Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification

I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience is sufficient to justify beliefs about the external world. I propose that justification for propositions describing our perceptual experiences partially constitutes any justification we may possess for beliefs concerning the external world. In this way, our justification for beliefs about the physical world may only be inferential since it is grounded in any justification we have for at least one other proposition. This theory occupies an intermediate position between the two aforementioned foundationalist accounts, which allows it to sidestep problems that confront each of them.     

Supporting development of the epistemology of inquiry

A sixth-grade class investigated the ecologies of two local retention ponds over the course of one school year. In this context, instruction assisted development as students designed models of the pond in one-gallon jars and attempted to stabilize these jars in sustainable ecosystems that could be used to study questions about the ponds. Unintended outcomes (e.g., algal blooms, bacteria colonies) became opportunities to learn how aquatic systems function. Efforts to model aquatic functioning were complemented by weekly research meetings that served as a forum for conjecture and test of relations between evidence and questions. At the end of the year students responded to individual interviews about their understandings of ecology and research design, along with their beliefs about the epistemology of inquiry. Results suggest that participation in carefully crafted, extended investigations transformed students’ views of the goals and purposes of inquiry and of the nature of science.     

Is the spell really broken? Bio-psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief

Recent advances in the evolutionary and cognitive sciences of religion have raised questions about whether the assumptions and findings of these fields as applied to religion conflict with belief in gods. Specifically, three scientific approaches to religion (Neurotheology, Group Selection, and Cognitive Science of Religion) are sketched, and five arguments against theistic belief arising from these approaches are discussed and evaluated. None of the five arguments prove formidable challenges for belief in gods.     

Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.

Naturalizing and Interpretive Turns in Epistemology

In this paper I want to suggest that causal and interpretive approaches to epistemology are in tension with one another. Drawing on the work of hermeneutic writers I suggest that epistemological justification is an interpretive process. The possibility of rational justification requires attention to our locatedness within the domain of reasons, into which we have been culturally initiated. The recognition that there is no transcendent processes of rational justification has to be addressed from within this framework and cannot be resolved in a naturalizing way. The turn to hermeneutics in the context of epistemology allows us to reassign a central role to experience within epistemological justification. Here the very features of experience which render problematic its role in empiricist accounts form the basis of its position in hermeneutic ones. This presents us with an immanent conception of rationality, in place of the transcendent conception which so many writers have problematized.     

Modest deontologism in epistemology

Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some of the deontological sentences.     

Personhood and future belief: two arguments for something like Reflection

This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.

Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI

In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation.     

Williamson on justification

Timothy Williamson has a marvelously precise account of epistemic justification in terms of knowledge and probability. I argue that the account runs aground on certain cases involving the probability values 0 and 1.     

Mating competitors increase religious beliefs

It has been presumed that religiosity has an influence on mating behavior, but here we experimentally investigate the possibility that mating behavior might also influence religiosity. In Experiment 1, people reported higher religiosity after looking at mating pools consisting of attractive people of their own sex compared to attractive opposite sex targets. Experiment 2 replicated the effect with an added control group, and suggested that both men and women become more religious when seeing same-sex competitors. We discuss several possible explanations for these effects. Most broadly, the findings contribute to an emerging literature on how cultural phenomena such as religiosity respond to ecological cues in potentially functional ways.     

A consistency-based framework for merging knowledge bases

We present a framework for expressing various merging operators for belief sets. This framework generalises our earlier work on consistency-based belief revision and contraction. Two primary merging operators are identified: in the first approach, belief sources are consistently combined so that the result of merging knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n is a maximal consistent (if possible) set of formulas comprising the joint knowledge of the knowledge bases. This approach then accords with one's intuitions as to what a “merge” operator should do. The second approach is more akin to a generalised belief revision operator. Knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n are “projected” onto another (in the simplest case the knowledge base where only tautologies are known). Properties of these operators are investigated, primarily by comparing their properties with postulates that have been identified previously in the literature. Notably, the approach is independent of syntax, in that merging knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n is independent of how each K_i is expressed. As well, we investigate the role of entailment-based and consistency-based integrity constraints, the interrelationships between these approaches and belief revision, and the expression of further merging operators.     

A Taste for Justice: Unpacking Identity Politics in a Nascent Democracy

This article examines attention to justice cues in the novel context of the nascent democracy of Tanzania. Using secondary national survey data, we illustrate Tanzanian citizens' attention to justice cues. We then test two competing hypotheses about the impact of religious identity on attention to justice cues. The first hypothesized model, based on System Justification Theory, predicts that subordinate group members (Muslims) will stay more loyal than dominant group members (Christians) to their government due to a decreased attention to justice cues. The second hypothesized model, based on the relational model of procedural justice, predicts that subordinate group members (Muslims) will dissent more than dominant group members (Christians) from their government due to an increased attention to justice cues. Multiple regression and mediational analyses indicate support for the procedural justice framework, with trust in the dominant political party mediating the relationship between process satisfaction and party identification. Implications for political and psychological theorizing about democratic processes will be discussed.     

《文化演化与宗教》

社会学家贝拉(Robert Bellah)在其颇具影响力"宗教演化"的文章中,根据广泛的人类经验提出了一个检验文化和宗教互动的模式。贝拉在其雄心勃勃的计划中还是保持相当的谦虚,他警觉到其所用的例证源于历史文献,而模式本身则不是历史。模式是"一种思考的工具":一个用来指导思考的理论性框架,而非基于田野调查的经验性描述。在我们下面的讨论中,我们将使用贝拉的"思考工具"的基本模式,将包括来自贝拉本人和其他宗教学者研究中的一些修正和补充的内容。     

第三种生命形式的诞生与科学哲学

美国科学家卡尔·戊斯发现了生命的第三种形式－古生菌域,并将生物分成三大分支,即真核生物域、细菌域和古生菌域。这一理论被称为戊斯革命。但是,他的理论历经艰辛才得到同行的认可,从科学哲学研究的方法论和认识论讨论这一重大发现带给我们有关思维方式和科学评价体系的思考。     

Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

Measurement issues associated with conditional reasoning tests: An examination of faking

Conditional reasoning (CR) is a new item format that measures personality by indirectly assessing reliance upon the cognitive biases associated with specific traits (James et al., 2005). Previous research suggests that, relative to self-report measures, responses on CR-based measures are more difficult to distort (LeBreton, Barksdale, Robin, & James, 2007). The issue of response distortion in the context of CR-based measures was evaluated in two studies. Study 1 (within-subjects) and Study 2 (between-subjects) both investigated whether responses on a CR-based test of addiction could be faked when indirect assessment was upheld. Results of both studies indicated that, unlike a self-report measure of a similar construct, the CR-based measure was unaffected by response distortion.     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.