Sterilization, Catholic health care, and the legitimate autonomy of culture.

Disagreement over the legitimacy of direct sterilization continues within Catholic moral debate, with painful and at times confusing ramifications for Catholic healthcare systems. This paper argues that the medical profession should be construed as a key moral authority in this debate, on two grounds. First, the recent revival of neo-Aristotelianism in moral philosophy as applied to medical ethics has brought out the inherently moral dimensions of the history and current practice of medicine. Second, this recognition can be linked to Catholic morality through Vatican II's affirmation of the legitimate autonomy of culture, including the sciences. A partial precedent for understanding the moral authority of medicine can be found in the recent history of Catholic medical morality, and we further argue that a full contemporary recognition of that authority would weigh against an absolute prohibition of direct sterilizations. Institutionally, we propose the allowance of direct sterilizations in cases where the clinically perceived biomedical good of the patient is at stake.     

Why the Practice of Medicine is Not a Phronetic Activity

This essay argues that the practice of medicine is not a phronetic activity in the original Aristotelian sense of that term. Jonsen and Toulmin are two philosophers who have conflated the techne of medicine with phronesis. This conflation ignores Aristotle's crucial distinction between techne and phronesis and his use of the medical analogy. It is argued that medical reasoning is similar to phronesis but does not exemplify it. Phronesis will not save the life of medical ethics. The concept could be utilized as a moral prosthetic.     

A Practical Account of Autonomy: Why Genetic Counseling is Especially Well Suited to the Facilitation of Informed Autonomous Decision Making

In genetic counseling, facilitation of autonomous decision-making is seen as a primary aim and respect for autonomy is used to justify a nondirective counseling approach whereby clients are free to make their own choices after being given all necessary information. However in the genetic counseling literature, autonomy as a concept appears to be interpreted variably and often narrowly. We offer a practical account of autonomy that is coherent, consistent and philosophically defensible for the genetic counseling setting. At the same time we demonstrate how nondirective counseling may serve to frustrate rather than facilitate client autonomy. We suggest that promoting purposeful dialogue rather than counseling that is nondirective is more conducive to client autonomy.     

青少年的自主期望、对父母权威的态度与亲子冲突和亲合

通过对704名城乡高一和高三年青少年的问卷调查,探讨了高中阶段青少年－父母关系、青少年的行为自主期望和对父母权威的态度的特点,以及青少年—父母关系与青少年的行为自主期望和对父母权威的态度之间的关系。结果显示,我国城乡青少年对父母权威的认同程度较高,而期望获得行为自主的年龄较晚;青少年的行为自主期望、对父母权威的态度与青少年—父母冲突与亲合在某些方面存在城乡、性别和年级差异;青少年对父母权威的认同程度越高,对与父母发生分歧的接受性越高,其与父母的关系越亲密;那些期望在较晚年龄获得行为自主的青少年,与父亲的冲突较多,但与母亲较亲密     

五岁儿童自主性与权威认知的相关研究

本研究采用实验室观察法对五岁儿童自主性与权威认知之间的关系进行探讨。结果表明:(1)五岁儿童自主性与权威认知间相关显著,权威认知水平高的儿童自主性发展水平高,权威认知水平低的儿童自主性发展水平低;(2)五岁儿童权威认知与自主性三个维度间相关均显著。权威认知水平高的儿童,其自我依靠、自我控制和自我主张水平高;权威认知水平低的儿童,其自我依靠、自我控制和自我主张水平低。     

The Rights of Man: Libertarian Concern for Men's,But Not Women's,Reproductive Autonomy

Libertarianism enshrines individual autonomy as its central political principle, but it has been criticized for applying this principle selectively. Reproductive decisions can stress the concept of individual autonomy by placing into conflict the claimed rights of each biological parent to choose. Two studies (N₁ = 296; N₂ = 580) show that among U.S. participants, libertarianism is associated with opposition to women's reproductive autonomy and support for men's. Libertarianism was associated with opposition to abortion rights and support for men's right both to prevent women from having abortions (male veto) and to withdraw financial support for a child when women refuse to terminate the pregnancy (financial abortion). Adjusting for the association between libertarianism and conservatism, only the relationship with opposition to abortion rights was rendered nonsignificant. Mediation analyses suggest that hostile sexism may account for libertarians' selective support for men's and not women's reproductive autonomy.     

