On emotionally intelligent time travel: individual differences in affective forecasting ability

In two studies, the authors examined whether people who are high in emotional intelligence (EI) make more accurate forecasts about their own affective responses to future events. All participants completed a performance measure of EI (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test) as well as a self-report measure of EI. Affective forecasting ability was assessed using a longitudinal design in which participants were asked to predict how they would feel and report their actual feelings following three events in three different domains: politics and academics (Study 1) and sports (Study 2). Across these events, individual differences in forecasting ability were predicted by participants' scores on the performance measure, but not the self-report measure, of EI; high-EI individuals exhibited greater affective forecasting accuracy. Emotion Management, a subcomponent of EI, emerged as the strongest predictor of forecasting ability.     

The need for contextual and technical knowledge in judgmental forecasting

The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which judgmental forecasts are improved by having more contextual and technical knowledge. Contextual information is knowledge gained by practitioners through experience on the job, consisting of general forecasting experience in the industry as well as specific product knowledge. Technical knowledge is knowledge about data analysis and formal forecasting procedures, including information on how to analyze data judgmentally. We directly compared judgmental forecasts of business practitioners with those generated by students, using 22 real-world time series. The practitioners had considerable contextual but no technical knowledge. The students had no contextual but two different levels of technical knowledge. We also generated forecasts with statistical methods to benchmark performance. Results show that contextual knowledge is particularly important in making good judgmental forecasts, while technical knowledge has little value. Practitioner forecasts are better than student forecasts in almost all comparisons. A decisive factor affecting forecast performance appears to be data variability, measured by the coefficient of variation of the time-series data. As the variability of a time series increases, the performance of all forecasts deteriorates, but judgmental forecasts by practitioners become more preferable. Statistical methods have difficulty achieving reasonable forecasts when the data are more variable, whereas judgemental forecasts reinforced by contextual information do relatively well. Data variability is one explanation for the mixed findings of past studies, relative to how well statistical techniques compare with judgment as a forecasting method.     

Self-affirmation and affective forecasting: Affirmation reduces the anticipated impact of negative events

When forecasting how they will feel in the future, people overestimate the impact that imagined negative events will have on their affective states, partly because they underestimate their own psychological resiliency. Because self-affirmation enhances resiliency, two studies examined whether self-affirmation prior to forecasting reduces the extremity of affective forecasts. Participants in self-affirmation conditions completed a values scale or wrote an essay asserting their most important value, whereas participants in the no-affirmation condition asserted a relatively unimportant value. Participants then predicted their affective reactions to a negative or positive imagined event. In both studies, self-affirmation reduced the unpleasant affect expected to result from a negative event, but had no impact on affective forecasts for a positive event. This pattern was mediated by participants’ cognitive appraisals of the imagined event, but not by differential focus on that event. Results are consistent with self-affirmation activating or enhancing psychological resiliency to counteract immune neglect during affective forecasting of a negative event.     

How social and non-social information influence classification decisions: A computational modelling approach

Social information such as observing others can improve performance in decision making. In particular, social information has been shown to be useful when finding the best solution on one’s own is difficult, costly, or dangerous. However, past research suggests that when making decisions people do not always consider other people’s behaviour when it is at odds with their own experiences. Furthermore, the cognitive processes guiding the integration of social information with individual experiences are still under debate. Here, we conducted two experiments to test whether information about other persons’ behaviour influenced people’s decisions in a classification task. Furthermore, we examined how social information is integrated with individual learning experiences by testing different computational models. Our results show that social information had a small but reliable influence on people’s classifications. The best computational model suggests that in categorization people first make up their own mind based on the non-social information, which is then updated by the social information.     

