Applying statistics to the gatekeeping of expert evidence: Introducing the Structured Statistical Judgement (SSJ)

Daubert required judges to base their decisions about the admissibility of expert witness testimony in large part on the reliability and validity of empirical observations. Because judges have a wide array of duties and may not be equipped to understand the complexities of statistical analysis, some jurists have recommended that court‐appointed experts assist judges in their gatekeeping function. To assist such experts in scrutinizing empirical papers, we propose a Structured Statistical Judgement (SSJ) that takes advantage of advances in the various statistical methods – such as effect sizes that adjust for error – which have allowed researchers to report increasingly more reliable and valid observations. We also include supplementary materials that court‐appointed experts can use both as a codebook to operationalize the SSJ and as a quick reference that will aid consultation with judges. An initial application of the SSJ examined all 93 empirical articles published in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law and Law and Human Behavior in 2015 and resulted in excellent interrater reliability (π = 0.83; π = 0.95; π = 0.97), at the same time it indicated that a majority of the articles fail to include the comprehensive and transparent statistical analysis that would be most useful to courts.     

Demonstrating “Reasonable Fear” at Trial: Is it Science or Junk Science?

This paper explores how scientific knowledge is used in a criminal case. I examine materials from an admissibility hearing in a murder trial and discuss the dynamics of contesting expert scientific opinion and evidence. The research finds that a purported form of “science” in the relevant scientific community is filtered through, tested by, and subjected to legal standards, conceptions, and procedures for determining admissibility. The paper details how the opposing lawyers, the expert witness, and the judge vie to contingently work out what will count in court as appropriate scientific authority, methods and evidence, and as a scientifically valid and legally admissible account of “reasonable fear.” When science becomes enmeshed in legal controversies, science does not trump law. Rather, it is the court’s canons of proper procedure and measures of substantive adequacy that take precedence.

JOURNEY OF THE UNIVERSE: WEAVING SCIENCE WITH THE HUMANITIES

This article discusses Journey of the Universe as a project that consists of a film, book, conversation series, online classes, and a website. It describes how the creators worked to integrate science and humanities, not privilege or elevate science. It refutes arguments made in Lisa Sideris's Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World that suggest that Journey overlooks religion and distorts wonder. The article observes that Journey does not dismiss religion but includes it in explicit ways. It does not dictate wonder; it evokes wonder. In short, Journey is a living or functional cosmology with implications for mutually enhancing human–Earth relations.     

Disquiet in the consulting room: everything/nothing that is said here is confidential

Writing from experiences in the consulting room in private practice in Australia, the author refers to the layered complexity of a conflict of ethical duty which has legal and social implications. The paper explores how the ethics that are congruent with creating a safe vas bene claustrum can be diametrically opposed to the social and legal structures and processes on which we all rely. It is suggested that within the vas, analysts and analysands engage in a shared process of emotionally connected, layered, symbolic thinking. Subpoenas directed at analysts are seeking concrete evidence that will stand up in court. The paper argues that this is a category error based on ignorance and misconceptions of what analytic work entails. The intrusion of a subpoena into the vas has the potential to cause havoc in the mental health and the lives of already vulnerable, possibly traumatized and isolated individuals. It can undermine a fundamental human right and undermine the profession of psychotherapy as a whole. The paper proposes that analysts have an ethical obligation to protect the work contained within the vas from these category errors and to educate other professionals as to why we cannot provide the kind of evidence that the courts require.     

What's Fair When a Child Testifies?1

Undergraduates (N = 385) watched a 2-hr, videotaped, mock trial of a child sexual abuse case. The child testified in open court, with a barrier between the child and the defendant, or via closed circuit television. Students enacted the role of a juror, sibling of the defendant, or sibling of the mother of the victim. The judge either did or did not warn jurors that the barrier or video should not be considered evidence of the defendant's guilt. Use of the barrier or video did not influence guilty votes, the credibility of witnesses, nor the perceived fairness of the trial for jurors. Siblings of the defendant perceived these procedures to be biased and their use as unfair. Increased publicity about the use of barriers and closed-circuit television when children testify is recommended to reduce objections to these procedures.     

