On the existential core of professionalism in mental health care

ABSTRACT

Existential issues are at the heart of professional role fulfilment. To defend this thesis, it will first be shown that professional competence not only consists of knowledge and skills, but also includes a second-order capacity which enables the clinician to dose and guide his activities. Secondly, in the way the professional performs his or her role, there is also always something communicated about how the professional relates to his or her role performance. This “indirect” communication is not an undesirable by-product of the communication with the patient, it is intrinsic to the professional role. Thirdly, the shaping of this “self-relatedness” can be conceptualised as the result of an interaction between basic (existential) motives in the professional and the normative appeal of the therapeutic setting. A conceptual model of the professional - patient relationship will be presented that clarifies the different dimensions and relations which are addressed in the three successive steps.     

On deriving essence from existence

A definition of ‘alienation’ is proposed which is a rational reconstruction of the term as it is used in primarily moral contexts. Special attention is given to the Marxist tradition. It is argued that the earliest, moral form of Marx's economic determinism can be expressed in terms of the principle of the sufficiency of unalienated labor. In this connection four main kinds of alienation are distinguished. In the final section, it is argued that while ‘alienation’ has and should have an important theoretical role in the context of moral discourse, social scientists, and in particular sociologists, would be better off if they eliminated ‘alienation’ from their scientific vocabulary.     

Existence and the existential quantifier

This paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol ‘∃’ used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and ‘exists’, on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space.     

Mereological vagueness and existential vagueness

It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed.     

On disagreement about perception

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self‐contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self‐contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self‐contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic.     

Semantics for existential graphs

This paper examines Charles Peirce's graphical notation for first-order logic with identity. The notation forms a part of his system of existential graphs, which Peirce considered to be his best work in logic. In this paper a Tarskian semantics is provided for the graphical system.