Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

Uncertainty management: the influence of uncertainty salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness.

On the basis of fairness heuristic theory, it is argued in this article that people especially need fairness when they are reminded about aspects of their lives that make them uncertain. It is therefore proposed that thinking about uncertainty should make fairness a more important issue to people. The findings of 3 experiments support this line of reasoning: Asking (vs. not asking) participants 2 questions that solicited their thoughts and feelings of being uncertain led to stronger effects of perceived procedural fairness on participants' affective reactions toward the way they were treated. It is argued that these findings suggest that fairness matters to people especially when they are trying to deal with things that make them uncertain. An implication of the current findings therefore may be that fairness is important to people because it gives them an opportunity to manage uncertain aspects of their lives.     

Toward understanding why fairness matters: the influence of mortality salience on reactions to procedural fairness

This article focuses on the question of why fairness matters to people. On the basis of fairness heuristic theory, the authors argue that people especially need fairness when they are uncertain about things that are important to them. Following terror management theory, the authors focus on a basic kind of human uncertainty: fear of death. Integrating these two theoretical frameworks, it is proposed that thinking about their mortality should make fairness a more important issue to people. The findings of three experiments support the authors' line of reasoning: Asking participants to think about their mortality led to stronger fair process effects (positive effects of perceived procedural fairness on subsequent reactions) than not asking them to think about mortality. It is argued that these findings suggest that fairness especially matters to people when they are uncertain about fundamental aspects of human life such as human mortality.     

Deci and Ryan's cognitive evaluation theory of intrinsic motivation: A set of common sense theorems

Cognitive evaluation theory as put forward by Deci and Ryan (1985) is examined. The theory, which deals with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, has inspired considerable amount of empirical research in the last two decades. However, contrary to the mainstream view and that of its authors, it is argued here that the theory consists of necessary truths of common sense (folk) psychology, rather than contingent and empirically testable hypotheses. As such the theory spells out what must necessarily be the case in human motivation and the empirical evidence amassed to test its validity is irrelevant. Such testing should be abandoned if its purpose is to appraise the truth value of the theory's propositions. To empirically test necessary true propositions is not only redundant in such cases, but also a waste of time and resources.     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Event justice perceptions and employees' reactions: perceptions of social entity justice as a moderator

Building on 2 paradigms in organizational justice research and on fairness heuristic theory, the author argues that employees' perceptions about the fairness of social entities (their supervisor and their organization) moderate the relationship between their perceptions about the fairness of specific events and their reactions. A survey of 265 supervisor-employee pairs in 4 companies was conducted to test this argument. Hierarchical linear modeling analyses showed that when employees perceived their organization to be generally fair, this perception moderated the relationship between the perceived justice of a particular event and their reactions to the organization (organizational commitment and organization-directed citizenship behavior). In addition, employees' perceptions of the fairness of their supervisor were found to moderate the relationship between the perceived justice of a particular event and their supervisor-directed responses (trust in managers and supervisor-directed citizenship behavior) and their organization-directed responses. The results suggest that employee attitudes and behavior can be better understood when both event justice perceptions and social entity justice perceptions are considered together.     

Assimilation and contrast in organizational justice: The role of primed mindsets in the psychology of the fair process effect

This paper focuses on the psychology of the fair process effect (the frequently replicated finding that perceived procedural fairness positively affects people's reactions). It is argued that when people have received an outcome they usually assimilate their ratings of outcome fairness and affect toward their experiences of procedural fairness. As a result, ratings show fair process effects. It is also possible, however, that when people have received their outcome they compare this outcome to the procedure they experienced: Is the outcome better or worse than the procedure? A result of this comparison process may be that contrast effects are found such that higher levels of procedural fairness lead to more negative ratings of outcome fairness and affect. Research findings suggest that when comparison goals have been primed, contrast effects indeed can be found. The implications for the psychology of the fair process effect and organizational behavior are discussed.     

