The recall and use of belief statements as bases for judgments: Some determinants and implications

When people are asked to report their beliefs in a (target) statement, they may search memory for other, “informational” propositions that bear on its validity, and may use their beliefs in these propositions as bases for their judgments. Several factors were hypothesized to affect the particular propositions that subjects are likely to recall under such conditions. Subjects first familiarized themselves with a list of informational and target propositions. Then, they reported either their beliefs in these propositions or their attitudes toward them. In a second session 1 week later, they recalled as many of the propositions as they could. Both informational and target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions were unlikely to be true. In addition, the target statements were better recalled when the informational propositions associated with them had unclear implications for their validity. Recall of one proposition was more likely to cue the recall of the other when subjects had previously reported belief in the target proposition (rather than attitudes toward it). However, it was more likely to occur when subjects had reported attitudes toward the informational proposition (rather than beliefs in it). The effects of these variables were interpreted in terms of their mediating influence on the strength of association between the informational proposition and both (a) the target proposition and (b) contextual and environmental cues in the situation where target beliefs are reported.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Focused memory search in fact retrieval

Several studies of fact retrieval have shown that the more facts a person learns about a concept, the longer it takes him or her to retrieve any of these facts. This result has been interpreted to mean that retrieval of a fact about a concept involves a search of all facts stored in memory with that concept. In the present study, it is suggested that retrieval involves not an unfocused search of all facts stored with a concept, but rather a focused memory search that examines relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information. This argument is supported by three experiments in which subjects first learned simple facts (e.g., “The banker likes horses”) and then made speeded true-false decisions for test probes le.g., “The banker likes elephants”). Specifically, results suggest that facts stored with a concept may be organized into subsets. For example, a person’s knowledge about Richard Nixon might be organized into subsets concerning Nixon’s resignation, his trips to China, his family, and so on. The data further suggest that a person attempting to retrieve a fact about a concept (e.g., the name of Nixon’s wife) may simply decide which subset is most likely to contain the desired fact (e.g., the subset concerning Nixon’s family) and search that subset. If the sought-for fact is found in this subset, the search process terminates. If, however, the desired information is not located, other subsets of facts may be searched before the retrieval attempt is given up. The notion that memory search focuses on relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information may help to explain why experts (i.e., people who know a large number of facts about a topic) do not experience great difficulty in retrieving facts in their areas of expertise.     

The duration and generalization of attraction

Tested in the present study were the propositions that attraction toward others is lasting and that liked and disliked individuals serve as a basis for liking others. On the first day, subjects received interpersonal evaluations (e.g., judging the intelligence of others) which supposedly had originated with an anonymous person. Following a delay of 1 to 3 days, the attraction of some of the subjects toward the anonymous person was assessed while the attraction of other subjects toward a second anonymous person, who presumably had also evaluated the subjects, was also assessed. These latter subjects were never exposed to the alleged evaluation by the second person. Attraction toward the first person tended to endure and to generalize to the second person.     

Reading rate and retention as a function of the number of propositions in the base structure of sentences

English texts were constructed from propositional bases. One set of 16-word sentences was obtained from semantic bases containing from 4 to 9 propositions. For another set of sentences and paragraphs, number of words and number of propositions covaried. Subjects read the texts at their own rate and recalled them immediately. For the 16-word sentences, subjects needed 1.5 sec additional reading time to process each proposition. For longer texts, this value increased. In another experimental condition reading time was controlled by the experimenter. The analysis of both the text and the recall protocols in terms of number of propositions lent support to the notion that propositions are a basic unit of memory for text. However, evidence was also obtained that while the total number of propositions upon which a text was based proved to be an effective psychological variable, all propositions were not equally difficult to remember: superordinate propositions were recalled better than propositions which were stucturally subordinate.     

Temporal aspects of retrieval in short-term serial retention

In three experiments, temporal properties of memory retrieval are studied. Latency of positionally probed recall of a single item is measured as a function of its serial position (SP) in a serial list. The requested SP is indicated by a positional probe, presented immediately after the list. For two organizational structures of the list (i.e., grouped vs. ungrouped lists) the experiments study the effects of precueing the probe position briefly before probe presentation, the cue signal indicating the SPs relevant for recall. The problem of confounded effects on latency of requested SP and of probe-signal location is also investigated. A bow-shaped SP-curve is found for ungrouped lists; precueing reduces RT but does not affect the bowed shape. This argues against selective confounding effects of spatial probe position and also suggests that precueing preactivates memory access. Grouping the items into two sublists eliminates precueing effects for items around the group boundary. Furthermore, precueing is detrimental when SPs at opposite ends of the list are precued. This suggests that the available points of memory access can only be utilized one at a time, so that precueing is not beneficial when the item cannot be reached via the preactivated point. Although the notion of single access to memory is in accord with both positional cueing theory and non-associative hierarchical theories (e.g., Estes 1972), various details of the results are in favor of the first type of explanation.     

