Relapse prevention for alcohol and drug problems: that was Zen, this is Tao

Relapse prevention, based on the cognitive-behavioral model of relapse, has become an adjunct to the treatment of numerous psychological problems, including (but not limited to) substance abuse, depression, sexual offending, and schizophrenia. This article provides an overview of the efficacy and effectiveness of relapse prevention in the treatment of addictive disorders, an update on recent empirical support for the elements of the cognitive-behavioral model of relapse, and a review of the criticisms of relapse prevention. In response to the criticisms, a reconceptualized cognitive-behavioral model of relapse that focuses on the dynamic interactions between multiple risk factors and situational determinants is proposed. Empirical support for this reconceptualization of relapse, the future of relapse prevention, and the limitations of the new model are discussed.     

How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

This paper is an analysis of the performance of one reading of Charles Taylor's general criticisms of naturalist accounts of morality (excluding the issue of moral realism) when measured against a specific naturalist account, in this case J.L. Mackie's moral theory. It is argued that Taylor's criticisms, read in this way, fail to find purchase, despite his singling out of Mackie's theory as a prime example of a theory that exhibits the flaws Taylor believes are inherent in this kind of approach to moral theory. This points the supporter of Taylor's position towards an alternative reading of his challenge to naturalist accounts of morality.     

Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity

This essay shows that Jean‐Luc Nancy's reconceptualization of corporeality in such texts as L'Intrus and Corpus can be an important ally to feminist theories of body. I introduce Nancy's ontology and argue that his rejection of the unified, integrated body of humanist discourses in favor of dis‐integrated bodies constituted by multiple alterities and his consequent reinterpretation of body as a “being‐exscribed” begin the task of thinking bodies beyond traditional dualisms and their ahistorical and rationalist frameworks. I then address three potential criticisms of Nancy's work and suggest that though there may be reasons to move cautiously in adopting the framework he provides, his work harbors resources directly beneficial to critiques of prevailing forms of gender normativity. Quel étrange moi! —Jean‐Luc Nancy, Corpus     

Being and Doing in the Concept of God

In this essay I use the notion of divine values, those values analytically assigned to the concept of God, as a means of understanding replies to criticisms of open theism. I begin by orienting open theism according to the divine values open theist’s embrace within the larger context of relational theology. I then present three criticisms, a theological criticism, a practical criticism and a philosophical criticism and an open theist reply to each. Finally, I attempt to show the underlying motivation which unifies the open theist’s responses and points out where progress can be made in such discussions. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Reasons in Action

Abstract

When an agent performs an action because she takes something as a reason to do so, does she take it as a normative reason for the action or as an explanatory reason? In Reasons Without Rationalism, Setiya criticizes the normative view and advances a version of the explanatory view. I defend a version of the normative view against Setiya's criticisms and show that Setiya's explanatory account has two major flaws: it raises questions that it cannot answer about the occurrence of one motivational ‘because’ within the scope of another; and it cannot accommodate the fact that, if an agent can φ for the reason that p, then she could take p as a reason to φ without φ-ing.     

当代中国人价值观的结构与特点

本研究以事实驱动作为方法学切入点, 系统研究了中国人的价值观结构及特点等问题。研究采用通过系统编制形成的《中国人价值观问卷》, 对工人、农民、专业技术人员、大学生和中学生五类人群进行了测量。其中, 1100份有效数据的探索性因素分析表明, 中国人价值观是一个8因素结构, 具体包括品格自律、才能务实、公共利益、人伦情感、名望成就、家庭本位、守法从众、金钱权力; 随后对1196份有效数据进行结构验证和信度检验, 结果表明中国人价值观问卷(Chinese Values Questionnaire, CVQ)具有良好的构想效度和信度。同时, 通过对中国人价值观现状的分析发现, 中国人价值观具有“好人定位”特点, 并据此提出相应的理论模型。     

The concept of egocentrism in the context of Piaget’s theory

In this paper, we trace the origin and development of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s work. We evaluate a number of criticisms that have been leveled against the concept of egocentrism. Based on our evaluation, we propose a reconceptualization of the concept of egocentrism as a decentering process with different phases that is recapitulated at different stages of development. We provide examples of the decentering process for the sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete-operational, and formal operational stages.Piaget introduced the concept of egocentrism in his early writings in the 1920s to describe general characteristics of the preschool child. Since its introduction, the concept of egocentrism has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention and has drawn numerous criticisms. Piaget attributed these criticisms to serious misunderstandings of the concept of egocentrism. Indeed, Piaget (1945/1962, p. 285, fn) admitted that the choice of the term egocentrism was “unfortunate”, and he apologized (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1967, p. 220) for having dwelt on this expression for the last twenty-five years.In this paper, we trace the origins of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s writings and examine the subsequent changes to this concept. We examine some of the criticisms leveled against the concept of egocentrism and conclude that the concept of egocentrism remained ambiguous in Piaget’s writings. Finally, we suggest a revision of the concept of egocentrism that addresses these ambiguities.     

