Are thresholds reduced by illusions? An attempt at replication

Three experiments are reported, which are attempts to replicate the finding of Ross and Gregory (1964) that difference thresholds for weights can be lowered by means of the size-weight illusion. Three different procedures were used, the first one (experiment I) being designed to show whether or not changes in a subject's judgement criterion could account for apparent changes in sensitivity. The second method (Experiment II) was a replication of Ross and Gregory's first procedure, in which the standard weight was judged before the comparison. In Experiments I and II a larger illusion was induced than in the original studies, but in Experiment III both the weights and container sizes were practically identical to those used by Ross and Gregory. The procedure was also the same as their most successful procedure (number 3) in which standard and comparison were judged simultaneously. The findings were uniformly negative: there was no evidence of criterion shift when the size-weight illusion was induced nor did we find the lowering of threshold previously reported.     

Are inferences from stereotyped role names to characters' gender made elaboratively?

Two experiments provided evidence that gender stereotype inferences from role names--for example, that a surgeon is (probably) male--are made in a forward, elaborative, direction. We used sentences in which a person's gender was never made explicit, but was implied in two different ways. The two ways were by the use of a role name, and by mentioning an item of clothing (e.g., a bikini) or a biological characteristic (e.g., giving birth) that is typically associated with females or males. The two pieces of information (role name and clothing/biological characteristic) were presented in different orders in the two experiments. In both cases a mismatch between the associated genders slowed reading, showing that gender information has been activated. It is argued that if an inference about gender is made on the basis of the second piece of information, hence slowing comprehension, it is unlikely that the inference about gender based on the first piece of information was not made immediately.     

Are there multiple memory systems? Tests of models of implicit and explicit memory

[Formula: see text] This article reviews recent work aimed at developing a new framework, based on signal detection theory, for understanding the relationship between explicit (e.g., recognition) and implicit (e.g., priming) memory. Within this framework, different assumptions about sources of memorial evidence can be framed. Application to experimental results provides robust evidence for a single-system model in preference to multiple-systems models. This evidence comes from several sources including studies of the effects of amnesia and ageing on explicit and implicit memory. The framework allows a range of concepts in current memory research, such as familiarity, recollection, fluency, and source memory, to be linked to implicit memory. More generally, this work emphasizes the value of modern computational modelling techniques in the study of learning and memory.     

Are there multiple memory systems? Tests of models of implicit and explicit memory

This article reviews recent work aimed at developing a new framework, based on signal detection theory, for understanding the relationship between explicit (e.g., recognition) and implicit (e.g., priming) memory. Within this framework, different assumptions about sources of memorial evidence can be framed. Application to experimental results provides robust evidence for a single-system model in preference to multiple-systems models. This evidence comes from several sources including studies of the effects of amnesia and ageing on explicit and implicit memory. The framework allows a range of concepts in current memory research, such as familiarity, recollection, fluency, and source memory, to be linked to implicit memory. More generally, this work emphasizes the value of modern computational modelling techniques in the study of learning and memory.     

The invisible made visible?

With the starting point in a story about a dancer with a profound disability, the topic for critical discussion in this article is prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries in light of concepts of what it means to be human and human fulfilment. More specifically, the focus is on human life with limited capabilities and how a widened view of such a life is crucial in the task of creating a society where all human beings can be perceived as desirable and of equal worth. In the first part of this article the practice of prenatal diagnosis is showed to be filled with narrow conceptions of what it means to be human and perspectives are brought to light that can be argued to have been made invisible in the introduction and implementation of prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries as well as in the ethical debate. In the second part, the vision and actualization of L'Arche is discussed as an example of how befriending people with disabilities can challenge mainstream ethical narratives and widen a narrow view of morality and what it means to be human.     

Are Speedy Brains Needed when Divergent Thinking is Speeded—or Unspeeded?

In this study, we focus on mental speed and divergent thinking, examining their relationship and the influence of task speededness. Participants (N = 109) completed a set of processing speed tasks and a test battery measuring divergent thinking. We used two speeded divergent-thinking tasks of 2 minutes and two unspeeded tasks of 8 minutes to test the influence of task speededness on creative quality and their relation to mental speed. Before each task, participants were instructed to be creative in order to optimally measure creative quality. We found a large main effect of task speededness: less creative ideas were generated when tasks were speeded as compared to unspeeded (Cohen's d = −1.64). We could also replicate a positive relationship of mental speed with speeded divergent thinking (r = .21) and mental speed with unspeeded divergent thinking (r = .25). Our hypothesis that the relation is higher for the speeded divergent-thinking tasks was not confirmed. Importantly, variation in creative quality scores under speeded conditions was not explained by mental speed beyond the predictive power of unspeeded creative quality. The latter finding implies that measurement of creative quality under speeded conditions is not confounded by mental speed.     

Are spatial selection and identity extraction separable when attention is controlled endogenously?

Visual search for a target involves two processes: spatial selection and identity extraction. Ghorashi, Enns, and Di Lollo (2008) found these processes to be independent and surmised that they were carried out along distinct visual pathways: dorsal and ventral, respectively. The two experiments that are described in the present article evaluated this hypothesis. Attentional-blink methodology was combined with voluntary spatial cuing in a visual search task: Intertarget lag was used to manipulate identity extraction; predictive cues were used to signal target locations. Central digit cues in Experiment 1 required participants to identify digits before voluntarily directing attention to a corresponding location, whereas flashed dots in Experiment 2 (indicating an opposite location) required attentional redeployment without prior cue identification. Consistent with the dual-pathway hypothesis, cuing was impaired only when the first target and the number cue competed for ventral-pathway mechanisms. Collectively, the results support the dual-pathway account of the separability of spatial selection and identity extraction.     

