Duties to Make Friends

Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet widely recognised. Specifically, in certain situations, impartial principles generate duties to take actions and adopt attitudes in our personal lives that increase the chance of new or different special relationships being formed—new or different friendships, family-like relationships, relationships akin to co-nationality, and so on. In fact, even if one thinks partialism is the best justification of the duties we have once in special relationships, impartialist justifications for taking steps to form such relationships should have some sway. Moreover, a little reflection shows that these duties are not as demanding or counterintuitive as one might expect.     

Best Friends

Abstract

Eighty-six adults participated in the present study of the relationships among selected predictors and responses to potential earthquake and flood hazard. Results indicated (a) that length of residence was the best predictor of perceived probability of earthquake occurrence, whereas no predictors were identified for flood probability; (b) that estimation of potential earthquake damage was related to perceived reliability of official support systems, number of damage reduction measures, and trait anxiety, whereas flood damage estimation was associated with flood expectation, perceived reliability of agencies, severity of previously experienced damages, and education; and (c) that trait anxiety and availability of safety items in the home accounted for a significant percentage of the variance in acknowledged anxiety in response to an earthquake prediction, whereas damage expectation and previously experienced damage emerged as predictors of acknowledged anxiety in response to a flood prediction.     

A Response to the Contributors

Abstract

In my “response to the contributors” I emphasize that I was moved to write my book in response to the question “Why are so many well-trained colleagues, young and old, having so much difficulty developing satisfying analytic practices?” To answer that question I proposed to explore my experience successfully developing and maintaining an analytic practice.

In attempting to answer the question I inadvertently stumbled upon a revolutionary (with a “small r”) answer to the problem. I discovered, in my attitudes and in my way of working in a consultation and the early phase of an analytic collaboration, a new “concrete puzzle solution” to the problem of how to help a prospective, often reluctant collaborator give analysis a “try.”

My book emphasizes my view that courses on “analyzability” and differential diagnosis are based on psychiatric rather than psychoanalytic diagnostic schema and may interfere with candidates' ability to learn how to create analytic patients.

Since I was a candidate, courses on analyzability have always seemed to me to resemble an exclusive club, deciding whom to exclude and whom to admit, rather than a procedure based on sound clinical experience. Analytic experience has demonstrated that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis. To make matters worse, it is probable that an analyst whose mind is focused on the task of evaluating a prospective analysand contributes to creating an environment in which certain patients are experienced as sicker than they might otherwise be.

In spite of the fact that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis, many experienced “senior” analysts believe an analyst can and should be evaluative and selective. In their discussions of the subject, they focus primarily on characteristics of the patient rather than the match.

In my book I emphasize that in a consultation there are advantages in focusing on the patient's responses to the idea of engaging in a trial of analysis. The issue of the match and the particular time in their lives are significant from my perspective. The analyst's gender, age, personality, and related state of mind may be as important in effecting the outcome of a trial as any feature of the patient's mind.

My book shifts the emphasis of the focus of inquiry in a consultation from the patient to the analytic couple. It offers a different way of teaching candidates to work with prospective collaborators.     

A Response to Lesbian Ethics

Lesbian Ethics seems to address a need for an alternative to heteropatriarchal ethics. That need appears to have two suspect sources: a concept of agency which requires that agents know what is right; and a notion women may have that by being “good” we can escape the degraded status of females and achieve a status of citizeness, or honorary male. Instead of providing such an ethic, the book may show us how to live without it.     

A Response to Monica Mookherjee

This response discusses Mookherjee’s views on plural autonomy and autonomy-promoting education, and her recognition that different cultural value systems can lead to varied responses and strategies across cultures. It considers mechanisms to counter forced marriage and argues from the standpoint of grassroots work within the Muslim community for the importance of the distinction between traditional culture and religion. It raises the issues of racism, islamophobia, and stereotyping in silencing Muslim women’s voices and reducing the space for them to argue for change within communities.