The Scientific Impotence Excuse:Discounting Belief‐Threatening Scientific Abstracts

The scientific impotence discounting hypothesis predicts that people resist belief‐disconfirming scientific evidence by concluding that the topic of study is not amenable to scientific investigation. In 2 studies, participants read a series of brief abstracts that either confirmed or disconfirmed their existing beliefs about a stereotype associated with homosexuality. Relative to those reading belief‐confirming evidence, participants reading belief‐disconfirming evidence indicated more belief that the topic could not be studied scientifically and more belief that a series of other unrelated topics could not be studied scientifically. Thus, being presented with belief‐disconfirming scientific evidence may lead to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of scientific methods.     

Scientific reasoning in a real‐world context: The effect of prior belief and outcome on children's hypothesis‐testing strategies

The impact of event outcome and prior belief on scientific reasoning was investigated within a real‐world oral health context. Participants (N= 144; ranging from 3 to 11 years) were given hypothesis‐testing tasks and asked to explain their answers. Participants were presented with information that was either consistent or inconsistent with their own beliefs. Each task consisted of scenarios in which the outcome was either good or bad oral health. When the information was belief consistent and the outcome was good, or when the information was belief inconsistent and the outcome was bad, children were more likely to choose scientifically appropriate tests of the stated hypothesis (i.e. manipulate only one variable). Evidence‐based explanations were associated with scientifically appropriate choices in the good‐outcome, belief‐inconsistent scenario and the belief‐consistent, bad‐outcome scenario. Participants' performance on these tasks is explained by considering the plausibility of causal variables. A control of variables strategy was used to test hypotheses in cases in which the evidence was consistent with participants' beliefs and knowledge of causal mechanisms. In contrast, when the evidence was inconsistent with participants' beliefs, children chose to manipulate behaviours likely to lead to a positive health outcome. These findings demonstrate that context and prior knowledge interact to play an important role in children's scientific reasoning.     

Toward the Scientific Study of Polytheism: Beyond Forced‐Choice Measures of Religious Belief

This article argues that zero‐sum, forced‐choice approaches to measuring religious belief do not work well outside of the Abrahamic world. Positive‐sum approaches to measuring religious beliefs (in the plural) are better suited to the study of polytheistic societies. Using results from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 Taiwan, we demonstrate that in a polytheistic society like Taiwan, religious belief is not zero sum. We also contrast our results with those of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), and seek to show that our positive‐sum approach to measuring religious beliefs can help us better understand the disparate causes and consequences of different religious beliefs in polytheistic societies. The challenge of Christocentrism in quantitative studies of religion is also discussed.     

Higher‐Order Defeat is Object‐Independent

Higher‐order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one's beliefs as a result of receiving evidence that those beliefs resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Several philosophers have identified features of higher‐order defeat that distinguish it from familiar types of defeat. If higher‐order defeat has these features, they are data an account of rational belief must capture. In this article, I identify a new distinguishing feature of higher‐order defeat, and I argue that on its own, and in conjunction with the other distinguishing features, it favors an account of higher‐order defeat grounded in non‐evidential, ‘state‐given reasons’ for belief.     

Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement

The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of open‐mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view.     

Sensitivity and Higher‐Order Knowledge

Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure. (But that is an objection which sensitivity theorists are already prepared to meet, one way or another.)     

Scientific value

Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi‐dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.     

Children's Understanding of Second‐Order False Belief: Comparisons of Content and Method of Assessment

This research examined children's performance on second‐order false belief tasks as a function of the content area for the belief and the method of assessing understanding. A total of 70 kindergarten and first‐grade children responded to four second‐order stories. On two stories, the task was to judge a belief about a belief, and on two, the task was to judge a belief about an emotion. On one trial within each group, the task was to predict the target's belief, and on one trial, the task was to explain the belief. Older children outperformed younger children on the prediction measure. Differences as a function of content area and method of assessment were limited; when they did occur, performance was generally better with belief than with emotion as the target, and better with prediction than with explanation as the response criterion. Finally, there was no relation between number of siblings and performance.     

NON‐CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non‐conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non‐conceptual, non‐doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non‐conceptual perception. Non‐conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti‐luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one to act for a reason, and it provides justification. Furthermore, it makes a straightforward and elegant explanation of (doxastic) perceptual knowledge possible: doxastic perceptual knowledge builds on non‐conceptual perception as non‐conceptual knowledge. Three objections that might naturally arise will be discussed and answered. Thus, the prospects of an epistemology without belief seem to be much better than the orthodoxy wants to have it. We can extend knowledge into the non‐conceptual realm.     

Knowledge‐first functionalism

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.     

