Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

If they were to vote, they would vote for us

In two field studies, we examined whether voters overestimate support for their political party among nonvoters. In Study 1, voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive in an upcoming election, and this percentage increased when voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive if nonvoters also were to vote. In Study 2, participants overestimated support for their party even when we made them explicitly aware of current levels of this support by presenting them with poll-based forecasts of election results. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that commitment to vote for a specific party predicted the degree of overestimation. Our results imply that highly committed voters are particularly likely to project support for their party onto nonvoters. Implications for the literature on social projection and social identity are discussed.     

Hindsight bias: a by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback.     

Negative affect and hindsight bias

The relationship between hindsight bias and individual differences in negative affect, or ‘dysphoria’, was investigated in a naturalistic study. In a first session, 76 undergraduates predicted their grades prior to a midterm exam. In a second session, after having received feedback from the exam, they attempted to recall their predictions and predicted their grades on a second exam. Dysphoria was associated with hindsight bias whether initial predictions were overly optimistic or pessimistic. In the former case, the standard hindsight bias was modal for the sample, whereas a ‘reverse hindsight’ bias was modal in the latter. This asymmetry suggests that hindsight bias is influenced by motivational or affective factors. The bias did not hinder the improvement of predictions between the first and second exams, and therefore could not have mediated a hypothesized adaptive learning impairment among dysphoric subjects.     

Effects of dysphoria and induced negative mood on the processes underlying hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants (n?=?123, BDI?≤?13) in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants (n?=?19, BDI?>?13) generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, that under dysphoria and induced negative mood different processes contributed to hindsight bias. Dysphoria, but not induced negative mood, was associated with a stronger reconstruction bias, compared with neutral mood. A recollection bias appeared in neutral, but neither in induced negative nor dysphoric mood. These findings highlight differences between the cognitive consequences of dysphoria and induced negative mood.     

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.     

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce—and fail to produce—hindsight bias.     

Hindsight bias and outcome-consistent thoughts when observing and making service provider decisions

Two studies examined the relationship between hindsight bias and corresponding open-ended thoughts for decisions in a service provider setting. Perspectives of those observing and making decisions were examined. In study 1, business students who learned the results of a financial advisor’s stock purchase showed the traditional hindsight effect regardless of outcome favorability, and produced heightened outcome-consistent thoughts. In contrast, study 2 participants were asked to make (rather than to observe) a purchase decision. They produced hindsight bias and consistent thoughts only when their decision outcomes were favorable. Relative to observers, those acting as the service provider (a) showed more bias when outcomes were favorable, and (b) showed less bias when outcomes were unfavorable. Discussion focuses on hindsight implications in service provider decision-making settings.     

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

The hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975) illustrates that outcome information can make people believe that they would have (or did) predict an outcome that they would not (or did not) actually predict. In two experiments, participants (N = 226) made a prediction immediately before receiving outcome information. Therefore, participants could not distort or misremember their predictions to make them align with the outcome information. In both experiments, participants distorted their reports of how certain they recalled having been in their prediction, how good of a basis they had for making the prediction, how long they took to make the prediction, and so forth. Experiment 2 showed that these effects were diminished when participants engaged in private thought about the upcoming questions prior to receiving outcome information, suggesting that the effect is not due to impression management concerns.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: a motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

Hindsight bias around the world

Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1996). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome ("hypothetical design"), Choi and Nisbett (2000) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome ("memory design"), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000), Heine and Lehman (1996), and our own study.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

GTIDHNIHS: I knew‐it‐all‐along

Individuals who do insight problems are highly susceptible to hindsight bias. Two sets of studies assessed the impact of hindsight consequences on participants' judgements about anagram difficulty and specific factors for performance. In the first set, hindsight participants underestimated anagram difficulty relative to participants with task experience (worksight). Also, supportive evidence revealed that hindsight consequences were related to self‐perceptions of confidence, ability, performance satisfaction, and subsequent performance expectations. In the second, two different hindsight techniques differentially impacted the participant's assessment of anagram difficulty. When comparing hindsight participants with and without worksight experience, the latter judged the anagrams to be easier. It is appropriate to examine further the cognitive and motivational consequences of hindsight bias in achievement situations. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hindsight Distortion: “I knew-it-all along and I was sure about it”1

Hindsight distortion was examined in the context of the 1982 Hawaiian gubernatorial election by obtaining estimates from 474 persons either prior or after the election. Two motivational factors (global self-esteem and political involvement) were also measured. Despite the accuracy of subjects in foresight, hindsight distortion was demonstrated. The most pronounced effect was exhibited in the subjects' degree of confidence which was significantly (p < .0001) higher in hindsight than in foresight. There was no mediation by global self-esteem or by political involvement. The findings support that hindsight distortion occurs because of biases in information processing, rather than through mediation by motivational factors.     

