Testimonial worth

Synthese - This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth (that is, judgments of the quality of character an agent displays when testifying) are central to...     

The origins and the worth of theism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Six things worth understanding about psychoanalytic psychotherapy

This paper is written for family therapists who may be curious but sceptical about psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It examines a number of areas of misunderstanding within mainstream family therapy discourse (diversity, authoritarianism, terminology, blame, history and separation) which, the author believes, have acted to help maintain a false coherence for family therapy through a distorted construction of the otherness of psychoanalytic therapy and, in so doing, inhibited a potentially more productive relationship.     

Universal worth: construct and scale development

Although research has demonstrated that narcissistic, contingent, and unsubstantiated forms of self-esteem correlate with undesirable behavior patterns, other researchers have searched for prosocial forms of belief in one's worth. Universal worth is proposed as the belief that (a) one is valued by a deity; (b) one's value is not contingent on success or failure; and (c) one is not valued by a deity more or less than others are valued. The Universal Worth Scale (UWS) was developed to measure this set of beliefs. Psychometric analyses showed that UWS scores were both internally consistent and temporally stable. Although scores on this scale were correlated with measures of constructs that were expected to be associated, the pattern of correlations suggests that UWS scores measure a distinct construct. Future research is suggested to explore universal worth in relation to sociometer theory and terror management theory, and within the continued search for prosocial foundations of self-worth.     

Systematic desensitization: a technique worth trying

Systematic desensitization is a limited form of behavior therapy used in the treatment of anxiety attached to specific objects or situations. The principles underlying the technique as developed by Wolpe and others are described briefly in this article. The author also relates his experiences in using a modified form of systematic desensitization in a public school setting with counselees whose success and development are hampered by test anxiety and fear of public speaking.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation

I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) need to assign moral agents such as a motive, and (ii) that possession of this motive, when properly understood, is morally admirable.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.