Michel Foucault and the “care of the self” approach to the Buddhist dharma

In line with a particular form of analysis as developed by Michel Foucault, this article proposes to elucidate a particular way of understanding Buddhist monastic culture as detailed in the rules concerning behaviour (the Vinaya), which may be called the “care of the self approach”. To develop this argument, the article first describes the nature of the Vinaya as a “training scheme” rather than a system of prohibitions or rules. Second, it examines the nature of confession or what is called “truth telling”. Third, it examines the nature of transgression of the Vinaya rules. Fourth, I examine the Vinaya and the role of ethics. Lastly, it is shown how these approaches to monastic Buddhism deal with the nature of the transformation of desire to construct what may be seen as a form of “ethical technology” or alternatively as a “transgressive technology”.     

Analyzing Negative Experiences Without Ruminating: The Role of Self-Distancing in Enabling Adaptive Self-Reflection

Both common intuition and findings from multiple areas of research suggest that when faced with distressing experiences, it is helpful to understand one’s feelings. However, a large body of research also indicates that people’s attempts to make sense of their feelings often backfire, leading them to ruminate and feel worse. In this article, we describe a program of research that focuses on disentangling these seemingly contradictory sets of findings. The research program we describe proposes that psychological distance from the self plays a key role in determining whether people’s attempts to understand their feelings lead to adaptive or maladaptive self-reflection. It suggests that people’s attempts to understand their feelings often fail because they analyze their feelings from a self-immersed perspective rather than a self-distanced perspective. Empirical evidence from multiple levels of analysis is presented to support this prediction. The basic science and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself.     

Weighing Outcomes by Time or Against Time? Evaluation Rules in Intertemporal Choice

Models of intertemporal choice draw on three evaluation rules, which we compare in the restricted domain of choices between smaller sooner and larger later monetary outcomes. The hyperbolic discounting model proposes an alternative‐based rule, in which options are evaluated separately. The interval discounting model proposes a hybrid rule, in which the outcomes are evaluated separately, but the delays to those outcomes are evaluated in comparison with one another. The tradeoff model proposes an attribute‐based rule, in which both outcomes and delays are evaluated in comparison with one another: People consider both the intervals between the outcomes and the compensations received or paid over those intervals. We compare highly general parametric functional forms of these models by means of a Bayesian analysis, a method of analysis not previously used in intertemporal choice. We find that the hyperbolic discounting model is outperformed by the interval discounting model, which, in turn, is outperformed by the tradeoff model. Our cognitive modeling is among the first to offer quantitative evidence against the conventional view that people make intertemporal choices by discounting the value of future outcomes, and in favor of the view that they directly compare options along the time and outcome attributes.     

The Patience of God the Creator: Reflections on Genesis 1:1–2:4a

This article proposes that Genesis 1:1–2:4a be read in terms of an exercise of divine patience – an act of ‘letting be’ and ‘letting happen’ wherein God establishes, guides, waits on and endorses the free action of non‐human creatures. It first articulates a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, affirming that God is solely responsible for the establishment of a dynamic, complex and valuable cosmos. Next, it contends that God's creative efforts include the empowerment of non‐human creatures who reward God's patience and commit themselves to the task of creatio cooperativa. It then argues that the emergence of human beings is a creative act undertaken by God and non‐human creatures, such that the human bears both the imago dei and the imago mundi. In conclusion, the article considers the relationship of divine and human action, the limits of the idiom of causality, and the possibility of developing a doctrine of creation in light of the witness of the Hebrew Bible.     

Getting it right: the trial of sexual assault and child molestation cases under federal rules of evidence 413-415

Congressional enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 changed centuries of the law which had excluded evidence by the state that the defendant had committed other bad acts and was therefore the sort of person who would be more likely to commit the act charged. The passage of Rules 413-415 opens the door to this type of character evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases and requires trial judges to assess the probative value of this propensity evidence offered. Yet, neither these rules nor their legislative history offer much guidance in this assessment. This article offers guidance to trial judges and lawyers to assess the probative value of propensity evidence offered under these rules.     

