Autonomous processes in comprehension: A reply to Marslen-Wilson and Tyler

A criterion which has been proposed for distinguishing minds from computing systems is examined from the point of view of some current work on computer induction.     

The theory of incubation: a reply to Bersh

Bersh's critique of Eysenck's theory of incubation is summarized, and some arguments are presented to indicate that while some criticisms are pertinent, they do not invalidate the theory.     

The theory behind Psychoticism: a reply to Eysenck

In this reply to Eysenck, we attempt to clarify why we have criticized Eysenck's Psychoticism model and have found it necessary to introduce our own alternative model. It is concluded that the validity of the P scale as a measure of Psychoticism has not been demonstrated and that the P construct itself is untenable.     

Common sense and psychological phenomena: A reply to Smedslund

Smedslund's argument that psycho-social reality is revealed by common sense is shown to be based on a confusion between logical inference and psychological induction. Common sense has no privileged access to psychological reality and is affected profoundly by reasoning errors. Its structure is loose, allowing for post hoc "explanations" of everything and clear-cut predictions of nothing.     

Folk theories,models and economic reality: A reply to Williams

In this article, I argue that Williams's sceptical view about the value of economic models expressed in 'The philosophy of economic modelling: a critical survey' [South African Journal of Philosophy, 18(2): 223–246, this issue], and widely shared amongst philosophers of science, is not warrented. Williams's error, I maintain, lies in his failure to adequately distinguish, (a) between theories in general and what he calls 'folk theories', and (b) between the different roles that models play in different sciences. With respect to (b), I suggest that Williams fails to recognize that scientists who lack the ability of physicists to constrain theorizing through rigorous controlled experiments must generally do a good deal of work investigating theories by means of models solely designed to test their formal implications, before further models with potentially direct applicability to the world can even be developed. Williams's central mistake, I argue, lies in confusing models of the first sort with models of the second.     

Common sense as psychosocial reality: A reply to Sjöberg

Attempted explications of common sense can be submitted to consensual validation. Therefore, purely programmatic discussion about common sense may be dispensed with in favor of actual studies. The failures to recognize the fundamental role of common sense may stem from an unreflective presupposition that psychological language and psychological reality are independent realms. Actually, language and psychosocial reality are mutually constitutive, and the total cultural order is built upon common sense. We are not free to choose conceptualizations. Our theorizing must consist of explications of common sense.     

Comment on internal feedback as a theory of judgment: a reply to Levin

Levin's suggestion that internal feedback strategies be employed in judgmental and learning tasks is discussed. The predictions of an internal feedback notion are seen as inconsistent with Veit's ratio and difference task data. Scale-free frameworks and scale-convergence criteria used in previous research are described as useful techniques for separating integration from judgmental processes in information-integration as well as learning-task situations.