Two (Weak) Cheers for Markets in Votes

This paper offers the first moral defense of markets in votes in a democratic electoral system based on majority rule where there are no moral restrictions on how votes can be cast. In Part 1 I outline the type of vote buying that I defend in this paper, and defend my methodological assumption. In Part 2 I criticize Freiman’s arguments for legalizing vote buying (arguments that do not address its morality). In Part 3 I outline and reply to some responses that could be made to my criticisms of Freiman’s arguments. In Part 4 I draw from the flaws in Freiman’s arguments to argue that vote buying is morally permissible and defend these arguments against objections.     

Goods,Principles, and Values in the Brighouse,Ladd, Loeb and Swift Framework for Educational Policy-Making

This article presents the promising framework for educational decision makers developed by Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, and Swift (BLLS). The framework consists of an account of the educational goods, distributional principles and independent values at stake in education, and a method for making policy decisions on the basis of these and solid social science. I present three criticisms of this approach. The first says that the derivation of educational goods proceeds on the basis of a too narrow conception of values. I suggest that this foundation should consist of an overlapping consensus, rather than flourishing. The second criticism has to do with the way that the distributive principles are characterized. I argue that BLLS’s characterization of distributive principles should be complemented with accounts of what domains of social life these principles regulate and a specification of whether the distributive principles should be understood as applying over time or at specific instances. The final criticism is that BLLS’s conception of independent values focuses solely on values that constrain the pursuit of educational goods. I claim that this part of the framework should be revised to include aspects of values that also support this pursuit. I conclude arguing that the BLLS frameworks should be further developed rather than rejected.     

The teleological stance: Past,present, and future

We review the support for, and criticisms of, the teleological stance theory, often described as a foundation for goal‐directed action understanding early in life. A major point of contention in the literature has been how teleological processes and assumptions of rationality are represented and understood in infancy, and this debate has been largely centered on three paradigms. Visual habituation studies assess infant's abilities to retrospectively assess teleological processes; the presence of such processes is supported by the literature. Rational imitation is a phenomenon that has been questioned both theoretically and empirically, and there is currently little support for this concept in the literature. The involvement of teleological processes in action prediction is unclear. To date, the ontology of teleological processes remains unspecified. To remedy this, we present a new action‐based theory of teleological processes (here referred to as the embodied account of teleological processes), based on the development of goal‐directed reaching with its origin during the fetal period and continuous development over the first few months of life.     

A cross‐cultural investigation into a reconceptualization of ethnocentrism

This investigation tests a reconceptualization of ethnocentrism based primarily on Sumner's definitions. Ethnocentrism is reconceptualized as ethnic group self‐centeredness, with four intergroup expressions of ingroup preference, superiority, purity, and exploitativeness, and two intragroup expressions of group cohesion and devotion. The reconceptualization was supported in Study 1 among 350 New Zealand participants and in Study 2 among 212 US, 208 Serbian, and 279 French participants. Ethnocentrism in each country consisted of two correlated second‐order factors representing intergroup and intragroup ethnocentrism and six first‐order factors representing the six primary expressions. Analyses in Study 2 supported the measurement invariance of the scale and a third‐order factor model, with one ethnocentrism factor at the broadest level of generalization. Ethnocentrism was empirically distinct from outgroup negativity and mere ingroup positivity. Intragroup ethnocentrism appeared primarily based on ethnic insecurity, personal self‐transcendence, and ethnic identification, whereas intergroup ethnocentrism appeared primarily based on self‐aggrandizement, warlikeness, and generally chauvinistic attitudes. Accordingly, although related, the two kinds of ethnocentrism tend to have quite differential implications for group attitudes and behaviors. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article was published online on 31 December 2008. Errors were subsequently identified. This notice is included in the online and print versions to indicate that both have been corrected [date to be added later].     

The Underdetermination of Total Theories

This paper criticizes the attempt to found the epistemological doctrine that all theories are evidentially underdetermined on the thesis that all theories have empirically equivalent rivals. The criticisms focus on the role of auxiliary hypotheses in prediction. It is argued, in particular, that if auxiliaries are underdetermined, then the thesis of empirical equivalence is undecidable. The inference from empirical equivalence to the underdetermination of total theories would seem to survive the criticisms, because total theories do not require auxiliaries to yield observational consequences. It is shown that, nevertheless, underdetermination cannot be established for total theories. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons

Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism. But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting “hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option.     