What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Implicit and explicit indicators of attitudes or personality traits are positively, and variably, related. This review places the question of implicit ‐ explicit consistency into the tradition of attitude/trait ‐ behaviour consistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Drawing on dual-process models, such as the recent distinction between associative and propositional representations (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we identify a working model of implicit ‐ explicit consistency that organises the empirical evidence on implicit ‐ explicit moderation into five factors: translation between implicit and explicit representations (e.g., representational strength, awareness), additional information integration for explicit representations (e.g., need for cognition), properties of explicit assessment (e.g., social desirability concerns), properties of implicit assessment (e.g., situational malleability), and research design factors (e.g., sampling bias, measurement correspondence).     

How are scientific corrections made?

This paper provides examples drawn from the author’s experience that support the conclusion that errors and deceptions in archival science are often not easily or quickly corrected. The difficulty in correcting errors and deceptions needs wider recognition if it is to be overcome. In addition, the paper discusses how subtle abuses introduce errors into the archival literature.     

Are errors differentiable from deceptive responses when feigning memory impairment? An fMRI study

Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that the neural activity associated with truthful recall, with false memory, and with feigned memory impairment are different from one another. Here, we report a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that addressed an important but yet unanswered question: Is the neural activity associated with intentional faked responses and with errors differentiable? Using a word list learning recognition paradigm, the findings of this mixed event-related fMRI study clearly indicated that the brain activity associated with intentional faked responses was different to the activity associated with errors committed unintentionally. For intentional faked responses, significant activation was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate region, and the precuneus. However, no significant activation was observed for unintentional errors. The results suggest that deception, in terms of feigning memory impairment, is not only more cognitively demanding than making unintentional errors but also utilizes different cognitive processes.     

The mind reduced to molecules?

According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.     

Are mindful people more risk-averse? Effects of trait and state mindfulness on risk preference in decision-making

The current research investigated whether various aspects of mindfulness were differentially associated with risk preference in decision-making. In Studies 1 and 2, attention and present-focus aspects of trait mindfulness were associated with lower risk preference in making monetary gains. In Study 3, participants completed either a mindfulness training or listened to a comparable control recording. Compared to the control condition, subjects in the mindfulness condition were more risk-averse in making choices for monetary gains. The attention and present-focus aspects of state mindfulness mediated this connection. Study 4 introduced a loss framing, where attention and present-focus no longer associated with lower risk preference, but awareness and acceptance aspects of trait mindfulness associated with higher risk preference in avoiding monetary losses. The results suggest that different aspects of mindfulness have potential for mitigating risk preference, but such potential is limited depending on the framing of a decision context.     

Are we more consistent when talking about ourselves than when behaving? Consistency differences through a questionnaire and an objective task

The present paper aimed to examine questionnaire response patterns and objective task-based test behavioral patterns in order to analyze the differences people show in consistency. It is hypothesized that people tend to be more consistent when talking about themselves (when describing themselves through verbal statements) that when they solve a task (when behaving). Consistency is computed using the pi* statistic (Hernandez, Rubio, Revuelta, & Santacreu, 2006). According to this procedure, consistency is defined as the value and the dimensionality of the latent trait of an individual (theta) remaining invariant through out the test of. Participants who are consistent must show a constant theta and follow a given response pattern during the entire course of the test. A sample of 3,972 participants was used. Results reveal that 68% of participants showed a consistent response pattern when completing the questionnaire. When tackling the task-based test, the percentage was 66%. 45% of individuals showed a consistent pattern in both tests. Implications for personality and individual differences assessment are discussed.     

When does explicit justification impair decision making?

The idea that careful analysis leads to better decisions is pervasive in research on decision making. Intriguingly, results raise the possibility that thinking about reasons for decisions before deciding may degrade decision quality. This paper reports the results of a laboratory study which examined whether task characteristics critically influence the effects of thinking about reasons on decision quality. We found that explicit reasoning degraded judgement quality, objectively measured, on an ‘intuitive’ task. However, we also found that explicit reasoning enhanced performance on an ‘analytic’ task. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are we puppets on a string? Comparing the impact of contingency and validity on implicit and explicit evaluations

Research has demonstrated that implicit and explicit evaluations of the same object can diverge. Explanations of such dissociations frequently appeal to dual-process theories, such that implicit evaluations are assumed to reflect object-valence contingencies independent of their perceived validity, whereas explicit evaluations reflect the perceived validity of object-valence contingencies. Although there is evidence supporting these assumptions, it remains unclear if dissociations can arise in situations in which object-valence contingencies are judged to be true or false during the learning of these contingencies. Challenging dual-process accounts that propose a simultaneous operation of two parallel learning mechanisms, results from three experiments showed that the perceived validity of evaluative information about social targets qualified both explicit and implicit evaluations when validity information was available immediately after the encoding of the valence information; however, delaying the presentation of validity information reduced its qualifying impact for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations.