物体表征强度对基于动态物体的注意的影响

基于物体的注意已得到许多静态物体实验的证实, 然而, 对注意分配如何受动态物体影响的研究较少, 存在提示物体假设和动态更新假设两种观点。提示物体假设认为基于物体的注意由最初的物体决定, 而动态更新假设则认为由变化之后的物体决定。动态物体的注意研究还发现了即时物体效应, 即注意基于新物体进行。对于物体变化时注意究竟基于旧物体还是新物体, 新旧物体的相对物体表征强度在其中起决定作用; 当提示物体表征较强时表现为提示物体(即旧物体)决定注意分配, 而当即时物体表征较强时表现为即时物体(即新物体)决定注意分配。相对物体表征强度的概念对理解物体动态变化情况下基于物体的注意的分配以及解决相关理论之冲突可能有重要作用。     

The space of an object: object attention alters the spatial gradient in the surround

Although object-based attention enhances perceptual processing of information appearing within the boundaries of a selected object, little is known about the consequences for information in the object's surround. The authors show that distance from an attended object's center of mass determines reaction time (RT) to targets in the surround. Of 2 targets in the surround, both equidistant from a cue, the target closer to the center of mass was detected faster. Moreover, RT was shown to be a linear function of distance from the center of mass of a fixed, attended object, and changes to the shape of the object and its center of mass predictably altered RT. Object-based attention leads to a pattern of facilitation in the surround that may contribute to the organization of visual scenes.     

The role of the human medial temporal lobe in object recognition and object discrimination

This paper reviews evidence from neuropsychological patient studies relevant to two questions concerning the functions of the medial temporal lobe in humans. The first is whether the hippocampus and the adjacent perirhinal cortex make different contributions to memory. Data are discussed from two patients with adult-onset bilateral hippocampal damage who show a sparing of item recognition relative to recall and certain types of associative recognition. It is argued that these data are consistent with Aggleton and Brown's (1999) proposal that familiarity-based recognition memory is not dependent on the hippocampus but is mediated by the perirhinal cortex and dorso-medial thalamic nucleus. The second question is whether the recognition memory deficit observed in medial temporal lobe amnesia can be explained by a deficit in perceptual processing and representation of objects rather than a deficit in memory per se. The finding that amnesics were impaired at recognizing, after short delays, patterns that they could successfully discriminate suggests that their memory impairment did not result from an object-processing deficit. The possibility remains, however, that the human perirhinal cortex plays a role in object processing, as well as in recognition memory, and data are presented that support this possibility.     

The role of object recognition in young infants' object segregation

Needham's (2001, this issue) new results confirm that young infants draw on experientially derived representations in resolving individuation ambiguities due to shared boundaries between adjacent objects. They extend previous findings in a surprising way: The memory representations that infants draw upon have bound together information about shape, color, and pattern. Our commentary on these important results draws a distinction between two senses of "recognition" and asks in which sense object recognition contributes to object individuation in these experiments.     

The role of the human medial temporal lobe in object recognition and object discrimination.

This paper reviews evidence from neuropsychological patient studies relevant to two questions concerning the functions of the medial temporal lobe in humans. The first is whether the hippocampus and the adjacent perirhinal cortex make different contributions to memory. Data are discussed from two patients with adult-onset bilateral hippocampal damage who show a sparing of item recognition relative to recall and certain types of associative recognition. It is argued that these data are consistent with Aggleton and Brown's (1999) proposal that familiarity-based recognition memory is not dependent on the hippocampus but is mediated by the perirhinal cortex and dorso-medial thalamic nucleus. The second question is whether the recognition memory deficit observed in medial temporal lobe amnesia can be explained by a deficit in perceptual processing and representation of objects rather than a deficit in memory per se. The finding that amnesics were impaired at recognizing, after short delays, patterns that they could successfully discriminate suggests that their memory impairment did not result from an object-processing deficit. The possibility remains, however, that the human perirhinal cortex plays a role in object processing, as well as in recognition memory, and data are presented that support this possibility.     

