Toward a phenomenology of attention

There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and the cognitive bestowal of organization on otherwise unorganized data. It is concluded that cognitive psychologists and others working on attention can benefit from Gurwitsch's work, and that a credible account of attention is crucial to the success of any comprehensive statement on the nature of consciousness.     

Toward a phenomenology of trance logic in posttraumatic stress disorder

Some induction procedures result in trance logic as an essential feature of hypnosis. Trance logic is a voluntary state of acceptance of suggestions without the critical evaluation that would destroy the validity of the meaningfulness of the suggestion. Induction procedures in real and simulated conditions induce a conflict between two contradictory messages in experimental hypnosis. In military induction the conflict is much more subtle involving society's need for security and its need for ethics. Such conflicts are often construed by the subject as trance logic. Trance logic provides an opportunity for therapists using the phenomenology of "presence" to deal with the objectified concepts of "avoidance," "numbing" implicit in this kind of dysfunctional thinking in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. An individual phenomenology of induction procedures and suggestions, which trigger trance logic, may lead to a resolution of logical fallacies and recurring painful memories. It invites a reconciliation of conflicting messages implicit in phobias and avoidance traumas. Such a phenomenological analysis of trance logic may well be a novel approach to restructure the meaning of trauma.     

Gurdjieff's presentation of emotions: Toward a phenomenology of affective experience

Abstract

This essay presents a phenomenology of emotion by drawing on the psychological account of human beings provided by the Armenian‐Russian philosopher and spiritual teacher George I. Gurdjieff (c. 1877–1949), whose work until recently was ignored by conventional academics. Relatively unknown to the West in his lifetime, Gurdjieff presents in his writings and teachings a detailed picture of the essential constitution of human experience, including the emotional dimension. Although not explicitly phenomenological, his work depicts five affective modes that fit together into a holistic, experientially verifiable conception of human emotion.     

What people think about an unjust event: Toward a better understanding of the phenomenology of experiences of injustice

This article reports on an initial attempt to improve our knowledge of the cognitive processes which are elicited by the perception of an unjust event. High school students were given a story describing an unfair treatment of a student by his teacher and were asked to place themselves either in the role of the unfairly treated student or in that of a non-affected fellow-student. They were then asked to write down all questions and thoughts coming to their minds in the described situation. The reported questions and thoughts were classified into three categories: attributions, action-oriented thoughts, and assessments and evaluations. Statistical analyses of the frequencies and the temporal sequence of occurrence of these categories of responses revealed that victims of an unjust event reported attributions and action-related thoughts more frequently and in an earlier position than non-affected observers. Assessments and evaluations, on the other hand, were more frequently reported by observers than by victims.     

Towards a real phenomenology of logic

This paper was presented at the Workshop on Husserlian Perspectives on Cognition and Ontology in Gargnano (Italy), September 1986. It is a revised version deriving from Ch. 4 of my book on noemata, in which the relationships between mind and logic are investigated through the framework provided by Husserl's thought (Noema. Mente e logica attraverso Husserl, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1988). I wish to thank Ernest LePore, Barry Smith and an anonymous reader for this Journal for helpful suggestions.     

Towards a phenomenology of ethical expertise

This paper was presented as the Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 1989. We would like to thank Drew Cross, David Greenbaum, Wayne Martin, Charles Spinosa, Charles Taylor and Kailey Vernallis for their helpful comments.     

Psychology and phenomenology: a clarification

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth.     

Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals

Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.