Skeptical Theism,the Preface Paradox,and Non-Cumulative Inductive Evidence of Pointless Evil

Philosophia - This paper discusses an analogical argument for the compatibility of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theism. The argument is based on an alleged parallel between the...     

A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox

This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad hoc nor unnatural.     

Saving the Truth Schema from Paradox

The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr(A)A (understood as the conjunction of Tr(A)A and ATr(A)). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(A)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an . Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with as an additional connective, and where the effect of classical logic is preserved in the arithmetic or formal syntax itself. Section 1 is an introduction to the problem and some of the difficulties that must be faced, in particular as to the logic of the ; Section 2 gives a construction of an arithmetically standard model of a truth theory; Section 3 investigates the logical laws that result from this; and Section 4 provides some philosophical commentary.     

Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either (1) this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 (2), 189–218] or else (2) it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 (Chapter 5); Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (242), 58–78]. Against (1), I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity.     

A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

This essay attempts to solve the so-called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x , one must know x ; but if one knows x , one has no questions about x . The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x 's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x ' be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with x , either S knows x ', in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x ', in which case he has no questions about it.
My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing-in-itself, but a certain analogue of the thing-in-itself. To inquire into x , it is necessary to know not x , but only some analogue of x ; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x .     

The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox

The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the “No Friday Argument,” which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the “Unprojectible Announcement Argument,” the “Wright & Sudbury Argument,” and the “Epistemic Blindspot Argument.” The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick.     

A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox

The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.     

循证医学与实事求是

循证医学主张"慎重、准确和明智地应用当前所能获得的最好的研究依据;结合临床医生的个人专业技能和多年临床经验;考虑患者的价值扣愿望,将三者完美地结合制定出患者的治疗措施."贯穿着临床医学对患者进行"以人为本"科学救死扶伤的实事求是理念.要使"循证医学"卓有成效,应当抓住二大关键:实事求是,维护"证据"的真实性,提高医术的可靠性.     

循证医学与实事求是

循证医学主张“慎重、准确和明智地应用当前所能获得的最好的研究依据;结合临床医生的个人专业技能和多年临床经验;考虑患者的价值和愿望,将三者完美地结合制定出患者的治疗措施。”贯穿着临床医学对患者进行“以人为本”科学救死扶伤的实事求是理念。要使“循证医学”卓有成效,应当抓住二大关键：实事求是,维护“证据”的真实性,提高医术的可靠性。     

A New Solution to Moore's Paradox

Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary.It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lenseof an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.