Unique contributions of religious and science beliefs on meaning systems in a nationally representative American sample

Individuals often hold beliefs in religion and in science, but how they mutually function is not well-understood. We examined these conjoint influences by examining their relative contributions to individuals' global meaning systems. We also examined whether subgroups of participants could be identified in terms of relative influence of religious or science beliefs on their meaning systems. A nationally representative sample of 300 American adults completed online surveys. Results suggested that science beliefs and religion beliefs comprise separate but only modestly negatively correlated dimensions. Both contributed similarly to the explanation of world assumptions, but only religious beliefs generally predicted goals, values and sense of meaning in life. Latent profile analysis produced a three-profile solution: one profile of moderate science and religious beliefs represented half the sample while the remainder split evenly between predominantly religious and predominantly science beliefs. In general, across most aspects of global meaning, the religious beliefs group was higher than the science beliefs and moderate beliefs in both groups. Results of this first systematic investigation of the separate effects of beliefs in religion and in science on meaning systems suggest that the balance of these beliefs is a potentially important individual difference warranting further investigation and elaboration.     

Is the spell really broken? Bio-psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief

Recent advances in the evolutionary and cognitive sciences of religion have raised questions about whether the assumptions and findings of these fields as applied to religion conflict with belief in gods. Specifically, three scientific approaches to religion (Neurotheology, Group Selection, and Cognitive Science of Religion) are sketched, and five arguments against theistic belief arising from these approaches are discussed and evaluated. None of the five arguments prove formidable challenges for belief in gods.     

Phillips and realists on religious beliefs and the fruits thereof

This article addresses some issues concerning the relation between religious beliefs and the fruits of those beliefs, where ‘fruits’ implies certain relevant forms of behaviour and affective attitudes. My primary aim is to elucidate the dispute between D. Z. Phillips and theological realists, emphasizing the extent to which this dispute is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement over how words acquire their meanings. In the course of doing so, I highlight an important difference between two alternative realist claims, exemplified by Trigg and Hick respectively, and draw attention to an infelicity in Phillips’ way of presenting his case.     

The accessibility of religious beliefs

We used reaction time techniques to study individual differences in accessibility of beliefs about the reality of religious targets. Moderately religious people were slower than religious or irreligious people. Religious people were faster than non-religious people. Reaction times to classify religious stimuli are stable over 8 days. We also found that religious people with accessible beliefs have the highest well-being, and that religious beliefs correspond to greater levels of religious behavior when the reality of religious stimuli is accessible. These results further our understanding on natural individual differences in attitude accessibility and add to our understanding of religious beliefs, including their impact.     

Ringing the changes: In tribute to Arthur R. Peacocke1

Justin Barrett's consideration of some challenges for religious belief raised by evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion was criticized by Howard Van Till for overstating tensions, mischaracterizing the most important epistemological issues, and proposing a solution that perpetuates war on evolution. We argue that each of these claims is untrue, and is not conducive to dialogue that constructively engages and attempts to resolve tensions between science and religion where they do exist.     

The seamy side of current religious beliefs

In this search for criteria to discern neurotic religion, the author notes the attraction and continuing psychological power of religion as well as the conflict and contention among many of its adherents. Neurotic religion is characterized as involving a sacrifice of intellect, wishful compromises, authoritarianism, and an inability to tolerate freedom. Neurotic attempts to cope with stress may manifest themselves in and through certain religious beliefs and practices in prevalent forms of religious pathology. Ten criteria of neurotic religion are contrasted with the enlarged freedom that marks the presence of healthy religion.His article was presented as a Cole Lecture at Vanderbilt Divinity School on March 9,1977, and is reprinted with permission from theBulletin of the Menninger Clinic, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 329–348, copyright 1977 by The Menninger Foundation.     

The correlates of traditional religious beliefs in Britain

This study provides an across time analysis of traditional religious beliefs and examines the socio-structural and religious correlates of such beliefs in Britain. It examines belief in God, life after death, hell, heaven, sin, as well as the notion of a personal God. It undertakes multivariate analysis of a recurrent social survey conducted over several decades. The main findings are that there is no uniform decline in traditional beliefs, with the picture one of change and continuity. Women, religious adherents and those showing greater religious commitment are more likely to hold traditional beliefs. There is a mixed picture for age effects while higher socio-economic status tends to lead to a lower likelihood of holding religious beliefs, as hypothesised by ‘deprivation theory’.     

From commonsense to science,and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.     

SOBIG: A Symposium on Belief in God

The following is a fictional account of a symposium on the age-old topic of belief in God. Organized by faculty members at a religion-based academy called the “Immutable Creeds University” (ICU), the goal of the Symposium was to generate candid discussion on two major questions of interest to both traditional theology and the contemporary cognitive sciences: (1) Why do people believe in God? and (2) Is that belief justified? Responses to these questions were posed and discussed by representatives of: (a) Pre-scientific creedal Christianity, (b) Scientifically informed Christian theology, and (c) Comprehensive naturalism. These three points of view also represent the succession of stages experienced by the author in his personal (and occasionally turbulent) worldview journey. For this reason, some readers may wish to read the author's closing remarks first.     

Workaholism in organizations: The role of personal beliefs and fears

Abstract

This research examined potential individual difference correlates of workaholism in organizational settings. Data were collected from 530 women and men in managerial and professional roles using anonymous questionnaires. Workaholism types were determined using measures developed by Spence and Robbins (1992) Journal of Personality Assessment 58, 160–178. Three personal beliefs and fears identified by Price (1982) Journal of Occupational Behavior, 3, 109–130 in her cognitive social learning model of Type A behavior were assessed as well, some suggesting a possible overlap between particular Type A components and workaholism. Two of the three beliefs and fears were positively and significantly related with workaholism type.     

Mating competitors increase religious beliefs

It has been presumed that religiosity has an influence on mating behavior, but here we experimentally investigate the possibility that mating behavior might also influence religiosity. In Experiment 1, people reported higher religiosity after looking at mating pools consisting of attractive people of their own sex compared to attractive opposite sex targets. Experiment 2 replicated the effect with an added control group, and suggested that both men and women become more religious when seeing same-sex competitors. We discuss several possible explanations for these effects. Most broadly, the findings contribute to an emerging literature on how cultural phenomena such as religiosity respond to ecological cues in potentially functional ways.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Do the cognitive origins of our theistic beliefs debunk them or explain them away? This paper develops an empirically motivated debunking argument and defends it against objections. First, we introduce the empirical and epistemological background. Second, we develop and defend the main argument, the debunking argument from false god beliefs. Third, we characterize and evaluate the most prominent religious debunking argument to date: the debunking argument from insensitivity. It is found that insensitivity-based arguments are problematic, which makes them less promising than the debunking argument from false god beliefs.     

Inhibiting beliefs demands attention

Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands attentional resources. In Experiment 1 we found that reasoning with scenarios that contained Belief-Laden content required fewer attentional resources than reasoning with scenarios that contained Non-Belief-Laden content, as evidenced by smaller costs on a secondary memory load task for the former than the latter. This trend was reversed in Experiment 2 when participants were instructed to ignore their beliefs when reasoning with Belief-Laden and Non-Belief-Laden scenarios. These findings provide evidence that beliefs automatically influence reasoning, and attempting to ignore them comes with an attentional cost.     

An organizing model for recent cognitive science work on the self

An organizing model of ‘the self’ emerges from applying various kinds of brain injury to recent cognitive science and philosophical work on ‘the self’. This model unifies various contents and mechanisms central to current notions of the self. The article then highlights several criteria and aspects of this notion of self. Qualities of the right type and level of psychological significance delineate ‘the self’ as an organizing concept useful for recent philosophical work and cognitive science research.     

Transmission of religious beliefs in college students

The aim of the current study was to assess factors contributing to the generational transmission of religious beliefs in a sample of college students. Participants were 92 students from a small Catholic university in the southeastern United States. Students were surveyed in school regarding family relationships, communication, and religious values. Overall, results indicated that children’s and parents’ religious beliefs were significantly correlated. Furthermore, children were fairly accurate reporters of their parents’ religious beliefs. Some gender differences were found in the strength of the correlations between parents’ and children’s beliefs. Additionally, explicit communication, implicit communication, and perception of parents’ beliefs predicted children’s beliefs. The current study holds clinical and developmental significance by examining the manner in which religiosity is expressed within the familial milieu of emerging adults.     

Associations between beliefs about and reactions toward people who stutter

PurposeThis study sought to assess whether beliefs about people who stutter (PWS) predict intended behavioral and affective reactions toward them in a large and varied sample of respondents while taking into account familiarity with PWS and the demographic variables of age, education, and gender.MethodsAnalyses were based on 2206 residents of the United States of America. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique was used to test the relationship between beliefs about PWS and behavioral and affective reactions toward PWS. Variables such as familiarity with PWS and demographic data were also controlled in the statistical model.ResultsFindings indicated that, when demographic variables and familiarity were taken into account, the accuracy of participants’ beliefs about PWS significantly predicted their intended behavioral and affective reactions toward PWS. The participants’ gender and familiarity with PWS were also associated with these reactions toward PWS.ConclusionThe finding of an association between beliefs and intended reactions validates attempts to improve public treatment of PWS through improving the accuracy of beliefs about PWS. Additionally, because familiarity with PWS is a significant predictor of helpful and positive reactions toward PWS, interventions involving PWS educating others through direct interpersonal interactions may be one effective way to improve public reactions toward individuals who stutter.     

A Quantitative Empirical Analysis of the Abstract/Concrete Distinction

This study presents original evidence that abstract and concrete concepts are organized and represented differently in the mind, based on analyses of thousands of concepts in publicly available data sets and computational resources. First, we show that abstract and concrete concepts have differing patterns of association with other concepts. Second, we test recent hypotheses that abstract concepts are organized according to association, whereas concrete concepts are organized according to (semantic) similarity. Third, we present evidence suggesting that concrete representations are more strongly feature‐based than abstract concepts. We argue that degree of feature‐based structure may fundamentally determine concreteness, and we discuss implications for cognitive and computational models of meaning.     

The necessity of theology and the scientific study of religious beliefs

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for a University of New England Social Sciences Seminar on ‘Religion and the Social Sciences’, organized by Professor of Philosophy peter forrest, to which it was presented on 14 June 1989.