The Course of Representation in Memory During the Comprehension of Paragraphs

The course of the representation built in memory from a text during comprehension of paragraphs was studied by a probe technique (immediate item recognition). Three experiments showed that response times, the main variable, gradually increase as a function of the lag between the probe (a word or an atomic proposition) and its target in the text. In Experiment 3 the same result was also found with a priming technique. The absence of any kick-up over the course of time was confirmed by several additional analyses of individual data. The results were only weakly consistent with models assuming two distinct memory stores, in particular a specific “short-term memory store,” but highly consistent with models involving semantic activation and subsequent gradual deactivation.     

Recognition memory of spatial location information: Another failure to support automaticity

Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed that spatial location information is automatically encoded. Evaluation of the empirical basis for this claim, however, casts doubt on some of the evidence for the automaticity position. This evaluation led to four experiments in which five criteria for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes were examined using a recognition task. Results of these experiments clearly show thatrecognition memory for spatial location information is influenced by intention, age of subjects, competing task loads, practice, and individual differences. The reported results, which extend those reported by Naveh-Benjamin (1987) for spatial locationrecall memory, are at odds with the claim that memory for spatial location information is exclusively mediated by automatic encoding processes. The concept of automaticity and the appropriateness of the criteria suggested for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes are discussed in light of the current results and recent findings on other features of the environment (e.g., frequency of occurrence) previously claimed to be automatically encoded.     

The memorial structure of organized sequences

Subjects were asked to memorize a sequence of nine consonants which were grouped into three groups of three letters each (e.g., SBJ FQL ZNG). After learning the sequence, they were presented with single letters, letter pairs, or letter triples and asked to indicate if the probe item appeared in the memorized sequence. The latency results suggest that subjects engage in a linear self-terminating memory search in which the items from one chunk are retrieved from memory as the items from the immediately preceding chunk are being scanned. When the probe consisted of more than one item, the subjects were slowed in their comparison if the letters came from different chunks (e.g., JF vs. FQ in the above illustration), and the number of letters in the probe also influenced the reaction time. Neither of those effects were obtained if all the letters in the probe came from the same chunk, and that would seem to suggest that the probe items from the same chunk were compared in parallel to the letters in the memory item, while items from different chunks were compared serial.     

The representation of time and location in memory for sentences

Two theoretical approaches to the representation of Time and Location Markers in Memory were contrasted. According to predictions derived from one approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for two-proposition sentences and sentences with a single proposition and a Time or a Location marker. According to the other approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for one-proposition sentences and sentences with a Time or a Location Marker. Propositional structure and the level of within-sentence associations were orthogonally varied to create eight within-subject experimental conditions. Ninety subjects studied 40 sentences and were required to recall then. Four dependent variables were used: number of sentences completely recalled, number of sentences partially recalled, number of sentences where information was lost from within the proposition, and number of sentences where a complete proposition was lost. The results suggest that Time and Location markers are represented in memory as arguments in a proposition rather than as separate propositions. Level of associations within the sentence seems to have a different effect when the sentence is composed of one or two propositions. The results also suggest that there may be differences between the representations of Time and Location markers.     

Tests of a holistic chunking model of sentence memory through analyses of noun intrusions

A holistic chunking model of sentence acquisition and retrieval is described and tested by a prompted sentence recall procedure. In this procedure, subjects first study a list of unrelated sentences and later receive single-word prompts to cue sentence recall. The model assumes that (1) words in sentences are grouped into propositions during acquisition, (2) the propositions are encoded holistically and later retrieved as units, and (3) the retrieval of one proposition does not automatically lead to recovery of other propositions in a sentence. The model was tested by patterns of intrusion errors. Noun intrusions for elements within a recovered proposition were always related conceptually to the presented nouns, even when a noun violated the co-occurrence restrictions of the verb (e.g., the tray loved the house). In contrast, noun intrusions for elements outside of the scope of a recovered proposition were often unrelated to presented nouns. It was argued that patterns of intrusion errors provide more appropriate tests for sentence structure than do quantitative patterns of correct recall, at least from the framework of the holistic chunking model.     

Familiarity and organization of category terms in semantic memory

In order to determine production frequencies for various category terms, 219 college students were asked to generate category terms (e.g. Automobiles, Vegetables, Relatives) during a 4-rain period. The production frequency (i.e., the number of subjects who listed a particular term) for a given category term may be considered as reflecting the familiarity or amount of usage of that category term, and, as such, should be of value to memory researchers in designing experiments. Additionally, examination of the order in which terms were produced showed that subjects "clustered" related category terms, (e.g., "Countries" and "States" were often produced successively). This clustering of category terrms is supportive of the hypothesis that categories are organized in semantic memory in some kind of higher order structure.     

