Religion and medical psychology

Summary The costly process of depersonalization underlies all living from which the individual must withhold his feeling of personal identity. Only my recognition of my self as creator of new selfness in my every experience continuously provides my self-consciousness (self-insight) the immediate recognition of my own intact autonomous wholeness.Responsible self-activity is conscious freedom. This comprehension of human unity is accessible to every devoted practitioner appreciating the full-measured meaning of individuality. Particularly since Hippocrates, who considered him-self of divine origin, every physician's medical ideal is: full respect for the idiosyncrasy of the individual.I close with a choice statement made by renowned Edward Glover, M.D., in the preface of his insightful work,An Investigation of the Technique of Psycho-Analysis, Periodic revision of technical principles is obviously essential for the good health of any science, and I look forward to a renewal of this investigation in the near future.     

Bearing Witness in Israel/Palestine: Finding My Voice

This article traces my evolution as a political activist in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over the past decade, and describes the ways my activism has become integrated into my professional life. I discuss my journeys in Israel/Palestine with delegations of the Compassionate Listening Project, highlighting disturbing stories of injustice and abuse and inspiring stories of interfaith cooperation and nonviolent peace work. My focus is on the emotional impact of becoming the bearer of stories of unbearable human experience that I felt compelled to bring back and share. I reveal my struggles with continuing to speak and write publically about the injustice that I witnessed. In the course of standing up to both internal and external attacks on bearing witness, I have discovered a stronger therapeutic voice with my patients as well.     

Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological investigation

Few, if any, scientific inquiries are conducted against a background of complete knowledge, a background in which inquirers are in possession of the full facts that relate to a particular question or issue. More often than not, scientists are compelled to conduct their deliberations in contexts of epistemic uncertainty, in which partial knowledge or even a total absence of knowledge characterise inquiry. Nowhere is this epistemic uncertainty more evident, or indeed more successfully controlled, than in the branch of scientific inquiry called epidemiology. In this paper, I examine how epidemiologists overcome the unique challenges to inquiry that are posed by epistemic uncertainty. In specific terms, I contend that epidemiologists employ analogical reasoning strategies in an attempt to advance their inquiries in situations that are epistemically uncertain. The context for my claims will be the early inquiries that were conducted into the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the United States. I argue that early scientific work in relation to HIV/AIDS was directly premised upon epidemiological investigations in which analogical reasoning with hepatitis B had featured significantly. I conclude that epidemiological investigations of AIDS exemplify the capacity of analogical reasoning to advance inquiry under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. To this extent, analogical reasoning should be a concern both to those who address practical problems of uncertainty management and to those who pursue theoretical debates within argumentation studies and epistemology.     

Flawed by Dasein? Phenomenology,Ethnomethodology, and the Personal Experience of Physiotherapy

This paper applies a hybrid Heideggerian-ethnomethodological approach to physiotherapy practice. Unlike previous studies written by and for practitioners, this paper uses my personal experience receiving physical therapy as its point of departure. By combining Heidegger’s [Being and time (trans: Stambaugh J). State University of New York Press, New York 1996] notion of the ‘ontological difference’ with Garfinkel’s (Studies in ethnomethodology, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1967) concept of ‘accountability,’ I argue that in physical therapy practice, both client and practitioner actively shape the body into a coherent object for medical intervention. I begin by introducing three key phenomenological concepts, the life-world, the ontological difference, and Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity. I then empirically substantiate these concepts by reviewing classic and recent studies in ethnomethodology. I conclude with my own experience of physical therapy, and demonstrate how both client and practitioner actively constitute the body as a medical and therapeutic object. This is cause for both disability studies and physiotherapy to reconsider some of their core concepts, ‘medicalization’ and ‘client-specific measurement,’ respectively.     

“Women Don't Get AIDS,They Just Die From It”: Memory,Classification, and the Campaign to Change the Definition of AIDS

In this paper, I examine activist group ACT UP's campaign to change the US Centers for Disease Control surveillance case definition of HIV and AIDS. This campaign's effects included a profound shift in how AIDS is understood, and thus in some real way in what it is. I argue that classification should be understood as a political formation with material effects, attending to the words of activists, most of them women, who contested the way AIDS was defined in a moment when no one else thought that definition needed to be changed. I argue that philosopher Sue Campbell's work on the importance of understanding memory and feeling as relational helps understand the histories of death and loss, resistance and fierce joy, crystallized in activist responses to HIV and AIDS.     

