On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial prospect relativity: context effects in financial decision‐making under risk

We report three studies in which methodologies from psychophysics are adapted to investigate context effects on individual financial decision‐making under risk. The aim was to determine how the range and the rank of the options offered as saving amounts and levels of investment risk influence people's decisions about these variables. In the range manipulation, participants were presented with either a full range of choice options or a limited subset, while in the rank manipulation they were presented with a skewed set of feasible options. The results showed that choices are affected by the position of each option in the range and the rank of presented options, which suggests that judgments and choices are relative. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Seeing is not enough: manipulating choice options causes focusing and preference change in multiattribute risky decision‐making

We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk‐related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade‐off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision making II: Estimating subjective weighting1

Abstract: In comparison between choice options, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects.” Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiment used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess the decision maker's interpretation of choice tasks under the “framing effect” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. This study examined whether preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions under which preference reversals under the framing manipulations ceased to occur were examined. The effects of valence showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision makers maintained consistent task interpretations as pertaining to gains or to losses. Most importantly, the pattern of subjective weighting under the valence effects was consistent with previous explanation of valence effects ( Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996 ). Possibilities for extending the current findings to understanding related psychological phenomena are discussed.     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision framing: moderating effects of individual differences and cognitive processing

Two studies examined the effect of an individual difference variable, need for cognition (NC), and processing of the options on the occurrence of risky choice framing effects. In Study 1 (N=206), frame interacted with NC and math skill such that no framing effect was observed among those high in both NC and math skill. No effect was found for the processing manipulation of requesting a reason for one's choices. Study 2 (N=257) enhanced the processing of the problems by asking participants to write out the options as they would describe them to a friend. Results showed that frame interacted with NC and depth of processing such that no framing effect was observed among those high in NC who were in the deep processing condition. These findings suggest that NC and depth of processing need to be considered in concert in order to understand their moderating effects on framing. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing fast and slow: a dual processing account of multimodal framing effects

ABSTRACT

Human reasoning can be characterized by a continuum anchored by two extremes: fast, automatic, and emotional processing on the one side; versus slow, controlled and rational processing on the other. Despite theoretical linkages, no studies have empirically connected these types of information processing with the mechanisms of multimodal (visual and textual) media effects. We employ tools from dual processing theories in a framing effects paradigm to test whether the effects of news visuals and text take place via relatively more automatic and controlled information processing, respectively. To do so, we combine experimental manipulations and individual differences data collected across two experiments using different political issues. Results from experimental manipulations provide converging evidence for the distinct processing of visuals and text. Individual differences data paint a more nuanced picture, suggesting that the processing of multimodal news frames does not always conform to a simple automatic-controlled dichotomy.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision-making: Assessing decision-makers' perceived domains of choice

Abstract: In comparison between choice alternatives, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects”. Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996 ) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiments used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess decision‐maker's interpretation of choice tasks under “framing effects” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. Two experiments showed that preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions wherein the framing manipulations lose the effectiveness were examined. Valence effects showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision‐makers maintained consistent domain perceptions as pertaining to gains or to losses, across the domains of gains and losses. Implications are discussed.     

Interactive effects of self-concept and social context on perceived cohesion in intensive care nursing

Group cohesion is critical in the workplace, especially when individual and contextual constraints coexist but high performance is essential. We assess the source of variation in group members' perceptions of cohesion. Using an interactional psychology perspective, and within the context of intensive care, this study examines the interactive effects of nurses' self-concept and the objective social context within which they are embedded. Individual- and unit-level factors are investigated because they jointly shape the degree to which nurses perceive their intensive care units as cohesive. A multisource, multilevel study of approximately 140 nurses employed in 20 units across Denmark demonstrates the role self-concept plays in easing and enhancing the constraints workplaces impose on cohesion. Implications for research on emergent states and interactional psychology are discussed.     

Order effects and memory for evidence in individual versus group decision making in auditing

Sequential processing of evidence may lead to recency effect, a potential bias in judgment. The present research seeks to extend the literature on recency effects by assessing the potential moderating influence of team work: whether group decision making moderates the severity of recency effects predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), and whether group processing influences the accuracy of, and confidence in memory for evidence. Experienced auditors from a Big‐6 accounting firm made audit judgments, either individually or as groups. They were randomly assigned to one of two levels of evidence presentation order. After performing the judgment task, participants completed two evidence recognition tests. Consistent with prior findings, recency effects on judgments were observed, but only for individuals. Group judgments or audit reports were not affected by recency. Order effects, however, did not translate into different choices of audit reports, and did not persist in memories of either individuals or groups. As expected, group memory was more accurate than individual memory and groups were more confident than individuals. Overall, confidence in accurate memories was greater than in inaccurate ones. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Groups, group members and individual decision processes: the effects of decision strategy, social interaction style and reception of decision-threatening information on post-decision processes

