Beliefs and inferences: a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 2. On the prospect of seeing a spider

96 subjects were asked to imagine that they were about to enter a room in which there may have been one or more spiders. They were also asked to imagine that (a) they either held a rational or an irrational belief about spiders, (b) they were about to enter the room either alone or with someone, and (c) that the room was either dark or light. Having absorbed their assigned role, the subjects were then asked to make inferences about various elements of their situation. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences. It was also found that the lighting conditions in the room and whether the subject was alone or with someone affected the negativity of the inferences made. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way interactions between the independent variables which indicated that entering a light room or being with someone else tended to moderate the negativity of inferences made by those holding a rational belief rather than the opposite, amplifying the negativity of inferences made by those holding an irrational belief. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B), and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).     

Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).Windy Dryden PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Julia Ferguson is Research Assistant in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Tony Clark was an Undergraduate Student in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. He graduated in 1987.     

Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis

Kelley and Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis states that competitors hold homogeneous views of others by assuming that most others are competitive, whereas cooperators or pro-social people hold more heterogeneous views by assuming that others are either cooperative or competitive. To evaluate the triangle hypothesis, this study examines differences between pro-socials, individualists, and competitors not only in their expectations about others' choice behaviour, but also in the confidence with which such expectations are held. It was found that pro-social subjects expected more cooperation than individualists and competitors. More importantly, as predicted on the basis of the triangle hypothesis, pro-socials were less confident about their expectations than competitors, with individualists holding intermediate levels of confidence.     

Psychometric properties of the Survey of Personal Beliefs: a rational-emotive measure of irrational thinking

A test consistency and confirmatory factor analyses were performed on the Survey of Personal Beliefs, a new measure of irrational thinking based on rational-emotive personality theory. The survey, which was logically derived, includes a general rationality factor and subscales measuring five hypothesized core categories of irrational beliefs. Subjects included a nonclinical sample of 130 men and 150 women, with a mean age of 46. Results indicated that the Survey of Personal Beliefs had satisfactory total and scale reliability. The confirmatory analyses supported a higher order factor model including 5 first-order factors ( awfulizing, self-directed shoulds, other-directed shoulds, low frustration tolerance, and self-worth) and 1 second-order or general factor.     

The evolution of cognition—a hypothesis

Behavior may be controlled by reactive systems. In a reactive system the motor output is exclusively driven by actual sensory input. An alternative solution to control behavior is given by “cognitive” systems capable of planning ahead. To this end the system has to be equipped with some kind of internal world model. A sensible basis of an internal world model might be a model of the system's own body. I show that a reactive system with the ability to control a body of complex geometry requires only a slight reorganization to form a cognitive system. This implies that the assumption that the evolution of cognitive properties requires the introduction of new, additional modules, namely internal world models, is not justified. Rather, these modules may already have existed before the system obtained cognitive properties. Furthermore, I discuss whether the occurrence of such world models may lead to systems having internal perspective.     

On symbolic temporal information: Beliefs about the experience of duration

Judgments on the subjective duration of simple and complex imagined situations are studied. Four facets, concerning the evaluation of the situation (pleasant/unpleasant) and the characteristics of its events (many/few, variable/monotonous, difficult/easy), are taken into account. These facets proved significant for duration judgments in previous studies in which subjects were exposed to situations varying with respect to one of them. In this paper, we study whether these time-perception facets have comparable effects on the symbolic temporal basis of duration judgments. that is, whether they allow one to account for differences in the beliefs about duration experience in imagined situations. Two approaches were chosen: (1) Three groups of subjects compared the durations of all possible pairs of situations characterized by facet elments x and y. The confusion probabilities could be scaled in one dimension for all groups. The facet elements defined intervals that were hierarchically nested. (2)The facets allowed us to distinguish 24 structuples. For each of them, a concrete situation was described in writing. Seventy-six subjects rated the subjective durations of the situations. The structuples led to a partial order that corresponded well to the duration ratings. Moreover, three of the facets showed significant main effects, and the fourth interacted significantly with two others. Finally, the facets were useful in explaining the similarity structure of the duration ratings.     

The one-target advantage: a test of the movement integration hypothesis.

Two experiments were conducted to compare the temporal structure of single aiming movements to two-component movements involving either a reversal in direction or an extension. For reversal movements, there was no cost associated with the movement time for the first segment of the movement. However, regardless of movement direction, initiation instructions, handedness or effector, two-component extension movements were always associated with a longer movement time for the first movement segment. This disadvantage for extension movements, but not reversal movements, is consistent with the notion that there is interference between the execution of the first movement and implementation of the second movement. By contrast, because the muscular force used to break the first movement is also used to propel the second movement, reversal movements are organised as an integrated unit.     

Processing a hierarchy of stimulus pattern of 3 dimensions: a test of Navon's precedence hypothesis

The purpose of the experiments was to test generalizations derived from Navon's (1977) perceptual precedence hypothesis (global features are extracted earlier than local ones in feature analysis). Experiment 1 compared the identification of a level in hierarchically organized stimulus patterns (small letters forming larger letters on higher levels) between two- and three-level structures. Results showed an effect on reaction time (RT) of the imbedment of a level within a structure of sub- and superordinated levels: The same level will be identified more quickly if it is the local level of a two-level letter than if it is the medium level of a three-level letter. This effect can be explained by the loss of the most easily noticed privileged structural position. This result and the observed longest RT for identifying the middle level in a three-level letter contradict expectations derived from Navon's (1977) hypothesis of perceptual precedence. Experiment 2 tested a variant of the precedence hypothesis by Kinchla and Wolfe (1979). On the basis of this hypothesis it can be expected that RT for identification of the middle level should converge toward those for the other levels if the middle level is presented at about 2 degrees. This hypothesis could not be confirmed. Results are discussed in the context of a proposed attentional explanation. This explanation suggests that a structural level is noticed more easily if it segregates perceptually from the other levels. In this respect, the global level usually but not necessarily has an advantage.     

Unemployment and civil commitment: a test of the intolerance hypothesis

We theorize that the reported association between economic indicators and the incidence of civil commitment for mental illness may result, at least in part, from reduced tolerance in the community for impaired behavior among minorities. Earlier work suggests that economically induced intolerance will be focused primarily on minority males. Based on this literature, we hypothesize that the median level of functioning among African-American males subjected to civil commitment will vary positively with earlier changes in the unemployment rate. The test applies Box-Jenkins methods to 156 months (August 1985-July 1998) of data from California. Consistent with theory, results support the hypothesis.     

Memory for information about nuclear power: A test of the selective recall hypothesis

To test the selective recall hypothesis, nearly 60 subjects read a report of approximately 500 words presenting both pro- and anti-attitudes to nuclear technology. Two hours prior to this they completed the Nuclear Attitudes Questionnaire. Subjects were given free and cued recall tests approximately five minutes after reading the report. The results partially supported the selective recall hypothesis, paticularly with respect to the free recall of anti-nuclear information. Results are discussed in terms of the recent work on selective memory effects.     

Response to Hanks and McDermott: Temporal Evolution of Beliefs and Beliefs about Temporal Evolution

This paper critically evaluates the celebrated paper of Hanks and McDermott on temporal projection, non-monotonic reasoning, and the frame problem. First I argue against their intuitions, and a fortiori, against their proposed solution. Next, I suggest how the solution they desire could be obtained, were they willing to represent the problem a bit differently.     

Beliefs about Memory as a Mediator of Relations between Metacognitive Beliefs and Actual Memory Performance

The goal of the present study was to investigate relationships between personal beliefs about memory, metacognitive beliefs, and actual memory performance. One hundred thirty-seven participants' (aged 20 to 60 years) metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ-30), memory beliefs were measured using the Personal Beliefs about Memory Instrument (PBMI), and an episodic memory task was used to measure actual memory performance, memory predictions, and postdictions. Younger adults had lower scores on the positive beliefs subfactor of the MCQ-30, higher scores on retrospective change and control subfactors of the PBMI, and outperformed middle-aged adults on recall and recall postdiction. Path analysis showed that individuals' beliefs about memory mediate the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and actual memory performance. Specifically, low lack of confidence (or less worry) in one's own memory and attentional capabilities was related to higher memory performance and positive personal beliefs regarding specific memory ability mediated relationship.     

Lightness constancy: a direct test of the illumination-estimation hypothesis

Many models of color constancy assume that the visual system estimates the scene illuminant and uses this estimate to determine an object's color appearance. A version of this illumination-estimation hypothesis, in which the illuminant estimate is associated with the explicitly perceived illuminant, was tested. Observers made appearance matches between two experimental chambers. Observers adjusted the illumination in one chamber to match that in the other and then adjusted a test patch in one chamber to match the surface lightness of a patch in the other. The illumination-estimation hypothesis, as formulated here, predicted that after both matches the luminances of the light reflected from the test patches would be identical. The data contradict this prediction. A second experiment showed that manipulating the immediate surround of a test patch can affect perceived lightness without affecting perceived illumination. This finding also falsifies the illumination-estimation hypothesis.