Why additional presentations help identify a stimulus

Nosofsky (1983) reported that additional stimulus presentations within a trial increase discriminability in absolute identification, suggesting that each presentation creates an independent stimulus representation, but it remains unclear whether exposure duration or the formation of independent representations improves discrimination in such conditions. Experiment 1 replicated Nosofsky's result. Experiments 2 (masking the ISI between two-presentations) and 3 (manipulating stimulus duration without changing number of presentations or overall trial duration) ruled out an explanation in terms of extended opportunities for stimulus sampling, from either a sensory buffer during additional ISIs or increased stimulus exposure, respectively. Experiment 4 (comparing two and three-presentations, other factors controlled) provided some limited additional support for Nosofsky's original claim that additional stimulus presentations can create either independent or duplicate representations. Experiments 5 and 6 (both manipulating ISI) demonstrated that a key factor in the additional stimulus presentation effect is the overall trial duration. We discuss the results in relation to models of absolute identification, their relative emphasis on stimulus sampling versus response selection, and the mechanisms by which duplicate representations could be created.     

Similarity, confusability, and the density hypothesis

Results from several letter- and digit-identification studies have been interpreted (Appelman & Mayzner, 1982; Krumhansl, 1982) as providing support for the hypothesis that psychological similarity is influenced by the local density of items in the stimulus space. This conclusion is questioned on the grounds that density was not directly manipulated in the studies, thus alternative explanations based on other stimulus characteristics cannot be excluded. In the present article six experiments are reported in which stimulus density was manipulated. In three experiments using similarity ratings and two using discrimination confusions, no effect of stimulus density was found. However, the identification counterpart of one of the discrimination studies did provide evidence of an effect of density on response probabilities. It is concluded that stimulus density can affect identification performance through its influence on the choice process implicit in any identification task, but is not an important determinant of psychological similarity.     

The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental storage capacity

Miller (1956) summarized evidence that people can remember about seven chunks in short-term memory (STM) tasks. However, that number was meant more as a rough estimate and a rhetorical device than as a real capacity limit. Others have since suggested that there is a more precise capacity limit, but that it is only three to five chunks. The present target article brings together a wide variety of data on capacity limits suggesting that the smaller capacity limit is real. Capacity limits will be useful in analyses of information processing only if the boundary conditions for observing them can be carefully described. Four basic conditions in which chunks can be identified and capacity limits can accordingly be observed are: (1) when information overload limits chunks to individual stimulus items, (2) when other steps are taken specifically to block the recording of stimulus items into larger chunks, (3) in performance discontinuities caused by the capacity limit, and (4) in various indirect effects of the capacity limit. Under these conditions, rehearsal and long-term memory cannot be used to combine stimulus items into chunks of an unknown size; nor can storage mechanisms that are not capacity-limited, such as sensory memory, allow the capacity-limited storage mechanism to be refilled during recall. A single, central capacity limit averaging about four chunks is implicated along with other, noncapacity-limited sources. The pure STM capacity limit expressed in chunks is distinguished from compound STM limits obtained when the number of separately held chunks is unclear. Reasons why pure capacity estimates fall within a narrow range are discussed and a capacity limit for the focus of attention is proposed.     

Individual differences in cognitive representations of action influence the activation of goal concepts

Goal representations play a key role in various psychological processes, including behavioral regulation, self-perception and social understanding. Research on cognitive representations of action has identified individual differences in the general tendency to construe actions in terms of their goal (vs. movement parameters), which can be reliably assessed with the Behavior Identification Form (BIF). The aim of the present study was to examine how individual differences in action identification, as measured by the BIF, affect online processing of action in a laboratory study. The main results showed that the level of action identification predicted participants' performance in a task designed to implicitly assess people's automatic processing of action regarding goal features. We discussed the possible role of impaired goal processing in psychological dysfunctions.     

Stimulus representations in human Pavlovian conditioning: Implications of missing negative transfer across response systems

Three Pavlovian conditioning experiments with human participants are reported, which investigated whether common or separate stimulus representations are involved in solving nonlinear discrimination tasks in different response systems. In our experiments we made use of a negative transfer effect between positive and negative patterning. Experiment 1 specified the conditions under which such a negative transfer effect occurs in human eyelid conditioning. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether a similar effect also occurs if two response systems- the eyelid and the skin conductance response system- are trained with trials of both types being randomly interleaved. The presence or absence of a negative transfer effect indicates whether or not the stimulus representations involved in the two conditioning processes overlap. The findings are discussed within the framework of a neuropsychological model of hippocampal function. The results suggest that the representations are distinct and thus support the idea of acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of stimulus representations.     

