Is pleasure all that is good about experience?

Philosophical Studies - Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article...     

Evolutionary possibilities: Can a society be constrained so that “the good” self-organizes?

Can a human society be constrained in such a way that self-organization will thereafter tend to produce outcomes that advance the goals of the society? Such a society would be self-organizing in the sense that individuals who pursue only their own interests would none-the-less act in the interests of the society as a whole, irrespective of any intention to do so. The paper sketches an agent-based model that identifies the conditions that must be met if such a self-organizing society is to emerge. The model draws heavily on an understanding of how self-organizing societies have emerged repeatedly during the evolution of life on Earth. The model demonstrates that the key enabling requirement for a self-organizing society is ‘consequence-capture’. Broadly this means that all agents in the society must capture sufficient of the beneficial (and harmful) consequences of their actions for the goals of the society. ‘Consequence-capture’ can be organized in a society by appropriate management (systems of evolvable constraints) that suppresses free riders and supports pro-social actions. In human societies these constraints include institutions such as systems of governance and social norms. If a self-organizing society is to emerge, consequence-capture must apply to all agents in the society, including those involved in the establishment and adaptation of institutions. If this is achieved, the result will be a fully self-organizing society in which the interests of all agents (including individuals, firms, multi-national corporations, political organizations, institutions and governments) are aligned with the interests of the society as a whole.     

Should I follow my feelings? How individual differences in following feelings influence affective well-being,experience, and responsiveness

Individuals high in the propensity to follow their feelings notice their feelings and use the information provided by their feelings. We investigate the hypothesis that following feelings is a multidimensional, rather than a unidimensional, construct. We reasoned that people follow their positive feelings because these feelings signal the presence of rewards that should be approached and follow their negative feelings because these feelings signal the presence of threats that should be avoided. Because approach and avoidance stem from independent motivational systems, we hypothesized and found that following positive feelings and following negative feelings are separable dimensions. In part 1, we developed a measure, called the Following Affective States Test (FAST), to assess these dimensions and provided psychometric data supporting its adequacy. In part 2, we continued to validate the scale and found that this new conceptualization clarifies the debate concerning whether following feelings is psychologically beneficial. In part 3, we tested the utility of the FAST by demonstrating that it predicts the degree to which individuals notice, react to, and use positive and negative affective information.     

赫勒以feelings为中心的马克思主义人类学建构

赫勒利用feelings概念的多义性建构了一种马克思主义人类学。feelings概念引导出的是一个从感觉出发，经由知觉、记忆、想象、情绪等上升到感情的哲学人类学体系。赫勒在马克思主义的视野中将每一个环节中的心理想象与社会性、社会经验的积极互动相融合，从而形成一个上升的认识世界的螺旋，并与思想和行动稳定地结构在一起。赫勒的哲学人类学不仅更新了哲学人类学的论域，深化了心理学的哲学论域，还将马克思主义与心理分析结合在一起，建构了一种马克思主义人类学的阐释路径。     

Does perpetrator punishment satisfy victims' feelings of revenge?

Criminal victimization often provokes strong feelings of revenge. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether legal punishment of the perpetrator reduces victims' feelings of revenge. A cross‐sectional study of 174 crime victims revealed that punishment severity does not predict feelings of revenge at a time several years after the trial. A longitudinal study of 31 crime victims revealed that, for the time interval from a few weeks before the trial to a few weeks after the trial, punishment severity significantly predicts a decrease in feelings of revenge; nevertheless intraindividual and interindividual stability of these feelings was high. Taken together, results of the two studies suggest that perpetrator punishment only partially, and moreover only transitorily, satisfies victims' feelings of revenge. Therefore, satisfaction of victims' feelings of revenge cannot be taken as empirical justification for tightening of sentencing norms. Aggr. Behav. 30:62–70, 2004. © 2004 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Who's calling the shots? Intentional content and feelings of control

Based on Pacherie’s dynamic theory of intentions, this study investigated how the way an intention is formed and sustained affects action performance and the experience of control during acting. In Experiment 1, task-irrelevant verbal commands were given while participants responded to stimuli in a two-choice reaction time (RT) task. The commands referred to an action goal congruent or incongruent with the actor’s current intention, or ordered the initiation or abortion of the action. In Experiment 2, the same commands were given as participants freely chose between two actions. The distractors affected performance in the reactive task only. In both experiments, feelings of control were based on movement parameters as well as perceived (mis)matches between distractors and intended actions. These findings suggest that the way an intention is implemented affects how well it can be shielded against external perturbations and how much one feels in control.     

Human feelings: why are some more aware than others?

A recent article reports that human perception of heartbeat timing is mediated by right (non-dominant) anterior insular cortex, and that the activity and the size of this region is directly correlated with individuals' subjective awareness of inner body feelings and emotionality. These results support the somatic-marker hypothesis of consciousness (a modern successor to the James-Lange theory of emotion) and the neuroanatomical concept that human awareness is based on a phylogenetically distinct interoceptive pathway.     

Doing good,feeling good: Values and the self 's moral center

Rarely do social psychological treatments of the self highlight its moral dimension. We expect people with prosocial values to feel better about themselves when enacting such values. Social identities situate individuals within social groups and wider social structures; successfully enacting important identities increases feelings of self-esteem. This paper looks at individual differences and demonstrates that enacting a social identity (volunteering) contributes more to feelings of self-esteem for those individuals whose values align with that identity. Volunteering may increase self-esteem in general; but for those who claim the identity and hold especially prosocial values, volunteering becomes an important route toward positive self-evaluation.     

Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

What justifies that?

I clarify and defuse an argument for skepticism about justification with the aid of some results from recent linguistic theory. These considerations illuminate debates about the structure of justification.     

Does hurt linger? Exploring the nature of hurt feelings over time

The utility of distinguishing between introjective hurt (feeling sad, engaging in selfblame, and wondering what one did wrong) and retaliatory hurt (yelling at, blaming, confronting, and feeling angry toward the offender) was explored in a longitudinal design of two months. Participants (N=51) were asked to describe a recent hurtful incident in survey format and complete subsequent measures of various behavioral and emotional reactions, including hurt and forgiveness. Results suggested the stability and relative independence of the two types of hurt and the differential significance of predictor variables (for example, apology) for each hurt type, both simultaneously and over time. These results support the distinction between retaliatory and introjective hurt as they represent distinct reactions with differential interpersonal outcomes.     

Shameful selves: Women's feelings of inadequacy and constructed façades

This paper explores women's experiences of shame as a political, existential and psychological emotional state. In particular, it focuses on women's accounts of the specific shameful experiences containing the employment of a ‘façade’ to protect the ‘true’ self constructed as inadequate and shameful. The key argument in this paper is that women's shame should be understood as discursively, politically and psychodynamically over-determined. It therefore presents a reading of women's shame that brings together Foucauldian ideas of self-surveillance and positioning in discourse, with a psychodynamic theorization of shame as resulting from a constant negotiation between external forces and internal agencies. The paper also argues for the necessity of a multiplicity of readings to make adequate sense of such over-determination.      

What good is moral imagination?

Johnson, Mark. (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (287 pp.). ISBN 0–226–40168–5.     

Are philosophers good intuition predictors?

Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson (1998) implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway, Edmunds, and Manley (2013) empirically demonstrate that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once the most relevant question is identified, a re-analysis of Dunaway and colleagues’ data actually undermines the superfluity criticism.     

Might anything be plain good?

Philosophical Studies - G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is...     

How do I remember that I know you know that I know?

Communication is aided greatly when speakers and listeners take advantage of mutually shared knowledge (i.e., common ground). How such information is represented in memory is not well known. Using a neuropsychological-psycholinguistic approach to real-time language understanding, we investigated the ability to form and use common ground during conversation in memory-impaired participants with hippocampal amnesia. Analyses of amnesics' eye fixations as they interpreted their partner's utterances about a set of objects demonstrated successful use of common ground when the amnesics had immediate access to common-ground information, but dramatic failures when they did not. These findings indicate a clear role for declarative memory in maintenance of common-ground representations. Even when amnesics were successful, however, the eye movement record revealed subtle deficits in resolving potential ambiguity among competing intended referents; this finding suggests that declarative memory may be critical to more basic aspects of the on-line resolution of linguistic ambiguity.