<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ziran</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Wuwei</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daodejing</Emphasis>: An Ethical Assessment

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> as a Korean Culture-Bound Narcissism: Dealing with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> Through <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong</Emphasis>-Dynamics

This article explores a Korean culture-bound emotion called jeong-han, which shares similarities with narcissism and depression in terms of causes, formation processes, emotions, cognitions, and neurotic sufferings. This article has three main goals: 1) to report and describe the presence and experience of jeong-han among contemporary Koreans; 2) to compare jeong-han with narcissism and depression; and 3) to suggest an effective way of dealing with jeong-han through jeong-dynamics. In order to effectively help people with jeong-han both in counseling and ministry settings, providing jeong and facilitating jeong-dynamics in a small group or community setting can be helpful.     

The codification of intersubjectivity in the diachronic change <Emphasis Type="Italic">AD locative</Emphasis> &gt; <Emphasis Type="Italic">A</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>) <Emphasis Type="Italic">indirect object</Emphasis> in Spanish

The principal aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between intersubjectivity and grammar. We argue that intersubjectivity represents, on the one hand, a prerequisite for the development of language as a symbolic system, and therefore also for the development of grammar. Furthermore, we attempt to show that language, and especially grammar, codify intersubjectivity. That is to say, grammatical constructions represent the intersubjective interactions that situated agents maintain in different pragmatic contects. We call this phenomenon the meta-representational capacity of language. Our main object of analysis is the development of the ditransitive construction (give something to someone - dar algo a alguien) in the Spanish language. The evolution of this construction makes it clear that there is an important correlation between the degree of complexity of the codified intersubjective interaction and grammatically obligatory nature and the prominence of the grammatical construction that codifies it: the greater the complexity, the greater its obligatoriness, and vice versa.     

Combinations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stit</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ought</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Know</Emphasis>

This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.     

That <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis>

Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.

Plural <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grundgesetze</Emphasis>

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which a formulation of the infamous Basic Law V. It is shown that second-order Peano arithmetic can be derived in PG. I also investigate the philosophical issue of predicativism connected to PG. In particular, as predicativism about concepts seems rather un-Fregean, I analyse whether there is a way to make predicativism compatible with Frege’s logicism.     

Sharing <Emphasis Type="Italic">GJB2</Emphasis>/<Emphasis Type="Italic">GJB6</Emphasis> Genetic Test Information with Family Members

Although GJB2/GJB6 genetic testing for non-syndromic hearing loss is available, there is no information regarding sharing of test results with family members. A qualitative study was conducted to elucidate if, how, and why parents of a child with hearing loss share GJB2/GJB6 test results with relatives. Parents whose child had testing (n = 7 positive, n = 4 negative, n = 1 inconclusive results) participated in a semi-structured interview and responses were analyzed using qualitative methods. All participants shared the test result with at least one relative, but selective non-disclosure also was observed. Reasons for, and reactions to, sharing were diverse and differed as a function of test result. In comparing the results from this study to published literature, similarities and differences were identified with regards to disclosure of genetic test results for hearing loss versus other conditions. Differences suggest that hearing loss may have unique attributes that influence responses to genetic test information. Further research is needed to replicate these findings.     

Precis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophy and Neuroscience</Emphasis>: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Ruthlessly Reductive Account</Emphasis>

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.     

Three-Valued Temporal Logic <Emphasis Type="Italic">Q</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis></Subscript> and Future Contingents

Prior’s three-valued modal logic Q was developed as a philosophically interesting modal logic. Thus, we should be able to modify Q as a temporal logic. Although a temporal version of Q was suggested by Prior, the subject has not been fully explored in the literature. In this paper, we develop a three-valued temporal logic Q _t and give its axiomatization and semantics. We also argue that Q _t provides a smooth solution to the problem of future contingents. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

Reading <Emphasis Type="Italic">Principia Iuris</Emphasis>

This paper illustrates the main features of Luigi Ferrajoli’s theoretical approach to law, as they are developed in his Principia Juris. These include his opposition to the traditional perspective of natural law; his anti-cognitivist orientation; and, finally, his fundamentally normative approach. Among the numerous problems discussed in Ferrajoli’s compendious book, the paper focuses on his definition of constitutional democracy. In particular, the paper discusses the way in which Ferrajoli defines the complementarity between democracy and rights; Ferrajoli’s own criticism of T. H. Marshall’s idea of citizenship; and the importance that the distinction between ‘decidable’ and ‘non-decidable’ rights have in Ferrajoli’s own system. Other issues of interests that are briefly discussed include the constitutionalisation of private law, and the defence of different kinds of liberty-rights.     