In two experiments, one conducted at an individual level and one at a group level, it was investigated how decision strategies and the reception of decision-threatening information affect the degree of post-decision consolidation for both individual and group decision-makers. In Experiment 1, roughly half the 55 participants made decisions in three-person groups and the other half individually. The type of decision strategies subjects employed (compensatory, non-compensatory, other) was assessed by questionnaire. In two post-decision sessions, consolidation was assessed using a memory task, either decision-supporting or decision-threatening information being provided at the start of the last post-decision session. In Experiment 2, the same design and procedure were used at a group level. In both experiments, the groups (and the single group members) were analyzed with the SYMLOG instrument. The results indicated that individual decision-makers consolidated their own decisions more than members of decision-making groups. There was also greater post-decision consolidation with the use of non-compensatory decision strategies as well as with reception of decision-threatening information, this latter result being seen as providing an explanation for the greater consolidation that individual decision-makers showed. Furthermore, single task-oriented group members and groups with a task-oriented leader consolidated the decision made by their group.     

不确定性容忍度对风险偏好的影响及其情景依赖性

研究以经营店面为背景设计决策材料,采用2(不确定性容忍度:高/低)×2(损益背景:损失/获益)×2(选项描述框架:积极/消极)×3(损益概率:高/中/低)混合实验设计,探讨不同任务情景下个体不确定性容忍度对风险偏好的影响。结果发现,不确定性容忍度主效应显著,高容忍度者比低容忍度者更冒险。不确定性容忍度与损益背景交互作用显著：在损失背景下,高容忍度者比低容忍度者更冒险,在获益背景下无此效应。不确定性容忍度与选项描述框架交互作用显著：在积极框架下,高容忍度者比低容忍度者更冒险,在消极框架下无此效应。这表明,不确定性容忍度对风险偏好产生影响,但这种影响会受到损益背景和选项描述框架的调节,具有情景依赖性。     

Outcome effects: The impact of decision process and outcome controllability

An ‘outcome effect’ refers to the phenomenon whereby performance evaluations of decision makers are affected by the outcomes of those decisions. Although some consider such an effect to be a judgmental error, judgment by outcomes may not be dysfunctional when the evaluator does not know how the decision maker chose his or her action. In such situations, outcomes may provide some noisy information about decision quality. We test whether an outcome effect will still occur when the decision methodology and quality are more explicitly identified. Further, we test whether outcome controllability, a previously unexplored moderator variable, will have an impact on the outcome effect. Our first experiment, using undergraduates as subjects, shows that decision quality and controllability have an impact on performance evaluations but that the ubiquitous outcome effect still obtains. These results were replicated with experienced business people, except that controllability only affected their judgments in the case of negative outcomes. Implications of these results are discussed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Physical Elevation in Buildings on Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Pilot and Four Field Studies

Little empirical research has been reported on the role of spatial positioning inside buildings on consumer behavior. Based on embodied cognition literature, we propose that elevation from street level influences risk preferences. In a pilot study and four field studies involving financial decisions with both hypothetical and real payoffs, we find evidence that high physical elevation increases risk‐seeking tendencies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that elevation leads to riskier behavior by increasing sensitivity to power. Finally, we establish a boundary condition for the impact of elevation on risk preferences by demonstrating that the effect attenuates when accessibility of physical elevation is low. These findings show that a subtle environmental parameter—physical elevation from street level—can influence human psychological states and consequently affect decisions.     

“All‐or‐None” Versus “Most‐or‐Some” Options in Risky Choice: Effects of Domain and Handedness

Two methodological variants of Kahneman and Tversky's Asian disease scenario were investigated. One variant involved replacing the “all‐or‐none” outcome scenarios of the risky choice with “most‐or‐some” scenario outcomes, and the second variant involved replacing the negative domain of lives lost with a positive domain of jobs created. In addition, the effects of strength of handedness, a variable related to individual differences in risk perception, were examined. Results indicated that standard framing effects were obtained across both domains, with a decrease in risky choice under the gain domain. Scenario type also interacted with handedness, such that the all‐or‐none scenario yielded framing effects for consistent (strong)‐handers only, whereas the most‐or‐some scenario yielded framing effects for inconsistent (mixed)‐handers only (consistent‐handers are those who use the same hand exclusively for almost all activities). These results demonstrate that framing effects are strongly influenced by the presence versus absence of extreme/absolute outcomes and that individuals (in this case, decision makers with varying degrees of handedness strength) are differentially sensitive to different pieces of information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

道德决策的机制及干预研究:自我相关性与风险水平的作用

现有的道德决策脑机制研究更多地关注了认知和情绪的交互作用,较少关注个体对"自我相关性"和"风险水平"信息的整合加工,更是忽视了帮助情境和伤害情境下道德决策的心理与脑机制的异同。因此,有必要通过行为、事件相关电位(ERP)和多模态脑功能成像(f MRI)等多种方法来系统考察帮助和伤害情境下自我相关性和风险水平交互影响道德决策的认知和神经机制,并进一步探讨共情训练对道德决策的干预作用。旨在揭示道德决策的时间进程和神经基础;探寻自我相关性与风险水平对道德决策的影响,及其在不同情境和共情水平下可能存在的变异;共情训练能否有效提升个体的道德决策水平。