Effects of reiteration,hindsight bias,and memory on realism in eyewitness confidence

This study investigated the effects of repetition, memory, feedback, and hindsight bias on the realism in confidence in answers to questions on a filmed kidnapping. In Experiment 1 the participants showed overconfidence in all conditions. In the Repeat condition (‘how confident are you now that your previous answers are correct’) overconfidence was reduced as a consequence of the decrease in confidence in both correct and incorrect answers compared with the Repeat condition when the participants received feedback on their answers and were asked to remember their initial confidence, the confidence level was higher for correct and lower for incorrect answers. In Experiment 2, recalled confidence (the Memory condition) increased compared with the original confidence both for correct and incorrect answers; the effect of this was increased overconfidence. The Hindsight condition showed a decrease in confidence in incorrect answers. The results suggest that a unique hindsight effect may be more clearly present for incorrect than for correct answers. Our study gives further evidence for the malleability of the realism in eyewitness confidence and we discuss both the theoretical and forensic implications of our findings. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hindsight bias in insight and mathematical problem solving: Evidence of different reconstruction mechanisms for metacognitive versus situational judgments

This article presents two experiments that used insight and mathematical problems to investigate whether different factors would affect hindsight bias on metacognitive and situational judgments. In both studies, participants initially rated their likelihood of solving each problem within a certain amount of time (metacognitive judgments) and rated the importance of each component of the problem for finding the solution (situational judgments). Next, participants attempted to solve each problem. In Experiment 1, all participants were given solution feedback information, but in Experiment 2, participants were not given any solution feedback. After 1 week, participants were asked to recall their original judgments. Hindsight bias was assessed by comparing the initial with the final ratings. Insight problems and math problems showed different patterns of hindsight bias effects on the metacognitive and situational judgments. The results suggest that two competing models of hindsight effects are actually complementary explanations for judgment reconstruction on different types of judgment tasks.     

We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups

Two studies investigated the occurrence of hindsight distortion in groups as compared to individuals. Competing predictions were derived from four theoretical positions: Memory impairment, response bias, self-presentation, and group polarization. In Experiment 1, small groups vs individuals made hypothetical predictions with or without outcome information. Both individuals and groups were found to distort their predictions in the direction of the alleged outcome. Experiment 2 employed a memory design in which individuals vs groups made a series of predictions for which they subsequently received outcome information which was either above or below their prediction or for which they received no outcome information. Subjects had to recall their initial prediction. Results indicated that (a) hindsight bias was slightly attenuated in groups compared to individuals, (b) groups were more likely to recall their original predictions correctly than individuals, (c) this recall advantage of groups disappeared when time taken to make the initial prediction was held constant, and (d) outcome information affected hindsight bias but not hit rates. Results were interpreted as supporting the response bias perspective.     

Personality differences in hindsight bias

Ten personality correlates of hindsight bias were tested in a study with 75 participants answering almanac-type knowledge questions. Participants showed hindsight bias when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates (memory condition), when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates of other participants (BS = between-subjects hypothetical condition), and when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates in response to equally difficult control items (WS = within-subject hypothetical condition). The magnitude of hindsight bias in both hypothetical conditions was positively associated with the participant's field dependence and his or her tendency for favourable self-presentation (as measured by social desirability and impression management). Between-subjects hypothetical hindsight was associated with the participant's conscientiousness and need for predictability and control (as measured by a rigidity scale). In a multiple regression analysis, 39% of the variance in BS hypothetical hindsight, 24% of the variance in WS hypothetical hindsight, but no significant proportion of the variance in memory hindsight could be accounted for by personality measures. It is concluded that individual differences in hindsight bias exist and must be taken into account in a complete model of the effect.     

Candidate Name Exposure and Voting: Two Field Studies

Two studies clarify previous research on the impact of candidate name exposure in political election campaigns. In an election involving 27 candidates and 1157 voters, level of name exposure on campaign posters significantly predicted votes received, independent of other forms of campaigning. In the second study, name exposure levels were manipulated for hypothetical candidates, to eliminate potential confounds. Again, exposure significantly improved candidates' electoral performance'. The findings are interpreted as evidence for a direct effect of mere name exposure in electoral campaigns.     

Personality differences in hindsight bias

Ten personality correlates of hindsight bias were tested in a study with 75 participants answering almanac-type knowledge questions. Participants showed hindsight bias when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates (memory condition), when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates of other participants (BS = between-subjects hypothetical condition), and when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates in response to equally difficult control items (WS = within-subject hypothetical condition). The magnitude of hindsight bias in both hypothetical conditions was positively associated with the participant's field dependence and his or her tendency for favourable self-presentation (as measured by social desirability and impression management). Between-subjects hypothetical hindsight was associated with the participant's conscientiousness and need for predictability and control (as measured by a rigidity scale). In a multiple regression analysis, 39% of the variance in BS hypothetical hindsight, 24% of the variance in WS hypothetical hindsight, but no significant proportion of the variance in memory hindsight could be accounted for by personality measures. It is concluded that individual differences in hindsight bias exist and must be taken into account in a complete model of the effect.