Attentional distraction and time perception in children

The purpose of the present study was to test the effect of attentional distraction on temporal bisection performance in 5‐ and 8‐year‐old children. During a first learning phase, children were trained to discriminate on a temporal bisection task a short standard duration (2 sec) from a long one (8 sec), presented as visual stimuli. Later, in a second testing phase, intermediate durations (3, 4, 5, 6, 7 s), including the standard durations, were presented. Children's task still was to report if it was a short standard duration or a long one. In addition, during the non‐standard duration, a distracter either did or did not appear. Results showed increasing proportions of “it is the long standard duration” (response “long”) with increasing stimulus durations in both distracter and non‐distracter conditions. However, psychophysical functions were flatter in the 5‐year‐olds than in the 8‐year‐olds, revealing their lower sensibility to time. Nevertheless, the 5‐year‐olds' proportion of long responses was higher under the distracter than in the non‐distracter condition. Consequently, the point of subjective equality (PSE), corresponding to the stimulus duration to which the subject produced 50% of responses of “long” was lower under the distracter condition as compared to the non‐distracter condition. Conversely, for the 8‐year‐olds, the PSE was significantly higher in the distracter than in the non‐distracter condition. Five‐year old children overestimated the time in the presence of an attentional distracter, whereas 8‐year olds tended to underestimate it. The leftward shift and the rightward shift of the PSE in the 5‐ and the 8‐year‐olds, respectively, were accounted for by limited‐capacity attention in the five‐year olds.     

Children's (and Adults') Production Adjustments to Generic and Particular Listener Needs

Adults design utterances to match listeners' informational needs by making both “generic” adjustments (e.g., mentioning atypical more often than typical information) and “particular” adjustments tailored to their specific interlocutor (e.g., including things that their addressee cannot see). For children, however, relevant evidence is mixed. Three experiments investigated how generic and particular factors affect children's production. In Experiment 1, 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children and adults described typical and atypical instrument events to a silent listener who could either see or not see the events. In later extensions, participants described the same events to either a silent (Experiment 2) or an interactive (Experiment 3) addressee with a specific goal. Both adults and 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds performed generic adjustments but, unlike adults, children made listener‐particular adjustments inconsistently. These and prior findings can be explained by assuming that particular adjustments can be costlier for children to implement compared to generic adjustments.     

Children’s early mental number line: Logarithmic or decomposed linear?

Recently, the nature of children’s mental number line has received much investigation. In the number line task, children are required to mark a presented number on a physical number line with fixed endpoints. Typically, it was observed that the estimations of younger/inexperienced children were accounted for best by a logarithmic function, whereas those of older/more experienced children were reflected best by a linear function. This led to the conclusion that children’s mental number line transforms from logarithmic to linear with age and experience. In this study, we outline an alternative interpretation of children’s performance in a number line task. We suggest that two separate linear representations for one- and two-digit numbers may exist in young children and that initially the integration of these two representations into the place value structure of the Arabic number system is not fully mastered. When testing this assumption in a sample of more than 120 first graders, we observed that the two-linear model consistently provided better fit indexes. We conclude that instead of assuming a transition from logarithmic to linear coding, performance differences could also be accounted for by an improvement in integrating tens and units into the Arabic place value system.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Opening the cuebox: The information children and young adults generate and rely on when making inferences from memory

We used a cue‐generation and a cue‐selection paradigm to investigate the cues children (9‐ to 12‐year‐olds) and young adults (17‐year‐olds) generate and select for a range of inferences from memory. We found that children generated more cues than young adults, who, when asked why they did not generate some particular cues, responded that they did not consider them relevant for the task at hand. On average, the cues generated by children were more perceptual but as informative as the cues generated by young adults. When asked to select the most informative of two cues, both children and young adults tended to choose a hidden (i.e., not perceptual) cue. Our results suggest a developmental change in the cuebox (i.e., the set of cues used to make inferences from memory): New cues are added to the cuebox as more cues are learned, and some old, perceptual cues, although informative, are replaced with hidden cues, which, by both children and young adults, are generally assumed to be more informative than perceptual cues.     

Children's stereotypes of overweight children

The aim of the present study was to assess the content, favourability and generality of perceptions held about overweight children. The research also addressed whether anti‐fat biases change with age and whether they result from a strong association between overweight and bad behaviour, a weak association between overweight and good behaviour or both. Seventy‐three 5‐ to 10‐year‐olds were read aloud a number of short stories containing characters demonstrating high and low athletic, academic, artistic and social abilities. They were then shown eight different pairs of cards; each pair comprised a drawing of an average‐weight and an overweight version of the same child. Participants were then asked to point to the pictures that looked most like the good and bad characters in the stories. The results demonstrated that 5‐ to 8‐year‐olds were significantly less likely to choose an overweight picture to represent the characters with high athletic, academic, artistic and social ability. In contrast, 9‐ to 10‐year‐olds were significantly less likely to choose an overweight figure to represent the characters with high athletic ability, did not differentiate on the basis of weight for the academic and artistic stories, and were significantly more likely to choose an overweight picture as having high social ability.     

The development of numerosity estimation: Evidence for a linear number representation early in life

Several studies investigating the development of approximate number representations used the number-to-position task and reported evidence for a shift from a logarithmic to a linear representation of numerical magnitude with increasing age. However, this interpretation as well as the number-to-position method itself has been questioned recently. The current study tested 5- and 8-year-old children on a newly established numerosity production task to examine developmental changes in number representations and to test the idea of a representational shift. Modelling of the children's numerical estimations revealed that responses of the 8-year-old children approximate a simple positive linear relation between estimated and actual numbers. Interestingly, however, the estimations of the 5-year-old children were best described by a bilinear model reflecting a relatively accurate linear representation of small numbers and no apparent magnitude knowledge for large numbers. Taken together, our findings provide no support for a shift of mental representations from a logarithmic to a linear metric but rather suggest that the range of number words which are appropriately conceptualised and represented by linear analogue magnitude codes expands during development.     

The role of pattern recognition in children's exact enumeration of small numbers

Enumeration can be accomplished by subitizing, counting, estimation, and combinations of these processes. We investigated whether the dissociation between subitizing and counting can be observed in 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds and studied whether the maximum number of elements that can be subitized changes with age. To detect a dissociation between subitizing and counting, it is tested whether task manipulations have different effects in the subitizing than in the counting range. Task manipulations concerned duration of presentation of elements (limited, unlimited) and configuration of elements (random, line, dice). In Study 1, forty‐nine 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds were tested with a computerized enumeration task. Study 2 concerned data from 4‐, 5‐, and 6‐year‐olds, collected with Math Garden, a computer‐adaptive application to practice math. Both task manipulations affected performance in the counting, but not the subitizing range, supporting the conclusion that children use two distinct enumeration processes in the two ranges. In all age groups, the maximum number of elements that could be subitized was three. The strong effect of configuration of elements suggests that subitizing might be based on a general ability of pattern recognition.     

Understanding the real value of fractions and decimals

Understanding fractions and decimals is difficult because whole numbers are the most frequently and earliest experienced type of number, and learners must avoid conceptualizing fractions and decimals in terms of their whole-number components (the “whole-number bias”). We explored the understanding of fractions, decimals, two-digit integers, and money in adults and 10-year-olds using two number line tasks: marking the line to indicate the target number, and estimating the numerical value of a mark on the line. Results were very similar for decimals, integers, and money in both tasks for both groups, demonstrating that the linear representation previously shown for integers is also evident for decimals already by the age of 10. Fractions seem to be “task dependent” so that when asked to place a fractional value on a line, both adults and children displayed a linear representation, while this pattern did not occur in the reverse task.     

Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations

In two studies we investigated 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children’s ability to reverse ambiguous figures and the relation between this ability and the ability to understand multiple representations. Children never reversed before they were informed of the two alternative interpretations of the figures. Even when they were informed of the alternatives and understood that both were possible, 3‐year‐olds and most 4‐year‐olds did not reverse. In contrast, a majority of 5‐year‐olds did reverse. In general, children only reversed if they also passed a standard false belief task. However, there was a closer correlation between reversals and a ‘droodle’ task that involved an understanding of the ambiguity of perceptual representations. These results suggest that the immediate experience of reversal may depend on a more abstract understanding of ambiguous representations.     

