Temporal information and children's and adults' causal inferences

Three experiments examined whether children and adults would use temporal information as a cue to the causal structure of a three-variable system, and also whether their judgements about the effects of interventions on the system would be affected by the temporal properties of the event sequence. Participants were shown a system in which two events B and C occurred either simultaneously (synchronous condition) or in a temporal sequence (sequential condition) following an initial event A. The causal judgements of adults and 6–7-year-olds differed between the conditions, but this was not the case for 4-year-olds' judgements. However, unlike those of adults, 6–7-year-olds' intervention judgements were not affected by condition, and causal and intervention judgements were not reliably consistent in this age group. The findings support the claim that temporal information provides an important cue to causal structure, at least in older children. However, they raise important issues about the relationship between causal and intervention judgements.     

Knowledge-based information acquisition: norms and the functions of consensus information

Mill's (1872/1973) method of difference prescribes that the lay scientist should use consensus information as a control condition for the person and distinctiveness information as a control condition for the stimulus when analyzing their causal effects on the occurrence of the target event. However, in studies of information acquisition, subjects have shown a consistent preference for distinctiveness information when answering causal questions about the person, and for consensus information when answering causal questions about the stimulus. To explain this discrepancy, we distinguish between the evaluative, contrastive, and corroborative functions of consensus and distinctiveness information. In addition, we suggest that subjects seek consensus information only if it is relevant to the question posed to them, and if they cannot supply it from their own presupposed knowledge of behavioral norms. We report four information acquisition experiments that provide support for our analysis.     

When does prior knowledge disproportionately benefit older adults’ memory?

Material consistent with knowledge/experience is generally more memorable than material inconsistent with knowledge/experience – an effect that can be more extreme in older adults. Four experiments investigated knowledge effects on memory with young and older adults. Memory for familiar and unfamiliar proverbs (Experiment 1) and for common and uncommon scenes (Experiment 2) showed similar knowledge effects across age groups. Memory for person-consistent and person-neutral actions (Experiment 3) showed a greater benefit of prior knowledge in older adults. For cued recall of related and unrelated word pairs (Experiment 4), older adults benefited more from prior knowledge only when it provided uniquely useful additional information beyond the episodic association itself. The current data and literature suggest that prior knowledge has the age-dissociable mnemonic properties of (1) improving memory for the episodes themselves (age invariant), and (2) providing conceptual information about the tasks/stimuli extrinsically to the actual episodic memory (particularly aiding older adults).     

Diversity-Based Reasoning in Children

One of the hallmarks of inductive reasoning by adults is the diversity effect, namely that people draw stronger inferences from a diverse set of evidence than from a more homogenous set of evidence. However, past developmental work has not found consistent diversity effects with children age 9 and younger. We report robust sensitivity to diversity in children as young as 5, using everyday stimuli such as pictures of objects with people. Experiment 1 showed the basic diversity effect in 5- to 9-year-olds. Experiment 2 showed that, like adults, children restrict their use of diversity information when making inferences about remote categories. Experiment 3 used other stimulus sets to overcome an alternate explanation in terms of sample size rather than diversity effects. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that children more readily draw on diversity when reasoning about objects and their relations with people than when reasoning about objects' internal, hidden properties, thus partially explaining the negative findings of previous work. Relations to cross-cultural work and models of induction are discussed.     

儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习

儿童的选择性学习是目前认知发展领域的热点问题。儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习(即选择性因果学习)对于回答儿童如何获取知识这个经典问题具有重要意义。儿童的选择性因果学习表现在对他人解释的辨别、评估与采纳上。他们会主动向可靠的信息提供者寻求解释, 并在接收回答后表现出选择性跟进反应。对于他人的回答, 年幼儿童不仅能根据言语线索辨别出解释性陈述, 还能依据解释的结构特征选择更好的陈述加以采纳, 年长儿童甚至可以从不同模式的解释中灵活地学习更适宜的因果知识。未来研究应深入关注解释的其它特征在儿童选择性因果学习中的作用, 进一步探讨选择性因果学习的认知机制。     

Mechanisms of theory formation in young children

Research suggests that by the age of five, children have extensive causal knowledge, in the form of intuitive theories. The crucial question for developmental cognitive science is how young children are able to learn causal structure from evidence. Recently, researchers in computer science and statistics have developed representations (causal Bayes nets) and learning algorithms to infer causal structure from evidence. Here we explore evidence suggesting that infants and children have the prerequisites for making causal inferences consistent with causal Bayes net learning algorithms. Specifically, we look at infants and children's ability to learn from evidence in the form of conditional probabilities, interventions and combinations of the two.     

Developmental Features of Rapid Aiming Arm Movements Across the Lifespan

Using a lifespan approach, the authors investigated developmental features of the control of ballistic aiming arm movements by manipulating movement complexity, response uncertainty, and the use of precues. Four different age groups of participants (6- and 9-year-old boys and girls and 24- and 73-year- old men and women, 20 participants in each age group) performed 7 types of rapid aiming arm movements on the surface of a digitizer. Their movement characteristics such as movement velocity, normalized jerk, relative timing, movement linearity, and intersegment intervals were profiled. Analyses of variance with repeated measures were conducted on age and task effects in varying movement complexity (Study 1), response uncertainty (Study 2), and precue use (Study 3) conditions. Young children and senior adults had slower, more variant, less smooth, and less linear arm movements than older children and young adults. Increasing the number of movement segments resulted in slower and more variant responses. Movement accuracy demands or response uncertainty interacted with age so that the 6- and 74-year-old participants had poorer performances but responded similarly to the varying treatments. Even though older children and young adults had better performances than young children and senior adults, their arm movement performance declined when response uncertainty increased. The analyses suggested that young children's and senior adults' performances are poorer because less of their movement is under central control, and they therefore use on-line adjustments. In addition, older children and young adults use a valid precue more effectively to prepare for subsequent movements than do young children and senior adults, suggesting that older children and young adults are more capable of organizing motor responses than arc young children and senior adults.     

Developmental features of rapid aiming arm movements across the lifespan

Using a lifespan approach, the authors investigated developmental features of the control of ballistic aiming arm movements by manipulating movement complexity, response uncertainty, and the use of precues. Four different age groups of participants (6- and 9-year-old boys and girls and 24- and 73-year-old men and women, 20 participants in each age group) performed 7 types of rapid aiming arm movements on the surface of a digitizer. Their movement characteristics such as movement velocity, normalized jerk, relative timing, movement linearity, and intersegment intervals were profiled. Analyses of variance with repeated measures were conducted on age and task effects in varying movement complexity (Study 1), response uncertainty (Study 2), and precue use (Study 3) conditions. Young children and senior adults had slower, more variant, less smooth, and less linear arm movements than older children and young adults. Increasing the number of movement segments resulted in slower and more variant responses. Movement accuracy demands or response uncertainty interacted with age so that the 6- and 74-year-old participants had poorer performances but responded similarly to the varying treatments. Even though older children and young adults had better performances than young children and senior adults, their arm movement performance declined when response uncertainty increased. The analyses suggested that young children's and senior adults' performances are poorer because less of their movement is under central control, and they therefore use on-line adjustments. In addition, older children and young adults use a valid precue more effectively to prepare for subsequent movements than do young children and senior adults, suggesting that older children and young adults are more capable of organizing motor responses than are young children and senior adults.     

Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences

Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.     

