Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

Bhāvaviveka's Arguments for Emptiness

In defending the teaching of emptiness, Bhāvaviveka offers some very strange arguments, which initially may appear so weak that we may be hard pressed to understand how anyone could endorse them. To make sense of these passages, it is helpful to compare them to an argument found in the writings of the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara. These arguments have a certain formal feature which makes them count as valid from the point of view of the rules and norms of some forms of Indian logic. Once we understand the logical structure of the arguments offered by Uddyotakara and Bhāvaviveka, we will not only have a better grasp on their philosophical views, but we will also be in a better position to understand how and why those views were rejected by later figures in the Indian tradition, such as Dharmakīrti and ?āntarak?ita.     

Logical Argument Structures in Decision-making

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's practical reasoning theory has attracted a great deal of interest since its publication in 1969. Their most important assertion, however, that argument is the logical basis for practical decision-making, has been under-utilized, primarily because it was not sufficiently operationalized for research purposes. This essay presents an operationalization of practical reasoning for use in analyzing argument logics that emerge through group interaction. Particular elements of discourse and argument are identified as responding to principles put forward by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and are viewed as fitting together in a kind of logical argument structure that is well suited to the study of practical arguments in decision-making. Both the content elements and the logical argument structure are illustrated using examples from two studies examining decision logics in public participation and jury decision-making. Advantages of this approach and proposed recognition of a new `filtered' type of argument structure are discussed.     

Fight the power: the limits of empiricism and the costs of positivistic rigor

A summary of the influence of positivistic philosophy and empiricism on the field of psychology is followed by a critique of the empirical method. The dialectic process is advocated as an alternative method of inquiry. The main advantage of the dialectic method is that it is open to any logical argument, including empirical hypotheses, but unlike empiricism, it does not automatically reject arguments that are not based on observable data. Evolutionary and moral psychology are discussed as examples of important fields of study that could benefit from types of arguments that frequently do not conform to the empirical standards of systematic observation and falsifiability of hypotheses. A dialectic method is shown to be a suitable perspective for those fields of research, because it allows for logical arguments that are not empirical and because it fosters a functionalist perspective, which is indispensable for both evolutionary and moral theories. It is suggested that all psychologists may gain from adopting a dialectic approach, rather than restricting themselves to empirical arguments alone.     

Mathematics,Morality, and Self‐Effacement

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman‐style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman‐style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden‐shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why moral beliefs are vulnerable to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman‐style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman‐style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self‐effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality.     

Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy and E Contrario

Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather different from traditional approaches appealing to standards of propositional logic. Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e contrario seem to disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation appears to be borne by often implicit general principles and an appeal to the system of the law as a whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best seen as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal argument.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

How Morality Can Be Absent from Moral Arguments

What is a moral argument? A straightforward answer is that a moral argument is an argument dealing with moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in certain circumstances. I call this the thin sense of ‘moral argument’. Arguments that we find in normative and applied ethics are almost invariably moral in this sense. However, they often fail to be moral in other respects. In this article, I discuss four ways in which morality can be absent from moral arguments in the thin sense. If these arguments suffer from an absence of morality in at least one of these ways, they are not moral arguments in what I will call the thick sense of ‘moral argument’. Because only moral arguments in the thick sense could possibly qualify as proper responses to moral problems, the absence of morality in thin arguments means that these arguments will fail to give us a reason to do whatever they claim that we ought to do, even if we see no independent reason to question the truth of the premises or the logical validity of the argument.     

Development of logical reasoning: children's ability to verbally explain the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument

Previous research by D. Moshman and B. Franks (1986) supported the hypothesis that children do not explicitly understand the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument. This research examined the performance of 8-11-year-olds (N = 220) on Moshman and Franks's experimental tasks when the children were cued to apply particular comprehension strategies. Findings from 2 experiments indicated that a significant number of children are capable of explicitly recognizing the necessity of logical forms and the indeterminacy of nonlogical forms and that this competence must be distinguished from their tendency to fail to attend to structural relationships between propositions and to monitor the intrusion of extraneous personal knowledge in assessing the validity of an argument. The findings suggest that all of these competencies are important components of the ability to distinguish logical and nonlogical arguments.     

Temporal Creation and Cosmological Arguments in Early-Modern Calvinism

This study examines the varieties of cosmological arguments deployed in the natural theologies of early-modern Calvinism. Some of the first Reformed forays into theistic proofs make use of Thomist arguments which allow for the logical possibility of creation from eternity. In the seventeenth century, many Reformed theologians prefer to use arguments against the possibility of an eternal world – arguments which had been defended by medieval theologians such as Bonaventure. But these arguments in turn faced criticism in the seventeenth century, and many of the Reformed supplemented them or replaced them with others. The argument from the mutability of the world to its temporal beginning became increasingly popular among Reformed thinkers. Historical arguments from the recent rise of arts and sciences or biological species supplemented the philosophical arguments for the world's beginning. Their theological commitment to the impossibility of eternal creation may explain why the Reformed did not typically use the Clarke and Leibniz argument from contingency.     

The logic of logical revision formalizing dummett's argument

Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement of the argument, I am able to delineate four possible anti-Dummettian responses. Following recent work by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, I conclude that progress in the anti-realist's dialectic requires greater clarity about the key modal notions used in Dummett's proof.     

Self‐supporting Arguments*

Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating.     

The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument

In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them.I support this thesis by first considering an argument against moral dilemmas, the argument from deontic logic, and showing that its persuasive force depends on one's having already accepted its conclusion. I then make a different, and general, case that any argument in the moral dilemmas debate concerning the defeasibility of conflicting obligations can be marginalized by making not-unreasonable adjustments in the conditions for wrongdoing.These two strands of argument are related by the notion of inescapable wrongdoing. It is our standing intuitions about inescapable wrongdoing which make the relevant deontic logical principles plausible or implausible to us. And whether wrongdoing can be inescapable is central to deciding what the conditions for wrongdoing are. My conclusion is that the arguments in the moral dilemmas debate merely implement whatever standing intuition we have concerning inescapable wrongdoing, and that apart from any such intuition the arguments are unpersuasive.     

Free Will and Scientiphicalism

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.     

Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention

In “Truth by Convention” W.V. Quine gave an influential argument against logical conventionalism. Even today his argument is often taken to decisively refute logical conventionalism. Here I break Quine’s arguments into two—(i) the super-task argument and (ii) the regress argument—and argue that while these arguments together refute implausible explicit versions of conventionalism, they cannot be successfully mounted against a more plausible implicit version of conventionalism. Unlike some of his modern followers, Quine himself recognized this, but argued that implicit conventionalism was explanatorily idle. Against this I show that pace Quine’s claim that implicit conventionalism has no content beyond the claim that logic is firmly accepted, implicit rules of inference can be used to distinguish the firmly accepted from the conventional. As part of my case, I argue that positing syntactic rules of inference as part of our linguistic competence follows from the same methodology that leads contemporary linguists and cognitive scientists to posit rules of phonology, morphology, and grammar. The upshot of my discussion is a diagnosis of the fallacy in Quine’s master critique of logical conventionalism and a re-opening of possibilities for an attractive conventionalist theory of logic.     

Argument Structure and Disciplinary Perspective

Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a given conclusion. Structure is internal to this unit. From a dialectical point of view, where the focus concerns how well a critical discussion comes to a reasoned conclusion of some disputed question, the argumentation need not constitute a single unit of argument. The unit of dialectical analysis will be the entire argumentation made up of these several arguments. The multiple/co-ordinatively compound distinction is dialectical, while the linked/convergent distinction is logical. Keeping these two pairs of distinctions separate allows us to see certain attempts to characterize convergent versus linked arguments as rather characterizing multiple versus co-ordinatively compound arguments, in particular attempts of Thomas, Nolt, and Yanal, and to resolve straightforwardly conflicts, tensions, or anomalies in their accounts. Walton's preferred Suspension/Insufficient Proof test to identify linked argument structure correctly identifies co-ordinatively compound structure. His objection to using the concept of relevance to explicate the distinction between linked and convergent structure within co-ordinatively compound argumentation can be met through explicating relevance in terms of inference licenses. His counterexample to the Suspension/No Support test for identifying linked structure which this approach supports can itself be straightforwardly dealt with when the test is explicated through inference licenses.     

Exhibiting interpretational and representational validity

A natural language argument may be valid in at least two nonequivalent senses: it may be interpretationally or representationally valid (Etchemendy in The concept of logical consequence. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990). Interpretational and representational validity can both be formally exhibited by classical first-order logic. However, as these two notions of informal validity differ extensionally and first-order logic fixes one determinate extension for the notion of formal validity (or consequence), some arguments must be formalized by unrelated nonequivalent formalizations in order to formally account for their interpretational or representational validity, respectively. As a consequence, arguments must be formalized subject to different criteria of adequate formalization depending on which variant of informal validity is to be revealed. This paper develops different criteria that formalizations of an argument have to satisfy in order to exhibit the latter’s interpretational or representational validity.     

Why Induction Is No Cure For Baldness

The paper aims at establishing that the premises of both the inductive and the multi‐premised versions of the sorites argument are not apparently acceptable and that, therefore, sorites‐type arguments do not constitute logical or conceptual paradoxes. Rather, it is suggested that such arguments are most properly and fruitfully described as skeptical challenges. A secondary goal of the paper is to focus attention to the unduly neglected inductive version of the argument.     

The value of emotionally expressive visual art in medical education

This paper approaches the topic of visual art in medical education from a philosophical perspective, drawing on arguments from epistemology, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and contemporary ethical theory. Several medical ethicists have noted that the traditional clinical paradigm may increase the epistemic and emotional distance between patient and physician in part by focusing on the physical body and medical technology. Some of these same writers recommend a new approach to patients based on empathy and increased attention to suffering. After reviewing these arguments, supporting examples, and recommendations, I explain how visual art that expresses or symbolizes the emotional response to illness could be used to introduce an additional paradigm into medical education. This would be a paradigm based on empathetic attention to patients' emotional experiences in illness. My own argument is that this additional way of perceiving and relating to patients may reduce the distance between patient and physician and may allow physicians to better meet the ideal of treating the patient as a person.     

Against Disjunctive Properties: Four Armstrongian Arguments

Philosophia - This paper defends the case against (sparse) disjunctive properties by means of four Armstrongian arguments. The first of these is a logical atomist argument from truthmaking, which...