123s and ABCs: developmental shifts in logarithmic‐to‐linear responding reflect fluency with sequence values

When placing numbers along a number line with endpoints 0 and 1000, children generally space numbers logarithmically until around the age of 7, when they shift to a predominantly linear pattern of responding. This developmental shift of responding on the number placement task has been argued to be indicative of a shift in the format of the underlying representation of number (Siegler & Opfer, 2003 ). In the current study, we provide evidence from both child and adult participants to suggest that performance on the number placement task may not reflect the structure of the mental number line, but instead is a function of the fluency (i.e. ease) with which the individual can work with the values in the sequence. In Experiment 1, adult participants respond logarithmically when placing numbers on a line with less familiar anchors (1639 to 2897), despite linear responding on control tasks with standard anchors involving a similar range (0 to 1287) and a similar numerical magnitude (2000 to 3000). In Experiment 2, we show a similar developmental shift in childhood from logarithmic to linear responding for a non‐numerical sequence with no inherent magnitude (the alphabet). In conclusion, we argue that the developmental trend towards linear behavior on the number line task is a product of successful strategy use and mental fluency with the values of the sequence, resulting from familiarity with endpoints and increased knowledge about general ordering principles of the sequence.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zg5Q2LIFk3M     

A Repeated Forced‐choice Line‐up Procedure Provides Suspect Bias Information with No Cost to Accuracy for Older Children and Adults

In two experiments and one follow‐up analysis, we examined the impact of using a repeated forced‐choice (RFC) line‐up procedure with child and adult eyewitnesses. The RFC procedure divides the identification task into a series of exhaustive binary comparisons that produces not only traditional line‐up information (identification decision and confidence) but also information about witness' selection behavior. Experiment 1 revealed that younger children (6‐ to 8‐year‐olds) struggled with the RFC procedure, while older children (9‐ to 11‐year‐olds) performed as well with the RFC procedure as with a simultaneous procedure (with wildcard). Experiment 2 replicated this comparable performance with adults. Witnesses' suspect selection behavior during the RFC was predictive of identification accuracy for older children and adults. A model examined the additional information provided by the RFC in experiments 1 and 2 and provided evidence that witnesses' patterns of responding can be used to estimate suspect selection bias (a proxy for suspect recognition strength) associated with individual line‐up decisions. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sticking to the Evidence? A Behavioral and Computational Case Study of Micro‐Theory Change in the Domain of Magnetism

Constructing an intuitive theory from data confronts learners with a “chicken‐and‐egg” problem: The laws can only be expressed in terms of the theory's core concepts, but these concepts are only meaningful in terms of the role they play in the theory's laws; how can a learner discover appropriate concepts and laws simultaneously, knowing neither to begin with? We explore how children can solve this chicken‐and‐egg problem in the domain of magnetism, drawing on perspectives from computational modeling and behavioral experiments. We present 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds with two different simplified magnet‐learning tasks. Children appropriately constrain their beliefs to two hypotheses following ambiguous but informative evidence. Following a critical intervention, they learn the correct theory. In the second study, children infer the correct number of categories given no information about the possible causal laws. Children's hypotheses in these tasks are explained as rational inferences within a Bayesian computational framework.     

Explaining Variability: Numerical Representations in 4- to 8-Year-Old Children

The present study aims to examine relations between number representations and various sources of individual differences within early stages of development of number representations. The mental number line has been found to develop from a logarithmic to a more linear representation. Sources under investigation are counting skills and executive functions and are set out against mental number lines from 0 to 10 and 0 to 100 in a sample of 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 80). Findings indicate that counting skills, inhibition, and updating are the most important predictors of the shape of the mental number line over and above age-related developmental differences, with number lines from 0 to 10 being linear to a large extent and number lines from 0 to 100 developing from a random pattern toward logarithmic representations. The shape of the mental number line was found to predict scores on the number comparison task only on the smaller-scale comparison task.     

Identifying unreliable informants: do children excuse past inaccuracy?

In three experiments (N = 123; 148; 28), children observed a video in which two speakers offered alternative labels for unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds endorsed the label given by a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects accurately, rather than that given by a speaker with a history of inaccurate labeling, even when the inaccurate speaker erred only while blindfolded. In Experiments 2 and 3, 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds showed no preference for the label given by a previously inaccurate but blindfolded speaker, over that given by a second inaccurate speaker with no obvious excuse for erring. Children based their endorsements on speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy irrespective of the speakers’ information access at the time, raising doubts that children made mentalistic interpretations of speakers’ inaccuracy.     