Trade‐off ranking method for multi‐criteria decision analysis

Multi‐criteria decision analysis presumes trade‐off between different criteria. As a result, the optimal solution is not unique and can be represented by the Pareto frontier in the objective space. Each Pareto solution is a compromise between different objectives. Despite a limited number of Pareto optimal solutions, the decision‐maker eventually has to choose only one option. Such a choice has to be made with the use of additional preferences not included in the original formulation of the optimization problem. The paper represents a new approach to an automatic ranking that can help the decision‐maker. In contrast to the other methodologies, the proposed method is based on the minimization of trade‐off between different Pareto solutions. To be realized, the approach presumes the existence of a well‐distributed Pareto set representing the entire Pareto frontier. In the paper, such a set is generated with the use of the directed search domain algorithm. The method is applied to a number of test cases and compared against two existing alternative approaches.     

Evolution of multi‐criteria analysis: a scientometric analysis

The field of multi‐criteria analysis has known very important developments during the last 20 years, if one considers the very large amount of activities that it has generated and continues to generate (papers in journals, a dedicated journal, books, meetings, applications, …). Even if multi‐criteria analysis has reached some maturity, its future is subject to questions and debate among its researchers: what is the evolution of the field? What is its structure? Is it integrating new topics? In order to answer such questions at least partially, we have studied multi‐criteria analysis literature by means of the method of associated words (scientometric analysis) and the software ‘Leximappe’. All the abstracts of the papers which are relative to multi‐criteria analysis and are included in the bibliographic ABI‐INFORM database from 1985 to 1996 have been analysed. In this paper, we will present some results of this study. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measurement invariance of the Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game scale across 36 countries

In this paper, we examined the psychometric properties of cross‐cultural validation and replicability (i.e. measurement invariance) of the Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game (BZSG) scale, measuring antagonistic belief about interpersonal relations over scarce resources. The factorial structure of the BZSG scale was investigated in student samples from 36 countries (N = 9907), using separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) for each country. The cross‐cultural validation of the scale was based on multigroup confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA). The results confirmed that the scale had a one‐factor structure in all countries, in which configural and metric invariance between countries was confirmed. As a zero‐sum belief about social relations perceived as antagonistic, BZSG is an important factor related to, for example, social and international relations, attitudes toward immigrants, or well‐being. The paper proposes different uses of the BZSG scale for cross‐cultural studies in different fields of psychology: social, political, or economic.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

Naïve and Robust: Class‐Conditional Independence in Human Classification Learning

Humans excel in categorization. Yet from a computational standpoint, learning a novel probabilistic classification task involves severe computational challenges. The present paper investigates one way to address these challenges: assuming class‐conditional independence of features. This feature independence assumption simplifies the inference problem, allows for informed inferences about novel feature combinations, and performs robustly across different statistical environments. We designed a new Bayesian classification learning model (the dependence‐independence structure and category learning model, DISC‐LM) that incorporates varying degrees of prior belief in class‐conditional independence, learns whether or not independence holds, and adapts its behavior accordingly. Theoretical results from two simulation studies demonstrate that classification behavior can appear to start simple, yet adapt effectively to unexpected task structures. Two experiments—designed using optimal experimental design principles—were conducted with human learners. Classification decisions of the majority of participants were best accounted for by a version of the model with very high initial prior belief in class‐conditional independence, before adapting to the true environmental structure. Class‐conditional independence may be a strong and useful default assumption in category learning tasks.     

The role of the counterfactually satisfied desire in the lag between false‐belief and false‐emotion attributions in children aged 4–7

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper refers to the theory of appraisal which links emotion to the belief about desire satisfaction rather than the belief concerning the state of the world. The authors claim that, even if counterfactual belief is understood, the associated emotion and belief about counterfactual satisfaction of desire are not automatically understood because they depend on the success of an action. Two experiments conducted on happiness, fear, and anger confirmed this view: Attributing false belief about counterfactual desire satisfaction is much more difficult than attributing false belief about a current state of affairs, and the emotion attributed to the individual is more closely linked to a belief about desire than to a belief about the world. A four‐step developmental sequence is proposed, and the link between action and realist bias is discussed.     

Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.     

RESCUING RELIGIOUS NON‐REALISM FROM CUPITT

Don Cupitt's version of religious non‐realism based as it is on linguistic constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that there is another strand in Cupitt's thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a different version of religious non‐realism and that he failed to see this possibility because of his global non‐realism and commitment to the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Cupitt's biological naturalism should have led smoothly into evolutionary psychology, which has an account of religious belief that supports a non‐realist interpretation. Evolutionary psychology shows that religious beliefs are natural, normal and about matters of the deepest significance to humans. They gain their character from the operation of evolved structures of the mind and cannot be reduced to other sorts of belief. I argue that the form of religious non‐realism that emerges from taking biological naturalism seriously has a future because it respects the nature of religious belief and seeks to build on its capacity as a unique source of meaning in people's lives. There is also enough common ground with religious realism for there to be genuine dialogue between the two.     

Cognitive control in belief‐laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event‐related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high‐density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from ?400 to ?200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias.