The Chan Mind: Transmission or mission-of-translation? Reading Wright’s<Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophical Meditations</Emphasis>

Conclusion Wright maintains that tradition (including language) plays a fundamental role in the origins and shaping of the monastic world that made a unique “Chan mind” possible. Through a creative application of the Buddhist idea of “dependent origination,” Wright has broadened the hermeneutic concept of historicity in that it is more than a linear and causal relationship of contextuality (that is, the person is always a person-in-community, and the text is always a text-in-context). Instead, contextuality refers to a (w)holistic network of associations and re-associations. The word “tradition” thus becomes an open tradition that is constantly shaped and reshaped, formed and transformed. The meaning of tradition as such is always a “trace” of that other which is forever absent. In this sense, Wright is quite Derridean. Like Derrida’s deconstruction, Wright’s interpretative endeavor, as part of the tradition of “linguistic turn,” seems to become separated from the real world of flux and takes on an independent status, that is, the realm of reading, explaining, and understanding (perhaps mis-understanding, sometimes). Wright’s project fits the need of those who have a passion for “doing things with words,” and those who prefer meditative reading to meditative practice (in a Buddhist sense). Though Wright keeps reminding us that the effort to play language in relation to Chan experience does not imply that Chan enlightenment/mind is in any sense reducible to language; it still remains a question whether his critical “philosophical meditations” are fully out of the “spell of conceptuality” of the hermeneutical circle. Wright might say that there is no need to be out of the circle, or there is no such circle in the first place.     

The Flexibility of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Gua</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Yao</Emphasis>—Based on an interpretation of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Yizhuan</Emphasis>

In Yizhuan’s interpretation of The Book of Changes, the book’s fundamental concepts, xiang 象 (images) and ci 辞 (words), play different roles. Concepts, including yin and yang, firmness and gentleness, sancai 三才 (three fundamentals), and the wuxing 五行 (five active elements), are used to interpret The Book of Changes through the interpretation of images, while the core Confucian values, such as benevolence and righteousness, are used to interpret The Book of Changes because of their connection with words of gua and yao. In order to expand the meaning of the words of gua and yao, Yizhuan sometimes connects words with images; in other occasions, however, it simply takes these words as independent guides. The Confucian scholars who wrote Yizhuan, therefore, not only revered the classic, but also used it to send their own message. Out of reverence, they “shu 述 (recited)”; in using it, they “zuo 作 (created)”. The combination of recitation and creation made the words of gua and yao very flexible in the process of interpretation, while the interpretation changed the meaning of the classic to a great extent.     

Frege’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Begriffsschrift</Emphasis> as a <Emphasis Type="Italic">lingua characteristica</Emphasis>

In this paper I suggest an answer to the question of what Frege means when he says that his logical system, the Begriffsschrift, is like the language Leibniz sketched, a lingua characteristica, and not merely a logical calculus. According to the nineteenth century studies, Leibniz’s lingua characteristica was supposed to be a language with which the truths of science and the constitution of its concepts could be accurately expressed. I argue that this is exactly what the Begriffsschrift is: it is a language, since, unlike calculi, its sentential expressions express truths, and it is a characteristic language, since the meaning of its complex expressions depend only on the meanings of their constituents and on the way they are put together. In fact it is in itself already a science composed in accordance with the Classical Model of Science. What makes the Begriffsschrift so special is that Frege is able to accomplish these goals with using only grammatical or syncategorematic terms and so has a medium with which he can try to show analyticity of the theorems of arithmetic.     

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in the light of Kant’s Third <Emphasis Type="Italic">Critique</Emphasis> and Schelling’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Real</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Idealismus</Emphasis>

In this paper I offer a selective, systematic rather than historical account of Merleau-Ponty’s highly complex relation to classical German philosophy, focussing on issues which bear on the question of his relation to transcendentalism and naturalism. I argue that the concerns which define his project in Phenomenology of Perception are fundamentally those of transcendental philosophy, and that Merleau-Ponty’s disagreements with Kant, and the position he arrives at in The Visible and the Invisible, are helpfully viewed in light of (1) issues which Merleau-Ponty identifies as raised by Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, and (2) Schelling’s conversion of Kantian idealism into a Real-Idealismus. Finally I address the question of whether, and on what basis, Merleau-Ponty’s claim to have surpassed systematic philosophy can be defended.     

The Role of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Umwelt</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Aufbau</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Abbau</Emphasis> of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Natur/Geist</Emphasis> Distinction

In this essay I argue that Husserl’s development of the nineteenth century Natur/Geist distinction is grounded in the intentional correlate between the pre-theoretical natural attitude and environing world (Umwelt). By reconsidering the Natur/Geist distinction through its historical context in the nineteenth century debate between Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians from the Baden or Southwest school, it is possible to understand more clearly Husserl’s appropriations and novel contributions. One of Husserl’s contributions lies in his rigorous thematization and clarification of the constitutive features proper to the natural and human sciences as they arise from the pre-theoretical experience of an environing world. This ordinary lived experience between the lived body and environing world is presupposed by and forms a unity with both Natur and Geist, thereby acting as the unified ground that is inclusive of naturalized Geist and a geistig nature. This unbuilding (Abbau) of the Natur/Geist distinction is necessary, according to Husserl, for the radical clarification of the respective methodologies of the natural and human sciences.     

The Real-Constitution in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ <Emphasis Type="Italic">Realontologie</Emphasis>

In this work we try to distinguish five levels of the constitution of reality in Conrad Martius’ Realontologie (1923) (Real Ontology). The difference between “existential autonomy” and “existential relativity” seems to be the first one. The second level of the constitution of reality concerns the problem of “whatness” (Washeit) and the substantial reality (Realität). We can find the third level in the materiality from the eidetical point of view. The fourth level of the constitution of reality concerns the material formation as presupposition of a personal essence. Finally we can distinguish a fifth level of the constitution of the reality in the essential stratification.     

The Concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology</Emphasis>

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the only way to respond to the scientific Krisis of which he speaks is with phenomenological reflections on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, this paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the Krisis of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [Krisis] of the European sciences”? There are two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the Krisis of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to an innovative suggestion, the Krisis lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the Krisis as something that it is not. The argument of this paper, however, is that, given the many different senses of Krisis in The Crisis, an adequate understanding of the Krisis that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl’s Krisis of the European sciences is both a crisis of their scientificity and a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl’s philosophical and historical sense-investigations in The Crisis—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Tian</Emphasis> as Cosmos in Z<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">hu</Emphasis> Xi’s Neo-Confucianism

Tian 天 is central to the metaphysics, cosmology, and ethics of the 800-year-long Chinese philosophical tradition we call “Neo-Confucianism,” but there is considerable confusion over what tian means—confusion which is exacerbated by its standard translation into English as “Heaven.” This essay analyzes the meaning of tian in the works of the most influential Neo-Confucian, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), presents a coherent interpretation that unifies the disparate aspects of the term’s meaning, and argues that “cosmos” does an excellent job of capturing this meaning and therefore should be adopted as our translation of tian.     

Interval estimation of gamma for an<Emphasis Type="Italic">R</Emphasis>×<Emphasis Type="Italic">S</Emphasis> table

When the underlying responses are on an ordinal scale, gamma is one of the most frequently used indices to measure the strength of association between two ordered variables. However, except for a brief mention on the use of the traditional interval estimator based on Wald's statistic, discussion of interval estimation of the gamma is limited. Because it is well known that an interval estimator using Wald's statistic is generally not likely to perform well especially when the sample size is small, the goal of this paper is to find ways to improve the finite-sample performance of this estimator. This paper develops five asymptotic interval estimators of the gamma by employing various methods that are commonly used to improve the normal approximation of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). Using Monte Carlo simulation, this paper notes that the coverage probability of the interval estimator using Wald's statistic can be much less than the desired confidence level, especially when the underlying gamma is large. Further, except for the extreme case, in which the underlying gamma is large and the sample size is small, the interval estimator using a logarithmic transformation together with a monotonic function proposed here not only performs well with respect to the coverage probability, but is also more efficient than all the other estimators considered here. Finally, this paper notes that applying an ad hoc adjustment procedure—whenever any observed frequency equals 0, we add 0.5 to all cells in calculation of the cell proportions—can substantially improve the traditional interval estimator. This paper includes two examples to illustrate the practical use of interval estimators considered here.The authors wish to thank the Associate Editor and the two referees for many valuable comments and suggestions to improve the contents and clarity of this paper. The authors also want to thank Dr. C. D. Lin for his graphic assistance.     

Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Physical Realization</Emphasis>

This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.     

Free will,bound and unbound: reflections on Shaun Nichols’ <Emphasis Type="Italic">bound</Emphasis>

Nichols’ Bound presents interesting new angles on traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility, relating them to the latest empirical research in psychology, social sciences and experimental philosophy. In experimental philosophy, he cites numerous recent studies showing that there are strong incompatibilist strands in folk intuitions about free will and responsibility, taking issue with other recent studies claiming that folk intuitions are predominantly compatibilist. But he also argues that incompatibilist folk intuitions are based on faulty reasoning and cannot be realized. We are left with a choice between an eliminativism about free will and moral responsibility (free will skepticism) or revising ordinary beliefs and practices in a compatibilist direction. Though Nichols sees problems with both these positions, he ultimately opts for the latter. Despite agreeing with Nichols on many points, I argue in this paper that he takes the libertarian view of free will off the table too precipitously, leaving us with too narrow a choice of options. I argue that we can make sense of an incompatibilist view of free will and responsibility without reducing it to mere chance or mystery and that it remains an open scientific question whether we can have such a free will.     

Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Physical Realization</Emphasis>

This paper interprets and criticizes some of the views presented in Sydney Shoemaker’s book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), on the topic of how mental properties are realized by physical properties, given that, on his view, human persons are not even token-identical with human bodies.     

The Effect of Short-Term Training of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vipassana’s</Emphasis> Body-Scan on Select Cognitive Functions

This experiment examined the effect of a short-term body-scan meditation technique of vipassana practice on select cognitive functions. Participants (n?=?77) were randomly divided into an experimental group (n?=?37) and an active control group (n?=?40). The average age of participants in the experimental group and the active control group was 21.67?±?1.16 and 21.40?±?3.14 years, respectively. The experimental group practiced body-scan mindfulness, one session per day for 6 days with each session lasting for 25 min. Participants in the active control group spent an equal amount of time reading fiction of their choice and listening to soothing music. Variables that were studied included five cognitive functions, namely reaction time, attention, learning, working memory, and social-emotional cognition. Results showed that short-term mindfulness meditation decreased reaction time and increased attention, with mild effect size. It may be concluded that short-term mindfulness practice might be an alternative for individuals who, due to various reasons, cannot practice long-term courses.     

On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell’s<Emphasis Type="Italic">Reference and Consciousness</Emphasis>

John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience.     

Von Wright’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">“The Logic of Preference”</Emphasis> revisited

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory.