Novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to novel objects

What is the source of the mutual exclusivity bias whereby infants map novel labels onto novel objects? In an intermodal preferential looking task, we found that novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to a novel object over a familiar object. In contrast, familiar labels and a neutral phrase gradually reduced attention to a novel object. Markman (1989, 1990) argued that infants must recall the name of a familiar object to exclude it as the referent of a novel label. We argue that 10-month-olds’ attention is guided by the novelty of objects and labels rather than knowledge of the names for familiar objects. Mutual exclusivity, as a language-specific bias, might emerge from a more general constraint on attention and learning.     

Twelve-Month-Old Infants Generalize Novel Signed Labels,but Not Preferences Across Individuals

By the end of the 1st year, infants expect spoken labels to be extended across individuals and thus seem to understand words as shared conventional forms. However, it is unknown whether infants' willingness to extend labels across individuals is constrained to familiar forms, such as spoken words, or whether infants can identify a broader range of symbols as potential conventions. The present study tested whether 12-month-old infants will extend a novel sign label to a new person. Results indicate that 12-month-olds expect signed object–label relations to extend across agents but restrict object preferences to individuals. The results suggest that infants' expectations about conventional behaviors and linguistic forms are likely broad at 12 months. The implications of these findings for infants' early conceptions of conventional behaviors as well as our understanding of the initial state of the learner are considered.     

Matching and naming objects by shape or function: age and context effects in preschool children

Three experiments tested preschoolers' use of abstract principles to classify and label objects by shape or function. Three- and 4-year-olds were instructed to match objects by shape or function. Four-year-olds readily adopted either rule, but 3-year-olds followed only the shape rule. Without a rule, 4-year-olds tended to match by shape unless object function was shown during matching (Experiment 2). Three-year-olds' ability to use a function rule was tested in several conditions (re-presenting functions; reminders to "use the rule"; repeating rule on every trial). None induced consistent function matching (Experiment 3). Supplemental memory and verbal tasks showed that 3-year-olds have trouble using function as an abstract basis of comparison. Naming data, however, show that preschoolers are learning that object labels are based on function. The results show preschoolers' growing flexibility in adopting abstract generalization rules and growing knowledge of conventions for extending words.     

Children's Conformity When Acquiring Novel Conventions: The Case of Artifacts

Prior research focused on children's acquisition of arbitrary social conventions (e.g., object labels) has revealed that both 3- and 4-year-old children conform to majority opinion. Two studies explored whether children show similar conformist tendencies when making category-based judgments about a less socially arbitrary domain that offers an objective basis for judgment: object functions. Three- and 4-year-old children watched a video in which two informants disagreed with a lone dissenter on the function of a novel artifact. Children were asked to categorize the object by stating with whom they agreed. The plausibility of the majority's response was manipulated across test trials. Results demonstrated that children were more likely to agree with the majority when majority and minority opinions were equally plausible, especially when the majority demonstrated an overt consensus. However, 4-year-olds actively eschewed the majority opinion when it was implausible in context of the artifact's functional design. The current results indicate that expertise in a domain of conventional knowledge reduces conformist tendencies.     

Knowing linguistic conventions

A linguistic convention is a principle or norm that has been adopted by a person or linguistic community about how to use, and therefore what the meaning is of, a specific term. Examples of such norms or principles are those expressed by propositions that express the laws of logic or those that express implicit definitions. Arguments about the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, very broadly, fall into two camps: the one holds that the basis of linguistic conventions is objective and that, therefore, such conventions are genuinely truth-bearing. Knowledge of such conventions is therefore knowledge of the objective truth of such conventions. This camp might be labelled ‘realist’. The other holds that there is no known basis to linguistic conventions and that conventions are, to the best of our knowledge, not objective, but invented. Their truth is stipulated by the relevant speaker or linguistic community. Such truth is, consequently, trivial and knowledge of such conventions simply knowledge of the stipulation. This camp might be labelled ‘anti-realist’. These are three standard accounts of the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, which all play into the first camp: (1) knowledge by intuition, (2) inferential a priori knowledge and (3) a posteriori knowledge. I give reasons why these accounts should be rejected. I then argue that linguistic conventions, if conceived of as trivial truths, are knowable non-inferentially a priori. Such an epistemic account provides support for the second camp. In this regard, I marshal support from some recent work by Wright and Hale.     

Training experts: individuation without naming is worth it

There is growing evidence that individuation experience is necessary for development of expert object discrimination that transfers to new exemplars. Individuation training in human studies has primarily used label association tasks where labels are learned at both the individual and more abstract (basic) level, and expertise criterion requires that individual-level judgments become as fast as basic-level judgments. However, there are training situations when the use of labels is not practical (e.g., with animals or some clinical populations). Moreover, labeling itself can facilitate object discrimination, thus it is unclear what role labels play in the acquisition of expertise in such training paradigms. Here, participants completed an online game that did not require labels in which they interacted with novel objects (Greebles) or control objects (Yufos). Games either required individuation or categorization. We then assessed the impact of this exposure on an abridged Greeble training paradigm. As expected, participants who played Yufo games or Greeble categorization games showed a significant basic-level advantage for Greebles in the abridged training paradigm, typical of novices. However, participants who played the Greeble identity game showed a reduced basic-level advantage, suggesting that individuation without labels may be sufficient to acquire perceptual expertise.     

A role for action knowledge in visual object identification

We evaluated the impact of visual similarity and action similarity on visual object identification. We taught participants to associate novel objects with nonword labels and verified that in memory visually similar objects were confused more often than visually dissimilar objects. We then taught participants to associate novel actions with nonword labels and verified that similar actions were confused moreoften th an dissimilaractions. We then paired specific objects with specific actions. Visually similar objects paired with similar actions were confused more often in memory than when these same objects were paired with dissimilar actions. Hence the actions associated with objects served to increase or decrease their separation in memory space, and influenced the ease with which these objects could be identified. These experiments ultimately demonstrated that when identifying stationary objects, the memory of how these object were used dramatically influenced the ability to identify these objects.     

Evidence for a form of mutual exclusivity during label acquisition by grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus)?

The authors present context-dependent evidence for a form of mutual exclusivity during label learning by Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). For human children, mutual exclusivity refers to their assumption during early word learning that an object has one and only one label. Along with the whole-object assumption (that a label likely refers to an entire object rather than some partial aspect), mutual exclusivity is thought to guide children in initial label acquisition. It may also help children overcome the whole-object assumption by helping them interpret a novel word as something other than an object label, but for young children, any second label for an object can initially be more difficult to acquire than the first. The authors show that Grey parrots quickly learn object labels for items, then have considerable difficulty learning to use color labels with respect to a previously labeled item unless specifically taught to use a color and object label as a pair.     

Object labeling influences infant phonetic learning and generalization

Different kinds of speech sounds are used to signify possible word forms in every language. For example, lexical stress is used in Spanish (/‘be.be/, ‘he/she drinks’ versus /be.’be/, ‘baby’), but not in French (/‘be.be/ and /be.’be/ both mean ‘baby’). Infants learn many such native language phonetic contrasts in their first year of life, likely using a number of cues from parental speech input. One such cue could be parents’ object labeling, which can explicitly highlight relevant contrasts. Here we ask whether phonetic learning from object labeling is abstract—that is, if learning can generalize to new phonetic contexts. We investigate this issue in the prosodic domain, as the abstraction of prosodic cues (like lexical stress) has been shown to be particularly difficult. One group of 10-month-old French-learners was given consistent word labels that contrasted on lexical stress (e.g., Object A was labeled /‘ma.bu/, and Object B was labeled /ma.’bu/). Another group of 10-month-olds was given inconsistent word labels (i.e., mixed pairings), and stress discrimination in both groups was measured in a test phase with words made up of new syllables. Infants trained with consistently contrastive labels showed an earlier effect of discrimination compared to infants trained with inconsistent labels. Results indicate that phonetic learning from object labeling can indeed generalize, and suggest one way infants may learn the sound properties of their native language(s).     

Grounded Theory in Genetic Counseling Research: An Interpretive Perspective

As qualitative inquiry has gained wider acceptance in genetic counseling research, it has become increasingly important for researchers and those who evaluate their work to recognize the diversity of methods that fall under this broad umbrella. Some of these methods adhere to the traditional conventions of scientific research (e.g., objectivity, reliability, validity, replicability, causality and generalizability). When such studies are evaluated by reviewers who are well versed in scientific methods, the rigor of the study may be readily apparent. However, when researchers are using methods that do not conform to traditional scientific conventions, the distinction between well conducted and poorly conducted studies may become more difficult to discern. This article focuses on grounded theory because it is a widely used qualitative method. We highlight key components of this method in order to contrast conventions that fall within a scientific paradigm to those that fall within an interpretivist paradigm. The intent is to illustrate how the conventions within these two different paradigms yield different types of knowledge claims—both of which can advance genetic counseling theory and practice.     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.     

Predicting reading achievement in the first year of schooling: A comparison of readiness tests and instructional programs

Data from four reading-related tests, including a measure of knowledge about books and print conventions, and two demographic variables, obtained at the end of the first year of schooling, were used to predict a range of students' word and discourse reading achievement at the conclusion of that year. Students were enrolled in a reading program that emphasized either the subskills involved in breaking the reading code or the more holistic gaining of meaning from print. The results indicated that a measure of knowledge about books and print conventions is strongly related to end-of-year reading achievement, but that, over and above the other more traditional measures, it is a significant predictor of only one type of comprehension - that involving the inferential linking of two pieces of information separated in the text. Students in a subskills-emphasis program outperformed those in a meaning-emphasis program on tests of word knowledge but not of comprehension of discourse.     

Gesturing and naming: the use of functional knowledge in object identification

Studies using functional imaging show reliable activation of premotor cortex when observers view manipulable objects. This result has led to the view that knowledge of object function, particularly the actions associated with the typical use of objects, may play a causal role in object identification. To obtain relevant evidence regarding this causal role, we asked subjects to learn gesture-color associations and then attempt to identify objects presented in colors denoting functional gestures that were congruent or incongruent with the objects' use. A strong congruency effect was observed when subjects gestured the use of an object, but not when they named an object. We conclude that our procedure constitutes a sensitive measure of the recruitment and causal role of functional knowledge and that this recruitment is not present during object naming. Preliminary evidence, however, indicates that gestures evoked by the volumetric shape of an object do contribute to object naming.     

Conversation and convention: Enduring influences on name choice for common objects

The name chosen for an object is influenced by both short-term history (e.g., speaker-addressee pacts) and long-term history (e.g., the language's naming pattern for the domain). But these influences must somehow be linked. We propose that names adopted through speaker-addressee collaboration have influences that carry beyond the original context. To test this hypothesis, we adapted the standard referential communication task. The first director of each matching session was a confederate who introduced one of two possible names for each object. The director role then rotated to naive participants. The participants later rated name preference for the introduced and alternative names for each object. They also rated object typicality or similarity to each named category. The name that was initially introduced influenced later name use and preference, even for participants who had not heard the name from the original director. Typicality and similarity showed lesser effects from the names originally introduced. Name associations built in one context appear to influence retrieval and use of names in other contexts, but they have reduced impact on nonlinguistic object knowledge. These results support the notion that stable conventions for object names within a linguistic community may arise from local interactions, and they demonstrate how different populations of speakers may come to have a shared understanding of objects' nonlinguistic properties but different naming patterns.     

Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided.     