Fictions of the internal object

This paper examines internal objects in their role as theoretical constructs which analysts use to make sense of human experience. Object relations theory is based upon a vision that the personality is divided or split into parts. Clinical experience reveals that such splits are commonly expressed in the language of our analysing. However, a lexical reality is not a thing-in-itself, but a way of organizing and understanding experience. Jung's vision of the dynamics of the split self encompass a unique 'object relations theory' that is both similar and yet quite different from the object relations theories of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Thomas Ogden A clinical example is used to examine the way in which these different theoretical views explain the same clinical phenomenon. The last section of the paper is devoted to a narrational analysis of the place of internal objects in analytic theory. The split self, dynamic is seen as a narrative device - one that makes sense and provides coherence, but is neither the only view of psychic reality nor necessarily an accurate reflection of the nature of the internal world.     

The exercise of the object

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - What is an object? A prior question: What is objecthood? Au fond, and to logic’s eye, object is a role to be played with respect to a thought (on a...     

From object to image to object

Images are mental representations accommodated by grammatical structures. These structures order sensori-input of information as well as provide for articulated ways of expressing motor sequences associated with images. The psychological process of perception is reflected in the development of paradigmatic structures. The psychological process of action (behavior and its mental representations) is reflected in the development of syntagmatic structures. Forming and expressing imagery requires both paradigmatic and syntagmatic structuring. The former relates to logical issues of identity of objects and to the formation of concepts. The latter relates to the solution of psycho-logical questions of causality through articulation of grammatical roles in sentences. Two issues affecting the formation of a model to account for imagery are examined: (1) The tendency to explain imagery as a result of motor sequences and to utilize performance grammar. (2) The impact of ontogenesis on social processes affecting the logical and psycho-logical concerns facing the person at different stages of development. The grammar of imagery is seen as broader than one of performance. The epistemology of imagemaking does not reflect a linear ontogenetic development which precludes attention to problems of creating the logical structures of an object.     

Visual object affordances: object orientation

Five experiments systematically investigated whether orientation is a visual object property that affords action. The primary aim was to establish the existence of a pure physical affordance (PPA) of object orientation, independent of any semantic object-action associations or visually salient areas towards which visual attention might be biased. Taken together, the data from these experiments suggest that firstly PPAs of object orientation do exist, and secondly, the behavioural effects that reveal them are larger and more robust when the object appears to be graspable, and is oriented in depth (rather than just frontally) such that its leading edge appears to point outwards in space towards a particular hand of the viewer.     

The subjective experience of object recognition: comparing metacognition for object detection and object categorization

Perceptual decisions seem to be made automatically and almost instantly. Constructing a unitary subjective conscious experience takes more time. For example, when trying to avoid a collision with a car on a foggy road you brake or steer away in a reflex, before realizing you were in a near accident. This subjective aspect of object recognition has been given little attention. We used metacognition (assessed with confidence ratings) to measure subjective experience during object detection and object categorization for degraded and masked objects, while objective performance was matched. Metacognition was equal for degraded and masked objects, but categorization led to higher metacognition than did detection. This effect turned out to be driven by a difference in metacognition for correct rejection trials, which seemed to be caused by an asymmetry of the distractor stimulus: It does not contain object-related information in the detection task, whereas it does contain such information in the categorization task. Strikingly, this asymmetry selectively impacted metacognitive ability when objective performance was matched. This finding reveals a fundamental difference in how humans reflect versus act on information: When matching the amount of information required to perform two tasks at some objective level of accuracy (acting), metacognitive ability (reflecting) is still better in tasks that rely on positive evidence (categorization) than in tasks that rely more strongly on an absence of evidence (detection).     

The role of the structure of parts and of the overall object shape in children's generalization of novel object names

We investigated the role of the structure of stimuli and their functional affordance on novel name generalization. Three- and 5-year-old children and adults were shown a training object with two possible functions, each one associated with a different part. They were taught about the name and the function of the object. We compared the classifications obtained for transfer stimuli composed of one part of the training stimulus—functional or not, perceptually transformed or not, or composed of all the original training parts. Even young children generalized the novel name to functional one-part transfer objects and disregarded non-functional or dysfunctional objects, although their generalizations were more constrained by perceptual similarity than that of the adults.     