公正的启发理论述评

组织公正感包括分配公正、程序公正、互动公正等重要的组成要素。尽管这些公正感的构成要素有不同的内涵和影响因素,然而在许多情况下,这些要素之间有较高的一致性。与过去注重这些要素的差异性相反,Lind看到了这些公正感要素之间的一致性,提出了试图整合这些一致性的公正理论：公正的启发理论。该文比较全面地介绍了公正的启发理论的含义,如何启发等核心概念,并对启发理论存在的问题进行了分析,指出了启发理论研究的方向。     

Procedural fairness, outcome favorability, and judgments of an authority's responsibility

Fairness theory (R. Folger & R. Cropanzano, 1998, 2001) postulates that, particularly in the face of unfavorable outcomes, employees judge an organizational authority to be more responsible for their outcomes when the authority exhibits lower procedural fairness. Three studies lent empirical support to this notion. Furthermore, 2 of the studies showed that attributions of responsibility to the authority mediated the relationship between the authority's procedural fairness and employees' reactions to unfavorable outcomes. The findings (a) provide support for a key assumption of fairness theory, (b) help to account for the pervasive interactive effect of procedural fairness and outcome favorability on employees' attitudes and behaviors, and (c) contribute to an emerging trend in justice research concerned with how people use procedural fairness information to make attributions of responsibility for their outcomes. Practical implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research also are discussed.     

The new growing block theory vs presentism

It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as what makes true, present-tensed propositions. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity.     

Stoic Conditionals,Necessity and Explanation

An examination of a particular passage in Cicero's De fato—Fat. 13–17—is crucial to our understanding of the Stoic theory of the truth-conditions of conditional propositions, for it has been uniquely important in the debate concerning the kind of connection the antecedent and consequent of a Stoic conditional should have to one another. Frede has argued that the passage proves that the connection is one of logical necessity, while Sorabji has argued that positive Stoic attitudes toward empirical inferences elsewhere suggest that that cannot be the right interpretation of the passage. I argue that both parties to the debate have missed a position somewhere between them which both renders a connection between antecedent and consequent that is not merely empirical and makes sense of the actual uses to which the Stoics put the conditional. This will be an account which grounds the connection between antecedent and consequent in a prolêpsis, a special kind of concept which plays a special epistemological role for the Stoics, especially in grounding scientific explanations. My contention will be that Stoic conditionals are true when there is a conceptually necessary connection between antecedent and consequent such that the former explains the latter via a prolêpsis     

人工智能决策的公平感知

不平等问题是全球社会和经济发展需要应对的首要挑战,也是实现全球可持续发展目标的核心障碍。人工智能(artificial intelligence, AI)为缓解不平等、促进社会公平提供了新的途径。然而,新近研究发现,即使客观上AI决策具有公平性和准确性,个体仍可能对AI决策的公平感知较低。因此,近年来越来越多的研究开始关注AI决策公平感知的影响因素。然而,目前研究较为分散,呈现出研究范式不统一、理论不清晰和机制未厘清等特征。这既不利于跨学科的研究对话,也不利于研究者和实践者对AI决策公平感知形成系统性理解。基于此,通过系统的梳理,现有研究可以划分为两类:(1) AI单一决策的公平感知研究,主要聚焦于AI特征和个体特征如何影响个体对AI决策的公平感知;(2) AI-人类二元决策的公平感知研究,主要聚焦于对比个体对AI决策与人类决策公平感知的差异。在上述梳理基础上,未来研究可以进一步探索AI决策公平感知的情绪影响机制等方向。     

Justice and personality: Using integrative theories to derive moderators of justice effects

Although organizational justice has been shown to have behavioral consequences, there remains a surprising amount of variation in how individuals react to fair and unfair treatment. The present study drew on three integrative theories in the justice literature—fairness heuristic theory, uncertainty management theory, and fairness theory—to identify personality traits that could explain such variation. From these theories, we identified trust propensity, risk aversion, and morality (rooted in circumplex models of personality) as potential moderators. A laboratory study provided some support for the prediction that the three traits moderate the effects of procedural, interpersonal, and distributive justice on task performance and counterproductive behavior. The moderating effects of the three traits explained more variance in the outcomes than moderators based in the justice literature (equity sensitivity, sensitivity to befallen injustice) or the five-factor model of personality. Taken together, the results suggest that the three integrative theories can inform the search for personality-based moderators of justice effects.     

