Me,us and them: Political identification and the third-person effect in the 1993 Australian federal election

Three days prior to the 1993 Australian federal election 54 Australian university students who identified with one of the two major political parties were surveyed regarding their perceptions of media campaign impact on self and others. Results provided evidence of a third-person effect (Davison, 1983) wherein respondents judged others us more influenced by the election campaign than themselves. Consistent with predictions derived from social identity theory and self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987), political ingroup members were also judged as less injuenced by campaign content than political outgroup members. Respondents who identified strongly with their preferred party judged self and ingroup members as less influenced by campaign content than did other respondents, and showed more evidence of positive intergroup differentiation. At the same time, however, these respondents exaggerated self–ingroup differences, challenging the theoretical assumption that intergroup diferentiation is associated with ingroup assimilation. Judgements of media impact on self and other also depended on the direction of the campaign message. Respondents believed ‘voters in general’ were persuaded in line with the intent of campaign content, while outgroup members were seen to be persuaded by material favouring their own side but to be uninfluenced by counter-attitudinal content. Election propaganda, irrespective of direction, was seen to amplify existing party preferences in self and ingroup members. Hence the relative invulnerability of self to media impact was pronounced when respondents judged the impact of pro-outgroup messages. Results suggest that perceptions of self–other differences in media vulnerability are influenced by the subjectively salient social relationship between self and other, and are governed by motivational needs, such as self-esteem, social-identity, and differentiation from others (cf. Brewer, 1991; Hogs and Abrams, 1993).     

Social Identity and Perceptions of Media Persuasion: Are We Always Less Influenced Than Others?1

People typically perceive negative media content (e.g., violence) to have more impact on others than on themselves (a third-person effect). To examine the perceived effects of positive content (e.g., public-service advertisements) and the moderating role of social identities, we examined students' perceptions of the impact of AIDS advertisements on self, students (in-group), nonstudents (out-group), and people in general. Perceived self-other differences varied with the salience of student identity. Low identifiers displayed the typical third-person effect, whereas high identifiers were more willing to acknowledge impact on themselves and the student in-group. Further, when influence was normatively acceptable within the in-group, high identifiers perceived self and students (us) as more influenced than nonstudents (them). The theoretical and practical implications of this reversal in third-person perceptions are discussed.     

The Perceived Influence of AIDS Advertising: Third-Person Effects in the Context of Positive Media Content

Although there is consistent evidence indicating that people perceive themselves to be less influenced than others by negative media content and persuasive communications with negative intent (viz., a third-person effect), much less is known about the perceived impact of positive media content and public service advertisements. This study investigated the perceived impact of 11 AIDS advertisements promoting a common message for safe sex, in an attempt to clarify the conditions in which people might judge themselves as more, rather than less, influenced than others. Results indicated that student respondents perceived themselves as less vulnerable than others to low-quality AIDS advertisements, but as more influenced than others by high-quality AIDS advertisements. Respondents who believed strongly that it is good to be influenced by AIDS campaigns saw themselves as relatively vulnerable to such messages, whereas other respondents did not distinguish between the level of impact on self and other. Results are consistent with motivational accounts that emphasize the ego-enhancing function of social comparisons.     

A Self‐Categorization Explanation for the Third‐Person Effect

Three studies tested a self‐categorization theory explanation for the third‐person effect. In Study 1 (N= 49) undergraduate students judged the influence of the National Enquirer, Wall Street Journal, and TV show Friends on themselves, relative to low‐ and high‐status outgroup members, and other undergraduate students. The profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions was largely consistent with predictions, and the size of the third‐person effect decreased as perceived similarity to target others increased—but only for media that were normative for comparison others. Study 2 (N= 49) provided evidence for this process with different media and showed that the profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions matched closely with perceived norms of media consumption—but not the social desirability of those media. Study 3 (N= 64) showed that the third‐person effect for the same media and target other shifts with the frame of reference in which the judgment is made. Taken together, the findings are consistent with self‐categorization theory and difficult to reconcile with other explanations.     

A Critical Test of Self‐Enhancement,Exposure, and Self‐Categorization Explanations for First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

The third‐person perception is the tendency for people to believe that others are more influenced by media content than themselves (W. P. Davison, 1983 ). The current study provides a critical test of self‐enhancement, exposure, and self‐categorization explanations for first‐ (i.e., self more influenced than others) and third‐person perceptions. Male and female participants (N = 323) judged the extent to which pornography elicited“aroused and excited” (i.e., male normative) versus“repulsed and offended” (i.e., female normative) reactions in themselves relative to average men and women. Men perceived an average woman to be more repulsed and offended by pornography than themselves, and women perceived an average man to be more aroused and excited than themselves (i.e., large third‐person perceptions). Further, men perceived themselves to be more aroused and excited by pornography than an average woman (independent of the degree to which pornography was judged as antisocial), and women perceived themselves to be more repulsed and offended than an average man (i.e., large first‐person perceptions). There were relatively small effects for same sex comparisons independent of norm. The pattern and magnitude of first‐ and third‐person perceptions are consistent with self‐categorization theory, irreconcilable with the exposure hypothesis, and difficult to reconcile with the self‐enhancement explanation.     