The effects of storage and processing complexity on comprehension repair in children and adults

In four experiments, the ability of young children (6 to 10 years of age) and college adults to repair a comprehension problem in situations varying repair difficulty was examined. The subjects were read short stories describing a consistent or inconsistent adult response to a child's action, and repair information that resolved or failed to resolve the inconsistency. The subjects were asked questions after each story to determine if they had detected and resolved the inconsistency. The repair information was manipulated as a means of varying the storage and prosessing complexity of integrating problem and repair information. The information was separated from or adjacent to the inconsistent response, before or after the response, and the relevancy of the repair information was obvious or only inferentially available. The results showed that even first graders can repair a comprehension problem in situations of minimal information processing complexity, and that increments in complexity affect the repair performance of younger more than older subjects.     

Making sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg: the case of the child's moral competence

This study attempts to make conceptual and empirical sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg concerning the child's moral competence. Forty-eight children from two age-levels (24 6-year-olds, and 24 8-year-olds; Experiment 1), and 20 young adults aged between 17 and 21 years (Experiment 2) were confronted with hypothetical situations in which two apparently immoral acts (stealing and lying) were right if a principled or reversible exchange of perspectives were adopted. Contrary to what would be expected from Turiel's claim about the child's sophisticated moral competence, children, but not young adults, judged the acts at hand more in accord with a pattern of pseudo-moral necessity or fuzzy traces of morality than with a pattern of a developing idea of principled morality or “necessary” moral knowledge. The paper also argues that one is in a better position to make sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg when one becomes aware of (a) Wittgenstein's idea of grammatical investigations, (b) Piaget's distinction between false, true, and necessary (cognitive) knowledge, and (c) Kohlberg's distinction between pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional moral reasoning as a distinction that, to an extent, corresponds in the moral domain to Piaget's epistemic types of knowledge in the cognitive domain.     

Young Children Prefer and Remember Satisfying Explanations

Research with preschool children has shown that explanations are important to them in that they actively seek explanations in their conversations with adults. But what sorts of explanations do they prefer, and what, if anything, do young children learn from the explanations they receive? Following a preliminary study with adults (N = 67) to establish materials for use with children, we addressed this question using a seminaturalistic methodology. Four- and 5-year-olds (N = 69) were dissatisfied when receiving nonexplanations to their explanatory questions, but they were satisfied when receiving explanations, and their satisfaction varied appropriately across several levels of explanatory information. Moreover, using recall as a measure of learning, whereas children typically failed to recall nonexplanations, their recall of explanatory information was consistently high and also varied appropriately across differing levels of information provided. These results confirm that children not only actively seek informative explanations in their everyday conversational interactions with adults, but they selectively retain the answers they receive.     

Language, space, and the development of cognitive flexibility in humans: the case of two spatial memory tasks

Prior experiments have shown that young children, like adult rats, rely mainly on information about the macroscopic shape of the environment to reorient themselves, whereas human adults rely more flexibly on combinations of spatial and non-spatial landmark information. Adult rats have also been shown to exhibit a striking limitation in another spatial memory task, movable object search, again a limitation not shown by human adults. The present experiments explored the developmental change in humans leading to more flexible, human adult-like performance on these two tasks. Experiment 1 identified the age range of 5-7 years as the time the developmental change for reorientation occurs. Experiment 2 employed a multiple regression approach to determine that among several candidate measures, only a specific language production measure, the production of phrases specifying exactly the information needed to solve the task like adults, correlated with the reorientation performance of children in this age range. Experiment 3 revealed that similar language production abilities were associated with more flexible moving object search task performance. These results, in combination with findings with human adults, suggest that language production skills play a causal role in allowing older humans to construct novel representations rapidly, which can then be used to transcend the limits of phylogenetically older cognitive processes.     