Patterns of Preference for Numerical and Verbal Probabilities

We report results of an experiment designed to test a principle formulated by Budescu and Wallsten (1995), that, when communicating uncertainty information, mode choices are sensitive to sources and degrees of vagueness. In addition, we examined subjects’ efficacy in using such uncertainty information as a function of communication mode, source, and vagueness. In phase one of the experiment, subjects in a dyad used precise (numerical) or imprecise (verbal) expressions to communicate to a remote partner precise or vague uncertainty about the likelihoods of events. Spinner outcomes were used to generate precise uncertainty while answers to almanac questions were used to elicit vague uncertainty. In phase two, subjects saw the events paired with their partners’ estimates of similar events, and were asked to gamble on one event from each pair. Communication mode preferences were measured as the relative frequency that subjects chose the numerical mode to either express or receive uncertainty information regarding the events. Efficacy was measured as the relative frequency that subjects choose from the pair the event associated with the objectively more probable uncertainty expression. Underlying uncertainty interacted with direction of communication to affect preferences for modes of expression of the probabilities. Subjects preferred precise (numerical) information, especially for precise events (spinners). For vague events (questions), their preference for precise (numerical) information was stronger when receiving than when communicating information. Similar preferences were reflected in the efficiency of subsequent gamble decisions based on the probability estimates. Specifically, decisions were more efficacious (i.e. consistent with Expected Utility) when degrees of precision in events and estimates matched. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Five-year-olds' handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation

Children's concurrent success on false belief tasks and their handling of two labels for one object (e.g., bunny/rabbit) has been interpreted as demonstrating understanding about the essential features of representation. Three experiments reveal the limitations in 5-year-olds' understanding for both mental and linguistic representations. We report relatively poor performance on a task involving two labels for one object (e.g., dice/eraser) which required children to treat another's knowledge as representing only some of the feature of its real referent: Dice but not eraser. Five year olds who made errors also had difficulty handling the fact that a written word 'dice' referring to such a dice/eraser, can also be applied to a standard dice but not to a standard eraser. These children lacked metalinguistic awareness of words as entities that both refer and describe.     

Deranging the Mental Lexicon

This paper offers a defense of Davidson’s conclusion in ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, focusing on the psychology and epistemology of language. Drawing on empirical studies in language acquisition and sociolinguistics, I problematize the traditional idealizing assumption that a person’s mental lexicon consists of two distinct parts—a dictionary, comprising her knowledge of word meanings proper, and an encyclopedia, comprising her wider knowledge of worldly affairs. I argue that the breakdown of the dictionary–encyclopedia distinction can be given a cognitive and functional explanation: facts regarding language learning and the challenges of coping with linguistically diverse environments require that dictionary and encyclopedia remain deeply integrated rather than categorically distinct dimensions of the mental lexicon. This argument provides support for a psychologized version of Davidson’s conclusion in ‘Derangement’: there is no such thing as a language, in the sense that there is no diachronically stable and uniquely specifiable object that could constitute the language which a person knows. I then apply this conclusion to the question of whether the concept of a public language—understood as a more or less stable body of conventions shared by a group of speakers—could nonetheless retain an important explanatory role in philosophy of language and linguistics.     

The effects of feature-label-order and their implications for symbolic learning

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning-in particular, word learning-in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference.     

Effects of knowledge about cross-language equivalents on children's use of mutual exclusivity in interpreting novel labels

Young children seem to assume that words pick out mutually exclusive object categories. This assumption of mutual exclusivity can be useful in word learning, but it is fallible. This study examined the effects of knowledge about cross-language equivalents on children's use of mutual exclusivity in interpreting a novel label coming from a foreign language and in interpreting a novel label within their first language. It was found that 4-year-olds with such knowledge suspended the assumption of mutual exclusivity in interpreting a novel label coming from a foreign language. Furthermore, they were willing to accept multiple labels for an object even within a language, as long as the context suggested that they should do so. In contrast, 3-year-olds did not seem to make use of such knowledge in either case. Thus, it appeared that 4-year-olds could make use of knowledge about language to fine tune the use of mutual exclusivity, but that this seemed to be difficult for 3-year-olds.