Valence, comparison focus and self-positivity biases: does it matter whether people judge positive or negative traits?

The present research questions whether mere valence affects self-other comparisons in the domain of trait characteristics. While some previous studies have reported greater positivity bias for the self when traits were positive than when traits were negative, we suggest that this is an ambiguous finding, because valence and content were confounded. When we unconfounded content and valence, valence had no effect on the magnitude of self-positivity bias displayed. We also replicate several findings for our unconfounded set of traits. Firstly, comparing others to the self, rather than comparing the self to others, lowered self-positivity for positive and negative traits (focus effect). Secondly, extremely positive and negative traits triggered greater positivity bias than did more moderately evaluated ones. Finally, we suggest that comparative self-positivity biases may be based on a general positivity bias.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

Mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on self-other framing

Research on self-other framing suggests that self-judgements typically neglect information about others and instead use an ambiguous intrapersonal standard, making these judgements susceptible to the influence of mood as predicted by the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995). Two experiments tested the hypothesis that mood-congruent judgements of personal success occur when these judgements are framed to maintain self-focus but are eliminated when participants first focus on other individuals. In Experiment 1, self-other framing moderated the influence of mood on perceived success for an ambiguous object identification task. Happy participants reported greater perceived success, compared to sad participants, after judging their own success relative to others (self-focused frame) but not after directly judging the success of others (other-focused frame). Experiment 2 replicated these results with students' perceptions of their academic success. These findings suggest that the open, constructive processing accompanying most self-judgements is critical in producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success.     

得失情境下他人参照点及心理距离对自我-他人利益权衡的影响

以福利权衡率(WTR)为利他程度的指标, 通过3个实验逐步深入地考察了得失情境下他人参照点及心理距离对自我-他人利益权衡的影响。实验1的结果表明, 得失情境并未改变被试的WTR。实验2引入他人底线、现状和目标三个参照点变量, 发现被试获益情境下的WTR高于损失情境, 且WTR从高到低依次为他人临近底线、目标和现状; 他人临近底线时, 被试在获益情境下的WTR高于损失情境, 而他人临近现状和目标时, 个体在得失情境下的WTR无显著差异。实验3进一步引入心理距离变量, 发现心理距离较近他人的WTR高于较远他人, 且与得失情境和参照点发生了复杂的交互效应, 得失情境的主效应消失了, 但总体上并未改变实验2发现的参照点效应。这些结果对于更深入地理解得失不对称效应、三参照点理论及社会折扣和自我-他人决策差异研究的相关发现具有一定的启示意义。     

Perceptions by and of lonely people in social networks

Although past research has associated loneliness with negative perceptions of others, P. Christensen and D. A. Kashy (1998), using the social relations model (SRM), found that among new acquaintances, loneliness was associated with more positive other‐perceptions. SRM was used to examine loneliness and interpersonal perception within existing social networks. Seventy‐three university students in the United States rated themselves and others on 19 attributes and also judged how they thought others saw them (meta‐perceptions). Results indicated that lonely people tended to be more negative toward closer targets and somewhat positive toward less close acquaintances. Lonely people had lower self‐regard and perceived self‐regard, invariant across acquaintanceship, and were rated more negatively by others. Relationship contexts thus moderate effects of loneliness on other‐perceptions.     

The self and others in the experience of pride

Pride is seen as both a self-conscious emotion as well as a social emotion. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but have brought forth different ideas about pride as either revolving around the self or as revolving around one’s relationship with others. Current measures of pride do not include intrapersonal elements of pride experiences. Social comparisons, which often cause experiences of pride, contain three elements: the self, the relationship between the self and another person, and the other person. From the literature on pride, we distilled three related elements; perceptions and feelings of self-inflation, other-distancing, and other-devaluation. In four studies, we explored whether these elements were present in pride experiences. We did so at an implicit (Experiment 1; N?=?218) and explicit level (Experiment 2; N?=?125), in an academic setting with in vivo (Experiment 3; N?=?203) and imagined pride experiences (Experiment 4; N?=?126). The data consistently revealed that the experience of pride is characterised by self-inflation, not by other-distancing nor other-devaluation.     

