A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions

Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [2004; forthcoming] use experimental methods to raise a spectre of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian participants about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke's Gödel example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in participants' intuitions about semantic reference for that case. We argue that this interpretation is mistaken. We detail a type of ambiguity found in Machery et al.'s probe but not yet noted in the response literature. We argue that this epistemic ambiguity could have affected their results. We do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies to test the impact of this ambiguity on participants' responses. We found that this accounts for much of the variation in Machery et al.'s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of our new data, their argument is no longer convincing.     

Against Arguments from Reference*

It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.     

Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference

My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call ‘polylithic’. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist’s epistemic claims against the historical record of science.     

Are Gettier cases disturbing?

We examine a prominent naturalistic line on the method of cases (MoC), exemplified by Timothy Williamson and Edouard Machery: MoC is given a fallibilist and non-exceptionalist treatment, accommodating moderate modal skepticism. But Gettier cases are in dispute: Williamson takes them to induce substantive philosophical knowledge; Machery claims that the ambitious use of MoC should be abandoned entirely. We defend an intermediate position. We offer an internal critique of Macherian pessimism about Gettier cases. Most crucially, we argue that Gettier cases needn’t exhibit ‘disturbing characteristics’ that Machery posits to explain why philosophical cases induce dubious judgments. It follows, we show, that Machery’s central argument for the effective abandonment of MoC is undermined. Nevertheless, we engineer a restricted variant of the argument—in harmony with Williamsonian ideology–that survives our critique, potentially limiting philosophy’s scope for establishing especially ambitious modal theses, despite traditional MoC’s utility being partially preserved.

     

Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.

Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions

Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt’s Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority. This spoils his ‘modest explanation’. Devitt’s opponent, the Voice of Competence View, is back in business.     

The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions

Armchair philosophers have questioned the significance of recent work in experimental philosophy by pointing out that experiments have been conducted on laypeople and undergraduate students. To challenge a practice that relies on expert intuitions, so the armchair objection goes, one needs to demonstrate that expert intuitions rather than those of ordinary people are sensitive to contingent facts such as cultural, linguistic, socio‐economic, or educational background. This article does exactly that. Based on two empirical studies on populations of 573 and 203 trained philosophers, respectively, it demonstrates that expert intuitions vary dramatically according to at least one contingent factor, namely, the linguistic background of the expert: philosophers make different intuitive judgments if their native language is English rather than Dutch, German, or Swedish. These findings cast doubt on the common armchair assumption that philosophical theories based on armchair intuitions are valid beyond the linguistic background against which they were developed.     

THE ANATOMY OF IMPACT:

Abstract— This study presents an analysis of psychologists' implicit theories of what makes an article influential in psychology. The study opens with a review of some alternative approaches to assessing the influence of articles Next, the article discusses alternative conceptions of influence Then a study that assesses the factors underlying impact is described Six factors are identified Quality of Presentation, Theoretical Significance, Practical Significance, Substantive Interest, Methodological Interest, and Value for Future Research These findings are then discussed in terms of the theories presented earlier.     

The Context of Essence

I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts.     

Putting Everything in Context

In response to Casasanto, Brookshire, and Ivry (2015), we address four points: First, we engaged in conceptual replications of Brookshire, Casasanto, and Ivry (2010), not direct replications. Second, we did not question the validity of Brookshire et al.'s (2010) results, nor the similar findings of other researchers, but instead explained divergent findings within an integrated theoretical framework. Third, challenges to the construct of automaticity, including ours, were widespread, long before Brookshire et al.'s (2010) article. Fourth, the planned comparisons that we reported tested our theoretical claims and offered strong evidence for them.     

What “Intuitions” are Linguistic Evidence?

In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority.     