Autonomy and the Normativity Question: Framing Considerations

Abstract

An initial interest in the question of whether one can autonomously choose to be non-autonomous has developed into the broader question of whether there are any normative commitments that necessarily attend being autonomous. This paper argues that reflection on this issue has been systematically hampered by a failure to realize that the normativity question does not delineate a single line of inquiry, but rather several different such lines; and that these differences depend on how certain key concepts embedded in the question are understood. The paper concludes by noting several lines of future research suggested by the present work.     

Frontier Kantianism: Autonomy and Authority in Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joseph Smith

Ralph Waldo Emerson is often seen as the early American prophet of autonomy. This essay suggests a perhaps surprising fellow traveler in this prophetic call: Joseph Smith. Smith opposed religious creeds for the same reason that Emerson denounced them, namely that creeds represent a threat to the autonomy of a person's beliefs. Smith and Emerson also forward similar defenses of individual autonomy in action. Furthermore, they encounter a shared problem: how can autonomy be possible in a society where other individuals hold some kind of authority? I propose that each thinker resolves this tension through an insight with a Kantian echo. A suitably qualified version of authority can sometimes count as an expression of, rather than hindrance to, autonomy. I describe the overlap in Emerson and Smith as a “frontier” version of Kantianism. They favor determining one's own beliefs and actions in a way that looks forward to an open future of possibility.     

There is no moral authority in medicine: response to Cowdin and Tuohey.

Central to the Cowdin-Tuohey paper is the concept of a moral authority proper to medical practitioners. Much as I agree with the authors in refusing to degrade doctors to the status of mere technicians, I argue that one does not succeed in retrieving the moral dimension of medical practice by investing doctors with moral authority. I show that none of the cases brought forth by Cowdin-Tuohey really amounts to a case of moral authority. Then I try to explain why no such cases can be found. Developing an insight that is common to all the major moral thinkers in the philosophia perennis, I show that doctors are professionally competent with respect only to a part of the human good; morally wise persons are competent with respect to that which makes man good as man. I try to show why it follows that a) professional expertise has no natural tendency to pass over into moral understanding, and that b) doctor and non-doctor alike start from the same point in developing their understanding of medical morality. It follows that the authors fail in their attempt to de-center the moral magisterium of the Church by setting up centers of moral authority outside of the Church.     

自立、自主、独立特征的语义分析

用22对人格形容词制成的7级评定的语义分析量表对171名被试进行了调查,结果如下：在5对人格形容词上自立与自主的评分有显著差异,在ll对人格形容词上自立与独立的评分有显著差异。最后对自立与自主、独立的关系问题进行了讨论,提出：①自立是与自主、独立不同的人格构念,差异的关键在于自立是一种辩证性的人格特征。这种差异可能主要源于我国的传统文化;②与独立人格、自主人格相比,自立人格才是符合我国构建和谐社会所需的健全人格的重要因素;③我国公众对自主、独立的认识很可能与西方国家的公众不一样。     

Associations Among Perceived Autonomy Support,Forms of Self-Regulation,and Persistence: A Prospective Study

According to self-determination theory, when the social context is autonomy supportive, people are motivated to internalize the regulation of important activities, and whereas when the context is controlling, self-determined motivation is undermined. A model that incorporates perceptions of coaches' interpersonal behaviors (autonomy support vs. control), 5 forms of regulation (intrinsic motivation, identified, introjected and external regulation, and amotivation), and persistence was tested with competitive swimmers (N = 369) using a prospective 3-wave design. Analyses using structural equation modeling revealed that experiencing relationships as controlling fostered non–self-determined forms of regulation (external regulation and amotivation). Greater levels of self-determined motivation occurred when relationships were experienced as autonomy supportive. Individuals who exhibited self-determined types of regulation at Time 1 showed more persistence at both Time 2 (10 months later) and Time 3 (22 months later). Individuals who were amotivated at Time 1 had the highest rate of attrition at both Time 2 and Time 3. Introjected regulation was a significant predictor of persistence at Time 2 but became nonsignificant at Time 3. External regulation was not a significant predictor of behavior at Time 2, but became negatively associated with persistence at Time 3. The findings are discussed in light of the determinants of the internalization process and the consequences of different forms of self-regulation for psychological functioning.     