The Revival of Panpsychism and its Relevance for the Science-Religion Dialogue

Panpsychism, whereby mentality is considered fundamental within the natural world, does not appear prima facie to be a friend to with either natural science or Christian theology. This article challenges this first impression. Within the science and theology dialogue, panpsychism has been a central component of Process theologians’ efforts to integrate these disciplines into a larger metaphysical framework; but, this is not the method adopted in this paper. Instead, it is argued that panpsychism gives scholars the potential for greater progress in two field defining discussions: quantum accounts of special divine action and theistic evolution. It is shown that panpsychism currently finds sufficient consonance with the relevant scientific disciplines and has substantial benefits for theologians engaged in these areas. Panpsychism holds great promise as the philosophy of mind for future generations of science-and-religion scholars.     

The Location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism

Many philosophers have been puzzled by Kant's decision to insert the Refutation of Idealism into the second edition of the first Critique at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate. This article proposes a solution to the puzzle. It defends an explanation for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism that is plausibly expressed by Kant's claim at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate that the Refutation of Idealism is ‘here in its right place’ because ‘[a] powerful objection against these rules for proving existence indirectly is made by idealism’ (B274). According to this explanation, the Refutation of Idealism is Kant's response to the objection that the Second Postulate must be false since otherwise idealism is true. This article also considers and rejects a number of alternative explanations for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

Cost-effectiveness of online positive psychology: Randomized controlled trial

As yet, no evidence is available about the cost-effectiveness of positive psychological interventions. When offered via the Internet, these interventions may be particularly cost-effective, because they are highly scalable and do not rely on scant resources such as therapists’ time. Alongside a randomized controlled trial of an online positive psychological intervention, a health-economic evaluation was conducted. Mild to moderately depressed adults seeking self-help and recruited in the general population were randomly assigned to the intervention group (n?=?143) and a waitlisted usual care group (n?=?141). Improved clinical outcomes were achieved in the intervention group (at least for depression) at higher costs. When outliers (the top 2.5%, n?=?5 in intervention group, n?=?2 in control group) were removed, cost-effectiveness was increased considerably. For positive psychology, economic evaluations may be a means to nudge policy decision-makers towards placing positive psychological interventions on the health agenda.     

A PUZZLE ABOUT NATURALISM

Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly question‐begging. The article explains this and shows more generally that there are no scientific arguments for biconditional naturalism.     

Propositions pour un positivisme

Summary The author tries to specify a philosophical attitude which could be considered a form of Positivism, but this does not necessarily mean that it coincides with the doctrine of Auguste Comte or with that of the Vienna Circle.In order to facilitate the exposition the author formulates eight theses whose abrupt character is merely a consequence of the manner of presentation and by no means a manifestation of dogmatism.Eachdatum presents itself as finite experience (1) which is organized with the help ofsymbols, either on the level of perception or on the level of language (2). Inside the perception itself a reduction of experience which is essentially pragmatic first constitutes thephenomena (3). Theobject which is constituted by science on the basis of the phenomena is merely structural and always delimited (4). Its constitution is unceasingly revisable and it never corresponds to an alleged essence of reality.What is here called dialectic never consists in a set of rules governing a movement of phenomena, objects, or ideas; it is a general, historical movement of experience itself, taken as a whole, and the specific movement of the symbolic statements which inform it. One should not confuse it with a kind of general logic, nor with a so-called science of totalities (5). Logic explains the rules of the symbolic systems (6), andscience is the mediate determination of objects by means of the symbolism, and is not an immediate determination of reality (7). It constructs coherent and effective models of phenomena.As far asphilosophy is concerned, it wishes to interpret experience as a totality, not-withstanding experience's finitude as datum (8). Thus it is radically distinguished from science in that philosophy does not intend to construct models, but to explain the meanings of the phenomena and, in general, of experience. That is why the category of truth taken in a rigorous sense does not apply to philosophy's statements.