Analogical reasoning ability in autistic and typically developing children

Recent studies (e.g. Dawson et al., 2007 ) have reported that autistic people perform in the normal range on the Raven Progressive Matrices test, a formal reasoning test that requires integration of relations as well as the ability to infer rules and form high‐level abstractions. Here we compared autistic and typically developing children, matched on age, IQ, and verbal and non‐verbal working memory, using both the Raven test and pictorial tests of analogical reasoning. Whereas the Raven test requires only formal analogical reasoning, the other analogy tests require use of real‐world knowledge, as well as inhibition of salient distractors. We found that autistic children performed as well as controls on all these tests of reasoning with relations. Our findings indicate that the basic ability to reason systematically with relations, for both abstract and thematic materials, is intact in autism.     

Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth

In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.

Grammatical Processing of Spoken Language in Child and Adult Language Learners

This article presents a selective overview of studies that have investigated auditory language processing in children and late second-language (L2) learners using online methods such as event-related potentials (ERPs), eye-movement monitoring, or the cross-modal priming paradigm. Two grammatical phenomena are examined in detail, children’s and adults’ processing of German plural inflections (Lück et al. Brain Res 1077:144–152, 2006; Hahne et al. J Cognitive Neurosci 18:121–134, 2006; Clahsen et al. J Child Language 34:601–622, 2007) and language learners’ processing of filler-gap dependencies in English (Felser C, Roberts L Second Language Res 23:9–36, 2007; Roberts et al. J Psycholinguist Res 36:175–188, 2007). The results from these studies reveal clear differences between native and nonnative processing in both domains of grammar, suggesting that nonnative listeners rely less on grammatical parsing routines during processing than either child or adult native listeners. We also argue that factors such as slower processing speed or cognitive resource limitations only provide a partial account of our findings.     

Gender Differences in the Measurement of Creative Problem‐Solving

Despite significant scholarly attention, the literature on the existence and direction of gender differences in creativity has produced inconsistent findings. In the present paper, we argue that this lack of consensus may be attributable, at least in part, to gender‐specific inconsistencies in the measurement of creative problem‐solving. To explore this possibility, we empirically tested assumptions of multiple‐group measurement invariance using samples borrowed from four recent studies that assessed creative problem‐solving (J.D. B arrett et al., 2013; K.S. H ester et al., 2012; D.R. P eterson et al., 2013; I.C. R obledo et al., 2012). Across the four samples, apparent gender differences emerged on all three components of S.P. B esemer & K. O 'Q uin's (1999) three‐facet model of creativity (i.e., quality, originality, and elegance) such that, on average, females appeared to exhibit higher baseline levels of creativity. However, in light of violations of measurement invariance assumptions across genders found in these samples, comparisons such as these may not ultimately be appropriate. Although the underlying factor structure and factor loadings on a unitary creativity factor were consistent across gender (i.e., weak factorial invariance), measurement in‐equivalence assumptions were violated at the subfacet level (i.e., strong factorial invariance). Implications of these findings for understanding gender differences in creative problem‐solving are discussed.     

Robustness of the rule-learning effect in 7-month-old infants: A close,multicenter replication of Marcus et al. (1999)

We conducted a close replication of the seminal work by Marcus and colleagues from 1999, which showed that after a brief auditory exposure phase, 7-month-old infants were able to learn and generalize a rule to novel syllables not previously present in the exposure phase. This work became the foundation for the theoretical framework by which we assume that infants are able to learn abstract representations and generalize linguistic rules. While some extensions on the original work have shown evidence of rule learning, the outcomes are mixed, and an exact replication of Marcus et al.'s study has thus far not been reported. A recent meta-analysis by Rabagliati and colleagues brings to light that the rule-learning effect depends on stimulus type (e.g., meaningfulness, speech vs. nonspeech) and is not as robust as often assumed. In light of the theoretical importance of the issue at stake, it is appropriate and necessary to assess the replicability and robustness of Marcus et al.'s findings. Here we have undertaken a replication across four labs with a large sample of 7-month-old infants (N = 96), using the same exposure patterns (ABA and ABB), methodology (Headturn Preference Paradigm), and original stimuli. As in the original study, we tested the hypothesis that infants are able to learn abstract “algebraic” rules and apply them to novel input. Our results did not replicate the original findings: infants showed no difference in looking time between test patterns consistent or inconsistent with the familiarization pattern they were exposed to.