The role of control processes and structural constraints in models of memory and social judgment

Six experiments examining a recent model of memory and social judgment are reported. In particular, the theoretical concept of a Work Space is examined in terms of both its structural properties and a variety of control processes that govern its operation. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about a stimulus person and told that they would later be asked to recall it as well as possible. The length of the actual delay before recall and the length of the anticipated delay were factorially varied. Under short delay conditions, subjects anticipating a short delay recalled more of the information than those anticipating a long delay. The reverse was true under actual long delay conditions. Other results suggest that the anticipated length of the delay has an effect on processes related to both encoding and storage/retrieval. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that, relative to no delay conditions, a long actual delay or a long anticipated delay produces polarization in social judgments. Both of these results are predicted by the model. Experiments 4–6 examine the effect of interpolated cognitive activity on memory and social judgment. As predicted by the model, relatively complicated cognitive activity leads to lower levels of recall and a greater polarization of judgments than less complicated intervening cognitive activity. It is argued that all of these results can be accounted for by the concept of a Work Space as a temporary repository devoted to the current information processing activities of the subject. It is thought that such a concept must be kept theoretically distinct from long-term memory. Implications of the results for models of memory and social judgment are discussed.     

Content-specific phenomenological similarity between episodic memory and simulation

ABSTRACT

Numerous studies have indicated that remembering specific past experiences (i.e., episodic memory) and imagining specific novel future experiences (i.e., episodic simulation) are supported by common mental processes. An open question, however, is whether and to what extent the content of specific past episodes is sampled when simulating a specific future episode. The current study aimed to answer this question. Participants recalled past episodes each comprising two episodic details, a personally familiar location and person. Participants also simulated novel future episodes using recombined pairs of person and location details taken from different recalled episodes. Participants rated the vividness of each location and person in their memory and simulation. We conducted a multi-level analysis where the vividness rating during memory was used to predict the vividness rating during simulation at the level of individual shared details (i.e., location or person). The vividness of the memorial detail co-varied with the vividness of the simulated detail; this relationship persisted even after accounting for the underlying familiarity of the details. These findings strongly suggest that simulations of specific future experiences are based upon the contents of specific prior episodes.     

Negative priming from activation of counting and addition knowledge

In two experiments, subjects were presented with digit pairs (e.g., 32) and asked to respond to the rightmost number. Negative priming, that is, slowed processing, was evident when the rightmost number was a counting-string (e.g., 43 following 12) or addition-sum (e.g., 65 following 32) associate of the number pair from the preceding trial. The studies are the first to demonstrate negative priming with counting and arithmetical memory representations and suggest the obligatory activation of these representations with the presentation of number pairs. The results are also consistent with the view that negative priming often occurs at the semantic level. Received: 15 February 2000 / Accepted: 8 June 2000     

Short-term memory processes in counting

Four experiments examined the memory processes used to maintain location in a counting sequence. In Experiment 1, subjects who rapidly counted forward omitted many repeated-digit numbers (e.g., 77), as found previously with backward counting. Subjects in Experiment 2 counted backward with normal auditory feedback or with headphones through which white noise was channeled. In both cases, repeated-digit errors predominated, suggesting that the contents of short-term memory, rather than auditory sensory memory, are checked during counting. In Experiment 3, subjects silently wrote counting responses, and the omission errors resembled those in vocal counting. Repetition errors were also found and attributed to phonological recoding failures. Articulatory suppression in Experiment 4 greatly increased the number of repetition errors in the written counting task. A model of the counting process was proposed according to which subjects keep track of their location in the counting sequence by monitoring phonologically coded short-term memory representations of the numbers.     

Divided attention: Storing and classifying briefly presented objects

Although in many studies divided attention has been examined by having people perform the same task (e.g., report or search) with a large number of objects, in few studies have people had to perform two logically independent tasks involving the same brief display. In two experiments, subjects saw 200-msec arrays of characters. In dual-task blocks, theyclassified the color of some or all of the items (making an immediate response) andstored the shape of some of the items for a later recognition test. There was not much mutual interference between classifying and storing per se. However, the tasks were by no means independent: there was substantial interference whendifferent objects from the array had to be stored for one task and classified for the other. The results confirm that wholly unrelated visual tasks depend on the same input-attention system and suggest that attending to an object for any purpose may entail storing a representation of it in visual short-term memory.     

Relating distinctive orthographic and phonological processes to episodic memory performance

Three experiments examined the role of three distinctive perceptual factors in recognition and recall memory. Using a subject-paced presentation rate, the first two experiments (recognition and recall) examined (1) the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors, (2) phonological-to-orthographic consistency, and (3) orthographic-to-phonological consistency. The third experiment (recall) reexamined the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors, using an experimenter-paced presentation rate of 2 sec per item. In both recognition and recall memory tasks, the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors influenced memory performance, whereas the two types of consistency did not. The results indicate that having fewer phonological-to-orthographic neighbors (i.e., having distinct mappings between orthography and phonology, and between phonology and orthography, e.g., pulp) relieve words from interference in episodic memory tests for such words. Furthermore, words that are indistinct in terms of these mappings (e.g., tuck) are subject to interference from words with similar representations (e.g., luck, buck, stuck), and this weakens the memory trace for a particular word.