Self and other obedience estimates: biases and moderators

The authors conducted 2 studies regarding behavior perceptions of "self" and "typical other" in hypothetical replications of S. Milgram's (1963) obedience experiment. In Study 1, participants' knowledge about Milgram's actual results was manipulated. Regardless of knowledge, results demonstrated several specific social and perceptual biases (e.g., the self-other bias; J. D. Brown, 1986), in addition to several general, fundamental lessons of social psychology (e.g., the perseverance of lay dispositionism). Study 2 was designed to explore the possibility that participants' own academic interests and worldview could influence the biases explicated in Study 1. The authors assessed perceptions of both criminal-justice majors and non-criminal-justice majors regarding their perceptions of behaviors of self and typical other. The criminal-justice students' self-other obedience estimates were significantly higher than those of the non-criminal-justice students. Further, the self-other discrepancy for criminal-justice students was significantly smaller than the difference reported by non-criminal-justice majors, suggesting that the criminal-justice students demonstrated the self-other bias significantly less than non-criminal-justice students in this context. The findings indicate that specific social-perceptual biases may have been moderated by career interest and worldview.     

Object-Subject Distance and the Third Person Perception

Two studies demonstrate that third person perceptions are less dependent on ego-defensive mechanisms than previously thought. It is argued that people use intuitive notions of media dependency when they estimate the influence of media on different groups of others. Our results show that when the "others" that are the object of media influence are close to the subject of communication, people perceive less influence. This finding joins new research contrasting with the idea of the "social distance corollary."     

Attitude change in face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication: private self‐awareness as mediator and moderator

Two types of social influence can be distinguished: norm‐based influence occurs when social identity is salient and interpersonal influence occurs when personal identity is salient. In two experiments the impact of trait and state private self‐awareness on interpersonal influence during face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication (CMC) was investigated. It is argued that interpersonal influence resulting from face‐to‐face communication is stronger than interpersonal influence resulting from CMC because CMC heightens state private self‐awareness. As a result, it leads to a focus on personal perceptions and thoughts which in turn reduces attitude change. Experiment 1 suggests that communication media may influence attitude change via private self‐awareness. Experiment 2 showed that trait private self‐awareness moderates the effect of communication media on interpersonal influence. Interpersonal influence was stronger in face‐to‐face communication than in CMC only for individuals higher in private self‐awareness. This finding indicates that the impact of situational variations of a concept can be limited to individuals who have a more elevated sense of private self‐awareness. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"How long will I suffer?" versus "How long will you suffer?" A self-other effect in affective forecasting

This research presents evidence that people predict longer durations of negative affect for others than for themselves. It is argued that this self-other effect is based on the asymmetric availability of knowledge about psychological strategies that reduce negative affective experiences. Specifically, because people have available knowledge about their own coping strategies, they use this information when making predictions about their affect. The lack of information about others' coping strategies leads to longer predictions of affect duration for others, creating the self-other effect. A series of studies demonstrated this self-other effect, its source, and its boundary conditions. Specifically, the self-other effect occurred for negative but not for positive events, it was stronger when participants predicted affect duration for unfamiliar others than when participants predicted affect duration for familiar others, and the impact of the self versus other focus on affective forecasts was mediated by the availability of knowledge about coping strategies. In addition, alternative explanations for the self-other effect were ruled out. The implications for biases in affective forecasting are discussed.     

差距知觉的泛化效应：我和你之间的差距有多大?

当知晓自己和他人的表现,即自己与他人在某方面表现上的差距已经明确时,人们对自我-他人差异的知觉准确吗?本研究发现了差距知觉的泛化效应：人们将自身的绝对表现(自己的表现与零相比的结果)泛化到对自身相对表现(自己与他人相比的结果)的判断上。在7个研究中, 被试(N = 2766)得知自己的绝对表现和相对于他人的表现,并判断自己与他人之间的差距。结果显示,绝对获益时,人们在相对获益时感知到的自我-他人差距大于相对损失时;绝对损失时,人们在相对获益时感知到的自我-他人差距小于相对损失时;当泛化难以进行时,上述效应消失。研究揭示了差距知觉的泛化效应及其联结机制。     

自我—他人危机决策信息加工过程的差异:来自眼动的证据

本研究采用iView X-RED眼动仪,分两个实验来考察自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程的差异。实验一采用单因素实验设计探讨自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程,结果表明：为自我决策组的平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数都显著高于为他人决策组。实验二采用2（任务框架：积极,消极）x2（决策者角色：为自我、为他人）混合实验设计,结果表明：在积极框架下,为自我决策组平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数显著高于为他人决策组;在消极框架下,两个组没有显著差异。总体表现为,自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程存在差异,且受任务框架的影响。     

Preferred changes in power differences: Effects of social comparison in equal and unequal power relations

Efforts to change power differences with others who are equal and unequal in power were examined. According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; Rijsman, 1983), people prefer slight superiority in power over comparison others. In Experiment 1, 93 participants imagined working with two others in a group. Group members varied in hierarchical rank and on exact power scores. Participants indicated their preferred changes in power differences. Social comparison theory was supported regarding rank differences, but not regarding power scores. In Experiment 2, 145 participants imagined a similar group setting. Group members were equal, unequal, or very unequal in power. Social comparison theory was supported regarding ranks: power differences with an equally powerful person were increased more often than with a less powerful person. Power scores again yielded no effects. This suggests that social comparisons of power are based on rank and not interval information.