read this paper in February, 1994. Much of the research for this paper was carried out under a City University of New York Dissertation Fellowship; I am grateful for this.     

An Apology for a Religion of the Melancholic

This article is a study of depression and melancholia from the psychoanalytic perspective. Starting with the issue of levels and categories involving the phenomena of depression and melancholia, it elucidates the particular nature of the melancholic loss; the fact that the melancholic’s problem has to do with language; the view of the melancholic subject as a default subject; and the question of desire in melancholia and its trajectory toward recovery, eventually leading to a hopeful imagination concerning the innermost human desire. Three Lacanian psychoanalytic theories (Darian Leader (2009); Colette Soler (2006); Slavoj Zizek (2006)) are used to support my arguments; Suah Bae (2003, 2004) provides fascinating fictional truths that witness to the melancholic’s inner world; and Donald Capps (2000) renders a decisive help in my pastoral psychological reading of all of these writers.     

Purifying impure virtue epistemology

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the problem of eliminating luck—this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability (of the right kind) is incompatible with success from luck.