Preference change and conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision

Richard Bradley’s Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson’s AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.     

Feminist Radical Empiricism,Values, and Evidence

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.     

Vilification and Values

Social values are an important foundation of political attitudes, yet political controversies often embody conflicts between values, placing the citizen in an awkward position of having to prioritize competing values. One strategy is to consider the groups that are symbolically associated with the competing values. Groups held in high esteem will enhance associated values; groups held in disregard will diminish associated values. Persuasive communicators exploit this process by assailing groups that have been publicly associated with certain issue positions or values as “extreme” or “radical.” Even if the group represents a consensus value like equal opportunity, the extremist label suggests the group's agenda embodies an excessive and uncompromising imposition of this value. This article reports on four experiments that investigated how the extremist label can undermine support for a group's position. We further examine how reputation affects judgments of value priorities.     

Happiness is not Well-Being

This paper attempts to explain the conceptual connections between happiness and well-being. It first distinguishes episodic happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants, so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the idea that happiness in the personal attribute sense can serve as a “proxy” for well-being, i.e., that a person’s degree of deep or robust happiness approximates their degree of well-being. It is argued that happiness in both these senses is conceptually, metaphysically, and empirically distinct from well-being. A new analysis of welfare, well-being as agential flourishing, can explain welfare’s real connection to happiness in both the episodic and personal attribute senses. It predicts that such happiness is only directly beneficial when it is valued, when it is a form of valuing, or when it underwrites (i.e., serves as the causal basis for) the disposition to realize one’s values. It is therefore a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for especially high levels of well-being. This analysis of welfare integrates many insights from the eudaimonic tradition of welfare and happiness research in psychology, and also addresses common criticisms of these eudaimonic models.     

Development of the Brief Personal Values Inventory for Sense of Values

The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is a widely used questionnaire for assessing sense of values; however, it is difficult to apply for children and adolescents. Therefore, the present study aimed to develop a questionnaire for sense of values, called the Brief Personal Values Inventory (BPVI), consisting of simple questions and fewer items compared to the PVQ. We first created 12 items for the BPVI and then tested criterion-related validity with values in the PVQ-57 in 167 Japanese general population participants (81 males, mean age [SD], range: 23.4 [8.2], 15–57 years). Each of these items was correlated with one or more of the values in the PVQ-57 and covered all higher-order values in Schwartz's theory (openness to change, self-enhancement, conservation, and self-transcendence). In summary, the BPVI adequately corresponded with Schwartz's value theory, indicating an acceptable criterion-related validity. This questionnaire is applicable to a wide population, including adolescents, and will be a useful tool for researchers to elucidate the developmental pathway of personal sense of values.     

How are Bayesian models really used? Reply to

In response to the proposal that cognitive phenomena might be best understood in terms of cognitive theories (Endress, 2013), Frank (2013) outlined an important research program, suggesting that Bayesian models should be used as rigorous, mathematically attractive implementations of psychological theories. This research program is important and promising. However, I show that it is not followed in practice. I then turn to Frank’s defense of the assumption that learners prefer more specific rules (the “size principle”), and show that the results allegedly supporting this assumption do not provide any support for it. Further, I demonstrate that, in contrast to Frank’s criticisms, there is no circularity in an account of rule-learning based on “common-sense psychology”, and that Frank’s other criticisms of this account are unsupported. I conclude that the research program outlined by Frank is important and promising, but needs to be followed in practice. Be that as it might, the rule-learning experiments discussed by Frank are still better explained by simple psychological mechanisms.     

Political Extremism and a Generalized Propensity to Discriminate Among Values

Research exploring the psychological differences between people supporting extreme versus moderate ideologies is growing. However, this research has rarely examined the domain of values. Here, we explore this domain by assessing the possibility that political extremists discriminate more among values compared to moderates, namely, that extremists exhibit strong commitment toward some values at the expense of other values, whereas moderates would acknowledge a multiplicity of values as equally important. First, we propose a model positing that a value discriminability parameter captures a general tendency to discriminate among values. Second, we test empirically the prediction that, compared to moderates, political extremists exhibit a higher discriminability parameter. This prediction is supported by four studies (including one based on the European Social Survey where representative samples from 29 European countries are examined) where participants reported their ideological orientation and rated the importance of basic human values (we focused on basic values because these transcend the political domain, thus highlighting general effects). Specifically, in all studies we observed a positive correlation between political extremism and residual variability in ratings, a hallmark of a higher discriminability parameter. These findings highlight the value domain as critical to understanding differences between political extremists and moderates.