Reading,feeling, believing: online testimonies and the making of Evangelical emotion

A personal relationship with God is central to Evangelical belief. It unfolds as believers interpret internal sensations as coming from outside—from God. How does the formulaic design of testimonies present the audience with a personal relationship with God as a pursuit that is both feasible and deeply desirable? Analyzing the discursive rules structuring the appearance of emotion in the most popular testimonies on the online platform of Christianity Today reveals that such texts expertly present a microcosm in which the experience of reading mirrors the trajectory toward belief writers describe. To read a testimony from start to finish, readers must choose to tolerate the unfamiliar: that is, feel emotions that specifically belong in an Evangelical frame. Online written testimony relies on compelling storytelling to move readers, making them practise what it feels like to hand over part of one’s own story to God.     

On feeling and emotion in religious experience and understanding

Although most if not all human activities may be matters of passionate pursuit, it is less clear that emotions and feelings are inherently implicated in such pursuit: on the contrary, chemistry, cookery, sculpture or football might be effectively pursued without any significant or substantial emotional involvement. On the other hand, it seems less easy to see how religious experience or even religious understanding might be an entirely dispassionate or emotionally disengaged affair. That said, it is far from easy to identify the role of emotion and feeling in religious faith or understanding on some familiar conceptions of religious knowledge and discourse. This paper sets out to explore the place of feeling and emotion in religious experience and understanding via specific attention to the basically narratival form of religious discourse and its connections to wider forms of literary expression.     

Formalization of Damasio's theory of emotion, feeling and core consciousness

This paper contributes an analysis and formalization of Damasio's theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are 'emotion', 'feeling' and 'feeling a feeling' (or core consciousness). In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of relevant notions of representation used by Damasio. As part of this analysis, specifications of representation relations have been verified and confirmed against the simulation model.     

Some general laws of human emotion: Interrelationships between intensities of desire, expectation, and emotional feeling

Two experiments were performed to determine how desires and expectations interact to influence the intensities of emotional feelings. The first experiment required participants to respond to their imagined intensities of desire and expectation in two hypothetical situations, (1) anticipating different probabilities of receiving money (2) anticipating the possibility of different durations of continuous rain combined with different probabilities of rain occurring. Participants responded by producing line lengths to desire and feeling, a form of cross-modality matching. Feeling intensity but not desire intensity increased as a negatively accelerating power function of expectation for the positive approach goal of receiving money (F =KE^0.5) and both desire and feeling were negatively accelerating power functions of the hypothetical amount of money presented (F=K$⁴; D=K$⁴). Feeling intensity but not desire intensity increased as a positively accelerating function of expectation for the negative avoidance goal of anticipating different amounts of rain (F=KE^1.9) and both desire and feeling were negatively accelerating functions of amount of rain (F=KR^0.9; D=KR_0.9). The second experiment required participants to make visual analogue scale responses to desire, expectation, and emotional feeling intensities in ordinary life situations. Similar to Experiment 1, feeling intensity but not desire intensity increased as a negatively accelerating function of expectation for positive approach goals (F=KE^0.6) and as a positively accelerating function of expectation for negative avoidance goals (F=KE^2.0). Functional interrelationships found in both experiments were fit to the general equations F=K₁D+K₂DE^0.5 for positive approach goals and F=K₁D+K₂DE^2.0 for negative avoidance goals. Both equations have the same general form and indicate that desire and expectation have a multiplicative interaction with respect to their influence on emotional feeling intensity. Both functions     

Hooked on a feeling: rumination about positive and negative emotion in inter-episode bipolar disorder

Rumination has been consistently implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. Less work has examined rumination in the context of bipolar disorder, especially rumination about positive emotion. The present study examined rumination about negative and positive emotion in interepisode bipolar disorder (BD; n = 39) and healthy controls (CTL; n = 34). Trait rumination about positive and negative emotion, as well as experiential and physiological responses to a rumination induction, was measured. Illness course was also assessed for the BD group. Results indicated that the BD group reported greater trait rumination about positive and negative emotion compared with the CTL group, though no group differences emerged during the rumination induction. For the BD group, trait rumination about positive and negative emotion, as well as increased cardiovascular arousal (i.e., heart rate), was associated with greater lifetime depression frequency; trait rumination about positive emotion was associated with greater lifetime mania frequency. These findings suggest that interepisode BD is associated with greater rumination about positive and negative emotion, which in turn is associated with illness course.     

Knowing what you're feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation

Individuals differ considerably in their emotion experience. Some experience emotions in a highly differentiated manner, clearly distinguishing among a variety of negative and positive discrete emotions. Others experience emotions in a relatively undifferentiated manner, treating a range of like-valence terms as interchangeable. Drawing on self-regulation theory, we hypothesised that individuals with highly differentiated emotion experience should be better able to regulate emotions than individuals with poorly differentiated emotion experience. In particular, we hypothesised that emotion differentiation and emotion regulation would be positively related in the context of intense negative emotions, where the press for emotion regulation is generally greatest. To test this hypothesis, participants' negative and positive emotion differentiation was assessed using a 14-day diary protocol. Participants' regulation of negative and positive emotions was assessed using laboratory measures. As predicted, negative emotion differentiation was positively related to the frequency of negative emotion regulation, particularly at higher levels of emotional intensity.     

When feeling bad is expected to be good: emotion regulation and outcome expectancies in social conflicts

According to the instrumental approach to emotion regulation, people may want to experience even unpleasant emotions to attain instrumental benefits. Building on value-expectancy models of self-regulation, we tested whether people want to feel bad in certain contexts specifically because they expect such feelings to be useful to them. In two studies, participants were more likely to try to increase their anger before a negotiation when motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) a negotiation partner. Participants motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) their partner expected anger to be more useful to them, and this expectation in turn, led them to try to increase their anger before negotiating. The subsequent experience of anger, following random assignment to emotion inductions (Study 1) or engagement in self-selected emotion regulation activities (Study 2), led participants to be more successful at getting others to concede to their demands, demonstrating that emotional preferences have important pragmatic implications.     

The emotional feeling as a combination of two qualia: A neurophilosophical-based emotion theory

It is argued that the emotional feeling comprises the following two emotional qualia. (1) A nucleus feeling or primary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the end product of appraisal by the central nervous system. (2) The experience of being urged to emotion-related reflection or secondary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the brain's decision to inhibit pre-programmed emotional behaviour, and to initiate emotion-related reflections. Different brain modules regulate these two qualia, and thus each can be experienced independently of the other. The primary emotional quale is related to activation of the amygdala, it is emotion specific, and neutral with respect to affect. The secondary emotional quale is related to activation of the orbito-prefrontal cortex (O-PFC), and includes affective aspects.

It is argued that emotional behaviour is regulated by the following three neural mechanisms, two of which two are directly related to the two qualia. (1) An evolutionary ancient system (amygdala-system), which comprises the amygdalae and subcortical nuclei, and which activates pre-programmed emotional behaviour. (2) An evolutionary recent system (PFC-system), comprising the prefrontal cortex, which inhibits pre-programmed emotional behaviour, activates emotional reflection, generates and evaluates behavioural alternatives. In contrast to the pre-programmed behaviour, the behavioural alternatives are more likely to serve long-term goals. (3) A default mechanism, which gives rise to default (i.e., “just do something”) behaviour. The first two systems are mutually competitive, while the third mechanism takes over if either the competition between the first two mechanisms, or the decision process of the PFC-system, takes too long. This default mechanism involves the function of the medial-prefrontal cortex (M-PFC).     

Shame: mechanisms of activation and consequences for social perception, self-image, and general negative emotion

In two experiments we explored Tomkins's (1963) concept of shame, comparing conscious versus unconscious shame activation. In line with Tomkins' theory, an impeded positive feedback sequence, consciously or unconsciously perceived, elicited more shame than continuously negative feedback. This was, however, true only for participants with an initially low degree of internalized shame. Participants with a high degree of internalized shame unexpectedly displayed shame following the positive feedback intended to elicit positive emotion. Whether this has implications for Tomkins's theory or rather for methodological issues is discussed. Exploring consequences of shame for social perception and self-image, we found reversed results depending on level of consciousness. Effects were consistently greater for women, although at marginal significance levels. Results partly support Tomkins's notion of shame, but imply that his theory might need modification in terms of the role played by consciousness and, possibly, by individual differences such as sex and shame proneness.     

Thinking and feeling in the People's Republic of China: testing the generality of the "laws of emotion"

Cognitive theories of emotion assert that emotional reactions to events depend on the manner in which events are interpreted and appraised. From this perspective, the same outcome can produce different emotions. For example, a score of 85% on a test can evoke positive feelings if it is considered a success or negative feelings if it is considered a failure. Among the various appraisal dimensions that have been identified, causal attributions are thought to play a particularly influential role in shaping emotional reactions to various events. For example, success can evoke pride if it is attributed to high ability, gratitude if it is attributed to help from others, relief if it is attributed to a stroke of good fortune, or guilt if it is attained fraudulently or at the expense of others. These cognitive-affective linkages are thought to be universal. In this paper, we report two studies that tested the cross-cultural generality of some of these assumptions. In Study 1, participants from the People's Republic of China were led to succeed or fail on an (alleged) test of their intelligence and creativity. Consistent with previous findings with Western samples, attributions to ability predicted participants' emotional reactions to their test performance, with high ability attributions linked to greater pride following success. In Study 2, we extended these findings with American and Chinese participants, using a different experimental manipulation of success and failure, and a measure of attributions to effort. For both cultural groups, attributions to ability (but not attributions to effort) predicted greater emotional reactions to success. We conclude that attribution-emotion linkages have cross-cultural validity, and that pride is maximized when success is attributed to high ability.     

A rapprochement between emotion and cognition: amygdala, emotion, and self-relevance in episodic-autobiographical memory

Lindquist et al. remark that not all fear instances lead to heightened amygdalar activity and, instead, point to roles of the amygdala in detecting "motivationally salient "or "emotionally impactful" stimuli. By reviewing research on the amygdala's functions in episodic-autobiographical memory, we further emphasize the involvement of the amygdala in coding the subjective relevance and extracting the biological and social significance of the stimuli.     

Ecstasy and agony: activation of the human amygdala in positive and negative emotion

Considerable evidence indicates that the amygdala plays a critical role in negative, aversive human emotions. Although researchers have speculated that the amygdala plays a role in positive emotion, little relevant evidence exists. We examined the neural correlates of positive and negative emotion using positron emission tomography (PET), focusing on the amygdala. Participants viewed positive and negative photographs, as well as interesting and uninteresting neutral photographs, during PET scanning. The left amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex were activated during positive emotion, and bilateral amygdala activation occurred during negative emotion. High-interest, unusual photographs also elicited left-amygdala activation, a finding consistent with suggestions that the amygdala is involved in vigilance reactions to associatively ambiguous stimuli. The current results constitute the first neuroimaging evidence for a role of the amygdala in positive emotional reactions elicited by visual stimuli. Although the amygdala appears to play a more extensive role in negative emotion, it is involved in positive emotion as well.     

Self-esteem memories: feeling good about achievement success, feeling bad about relationship distress

College students and middle-aged adults provided memories of occasions when they felt especially good or especially bad about themselves. Probes directed the memory search to several age intervals during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Predominant themes represented in self-esteem memories differed consistently as a function of emotional valence. Memories of positive self-worth frequently focused on achievement/mastery themes, whereas memories of negative self-worth frequently focused on interpersonal/affiliation themes. When people evaluate the self through the lens of autobiographical memory, interpersonal distress is portrayed as especially damaging and achievement success is portrayed as especially enhancing. The asymmetry between positive and negative self-esteem memories is explained using multiple theoretical perspectives within social and personality psychology.     

Stance,feeling and phenomenology

This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique.     

The interplay of attention and emotion: top-down attention modulates amygdala activation in psychopathy

Psychopathic behavior has long been attributed to a fundamental deficit in fear that arises from impaired amygdala function. Growing evidence has demonstrated that fear-potentiated startle (FPS) and other psychopathy-related deficits are moderated by focus of attention, but to date, no work on adult psychopathy has examined attentional modulation of the amygdala or concomitant recruitment of relevant attention-related circuitry. Consistent with previous FPS findings, here we report that psychopathy-related differences in amygdala activation appear and disappear as a function of goal-directed attention. Specifically, decreased amygdala activity was observed in psychopathic offenders only when attention was engaged in an alternative goal-relevant task prior to presenting threat-relevant information. Under this condition, psychopaths also exhibited greater activation in selective-attention regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) than did nonpsychopaths, and this increased LPFC activation mediated psychopathy’s association with decreased amygdala activation. In contrast, when explicitly attending to threat, amygdala activation did not differ in psychopaths and nonpsychopaths. This pattern of amygdala activation highlights the potential role of LPFC in mediating the failure of psychopathic individuals to process fear and other important information when it is peripheral to the primary focus of goal-directed attention.