Hegel's Legacy

This paper deals with some aspects of the relationship between Hegel and Marx and with their influence on the development of Marxism. The story is largely, though not entirely, one of misunderstandings and misappropriations, lost opportunities, unnoticed slippages, wrong turnings and blind alleys. As a result the project which unites Hegel and Marx, and, indeed, is the driving force of their work, has fared less well than it might have done. This, to state it in the most general terms, is the project of a dialectical theory in the service of human freedom. Anyone interested in that project who wishes to gauge its current standing and prospects will need to understand its strange history. The history also contains elements of deep continuity and unity of thought, at least where Hegel and Marx themselves are concerned. Yet even these have been subject to distortion and forgetting by Marx's successors. The discussion will try to do justice to them too. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Hegel's Glutty Negation

Some authors have claimed that Hegel's ‘determinate negation’ should be distinguished from ‘logical’ or ‘formal’ negation, that is, from a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator. In contrast, I argue that dialectical determinate negation involves a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator, and can therefore count as formal negation in every respect. However, as it is clear in contemporary glutty semantics of negation, one may distinguish between different accounts of the relationship between negation, contradiction and content. I suggest that, differently from classical negation, and as glutty negation, dialectical negation has partial content.     

Hegel's real habits

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a “second nature.” This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life, if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call “real habits.” First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive—Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale—concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.     

黑格尔对道德的批判

黑格尔的伦理思想以他关于“道德法”和“伦理法”的区分以及对康德道德理论的批判而著名.本文的作者Mlen W.伍德从黑格尔早期关于道德问题的思考切入,以《自然法论文》、《精神现象学》以及《法哲学原理》为主要文本,较为系统地阐发了黑格尔对道德的批判.作者认为,黑格尔虽然批判了道德观点的空洞性、抽象性,但是赞同道德是伦理生活的一个方面和现代文化的组成部分.对于黑格尔而言,道德不是形而上学的假设,它要在伦理生活中获得实现.黑格尔与康德的伦理思想并不完全对立,他们共享着同样的伦理价值、理性自治,只是黑格尔试图在康德伦理思想的基础上使道德走出主观性的应该、把伦理价值与社会和历史现实联系起来.     

Hegel's critique of Kant

In this paper we present a reconstruction of Hegel's critique of Kant. We try to show the congruence of that critique in both theoretical and practical philosophy. We argue that this congruence is to be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's hylemorphism in his theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel is much more sympathetic to Kant's response to the distinction between matter and form in his theoretical philosophy and he credits Kant with ‘discovering’ here that thinking is an activity that always takes place within a greater whole. He, however, argues that the consequences of this are much more significant than Kant suspects and that, most importantly, the model of cognition in which thought (form) confronts something non-thought (matter) is unsustainable. This leads to Hegel's appropriation of Kantian reflective judgements, arguing that the greater whole in which thinking takes place is a socially shared set of meanings, something resembling what Kant calls a sensus communis. From here, it is not far to Hegel's Geist, which eventually gains self-consciousness in Sittlichkeit, a whole of social practices of mutual recognition. In practical philosophy, Hegel argues for the importance of situating oneself within such a whole in order to attain the self-knowledge required for autonomous, or ethically required, action. For this to happen, he claims, it is necessary to recognise the status of Kantian Moralität as a form of Sittlichkeit or social practice. This would justify our practices without an appeal to a ‘fact of reason’ and also allow a wider range of actions that could count as autonomous.     

Hegel's notion of Aufheben

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ‘rise above the mere “either‐or”; of understanding’ have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either‐or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either‐or depends, for example, on the categories of Being and Not‐Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either‐or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ‘falls apart’. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either‐or, we must, at the same time, ‘rise above’ that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ‘immanent transformation’ in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent.     

Phenomenological Naturalism

Naturalists seek to ground what exists in a set of fundamental metaphysical principles that they call ‘nature’. But metaphysical principles can’t function as fundamental explanatory grounds, since their ability to explain anything depends on the intelligibility granted by transcendental structures. What makes metaphysical principles intelligible, what unifies them, and allows them to characterize the being of worldly objects are the transcendental structures through which worldly objects are manifest. This means that the search for fundamental explanatory grounds must go deeper than the postulation of brute metaphysical facts. But this search cannot end with transcendental structures either, since the mode of being of transcendental subjects also calls out for explanation. Conceiving of transcendental subjects through the concept of being-in-the-world ties the mode of being of subjects to the world they inhabit. What grounds the existence of worldly objects, and what grounds our existence as being-in-the-world is nature: a principle that is neither an object, nor a subject – a principle that makes possible our encounters with intelligible worldly things.     

论黑格尔的现代性时间意识

黑格尔的现代性、时间意识与精神辩证法是密切相连的。具体包含以下几点(1)现代性只有在线性的、不可逆的历史性时间意识中,才是可能的;(2)人的精神具有历史性,是在历史中自我中介、自我扬弃、自我提升的过程;(3)现代性属于精神的“自知”或“反思”阶段,表现出过渡、危机和意识分裂的特征。它具有三个原则,即理性主义、内在的主体性和自我意识的反思性。自由精神的实现是现代性的终极目的,在这个意义上,精神与现实的“和解”是精神辩证法的必然。在后黑格尔时代,黑格尔思想是否定和批判的源泉。