Effects of stimulus orientation on the identification of common polyoriented objects

Experimental evidence has shown that the time taken to recognize objects is often dependent on stimulus orientation in the image plane. This effect has been taken as evidence that recognition is mediated by orientation-specific stored representations of object shapes. However, the factors that determine the orientation specificity of these representations remain unclear. This issue is examined using a word-picture verification paradigm in which subjects identified line drawings of common mono- and polyoriented objects at different orientations. A detailed analysis of the results showed that, in contrast to mono-oriented objects, the recognition of polyoriented objects is not dependent on stimulus orientation. This interaction provides a further constraint on hypotheses about the factors that determine the apparent orientation specificity of stored shape representations. In particular, they support previous proposals that objects are encoded in stored representations at familiar stimulus orientations.     

Judgments of relative position and distance on representations of spatial relations

This article examines Kosslyn's (1987) hypothesis of the unequal capacity of cerebral hemispheres to process categorical and coordinate spatial relations. Experiment 1 comprised 4 different tasks and failed to support this hypothesis in normal Ss. With the same stimulus patterns as in Kosslyn's study, the results failed to confirm cerebral asymmetry for representing the 2 types of spatial relations, in normal (Experiment 2) and commissurotomized (Experiment 3) Ss. In Experiment 4, a reduction in stimulus luminance produced a partial confirmation of the hypothesis as the right hemisphere proved more adept than the left hemisphere at operating on coordinate representations, whereas both were equally competent at processing categorical spatial-relation representations. The results suggest that the 2 hemispheres can operate on both types of spatial relations, but their respective efficiency depends on the quality of the representations to be processed.     

Changes in processing of masked stimuli across early- and late-night sleep: a study on behavior and brain potentials

Sleep has proven to support the memory consolidation in many tasks including learning of perceptual skills. Explicit, conscious types of memory have been demonstrated to benefit particularly from slow-wave sleep (SWS), implicit, non-conscious types particularly from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. By comparing the effects of early-night sleep, rich in SWS, and late-night sleep, rich in REM sleep, we aimed to separate the contribution of these two sleep stages in a metacontrast masking paradigm in which explicit and implicit aspects in perceptual learning could be assessed separately by stimulus identification and priming, respectively. We assumed that early sleep intervening between two sessions of task performance would specifically support stimulus identification, while late sleep would specifically support priming. Apart from overt behavior, event-related EEG potentials (ERPs) were measured to record the cortical mechanisms associated with behavioral changes across sleep. In contrast to our hypothesis, late-night sleep appeared to be more important for changes of behavior, both for stimulus identification, which tended to improve across late-night sleep, and for priming, with the increase of errors induced by masked stimuli correlating with the duration of REM sleep. ERP components proved sensitive to presence of target shapes in the masked stimuli and to their priming effects. Of these components, the N2 component, indicating processing of conflict, became larger across early-night sleep and was related to the duration of S4 sleep, the deepest substage of SWS containing particularly high portions of EEG slow waves. These findings suggest that sleep promotes perceptual learning primarily by its REM sleep portion, but indirectly also by way of improved action monitoring supported by deep slow-wave sleep.     

Relative judgment and knowledge of the category structure

For evenly spaced stimuli, a purely relative judgment account of unidimensional categorization performance is trivial: All that is required is knowledge of the size of stimulus difference corresponding to the width of a category. For unevenly spaced stimuli, long-term knowledge of the category structure is required. In the present article, we will argue that such knowledge does not necessitate a direct, absolute mapping between (representations of ) stimulus magnitudes and category labels. We will show that Stewart, Brown, and Chater’s (2005) relative judgment model can account for data from absolute identification experiments with uneven stimulus spacing.     

Can response preparation begin before stimulus recognition finishes?

The present experiments were designed to determine whether information obtained early in the process of recognizing a stimulus can be used to begin preparing keypress responses before recognition of the stimulus has completely finished. This question is relevant to the recent debate between discrete (e.g., Sternberg, 1969a) and continuous (e.g., McClelland, 1979) models of human information processing. Stimulus sets were chosen so that recognition processes could extract incomplete preliminary information about a stimulus much faster than they could extract secondary information needed for unique stimulus identification. Discriminability of the secondary information was manipulated to vary the opportunity for response preparation based on preliminary information, with difficult secondary discriminations providing more time for response preparation than easy ones. Precues were given on some trials to allow response preparation to occur before the stimulus was presented, thereby reducing any difference in response preparation as a function of discriminability. Continuous models predict that precues should facilitate response preparation less when the secondary discrimination is difficult than when it is easy, and discrete models predict equal facilitation regardless of secondary discrimination difficulty. Evidence of response preparation was obtained with some but not all stimulus sets. The results were interpreted as support for the asynchronous discrete coding model (Miller, 1982a), in which response preparation can begin only after recognition processes have completely activated a code used in categorizing the stimulus.     

Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology - namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology - that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements.     

More than a matter of getting ‘unstuck’: flexible thinkers use more abstract representations than perseverators

Why do people perseverate, repeating prior behaviours that are no longer appropriate? Many accounts point to isolated deficits in processes such as inhibition or attention. We instead posit a fundamental difference in rule representations: flexible switchers use active representations that rely on later‐developing prefrontal cortical areas and are more abstract, whereas perseverators use latent representations that rely on earlier‐developing posterior cortical and subcortical areas and are more stimulus‐specific. Thus, although switchers and perseverators should apply the rules they use to familiar stimuli equally reliably, perseverators should show unique limitations in generalizing their rules to novel stimuli, a process that requires abstract representations. Two behavioural experiments confirmed this counterintuitive prediction early in development. Three‐year‐old children sorted cards by one rule, were asked to switch to another rule, and then were asked simply to continue their behaviour, with novel cards. Perseverators applied the rule they were using (the first rule) just as reliably as switchers applied the rule they were using (the second rule) with familiar cards; however, only switchers generalized their rule to novel cards. This finding supports an early link between active representations that support switching and abstract representations that support generalization. We interpret this synergy in terms of prefrontal cortical development.     

Extending the ALCOVE model of category learning to featural stimulus domains

The ALCOVE model of category learning, despite its considerable success in accounting for human performance across a wide range of empirical tasks, is limited by its reliance on spatial stimulus representations. Some stimulus domains are better suited to featural representation, characterizing stimuli in terms of the presence or absence of discrete features, rather than as points in a multidimensional space. We report on empirical data measuring human categorization performance across a featural stimulus domain and show that ALCOVE is unable to capture fundamental qualitative aspects of this performance. In response, a featural version of the ALCOVE model is developed, replacing the spatial stimulus representations that are usually generated by multidimensional scaling with featural representations generated by additive clustering. We demonstrate that this featural version of ALCOVE is able to capture human performance where the spatial model failed, explaining the difference in terms of the contrasting representational assumptions made by the two approaches. Finally, we discuss ways in which the ALCOVE categorization model might be extended further to use “hybrid” representational structures combining spatial and featural components.     

Rehearsal,generative processes,and the activation of underlying stimulus representations

Previous research found that subjects engaged in mental rehearsal could reduce stimulus encoding time in classification and identification tasks by generating an appropriate representation of the probe stimulus prior to its presentation. The present experiment examined the types of representational codes activated by generative processes in character classification. Numerical stimuli were employed which could differ visually, yet have the same name and meaning (e.g., TWO, 2, II, &.). The results indicate that generative processes may activate visual and nonvisual memory codes prior to the encoding of an external stimulus. Effects of generative processes were discussed in terms of an activation model which defines the function of rehearsal in perceptual processing. Attention, through rehearsal, activates stimulus representations which are described by distributions of activation which change continuously over time. The momentary state of each distribution determines the rate of stimulus encoding.     

Electrophysiological evidence for a shared representational medium for visual images and visual percepts

Does mental imagery involve the activation of representations in the visual system? Systematic effects of imagery on visual signal detection performance have been used to argue that imagery and the perceptual processing of stimuli interact at some common locus of activity (Farah, 1985). However, such a result is neutral with respect to the question of whether the interaction occurs during modality-specific visual processing of the stimulus. If imagery affects stimulus processing at early, modality-specific stages of stimulus representation, this implies that the shared stimulus representations are visual, whereas if imagery affects stimulus processing only at later, amodal stages of stimulus representation, this implies that imagery involves more abstract, postvisual stimulus representations. To distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the earlier imagery-perception interaction experiment while recording event-related potentials (ERPs) to stimuli from 16 scalp electrodes. By observing the time course and scalp distribution of the effect of imagery on the ERP to stimuli, we can put constraints on the locus of the shared representations for imagery and perception. An effect of imagery was seen within 200 ms following stimulus presentation, at the latency of the first negative component of the visual ERP, localized at the occipital and posterior temporal regions of the scalp, that is, directly over visual cortex. This finding provides support for the claim that mental images interact with percepts in the visual system proper and hence that mental images are themselves visual representations.     

Verbal transformation: habituation or spreading activation?