Young children combine sensory cues with learned information in a statistically efficient manner: But task complexity matters

Human adults are adept at mitigating the influence of sensory uncertainty on task performance by integrating sensory cues with learned prior information, in a Bayes‐optimal fashion. Previous research has shown that young children and infants are sensitive to environmental regularities, and that the ability to learn and use such regularities is involved in the development of several cognitive abilities. However, it has also been reported that children younger than 8 do not combine simultaneously available sensory cues in a Bayes‐optimal fashion. Thus, it remains unclear whether, and by what age, children can combine sensory cues with learned regularities in an adult manner. Here, we examine the performance of 6‐ to 7‐year‐old children when tasked with localizing a ‘hidden’ target by combining uncertain sensory information with prior information learned over repeated exposure to the task. We demonstrate that 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds learn task‐relevant statistics at a rate on par with adults, and like adults, are capable of integrating learned regularities with sensory information in a statistically efficient manner. We also show that variables such as task complexity can influence young children's behavior to a greater extent than that of adults, leading their behavior to look sub‐optimal. Our findings have important implications for how we should interpret failures in young children's ability to carry out sophisticated computations. These ‘failures’ need not be attributed to deficits in the fundamental computational capacity available to children early in development, but rather to ancillary immaturities in general cognitive abilities that mask the operation of these computations in specific situations.     

Seeds of wisdom: adolescents' knowledge and judgment about difficult life problems

The present study examined adolescents' wisdom-related knowledge and judgment with a heterogeneous sample of 146 adolescents (ages 14-20 years) and a comparison sample of 58 young adults (ages 21-37 years). Participants responded to difficult and ill-defined life dilemmas; expert raters evaluated these responses along 5 wisdom criteria. Our findings confirmed that in contrast to adulthood, adolescence is a major period for normative age-graded development in knowledge about difficult life problems. Adolescents performed at lower levels than young adults but also demonstrated substantial age increments in performance. As expected, adolescents' performance varied as a function of criterion and gender. These results hold implications for research on adolescent development and for the development of wisdom-related knowledge and judgment.     

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning.     

Age differences in dimension weighting on visual feature search

Two experiments examined age‐difference effects in visual feature search for two types of prior information (knowledge about target‐defining features and intertrial transition of target‐defining features). In Experiment 1, younger participants had shorter reaction times searching for a target in blocks where the target was defined by a single feature dimension compared to where the target was defined across dimensions (within‐dimension facilitation; WDF). However, WDF was not found in older participants. Intertrial facilitation (ITF), a dimension‐based carryover effect in consecutive trials, was observed both for young and older participants. Experiment 2 provided participants with probabilistic knowledge about target‐defining features. Again, young participants showed a facilitatory effect related to this knowledge, but this effect was reduced in older participants. However, intertrial facilitation was observed for young and older adults to the same degree. These results are not consistent with general age‐related decrement in the maintenance of dimension weighting, but support a dual mechanism of dimension weighting (Kumada, 2001). The results suggest that knowledge‐based control of dimension weighting declined with ageing, but involuntary shift of dimension weighting by intertrial transition of target‐defining features is maintained in ageing.     

The illusion of replacement in research into the development of thinking biases: the case of the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge cued by the tasks.     

Evidence of System Justification in Young Children

The near ubiquity of ingroup preference is consistent with the view that it is an automatic consequence of social categorization, possibly a basic foundation of intergroup relations. However, research with adults has demonstrated that automatic ingroup preference is notably absent among less dominant, less advantaged groups, an outcome predicted by System Justification Theory ( Jost & Banaji, 1994 ). How basic is this tendency to justify existing social arrangements? Data from young children are crucial in addressing whether such an opposing orientation is itself a fundamental feature of intergroup social cognition. The developmental data summarized here suggest that knowledge about the relative status of one’s ingroup is absorbed and internalized sufficiently early in life, revealing system‐justifying tendencies by age 5, the earliest age such questions have been examined to date. Across several studies summarized here young children from non‐dominant groups failed to show an implicit ingroup preference, similar to their adult counterparts. We conclude that from an early age intergroup preferences are constrained by knowledge, implicit or explicit, about the relative status differences among groups and may suggest an orientation toward supporting existing social and political structures. The possibility that system‐justifying tendencies may exist in even younger children remains open for future tests.