When being right is not enough: four-year-olds distinguish knowledgeable informants from merely accurate informants

Recent evidence demonstrates that children are selective in their social learning, preferring to learn from a previously accurate speaker than from a previously inaccurate one. We examined whether children assessing speakers' reliability take into account how speakers achieved their prior accuracy. In Study 1, when faced with two accurate informants, 4- and 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) were more likely to seek novel information from an informant who had previously given the answers unaided than from an informant who had always relied on help from a third party. Similarly, in Study 2, 4-year-olds were more likely to trust the testimony of an unaided informant over the testimony provided by an assisted informant. Our results indicate that when children reach around 4 years of age, their selective trust extends beyond simple generalizations based on informants' past accuracy to a more sophisticated selectivity that distinguishes between truly knowledgeable informants and merely accurate informants who may not be reliable in the long term.     

Preschoolers trust particular informants when learning new names and new morphological forms

Across three studies, we investigated whether 4‐year‐olds would trust a previously reliable informant when learning novel morphological forms. In Experiment 1, children (N= 16) were presented with two informants: one who correctly named familiar objects and another who named them incorrectly. Children were invited to turn to these informants when learning novel labels and morphological forms. The majority of children chose the previously correct labeller when learning novel label and morphology. In Experiment 2, children (N= 16) were presented with an informant who used familiar plurals correctly and one who used them incorrectly. Children chose the previously correct morphologist when learning novel labels and past tense forms. Thus, children track both semantic and morphological accuracy. In Experiment 3, some children (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in naming accuracy, whereas others (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in morphological accuracy. To forestall any risk of experimenter cuing, one experimenter blind to the training children had received, tested children with novel labels and morphology. The results replicated those of Experiments 1 and 2. Implications for how children's trust in an informant might play a role in their acquisition of morphological forms are discussed.     

Preschoolers continue to trust a more accurate informant 1 week after exposure to accuracy information

To determine whether children retain a preference for a previously accurate informant only in the short term or for long‐term use, 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested in two experiments. In both experiments, children were given accuracy information about two informants and were subsequently tested for their selective trust in the two informants (Experiment 1: immediately, 1 day and 1 week later; Experiment 2: immediately, 4 days and 1 week later). Both age groups preferred to trust the accurate informant not only immediately after receiving accuracy information but also at subsequent time‐points. Children who were immediately able to explicitly identify the accurate informant were significantly more likely to seek and accept information from her 1 week later. However, even when they had not been asked to explicitly identify the accurate informant both age groups still maintained their preference for her. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously choose a previously accurate informant up to 1 week after exposure to information regarding her accuracy.     

Children assess informant reliability using bystanders' non-verbal cues

Recent findings show that preschool children are selective with respect to whom they ask for information and whose claims they endorse. In particular, they monitor an informant's record of past accuracy or inaccuracy and use that record to gauge future trustworthiness. We ask if preschoolers also monitor the non-verbal cues of assent or dissent that bystanders display toward an informant's claims and use that information to gauge an informant's trustworthiness. In familiarization trials, 4-year-olds watched as two adult informants made conflicting claims regarding the name of an unfamiliar object. Two adult bystanders consistently signaled assent - via nods and smiles - to the claims of one informant, and dissent - via head shakes and frowns - from the claims of the other informant. When invited to endorse one of the two claims, 4-year-olds mostly agreed with the informant who had received bystander assent. Thus, in the absence of background knowledge about an object's name, children use third-party non-verbal signals to assess the accuracy of conflicting labels. On subsequent test trials, the informants again made conflicting claims about novel object names, but in the absence of the two bystanders. Despite the lack of any informative bystander signals, children with more advanced understanding of mental states continued to display greater trust in the informant who had received bystander assent in the earlier trials.     

My people,right or wrong? Minimal group membership disrupts preschoolers’ selective trust

When preschoolers decide to trust one speaker over another, how does group membership influence their tracking of speaker reliability? In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were assigned to arbitrary groups of no social significance (0055 and 0170) and asked to endorse novel object labels provided by two ingroup members, one of whom was reliable and the second of whom was unreliable. Children selectively trusted the more reliable informant. In Experiment 2, we asked whether ingroup status or reliability would determine children's choices and found that 4-year-olds failed to trust reliable outgroup members over unreliable ingroup members (or vice versa). Experiment 3 showed that the failure of trust in Experiment 2 was not due to the mere inclusion of both ingroup and outgroup members: children presented with a control paradigm in which the ingroup members were reliable trusted reliable ingroup members over unreliable outgroup members. Children's use of reliability as an indicator of future credibility therefore appears disrupted when outgroup status and reliability are in conflict, even when group membership is arbitrary.     