Experiment 1 tested the habituation hypothesis of the Verbal Transformation Effect, an auditory illusion in which a repeating verbal stimulus undergoes perceptual transformation, by varying stimulus dimensions which might be expected to retard habituation. Transformations were found to increase as a function of imagery value and word length, failing to support the habituation hypothesis. Experiment 2, in which transformations were found to vary as a function of number of activated semantic representations of a physically invariant homophone stimulus, provided support for a new dual-process explanation of the Transformation effect, based on spreading activation between cognitive representations.     

Locus of the intensity effect in simple reaction time tasks

Evidence is still inconclusive regarding the locus of the stimulus intensity effect on information processing in reaction tasks. Miller, Ulrich, and Rinkenauer (1999) addressed this question by assessing the intensity effect on stimulus- and response-locked lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) as indices of the sensory and motor parts of reaction time (RT). In the case of visual stimuli, they observed that application of brighter stimuli resulted in a shortening of RT and stimulus-locked LRP (S-LRP), but not of response-locked LRP (R-LRP). The results for auditory stimuli, however, were unclear. In spite of a clear RT reduction due to increased loudness, neither S-LRP nor R-LRP onset was affected. A reason for this failure might have been a relatively small range of intensity variation and the type of task. To check for this possibility, we performed three experiments in which broader ranges of stimulus intensities and simple, rather than choice, response tasks were used. Although the intensity effect on the R-LRP was negligible, S-LRP followed RT changes, irrespective of stimulus modality. These findings support the conclusion that stimulus intensity exerts its effect before the start of motoric processes. Finally, S-LRP and R-LRP findings are discussed within a broader information-processing perspective to check the validity of the claim that S-LRP and R-LRP can, indeed, be considered as pure estimates of the duration of sensory and motor processes.     

Space-, object-, and feature-based attention interact to organize visual scenes

Biased-competition accounts of attentional processing propose that attention arises from distributed interactions within and among different types of perceptual representations (e.g., spatial, featural, and object-based). Although considerable research has examined the facilitation in processing afforded by attending selectively to spatial locations, or to features, or to objects, surprisingly little research has addressed a key prediction of the biased-competition account: that attending to any stimulus should give rise to simultaneous interactions across all the types of perceptual representations encompassed by that stimulus. Here we show that, when an object in a visual display is cued, space-, feature-, and object-based forms of attention interact to enhance processing of that object and to create a scene-wide pattern of attentional facilitation. These results provide evidence to support the biased-competition framework and suggest that attention might be thought of as a mechanism by which multiple, disparate bottom-up, and even top-down, visual perceptual representations are coordinated and preferentially enhanced.     

Parallel neural systems for classical conditioning: Support from computational modeling

Classical conditioning has been explained by two main types of theories that postulate different learning mechanisms. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) put forth a theory in which conditioning is based on the ability of the US to drive learning through error correction. Alternatively, Mackintosh (1973) put forth a theory in which the ability of the CS to be associated with the unconditioned stimulus is modulated. We have proposed a reconciliation of these two mechanisms as working in parallel within different neural systems: a cerebellar system for US modulation and a hippocampal system for CS modulation. We developed a computational model of cerebellar function in eyeblink conditioning based on the error correction mechanism of the Rescorla-Wagner rule in which learningrelated activity from the cerebellum inhibits the inferior olive, which is the US input pathway to the cerebellum (Gluck et al., 1994). We developed a computational model of the hippocampal region that forms altered representations of conditioned stimuli based on their behavioral outcomes (Gluck & Myers, 1993; Myers et al., 1995). Overall, computational modeling and empirical findings support the idea that, at least in the case of eyeblink conditioning, there may be two different neural systems: the cerebellum which mediates US-based error correction and hippocampus which alters representations of CSs.     

Parallel Neural Systems for Classical Conditioning: Support From Computational Modeling

Classical conditioning has been explained by two main types of theories that postulate different learning mechanisms. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) put forth a theory in which conditioning is based on the ability of the US to drive learning through error correction. Alternatively, Mackintosh (1973) put forth a theory in which the ability of the CS to be associated with the unconditioned stimulus is modulated. We have proposed a reconciliation of these two mechanisms as working in parallel within different neural systems: a cerebellar system for US modulation and a hippocampal system for CS modulation. We developed a computational model of cerebellar function in eyeblink conditioning based on the error correction mechanism of the Rescorla-Wagner rule in which learning-related activity from the cerebellum inhibits the inferior olive, which is the US input pathway to the cerebellum (Gluck et al., 1994). We developed a computational model of the hippocampal region that forms altered representations of conditioned stimuli based on their behavioral outcomes (Gluck & Myers, 1993; Myers et al., 1995). Overall, computational modeling and empirical findings support the idea that, at least in the case of eyeblink conditioning, there may be two different neural systems: the cerebellum which mediates US-based error correction and hippocampus which alters representations of CSs.