Autonomy and Conjugal Love: A Reply to Golash

In my response to Golash I distinguish between two steps in my original argument. The first relates to the special value of conjugal (two-person) love relationships. I defend this step against criticisms, arguing that the two-person relationship provides a form of recognition that is of special importance to us and cannot be found in other sorts of relationship. The two-person relationship is one that, at least as private individuals, we have special reason to pursue. The second step concerns the claim that the special value of such relationships tends to promote the autonomy of those who have them. It is this second step that is important for the argument that a liberal state – one, at any rate, that takes itself to be in the business of safeguarding the pre-conditions of autonomy – could have reason to favour marriage or some form of civic partnership over other forms of intimate adult tie. However, I admit that Golash puts forward plausible – if anecdotal – arguments against this second step. I therefore agree that I need to be more tentative about this step than I was in the original paper.     

教师的教学自主权与工作满意度的关系:教学自主性的中介作用

以北京、河北、宁夏、广东等地24所中小学923名中小学教师为被试,采取教学自主权量表、教学自主性量表、教师工作满意度量表,探讨了教师的教学自主权、教学自主性与工作满意度之间的关系。研究结果发现:(1)教学自主权与教学自主性均可显著预测教师工作满意度;(2)教学自主性在教学自主权与教师工作满意度之间起着完全中介作用,即教学自主权通过教师的教学自主性,对教师工作满意度有正向预测作用。     

Autonomy,Filial Piety,and Parental Authority: A Two-Year Longitudinal Investigation

A 2-year longitudinal study was conducted to test 3 causal models about adolescent autonomy, filial piety, beliefs about parental authority, and obedience in terms of personal, prudential, and multifaceted issues. Four hundred and thirty-six students from 10 junior and senior high schools in Taiwan (boys, n = 223; senior high school, n = 211) participated in the study. Hypothesis 1 predicted that autonomy (individuating autonomy vs. relating autonomy) would positively correlate with beliefs about authority legitimacy and obligation to obey, but was not supported. Hypothesis 2 predicted that filial piety (authoritarian piety vs. reciprocal piety) would positively associate with authority beliefs, and was partially supported. Authoritarian piety showed the positive relation with authority beliefs. Hypothesis 3 predicted that beliefs about authority legitimacy and obligation to obey would positively associate with obedience, and was supported. Hypothesis 4 predicted that age might moderate the structure models across domains, but the results indicated that age did not moderate the structural model in the prudential and multifaceted domains. The overall findings of this study reveal that adolescent beliefs about authority serve as a mediator between authoritarian piety and obedience, suggesting that traditional piety still has an influence on parent–child interaction in today's society.     

Privacy Rights,and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy.

     

Marriage, Autonomy, and the State: Reply to Christopher Bennett

Christopher Bennett has argued that state support of conjugal relationships can be founded on the unique contribution such relationships make to the autonomy of their participants by providing them with various forms of recognition and support unavailable elsewhere. I argue that, in part because a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to their participants. To the extent that intimate relationships can provide a unique form of reciprocal support, Bennett fails to show that couples have an advantage over multiple-partner arrangements in doing so.     

Happiness,Rationality, Autonomy and the Good Life

The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness. So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life.     

论自主性与公正之间的张力--一试管受精案例引起的伦理困境

高科技医疗技术,如试管受精技术在医疗实践中往往引发伦理原则之间的冲突.通过对英国一试管受精案例的分析,展示自主性原则与公正原则之间存在的深层张力.在对两个基本范畴作哲学解析的基础上,寻找两个基本原则的契合点,为解决类似的伦理困境提供一奈可能的途径.     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.