Glimpses of utopia near death? a rejoinder

Five scholars have offered comments, suggestions, and criticisms of my paper Near-Death Experiences and Pursuit of the Ideal Society. In this rejoinder, I reply to those comments and elaborate on aspects of my earlier paper. I discuss issues of methodology, epistemology, validity, logic, and other social considerations with respect to the plausibility of viewing some near-death imagery as utopian. I conclude with some reflections on the social character and study of the near-death experience.     

A Work in Progress

After expressing gratitude to each contributor, and briefly commenting on each, I probe several main themes of my work, addressing the question of the apparent difference between my earlier philosophical and later clinical writings. Central to both is the reflexivity of the human agent, and that each exhibits a form of practice regardless of the specific aims embedded in each. I then address the theme of narrative writing as my work has developed over the past several decades – at the heart of which are questions of self and integrity.     

Leaving London: Three Autoethnographic Sketches

In this essay, I use autoethnographic sketching (Rambo, 2007 Rambo, C. (2007). Sketching as autoethnographic practice. Symbolic Interaction, 30(4), 531–542. doi:10.1525/si.2007.30.4.531[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to explore the experience of arriving at and withdrawing from the London School of Economics and its impact on my life and work. I especially draw on the importance of close relationships with family, which helped me cope with and overcome limitations associated with my physical disability, cerebral palsy, as I work toward personal and professional fulfillment. It is my hope that these words will motivate others to better cope with and overcome challenges in pursuit of their goals.     

Becoming a person—Part II

Conclusion I have tried to tell you what has seemed to occur in the lives of people with whom I have had the privilege of being in a relationship as they struggled toward becoming themselves. I have endeavored to describe, as accurately as I can, the meanings which seem to be involved in this process of becoming a person. I am sure that I do not see it clearly or completely, since I keep changing in my comprehension and understanding of it. I hope you will accept it as a current and tentative picture, not as something final.One reason for stressing the tentative nature of what I have said is that I wish to make it clear that I amnot saying: This is what you should become; here is the goal for you. Rather, I am saying that these are some of the meanings I see in the experiences that my clients and I have shared. Perhaps this picture of the experience of others may illuminate or give more meaning to some of your own experience.I have pointed out that the individual appears to have a strong desire to become himself; that given a favorable psychological climate he drops the defensive masks with which he has faced life, and begins to discover and to experience the stranger who lives behind these masks—the hidden parts of himself. I have pictured some of the attributes of the person who emerges—the tendency, to be more open to all elements of his organic experience; the growth of trust in one's organism as an instrument of sensitive living; the acceptance of the fearsome responsibility of being a unique person; and finally the sense of living in one's life as a participant in a fluid, ongoing process, continually discovering new aspects of one's self in the flow of experience. These are some of the things which seem to me to be involved in becoming a person.     

TO SEE GOD IN HIS BEAUTY: AVRAHAM CHALFI AND THE MYSTICAL QUEST FOR THE EVASIVE GOD

Avraham Chalfi's poetry contains some of the main themes of the mystical experience, namely, the attempt “to see God in his Beauty” and the quest to gain an intimate communion with the Divine.1 I am grateful to the poet Raquel Chalfi for sharing of her memories and insights to her uncle Avraham Chalfi's life and work. The discussions we had contributed to my appreciation of Chalfi's poetry and character. I would also like to thank Claire Rechnitzer for her help in the translations of Chalfi's poems and to Prof. Jonathan Garb, my graduate student Mr. Vadim Putzu and the anonymous readers for their insightful comments. Of course, I take full responsibility for all errors that remain. View all notes Uncovering the intertextual references and the repertoire of his allusions positions this poetry within the ever-evolving mystical-religious discussion. Chalfi's theology transforms the Jewish mystical tradition into a critical, at times even fierce, encounter with God and turns fundamental elements, such as ascent to the Pardes and the respective roles of the mystic and God, on their heads. Exploring Chalfi's mystical poems expands our awareness of the theological elements embedded in a variety of modern secular Hebrew poems and their contribution to the evolution and diversification of the canon of Jewish thought.     

The ethics of poverty

Conclusions The conclusions set forth in this paper are of a highly tentative and even exploratory nature. I am willing to be demonstrated to be wrong at any point and excited by the realization that some of my hunches have been sufficiently far out to prompt confirmatory or invalidating research of a more precise variety. Yet I am willing to stand by my observations as to the relationship between the ethical perspective of the poor to the following seemingly unrelated events: (1) the implosion of these ethical perspectives into the middle classes, (2) through contemporary political uses of the poor by the upper classes, (3) professional interaction with the poverty community, (4) the unconscious moral identification of the middle classes with the ethics of the poor, (5) the transformation of thekinds of emotional disorder from one level of affluence to another by reason of the criterion of work as an indication of mental health, and (6) the ethical issue involved in economic determination of the use of medical and ministerial time in the care of the emotionally disturbed.     

Religious Wars in the NDE Movement: Some Personal Reflections on Michael Sabom's Light & Death

After a short personal glance at the early days of the field of near-death studies, I offer an open letter to Michael Sabom in response to his book, Light & Death (Sabom, 1998). This letter is in effect both a reply to certain criticisms Sabom has made of my work and an attempt to make public certain significant changes in my own view of near-death experiences (NDEs) since the publication of Heading Toward Omega (Ring, 1984), particularly in regard to their being a catalyst for higher consciousness. The second part of this essay presents a personal perspective on the ideological role of religion in the NDE movement, which I see as corrupting the original vision that prompted the formation of the field of near-death studies. I end with an ecumenical call for a return to the values of nontheologically driven inquiry with which near-death studies began.     

Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl’s specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl’s claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given.     

Continuity of Learning in Discontinuous Conditions: Children Experience of Transition in Irreversible Time

In this theoretical paper, I propose that in certain conditions children’s subjective continuity (irreversible time) of experience could be sustained by objective discontinuity in reference to instruments like the clock that is used to sequentialize time in school. I suggest that it happens through intervals-as-transitions (c.f., breaks in school) that Min (2018; this special issue) undermines for epistemological reasons but insisted upon by Bergson. I use Bergson to epistemologically reframe Min’s (2018) interesting suggestions –that I partially use— with respect to irreversible time. Yet, my epistemological and theoretical suggestion contrasts with both authors’ perspective, for instance Bergson’s critic of objective discontinuity as contaminating subjective experience while paradoxically tackling intervals that are constructed in discontinuous conditions. In this regard, I use Bergson’s as well as He Min’s conceptual contradictions with respect to subjective and objective time as zones for theoretical development enabling the extension of their approach. I mainly use ethnographic examples I made and secondarily from McLaren’s (1999) analysis of the intersection of school, family and community rituals to illustrate my epistemological and theoretical propositions.     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.     

Coming Out: Considering the Closet of Illness

This essay explores key concerns surrounding coming out as a person with illness and addresses important professional and social considerations for those who are closeted in various kinds of illness. Using central tenets of Queer Theory and Disability and Cultural Studies as a theoretical base, I examine the politics of coming out in the specific context of my lived experience during the 2002 NEH Summer Institute, Medicine, Literature, and Culture While such an environment might foster unusual candor about personal illness experience, I discovered that the choice to come out as a person with chronic, non-infectious disease (Inflammatory Bowel Disease) was nevertheless complicated in interesting ways.     

A Testimony to Muzil: Hervé Guibert, Foucault, and the Medical Gaze

Testimony to Muzil: Hervé Guibert, Michel Foucault, and the Medical Gaze examines the fictional/autobiographical AIDS writings of the French writer Hervé Guibert. Locating Guibert's writings alongside the work of his friend Michel Foucault, the article explores how they echo Foucault's evolving notions of the medical gaze. The article also explores how Guilbert's narrators and Guibert himself (as writer) resist and challenge the medical gaze; a gaze which particularly in the era of AIDS has subjected, objectified, and even sometimes punished the body of the gay man. It is argued that these resistances to the gaze offer a literary extension to Foucault's later work on power and resistance strategies.     

Response to Gracia Fay Ellwood's “Religious Experience,Religious Worldviews,and Near-Death Studies”

After a brief glance at religious wars that now embroil the field of near-death studies, I respond to Gracia Fay Ellwood's commentary on Light & Death (Sabom, 1998), in which she alleges serious problems with my discussion of Raymond Moody's research, my views on the psychic and the occult, my use of the Bible as an authoritative document, my research methodology, and my definition of Christianity.     

The concept of the fully functioning person

Conclusion Here then is my theoretical model of the person who emerges from therapy—a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person, whose specific formings of behavior are not easily predictable; a person who is ever changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time. This is the person who in an imperfect way actually emerges from the experience of safety and freedom in a therapeutic experience, and this is the person whom I have tried to describe for you in pure form.My purpose has not been to convince you of the correctness of this view. Indeed I would have to confess that I have written this paper primarily for my own satisfaction, to clarify the thoughts which have been stirring in me. But if this presentation causes you to formulate your view of the person who emerges from therapy, or enables you to point out flaws in my own thinking which I have not yet seen, or arouses in you the desire to put to objective test either this picture or one which you paint for yourself, then it will have fully served both its primary and its secondary purpose.Reprinted by permission from Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, August, 1963.