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1.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
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Robert HannaEmail: |
2.
Bill Brewer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):87-97
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind
in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy
replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational
content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly
consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting
mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.
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Bill BrewerEmail: |
3.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):65-77
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction
requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience.
I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the
association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates
considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought
and judgment.
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Hannah GinsborgEmail: |
4.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
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Christian MillerEmail: |
5.
Josefa Toribio 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):351-361
It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations.
On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that
holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems
consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject
to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such
content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the
way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported.
Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it
would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content
demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all.
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Josefa ToribioEmail: |
6.
Michael D. Barber 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):79-97
John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is
ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish
empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts
to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing
McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis
of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even
more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility
and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content
(rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects
are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential
possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell
focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements
his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual
content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.
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Michael D. BarberEmail: |
7.
Jordi Fernandez 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):333-356
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether
memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest
that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the
past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view,
when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that
caused the very memory experience that she is having.
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Jordi FernandezEmail: |
8.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
9.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of possibility, and not merely that of actuality, for an inquiry into the bodily constitution of experience. The paper will study how the possibilities of action that may
(or may not) be available to the subject help to shape the meaning attributed to perceived objects and to the situation occupied
by the subject within her environment. This view will be supported by reference to empirical evidence provided by recent and
current research on the perceptual estimation of distances and the effects brought about by the use of a tool on the organisation
of our perceived immediate space.
相似文献
Olivier GapenneEmail: |
10.
Jonathan Schaffer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):7-19
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view
puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can
provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is
fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement.
The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
相似文献
Jonathan SchafferEmail: |
11.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):43-62
This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in
Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s
views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given
consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have
the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not.
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John LemosEmail: |
12.
Robert Northcott 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):111-123
I argue that causation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively with actual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out that
causation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately
to members of E*.
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Robert NorthcottEmail: |
13.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
相似文献
M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
14.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
15.
Darrell P. Rowbottom 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):367-374
From a logical point of view, permissibility can be reduced to possibility by introducing demands which can be met. The alleged
reduction is circular from a philosophical perspective, however, because demands are fundamentally deontic. This paper solves
this problem by replacing demands which can be met with rules which can be satisfied and violated.
相似文献
Darrell P. RowbottomEmail: |
16.
Leo Iacono 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):423-436
In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing
names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution
of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that
the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent
with Millianism.
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Leo IaconoEmail: |
17.
Robert Audi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):475-492
This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some
significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds
of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of
inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation
to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do not take to be self-evident, and basic moral principles, which they
typically do take to be self-evident in a sense explicated in the paper. This explanation is accomplished in part by drawing
some analogies between moral and perceptual judgments in the light of a developmental conception of knowledge. The final section
of the paper presents a partial account of rational disagreement and indicates how the kind of intuitionist view defended
can allow for rational disagreement between apparent epistemic peers.
相似文献
Robert AudiEmail: |
18.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
19.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
20.
This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting
a plenitudinous metaphysic.
相似文献
Andrew McGonigalEmail: |