Orientation in the cuttlefish <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sepia officinalis</Emphasis>: response <Emphasis Type="Italic">versus</Emphasis> place learning

Several studies have demonstrated that mammals, birds and fish use comparable spatial learning strategies. Unfortunately, except in insects, few studies have investigated spatial learning mechanisms in invertebrates. Our study aimed to identify the strategies used by cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) to solve a spatial task commonly used with vertebrates. A new spatial learning procedure using a T-maze was designed. In this maze, the cuttlefish learned how to enter a dark and sandy compartment. A preliminary test confirmed that individual cuttlefish showed an untrained side-turning preference (preference for turning right or left) in the T-maze. This preference could be reliably detected in a single probe trial. In the following two experiments, each individual was trained to enter the compartment opposite to its side-turning preference. In Experiment 1, distal visual cues were provided around the maze. In Experiment 2, the T-maze was surrounded by curtains and two proximal visual cues were provided above the apparatus. In both experiments, after acquisition, strategies used by cuttlefish to orient in the T-maze were tested by creating a conflict between the formerly rewarded algorithmic behaviour (turn, response learning) and the visual cues identifying the goal (place learning). Most cuttlefish relied on response learning in Experiment 1; the two strategies were used equally often in Experiment 2. In these experiments, the salience of cues provided during the experiment determined whether cuttlefish used response or place learning to solve this spatial task. Our study demonstrates for the first time the presence of multiple spatial strategies in cuttlefish that appear to closely parallel those described in vertebrates.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Paribus</Emphasis> Qualifiers

Antecedent-strengthening, a trivially valid inference of classical logic of the form: P → Q ? (P & R) → Q, has a counterpart in everyday reasoning that often fails. A plausible solution to the problem involves assuming an implicit ceteris paribus (CP) qualifier that can be explicated as an additional conjunct in the antecedent of the premise. The qualifier can be explicated as ‘everything else relevant remains unchanged’ or alternatively as ‘nothing interferes’. The qualifier appears most prominently in the context of the discussion of laws in the sciences, where these laws are often expressed with a CP qualifier. From an analysis of the qualifier’s role in the problem of antecedent-strengthening, we can learn more about CP qualifiers in general and in their application to the laws used in the sciences.     

Reciprocal recognition of sifaka (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Propithecus verreauxi verreauxi</Emphasis>) and redfronted lemur (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Eulemur fulvus rufus</Emphasis>) alarm calls

Redfronted lemurs (Eulemur fulvus rufus) and Verreaux's sifakas (Propithecus verreauxi verreauxi) occur sympatrically in western Madagascar. Both species exhibit a so-called mixed alarm call system with functionally referential alarm calls for raptors and general alarm calls for carnivores and raptors. General alarm calls also occur in other contexts associated with high arousal, such as inter-group encounters. Field playback experiments were conducted to investigate whether interspecific recognition of alarm calls occurs in both species, even though the two species rarely interact. In a crossed design, redfronted lemur and sifaka alarm calls were broadcast to individuals of both species, using the alarm call of chacma baboons (Papio cynocephalus) as a control. Both species responded with appropriate escape strategies and alarm calls after playbacks of heterospecific aerial alarm calls. Similarly, they reacted appropriately to playbacks of heterospecific general alarm calls. Playbacks of baboon alarm calls elicited no specific responses in either lemur species, indicating that an understanding of interspecific alarm calls caused the responses and not alarm calls in general. Thus, the two lemur species have an understanding of each other's aerial as well as general alarm calls, suggesting that even in species that do not form mutualistic associations and rarely interact, common predator pressure has been sufficient for the development of heterospecific call recognition.     

Deontological evidentialism and <Emphasis Type="Italic">ought</Emphasis> implies <Emphasis Type="Italic">can</Emphasis>

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.     

Deceptive-like behaviour in dogs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis familiaris</Emphasis>)

Deception, the use of false signals to modify the behaviour of the receiver, occurs in low frequencies even in stable signalling systems. For example, it can be advantageous for subordinate individuals to deceive in competitive situations. We investigated in a three-way choice task whether dogs are able to mislead a human competitor, i.e. if they are capable of tactical deception. During training, dogs experienced the role of their owner, as always being cooperative, and two unfamiliar humans, one acting ‘cooperatively’ by giving food and the other being ‘competitive’ and keeping the food for themselves. During the test, the dog had the options to lead one of these partners to one of the three potential food locations: one contained a favoured food item, the other a non-preferred food item and the third remained empty. After having led one of the partners, the dog always had the possibility of leading its cooperative owner to one of the food locations. Therefore, a dog would have a direct benefit from misleading the competitive partner since it would then get another chance to receive the preferred food from the owner. On the first test day, the dogs led the cooperative partner to the preferred food box more often than expected by chance and more often than the competitive partner. On the second day, they even led the competitive partner less often to the preferred food than expected by chance and more often to the empty box than the cooperative partner. These results show that dogs distinguished between the cooperative and the competitive partner, and indicate the flexibility of dogs to adjust their behaviour and that they are able to use tactical deception.     

Against the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis> Argument

The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Depleted Self</Emphasis>

This article revisits Donald Capps’s book The Depleted Self (The depleted self: sin in a narcissistic age. Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1993), which grew out of his 1990 Schaff Lectures at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. In these lectures Capps proposed that the theology of guilt had dominated much of post-Reformation discourse. But with the growing prevalence of the narcissistic personality in the late twentieth century, the theology of guilt no longer adequately expressed humanity’s sense of “wrongness” before God. Late twentieth-century persons sense this disjunction between God and self through shame dynamics. Narcissists are not “full” of themselves, as popular perspectives might indicate. Instead, they are empty, depleted selves. Psychologists suggest this stems from lack of emotional stimulation and the absence of mirroring in the early stages of life. The narcissist’s search for attention and affirmation takes craving, paranoid, manipulative, or phallic forms and is essentially a desperate attempt to fill the internal emptiness. Capps suggests that two narratives from the Gospels are helpful here: the story of the woman with the alabaster jar and the story of Jesus’s dialogue with Mary and John at Calvary. These stories provide us with clues as to how depleted selves experienced mirroring and the potential for internal peace in community with Jesus.