公平或是利益?权力对分配公平感的影响

通过3个实验逐步考察了高、低权力个体对三种分配方案(公平/劣势不公平/优势不公平)的公平感。结果发现：(1)被试的公平评级从高到低依次为公平、优势不公平、劣势不公平, 做出评级的反应时则从快到慢依次为公平、劣势不公平、优势不公平; (2)相对于低权力被试, 高权力被试对劣势不公平分配的公平评级更低, 而对公平分配和优势不公平分配的公平评级更高, 且做出公平判断的反应时更短。基于这些结果, 作者提出了公平与利益权衡的公平优先效应及权力的自我增强假设, 以更好地理解权力和公平的本质及二者的关系。     

Justice as a dynamic construct: effects of individual trajectories on distal work outcomes

Despite an amassing organizational justice literature, few studies have directly addressed the temporal patterning of justice judgments and the effects that changes in these perceptions have on important work outcomes. Drawing from Gestalt characteristics theory (Ariely & Carmon, 2000, 2003), we examine the concept of justice trajectories (i.e., levels and trends of individual fairness perceptions over time) and offer empirical evidence to highlight the value of considering fairness within a dynamic context. Participants included 523 working adults who completed surveys about their work experiences on 4 occasions over the course of 1 year. Results indicate that justice trends explained additional variance in distal work outcomes (job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intentions) after controlling for end-state levels of justice, demonstrating the cumulative effects of justice over time. Findings also reveal that change in procedural justice perceptions affected distal work outcomes more strongly than any other justice dimension. Implications for theory and future investigations of justice as a dynamic construct are discussed.     

Selection Fairness and Outcomes: A field study of interactive effects on applicant reactions

Despite the vast amount of applicant reactions studies, few have examined combined effects of selection outcomes with perceived procedural and distributive fairness on both personal and organizational reactions. Further, most have been conducted in laboratory settings, limiting external validity. The present study examined these effects with a longitudinal design, measuring actual applicants' well‐being and organizational attractiveness preinterview and postoutcome. As expected, several interactions between outcomes and fairness were found. Applicants who were hired reported both highest well‐being and organizational attractiveness when they perceived the outcome as fair. In contrast, applicants who were rejected reported highest well‐being when they thought the outcome was unfair. Selection outcome and procedural fairness interacted for organizational attractiveness, with higher procedural fairness leading to higher attractiveness for rejected applicants.     

Who will win Wimbledon? The recognition heuristic in predicting sports events

Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) described the recognition heuristic as a fast, frugal, and effective decision strategy. However, most studies concerning the recognition heuristic have been conducted in static domains, that is, in domains where it could plausibly be argued that relevant variables stay relatively constant. Yet the question is whether the heuristic would also work in dynamic environments where the quality of the actors rises and falls, such as in sports. We tested performance of the recognition heuristic in a dynamic environment and used it to predict the outcomes of tennis matches in Wimbledon 2003. Recognition data of amateur tennis players and laypeople was used to build recognition rankings. These rankings correlated with official rankings and led to at least as good predictions. Simulations of individual choices showed high recognition validities of both amateurs (0.73) and laypeople (0.67). In a second study the recognition heuristic correctly predicted 90% of actual individual choices. Overall, the recognition heuristic may be effectively generalized to dynamic environments. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When fairness neither satisfies nor motivates: The role of risk aversion and uncertainty reduction in attenuating and reversing the fair process effect

It is widely acknowledged that procedural justice has many positive effects. However, some evidence suggests that procedural justice may not always have positive effects and may even have negative effects. We present three studies that vary in method and participant populations, including an archival study, a field study, and an experiment, using data provided by the general American population, Indian software engineers, and undergraduate students in the US. We demonstrate that key work-related variables such as people’s job satisfaction and performance depend on procedural justice, perceived uncertainty, and risk aversion such that risk seeking people react less positively and at times negatively to the same fair procedures that appeal to risk averse people. Our results suggest that one possible reason for these effects is that being treated fairly reduces people’s perception of uncertainty in the environment and while risk averse people find low uncertainty desirable and react positively to it, risk seeking people do not. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of procedural justice including the uncertainty management model of fairness, the fair process effect, and fairness heuristic theory.