What’s philosophically interesting about engineering ethics?

What makes a subject philosophically interesting is hard-to-resolve confusion about fundamental concepts. Engineering ethics suffers from at least three such fundamental confusions. First, there is confusion about what the “ethics” in engineering ethics is (ordinary morality, philosophical ethics, special standards, or something else?) Second, there is confusion about what the profession of engineering is (a function, discipline, occupation, kind of organization, or something else?) Third, there is confusion about what the discipline of engineering is. These fundamental confusions in engineering ethics connect with philosophically interesting work in moral theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Work in these areas may help with the philosophical problems of engineering ethics. But, equally important, work in engineering ethics may help with the philosophical problems in these others fields.     

Parent-child conversations about science: the socialization of gender inequities?

This study investigated the family as a context for the gender typing of science achievement. Adolescents (N = 52) from 2 age levels (mean ages = 11 and 13 years) participated with their mothers and fathers on separate occasions; families were from predominantly middle-income European American backgrounds. Questionnaires measured the parents' and the child's attitudes. Each parent also engaged his or her child in 4 structured teaching activities (including science and nonscience tasks). There were no child gender or grade-level differences in children's science-related grades, self-efficacy, or interest. However, parents were more likely to believe that science was less interesting and more difficult for daughters than sons. In addition, parents' beliefs significantly predicted children's interest and self-efficacy in science. When parents' teaching language was examined, fathers tended to use more cognitively demanding speech with sons than with daughters during one of the science tasks.     

Teaching psychologists and the new APA ethics code: do we fit in?

The new American Psychological Association (APA) ethics code (APA, 1992) creates dilemmas of both image and substance for teaching psychologists. Items specific to teaching psychologists reflect housekeeping matters of lesser importance and situations over which teaching psychologists have little control. Teachers of psychology are sometimes inappropriately grouped with other types of psychologists. Freedom of inquiry and communication are curtailed in ambiguous ways, and the standards expected of teachers in the academy are set a mediocre level. Although the new code contains some improvements over the previous code (APA, 1990)--especially in the areas of multiple relationships, prohibitions against sex with students, respect for differences among students, and authorship rights retained by students--numerous recommendations for future revision are strongly recommended.     

Why teach ethics in science and engineering?

The following views were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993 organized by Stephanie J. Bird (M.I.T.), Penny J. Gilmer (Florida State University) and Terrell W. Bynum (Southern Connecticut State University). Opragen Publications thanks the AAAS, seminar organizers and authors for permission to publish extracts from the conference. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of AAAS or its Board of Directors.     

Teaching research ethics: Can web-based instruction satisfy appropriate pedagogical objectives?

Ethical tasks faced by researchers in science and engineering as they engage in research include recognition of moral problems in their practice, finding solutions to those moral problems, judging moral actions and engaging in preventive ethics. Given these issues, appropriate pedagogical objectives for research ethics education include (1) teaching researchers to recognize moral issues in their research, (2) teaching researchers to solve practical moral problems in their research from the perspective of the moral agent, (3) teaching researchers how to make moral judgments about actions, and (4) learning to engage in preventive ethics. If web-based research ethics education is intended to be adequate and sufficient for research ethics education, then it must meet those objectives. However there are reasons to be skeptical that it can.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.     

What is moral about guilt? Acting "prosocially" at the disadvantage of others

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a person's social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of one's actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around-but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

What is magic about the magical number four?

Summary Previous studies have shown that the apprehension of number can be represented by three models according to the experimental procedure and the data analysis. The present experiment was designed to test the effect of figural characteristics of pattern on the response time. The subjects were asked to perform a same/different judgment, i.e., they were requested to decide whether a dot pattern, shown on a monitor, equalled a previously defined target number (n=2–6) or not. Different types of pattern were used and learning effects were studied. As was expected, the slopes for random and linear patterns were not so steep when the target number was low. With patterns in the dice mode, however, the slope was zero. Repeated presentations led to a slight reduction in slope for random and linear patterns only. In the case of the patterns in the dice mode, the repeated presentations caused only a change in the absolute reaction times (RTs) but had no effect on the slope. When the target numbers were larger (n=5–6), the repeated presentations led to remarkable reductions in slope for random and linear patterns. The slope discontinuity at n=4 occurred with all types of pattern but it became less pronounced in the course of training at least in the case of random and linear patterns. This result is explained by clustering effects, use of figural cues, and a more efficient scanning process.     

Development ethics – Why? What? How? A formulation of the field

The paper assesses the rationale, contributions, structure, and challenges of the field of development ethics. Processes of social and economic transformation involve great risks and costs and great opportunities for gain, but the benefits, costs, and risks are typically hugely unevenly and inequitably distributed, as is participation in specifying what they are and their relative importance. The ethics of development examines the benefits, costs, risks, formulations, participation, and options. The paper outlines a series of ways of characterizing such work, arguments for and against its importance, and some of its major sources and contributions, especially from the interdisciplinary stream of work represented over several decades by Denis Goulet. Definitions are diverse since the work covers many different intersections of practice and theorizing, at multiple levels. The paper considers and replies to arguments against discussing development ethics: the claim that it involves only endless proliferation of different opinions, is an expensive luxury that undermines long-run development, is superfluous if one already works with the capability approach or the human rights tradition, or never has influence. Finally, it presents suggestions for how development ethics thinking can have increased impact, with reference to incorporation in policy analysis and planning methods, professional codes and training, and to its intellectual location and communication strategies. The field should articulate the methodological pragmatism which much of it has adopted, consistent with its required role as a practice-oriented interdisciplinary meeting ground.