Revisiting Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object pictorial set: the role of surface detail in basic-level object recognition

Theories of object recognition differ to the extent that they consider object representations as being mediated only by the shape of the object, or shape and surface details, if surface details are part of the representation. In particular, it has been suggested that color information may be helpful at recognizing objects only in very special cases, but not during basic-level object recognition in good viewing conditions. In this study, we collected normative data (naming agreement, familiarity, complexity, and imagery judgments) for Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object database of 260 black-and-white line drawings, and then compared the data to exactly the same shapes but with added gray-level texture and surface details (set 2), and color (set 3). Naming latencies were also recorded. Whereas the addition of texture and shading without color only slightly improved naming agreement scores for the objects, the addition of color information unambiguously improved naming accuracy and speeded correct response times. As shown in previous studies, the advantage provided by color was larger for objects with a diagnostic color, and structurally similar shapes, such as fruits and vegetables, but was also observed for man-made objects with and without a single diagnostic color. These observations show that basic-level 'everyday' object recognition in normal conditions is facilitated by the presence of color information, and support a 'shape + surface' model of object recognition, for which color is an integral part of the object representation. In addition, the new stimuli (sets 2 and 3) and the corresponding normative data provide valuable materials for a wide range of experimental and clinical studies of object recognition.     

The singularity of the cinematic object

In order to avoid the reduction of desire to demand and to produce a theory in keeping with the insights of psychoanalysis, Lacan had to move beyond Hegel’s theorization based on recognition. To do so, Lacan had to come up with a new form of object, an object irreducible to the signifier but with the power to arouse the desire of the subject. The theorization of the objet a enables Lacan to make an important advance on Hegel’s theory of desire, an advance that effectively reverses the priority that Hegel establishes between the object and the Other. Despite the widespread association of Lacan with the signifier and its laws, his one great theoretical breakthrough concerns what remains absolutely irreducible to signification. My central contention in this essay is that Lacan’s theory of desire allows us to understand how singularity appears in the cinema, despite the medium’s inherent resistance to it. I examine this appearance of singularity through two filmic occasions—Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin and Michael Mann’s Heat. It is a medium in which recognition predominates, and yet the singularity of the objet a nonetheless emerges and animates the desire of the spectator.     

Bio-inspired computational object classification model for object recognition

Human beings can effortlessly perceive stimuli through their sensory systems to learn, understand, recognize and act on our environment or context. Over the years, efforts have been made to enable cybernetic entities to be close to performing human perception tasks; and in general, to bring artificial intelligence closer to human intelligence.Neuroscience and other cognitive sciences provide evidence and explanations of the functioning of certain aspects of visual perception in the human brain. Visual perception is a complex process, and its has been divided into several parts. Object classification is one of those parts; it is necessary for carrying out the declarative interpretation of the environment. This article deals with the object classification problem.In this article, we propose a computational model of visual classification of objects based on neuroscience, it consists of two modular systems: a visual processing system, in charge of the extraction of characteristics; and a perception sub-system, which performs the classification of objects based on the features extracted by the visual processing system.With the results obtained, a set of aspects are analyzed using similarity and dissimilarity matrices. Also based on the neuroscientific evidence and the results obtained from this research, some aspects are suggested for consideration to improve the work in the future and bring us closer to performing the task of visual classification as humans do.     

Reaching out for the object in the process of meeting

Reaching out for an object has been broadly discussed within psychoanalysis using the term 'object-seeking'. This article develops the idea that it is a fundamental feature of human beings to reach out for objects in order to survive and/or to gain vitality. Self-love, which is a derivative of object love, is not possible to achieve in a developmental manner without a sufficient phase-specific emotional response to the subject’s object seeking. In terms of psychoanalytic methodology, the present article represents a tradition (e.g. Tähkä) of renewal related to the classique approach, which is a more passive psychoanalytic technique (e.g. Freud and Winnicott). This traditional psychoanalytic methodology is complemented with a more active technique in order to be therapeutically efficient – especially in the treatment of individuals who are not primary neurotic. The four psychoanalytic schools (drive, object relations, ego and self-psychology) are integrated in a patient’s authentic attempt to reach out for the developmental object in the process of meeting.