幼儿基于信息判断的选择性信任的发展——其持续性及与人际信任的关系

采用物品命名任务的模式, 对60名2岁、3岁、4岁幼儿的选择性信任进行研究。结果表明:(1)幼儿更信赖那些正确率高的信息传达者, 形成选择性的信任。这种选择性信任的认知能力在3岁左右出现, 并随着年龄的增长而增强, 4岁达到稳定。(2)选择性信任一旦形成, 就具有一定的稳定性和持续性, 即3岁以上的幼儿在不同时间不同地点再见到先前的信息传达者时, 依然能区分出他们。(3)基于信息判断的选择性信任可以迁移到人际信任的其他方面。     

Trust in testimony: children's use of true and false statements

The extent to which young children monitor and use the truth of assertions to gauge the reliability of subsequent testimony was examined. Three- and 4-year-old children were presented with two informants, an accurate labeler and an inaccurate labeler. They were then invited to learn names for novel objects from these informants. The children correctly monitored and identified the informants on the basis of the truth of their prior labeling. Furthermore, children who explicitly identified the unreliable or reliable informant across two tasks went on to demonstrate selective trust in the novel information provided by the previously reliable informant. Children who did not consistently identify the unreliable or reliable informant proved indiscriminate.     

Explaining the errors away: Young children forgive understandable semantic mistakes

Errors differ in degree of seriousness. We asked whether preschoolers would use the magnitude of an informant's errors to decide if that informant would be a good source of information later. Four- and 5-year-olds observed two informants incorrectly label familiar objects, but one informant's errors were closer to the correct answer than the other's (e.g., one referred to a comb as a brush and the other referred to the same comb as a thunderstorm). When informants had an unambiguous view of the objects, children could identify which informant was closer to being correct, but they did not favor novel labels the “closer” informant later provided. When the informants had an ambiguous view of the objects (e.g., only the handle of the comb was visible), children preferred the novel labels provided later by the “closer” informant. Preschoolers are willing to overlook semantic errors that are close to being correct, but only when there is an understandable reason for the speaker's errors.     

Early tracking of informant accuracy and inaccuracy

Three‐ and four‐year‐old children (N=131) were tested for their sensitivity to the accuracy and inaccuracy of informants. Children were presented with one of three conditions. In the Accurate‐Inaccurate condition, one informant named objects accurately whereas the other named them inaccurately. In the Accurate‐Neutral condition, one informant named objects accurately whereas the other merely drew attention to them. Finally in the Inaccurate‐Neutral condition, one informant named objects inaccurately whereas the other merely drew attention to them. In subsequent test trials, 4‐year‐olds preferred to seek and accept information in a selective fashion across all three conditions, suggesting that they monitor informants for both accuracy and inaccuracy. By contrast, 3‐year‐olds were selective in the Accurate‐Inaccurate and Inaccurate‐Neutral conditions but not in the Accurate‐Neutral condition, suggesting that they monitor informants only for inaccuracy and take accuracy for granted.     

Children’s Judgments of Cultural Expertise: The Influence of Cultural Status and Learning Method

The authors investigated children’s use of cultural status (i.e., foreign vs. American) and learning method to evaluate informants’ expertise in novel cultural practices. Ninety-six 6- to 9-year-olds heard about a foreign informant (i.e., member of an unfamiliar out-group) and an American informant (i.e., member of the participant’s in-group) who each learned about a novel cultural practice differently (i.e., from a person vs. from a book). Participants decided which informant executed the cultural practice better, which informant they would prefer to learn from, and which learning method they would want to use themselves (i.e., learning method preference). Overall, participants endorsed foreign informants over American informants and foreign informants who learned from a person were generally viewed as the preferred option for imparting information in this context. These findings suggest that during the transition to middle childhood, learning context is an important influence on children’s evaluations of cultural identity and learning methods.     

Trust

Children rely extensively on others' testimony to learn about the world. However, they are not uniformly credulous toward other people. From an early age, children's reliance on testimony is tempered by selective trust in particular informants. Three- and 4-year-olds monitor the accuracy or knowledge of informants, including those that are familiar. They prefer to seek and endorse information provided by someone who has proved accurate in the past rather than someone who has made mistakes or acknowledged ignorance. Future research is likely to pinpoint other heuristics that children use to filter incoming testimony and may reveal more generalized patterns of trust and mistrust among individual children.     

Determining who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for: the development of inquiry in young children

To obtain reliable information, it is important to identify and effectively question knowledgeable informants. Two experiments examined how age and the ease of distinguishing between reliable and unreliable sources influence children’s ability to effectively question those sources to solve problems. A sample of 3- to 5-year-olds was introduced to a knowledgeable informant contrasted with an informant who always gave inaccurate answers or one who always indicated ignorance. Children were generally better at determining which informant to question when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an ignorant informant than when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an inaccurate informant. In some cases, age also influenced the ability to determine who to question and what to ask. Importantly, in both experiments, the strongest predictor of accuracy was whether children had acquired sufficient information; successful problem solving required integrating knowledge of who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for.     

Causal Clarity Prevents the Emergence of Social Biases in Children’s Excusing of Mistakes

In two studies, we examined how 5-­year-­olds weigh similarity against other factors in deciding from whom to learn. Specifically, we examined the factors of history of and reasons for inaccuracy in Experiment 1 (n = 64) and of competence and authority in Experiment 2 (n = 32). In the 1st phase of Experiments 1 and 2, children’s social biases were tested: 5-year-olds met both a similar informant (SI) and a dissimilar informant (DI). These informants were puppets (Experiment 1) or human teachers (Experiment 2). Children could select either informant as a source of object names. Across experiments children systematically preferred learning from the SI over DI. In the 2nd phase of Experiment 1, both informants first provided accurate information and then 1 of them became inaccurate during an event that clearly explained (being blindfolded) or did not explain (wearing a scarf) the inaccuracy. For half the children, the SI was accurate and the DI was inaccurate. Only after inaccuracy events that were causally unclear did children showcase similarity biases in their subsequent learning preferences. Experiment 2 showed that identifying a DI as a teacher (a profession associated with positive attributes) failed to counter children’s similarity bias. These findings provide important insights on contextual factors that contribute to children’s favoring of socially meaningful others.     

In the absence of conflicting testimony young children trust inaccurate informants

The present research investigated the nature of the inferences and decisions young children make about informants with a prior history of inaccuracies. Across three experiments, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds (total N = 182) reacted to previously inaccurate informants who offered testimony in an object‐labeling task. Of central interest was children's willingness to accept information provided by an inaccurate informant in different contexts of being alone, paired with an accurate informant, or paired with a novel (neutral) informant. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when a previously inaccurate informant was alone and provided testimony that was not in conflict with the testimony of another informant, children systematically accepted the testimony of that informant. Experiment 3 showed that children accepted testimony from a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant when both provided information, but accepted testimony from an inaccurate informant rather than seeking information from an available neutral informant who did not automatically offer information. These results suggest that even though young children use prior history of accuracy to determine the relative reliability of informants, they are quite willing to trust the testimony of a single informant alone, regardless of whether that informant had previously been reliable.     

Going With the Flow: Preschoolers Prefer Nondissenters as Informants

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, 3- and 4-year-olds were tested for their sensitivity to agreement and disagreement among informants. In pretest trials, they watched as three of four informants ( Experiment 1 ) or two of three informants ( Experiment 2 ) indicated the same referent for an unfamiliar label; the remaining informant was a lone dissenter who indicated a different referent. Asked for their own judgment, the preschoolers sided with the majority rather than the dissenter. In subsequent test trials, one member of the majority and the dissenter remained present and continued to provide conflicting information about the names of unfamiliar objects. Children remained mistrustful of the dissenter. They preferred to seek and endorse information from the informant who had belonged to the majority. The implications and scope of children's early sensitivity to group consensus are discussed.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

Pointing Disrupts Preschoolers' Ability to Discriminate Between Knowledgeable and Ignorant Informants

By 4 years of age, children have been reinforced repeatedly for searching where they see someone point. In two studies, we asked whether this history of reinforcement could interfere with young children's ability to discriminate between a knowledgeable and an ignorant informant. Children watched as one informant hid a sticker while another turned around, and then both informants indicated where they though the sticker was, either by pointing or by using a less practiced means of reference. Children failed to discriminate between the two informants when they pointed, but they chose the location indicated by the knowledgeable informant when the informants used a cue other than pointing. Pointing can disrupt as basic an understanding as the link between seeing and knowing.     

Trust in testimony about strangers: young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger’s personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children’s use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.     

The development of induction based on noun and feature labels

In two experiments, we examined the development of sensitivity to the inductive potential of shared novel noun and feature labels. Children (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and 8-year-olds) and adults were presented with a complete base stimulus and an incomplete target. The task was to infer whether the missing target feature matched the corresponding base feature. The base and target were given matching or mismatching novel labels, which were either count nouns or adjectives describing object features. Use of matching labels for induction increased with age. Nevertheless, all age groups were more likely to make inferences based on novel noun labels rather than feature labels. These results support the view that even preschool children grasp the conceptual significance of count nouns for induction.     

In beauty we trust: Children prefer information from more attractive informants

Preschool children were presented with slides on a computer screen showing a novel object, together with two informants, one with an attractive and one with a less attractive face. Children were asked which informant they would like to ask about the name of the novel object. After hearing the informants provide conflicting names, they were asked who they thought was correct. Children were more likely to endorse names provided by the person with the more attractive face, a bias that cannot be justified on epistemic grounds. The implications of this finding are discussed.