判断预测的心理偏差及产生机制

心理学对判断预测的研究主要关注预测的偏差及产生机制。判断预测中的偏差有两类：偏见和不一致。偏见主要表现：趋势阻尼;提高效应;给预测结果增加随机噪音。不一致包括：信息获得导致的不一致;信息加工导致的不一致。偏差的出现一是与信息加工过程有关,二是与序列的特征与呈现方式有关。研究发现提供反馈、分解、组合和建议采纳等策略可以增进判断预测的准确性。     

The Landslide Victory That Wasn't: The Bias Toward Consistency in Recall of Election Support1

Experiments that test for the judgmental bias that results from a preference for cognitive consistency often contain two threats to their internal validity. First, the subjects are asked to make judgments about themselves. Thus, the biases that result may be explained in terms of cognitive consistency or the motivation to see oneself in a positive light. Second, the decision subjects are asked to make is often difficult to verify objectively. The present research sought evidence in support of cognitive consistency using a methodology that avoided these two confounds. The context chosen was the tendency of perceivers to use the outcome of a group decision to make inferences about the magnitude of group members’ support for the outcome. The present experiment examined whether people in Richmond, Virginia, would use the outcome of a gubernatorial election to make decisions regarding the percentage of people in favor of the winning candidate. Although the winner won by less than one-half of one percent of the popular vote, we found that the subjects significantly overestimated the degree of voter support he received and underestimated the degree of support his opponent received. Moreover, this tendency was exacerbated over time.     

A French version of the situational self-awareness scale

ObjectiveThis paper presents the findings of three studies aimed at validating a French version of the situational self-awareness scale (Govern & Marsch, 2001). The 9-item scale measures the extent to which people focus their attention on private or public aspects of themselves or on their surroundings. The scale was translated into French. The first study examined the factor structure, the second study focused on consistency and reliability, and the third study examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale.MethodFactor analyses were performed on data collected among 397 students. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability were assessed using Cronbach's alpha and correlation analyses. Finally, we induced public and private self-awareness and assessed awareness to test the validity of the scale.ResultsThe results show that the scale has a three-factor structure and support the reliability of the scale over time. However, doubts remain over the construct validity of the public and private self-awareness dimensions. As expected, the data indicate that SSAS was sensitive to situational variations, in line with previous studies.DiscussionThe discussion focuses on the arguments supporting the use of the original scale and the practical implications of the scale.     

The role of psychological resilience and positive affect in risky decision‐making

Past studies suggest that positive affect produces a wide range of desirable outcomes because it helps people build lasting resources. It may be assumed that these resources build on positive affect over time, which in turn may explain the beneficial effect of positive affect in stressful encounters. However, this assumption has not been directly tested by empirical studies. This question is important in that it helps clarify the underlying mechanism through which individuals with more positive affect might respond adaptively to adverse situations. Using a stressful task that included 20 rounds of risky investment choices, the current study examined whether psychological resilience, an important personal resource fuelled by positive affect, could account for the beneficial effects of positive affect. Specifically, we examined the relationship between individuals’ baseline levels of positive affect, their levels of psychological resilience, their choices in a risky investment decision task, and their levels of positive affect on the final investment task. The results demonstrate that psychological resilience could indeed help explain happier people's enhanced outcomes: They chose higher return although more risky investment options and experienced more positive affect at the end of the task. The current study supports the notion that individuals who experience frequent positive affect thrive through various challenges not simply because they feel good, but because they have resources that they can utilize to deal with these challenges. Findings from the present study support further investigation of the important relationship between specific positive affect, psychological resilience, and performance in risky investment tasks.     

Causal attributions of physical education majors and mentally retarded adults

This exploratory study examined the causal attributions and expectancies of 51 physical education majors and 25 mentally retarded adults. The majors completed a written questionnaire concerning their causal attributions and expectancies for motor performance of the adults. The adults responded through an interview procedure regarding causal attributions and expectancies for their own motor performance. Analysis did not support the hypothesis that people make stable attributions about the performance of mentally retarded populations and subsequently maintain low expectancies. Previous experiences of failure did not diminish the expectancies of the adults for their own future success.     

Continuity of paternal social support and depressive symptoms among new mothers

The present study examined trajectories of paternal support and maternal depressive symptoms over the first two years after the birth of a child. First-time mothers (N = 582) were assessed 6 times during the first 24 months of their child's life. At each assessment they reported on a number of ways in which their child's father provided support, and at three of the assessments, their own depressive symptomatology was assessed. Latent growth curve models revealed that while higher support was related to lower depressive symptomatology, both paternal support and maternal depression tended to decrease over time. The relationships between paternal support and maternal depression are complex and suggest the importance of considering the multiple ways that parents influence one another over time.     

If they were to vote, they would vote for us

In two field studies, we examined whether voters overestimate support for their political party among nonvoters. In Study 1, voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive in an upcoming election, and this percentage increased when voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive if nonvoters also were to vote. In Study 2, participants overestimated support for their party even when we made them explicitly aware of current levels of this support by presenting them with poll-based forecasts of election results. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that commitment to vote for a specific party predicted the degree of overestimation. Our results imply that highly committed voters are particularly likely to project support for their party onto nonvoters. Implications for the literature on social projection and social identity are discussed.     

Examining the Empirical and Linguistic Bases of Current Theories of Agrammatism

This paper, which is organized into five sections, critically examines the empirical support and linguistic assumptions underlying several current accounts of language disturbances in Broca′s aphasia. In the first section, following a discussion of the use of signal detection methodologies in investigating grammatical sensitivity, the reliability of results from two studies that suggest that Broca′s aphasic patients are differentially sensitive to grammatical constraints is examined. It is concluded that in some cases, claims of intact sensitivity are not supported. The second section examines the empirical support for the hypothesis that agrammatic patients are unable to compute syntactic dependency relationships because of slowed lexical processing. It is argued that the statistical treatment of the data and interpretive problems associated with the lexical decision paradigm undermine this hypothesis. In the third section, some of the linguistic assumptions underlying criticisms of chain-disruption hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that these criticisms are based on arguable linguistic assumptions. In the fourth section, it is argued that the linguistic and empirical support for both earlier and revised versions of Grodzinsky′s default interpretive strategy is lacking. Methodological and conceptual shortcomings arising from this proposal are also discussed. In the final section, potential relationships between disordered language and currently developing models of normal language processing are discussed.     

Immediacy bias in social-emotional comparisons

In seven studies of naturally occurring, "real-world" emotional events, people demonstrated an immediacy bias in social-emotional comparisons, perceiving their own current or recent emotional reactions as more intense compared with others' emotional reactions to the same events. The events examined include crossing a scary bridge (study 1a), a national tragedy (study 1b), terrorist attacks (studies 2a and 3b), a natural disaster (study 2b), and a presidential election (study 3b). These perceived differences between one's own and others' emotions declined over time, as relatively immediate and recent emotions subsided, a pattern that people were not intuitively aware of (study 2c). This immediacy bias in social-emotional comparisons emerged for both explicit comparisons (studies 1a, 1b, and 3b), and for absolute judgments of emotional intensity (studies 2a, 2b, and 3a). Finally, the immediacy bias in social-emotional comparisons was reduced when people were reminded that emotional display norms might lead others' appearances to understate emotional intensity (studies 3a and 3b). Implications of these findings for social-emotional phenomena are discussed.     

The detrimental effects of power on confidence, advice taking, and accuracy

Incorporating input from others can enhance decision quality, yet often people do not effectively utilize advice. We propose that greater power increases the propensity to discount advice, and that a key mechanism explaining this effect is elevated confidence in one’s judgment. We investigate the relationships across four studies: a field survey where working professionals rated their own power and confidence and were rated by coworkers on their level of advice taking; an advice taking task where power and confidence were self-reported; and two advice taking experiments where power was manipulated. Results consistently showed a negative relationship between power and advice taking, and evidence of mediation through confidence. The fourth study also revealed that higher power participants were less accurate in their final judgments. Power can thus exacerbate the tendency for people to overweight their own initial judgment, such that the most powerful decision makers can also be the least accurate.     

How do I love thee? Let me count the Js: implicit egotism and interpersonal attraction

From the perspective of implicit egotism people should gravitate toward others who resemble them because similar others activate people's positive, automatic associations about themselves. Four archival studies and 3 experiments supported this hypothesis. Studies 1-4 showed that people are disproportionately likely to marry others whose first or last names resemble their own. Studies 5-7 provided experimental support for implicit egotism. Participants were more attracted than usual to people (a) whose arbitrary experimental code numbers resembled their own birthday numbers, (b) whose surnames shared letters with their own surnames, and (c) whose jersey number had been paired, subliminally, with their own names. Discussion focuses on implications for implicit egotism, similarity, and interpersonal attraction.     

People consider reliability and cost when verifying their autobiographical memories

Because memories are not always accurate, people rely on a variety of strategies to verify whether the events that they remember really did occur. Several studies have examined which strategies people tend to use, but none to date has asked why people opt for certain strategies over others. Here we examined the extent to which people's beliefs about the reliability and the cost of different strategies would determine their strategy selection. Subjects described a childhood memory and then suggested strategies they might use to verify the accuracy of that memory. Next, they rated the reliability and cost of each strategy, and the likelihood that they might use it. Reliability and cost each predicted strategy selection, but a combination of the two ratings provided even greater predictive value. Cost was significantly more influential than reliability, which suggests that a tendency to seek and to value “cheap” information more than reliable information could underlie many real-world memory errors.     

False Consensus and False Uniqueness in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors

The degree to which people perceive that their health-relevant behaviors are also performed by their peers may influence whether they continue these practices or are susceptible to change. The present paper examined estimates of social consensus for health-relevant behaviors. It was hypothesized that respondents would perceive their own behaviors to be relatively more common than do people not performing them, the so-called False Consensus Effect. However, in terms of the accuracy of consensus estimates, people who behave in undesirable ways will tend to overestimate the actual number of others who behave similarly. In contrast, people who behave in desirable ways will underestimate the actual number of people who behave like themselves (false uniqueness). A group of college-aged males were asked to report about their performance of a series of health-relevant behaviors and to estimate the frequency of each behavior among their peers. The findings strongly supported the first two hypotheses and provided some support for the third. One practical implication of the results is that persons with unhealthy practices may resist public health campaigns and other interventions by overestimating consensus for their own behaviors. Also, individuals who think their undesirable health behaviors are relatively common may believe that they involve few health risks for them. The research suggests the need for further research on social cognitions about health, illness, and health-protective behaviors.     

Myopic biases in competitions

In three studies using both laboratory and field data, we show that the focal competitor’s strengths and weaknesses feature more prominently in predictions of the outcomes of future competitions than do the strengths and weaknesses of the opponents. People are more confident when their own side is strong, regardless of how strong the competition is. We show that this effect is driven by the fact that people have better information about their own side than the other side, in part because they preferentially seek out information about their own side. Implications for theories of decision making in competitive settings are discussed.     

Romantic jealousy as a social comparison outcome: When similarity stings

Two studies examined the role of perceived self-rival similarity in the experience of romantic jealousy, which is assumed to reflect threats to self-evaluation. Self-other similarity is one factor that determines whether social comparison yields assimilation or contrast. Based on the premise that people want their romantic partners to see themselves positively, it is predicted that people experience greater jealousy when comparing with an attractive rival in terms of similarities because similarity challenges one’s positive distinctiveness. People should also experience greater jealousy, however, when they compare themselves with an unattractive rival in a manner that renders their own weaknesses salient during the comparison process. The results support the ‘distinctiveness hypothesis,’ but are inconsistent with cognitive models of social comparison, which posit that people see themselves more positively either when their self-evaluations are assimilated to superior others or contrasted away from inferior others.     

A case study of expert judgment: Economists' probabilities versus base-rate model forecasts

In this case study of economists' forecasts concerning economic downturn, we examine key issues concerning the psychology of prediction and the controversy surrounding the value of expertise in forecasting. We examine when experts' knowledge promotes forecast accuracy and whether biases found in psychological studies (including underutilization of relevant base rates and tendencies to extreme prediction) occur in these economic forecasts. Experts' forecasts were compared to forecasts derived from base-rate models that relied on the historical frequencies of economic downturns. The performance patterns of the experts and models crossed over the forecast horizon. Experts outperformed models in shorter-term forecasting, whereas models outperformed experts in longer-term forecasting. These results highlight the abilities and limits of experts and models in prediction and the sources of their inaccuracy.