Early humour production

The current studies explored early humour as a complex socio‐cognitive phenomenon by examining 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds’ humour production with their parents. We examined whether children produced novel humour, whether they cued their humour, and the types of humour produced. Forty‐seven parents were interviewed, and videotaped joking with their children. Other parents (N= 113) completed a survey. Parents reported children copy jokes during the first year of life, and produce novel jokes from 2 years. In play sessions, 3‐year‐olds produced mostly novel humorous acts; 2‐year‐olds produced novel and copied humorous acts equally frequently. Parents reported children smile, laugh, and look for a reaction when joking. In play sessions, 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds produced these behaviours more when producing humorous versus non‐humorous acts. In both parent reports and play sessions, they produced novel object‐based (e.g., underwear on head) and conceptual humour (e.g., ‘pig says moo’) and used wrong labels humorously (e.g., calling a cat a dog). Thus, parent report and child behaviour both confirm that young children produce novel humorous acts, and share their humour by smiling, laughing, and looking for a reaction.     

The role of associative strength and conceptual relations in matching tasks in 4‐ and 6‐year‐old children

T he associative strength between target and associates, a factor assumed to be critical but generally not controlled, and the type of conceptual relation (thematic and taxonomic) were manipulated independently in a matching to sample task to determine their respective effects on the matching behaviour of 4‐ and 6‐year‐old children. Perceptual similarity between target and associates was controlled and maintained at a low level. A preliminary task was designed to assess the associative strength between targets and several associated pictures. These judgments served to construct for each child the sets of stimuli used in the matching task. Exp. 1 opposed a strong and a weak associate with the target in different configurations: the sets included a target and two thematic associates, two taxonomic associates, or one associate of each type. Children were asked to choose the picture that “went well” with the target. Data revealed the role of associative strength on matching choices. This factor interacted sometimes with the greater availability of thematic relations in 4‐ and 6‐year‐old children. In Exp. 2, two other configurations were tested. Thematic and taxonomic associates were both either strongly or weakly related with the target. Results replicated those of Exp. 1 and extended them. They showed that younger children were biased towards thematic relations only when these relations corresponded to strong associations. Thus, increasing experience with objects appears to reinforce both associative strength and thematic orientation. Finally, in Exp. 3, instructions orienting toward taxonomic choices modified responses in 6‐year‐olds only. Altogether, these results show the influence of specific instances and suggest that preschoolers' matching decisions are partly stimulus driven.     

Object individuation and event mapping: developmental changes in infants’ use of featural information

The present research examined the development of 4.5‐ to 7.5‐month‐old infants’ ability to map different‐features occlusion events using a simplified event‐mapping task. In this task, infants saw a different‐features (i.e. egg‐column) event followed by a display containing either one object or two objects. Experiments 1 and 2 assessed infants’ ability to judge whether the egg‐column event was consistent with a subsequent one‐column display. Experiments 3 and 4 examined infants’ ability to judge whether the objects seen in the egg‐column event and those seen in a subsequent display were consistent in their featural composition. At 7.5 and 5.5 months, but not at 4.5 months, the infants successfully mapped the egg‐column event onto the one‐column display. However, the 7.5‐ and 5.5‐month‐olds differed in whether they mapped the featural properties of those objects. Whereas the 7.5‐month‐olds responded as if they expected to see two specific objects, an egg and a column, in the final display the 5.5‐month‐olds responded as if they simply expected to see ‘two objects’. Additional results revealed, however, that when spatiotemporal information specified the presence of two objects, 5.5‐month‐olds succeeded at tagging the objects as being featurally distinct, although they still failed to attach more specific information about what those differences were. Reasons for why the younger infants had difficulty integrating featural information into their object representations were discussed.     

Recency Tendency: Responses to Forced‐Choice Questions

The present study was conducted to investigate whether forced‐choice questions would lead to any particular tendency in young children's responses. Two experiments were conducted in which 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds children were shown a short animation and then were asked a set of two‐option, forced‐choice questions. Consistent findings were obtained: (i) Forced‐choice questions influenced children's responses; (ii) Children displayed a consistent ‘recency tendency.’ That is, they tended to choose the second option in forced‐choice questions; (iii) This tendency grew weaker as children aged. The findings suggest that forced‐choice questions carry some suggestibility load and can bias children's responses. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.