Deferentialism

There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend—deferentialism, as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems can be swiftly and decisively dispatched by appeal to disciplines other than philosophy. In this paper we will argue that such an attitude of uncritical deference to any non-philosophical discipline is badly misguided. With reference to the work of John Burgess and David Lewis, we consider deference to mathematics. We show that deference to mathematics is implausible and that main arguments for it fail. With reference to the work of Michael Blome-Tillmann, we consider deference to linguistics. We show that his arguments appealing to deference to linguistics are unsuccessful. We then show that naturalism does not entail deferentialism and that naturalistic considerations even motivate some anti-deferentialist views. Finally, we set out deferentialism’s failings and present our own anti-deferentialist approach to philosophical inquiry.     

Realization and Multiple Realization,Chicken and Egg

A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization.     

When psychology undermines beliefs

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.     

Indexicals and Reference‐Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach

I propose a pragmatic approach to the kind of reference‐shifting occurring in indexicals as used in e.g. written notes and answering machine messages. I proceed in two steps. First, I prepare the ground by showing that the arguments against such a pragmatic approach raised in the recent literature fail. Second, I take a first few steps towards implementing this approach, by sketching a pragmatic theory of reference‐shifting, and showing how it can handle cases of the relevant kind. While the immediate scope of the paper is restricted to indexicals and reference‐shifting, and the discussion is confined to a specific range of theories and cases, the approach proposed is compatible with a fairly broad range of more or less semantically conservative theories, and many of the conclusions drawn are significant for the evaluation of pragmatic explanations in philosophy more generally. The overall goal is to offer a new perspective on the issues under discussion, and to prompt philosophers to reconsider some of the established methods by which pragmatic explanations are evaluated.     

Subclinical delusional ideation and a self‐reference bias in everyday reasoning

Previous studies (e.g. Moller & Husby, 2000 ; Blackwood et al., 2004 ) have revealed that delusional thinking is accompanied by an exaggerated focus upon the self and upon stimuli that are perceived to be related to the self. The objective was to examine whether those high in subclinical delusional ideation exhibit a heightened tendency for self‐reference. Using a mixed design, healthy individuals, classified into high‐ and low‐scoring groups on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory ( Peters, Day, & Garety, 1996 ), were compared on everyday reasoning tasks across three experiments. High‐PDI scorers, in contrast to the low‐PDI group, rated self‐referent objections to everyday arguments as stronger than other‐referent objections and formulated more self‐referent assertion‐based objections to everyday arguments. The findings support the notion that subclinical delusional ideation is linked to a self‐reference bias, which is evident in the sort of everyday thinking that people engage in when forming or evaluating their beliefs and which may contribute to delusion formation.     

Against Arguments from Reference*

It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such ‘arguments from reference.’ Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross‐cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture ( Machery et al. 2004 ). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.     

NEWTON AND SPINOZA: ON MOTION AND MATTER (AND GOD,OF COURSE)

This study explores several arguments against Spinoza's philosophy that were developed by Henry More, Samuel Clarke, and Colin Maclaurin. In the arguments on which I focus, More, Clarke, and Maclaurin aim to establish the existence of an immaterial and intelligent God precisely by showing that Spinoza does not have the resources to adequately explain the origin of motion. Attending to these criticisms grants us a deeper appreciation for how the authority derived from the empirical success of Newton's enterprise was used to settle debates within philosophy. What I emphasize is that in the progression from More to Clarke to Maclaurin, key Newtonian concepts from the Principia (1687), such as motion, atomism, and the vacuum, are introduced and exploited in order to challenge the account of matter and motion that is presented in Spinoza's Ethics (1677). Building on this treatment, I use the arguments from More and Clarke especially to help discern the anti‐Spinozism that can be detected in Newton's General Scholium (1713). Ultimately, the Newtonian criticisms that I detail offer us a more nuanced view of the problems that plague Spinoza's philosophy, and they also challenge the idea that Spinoza seamlessly fits into a progressive narrative about the scientific revolution.     

Russell on specific and universal relations: the principles of mathematics, §55

In this paper we consider the arguments Russell uses in The principies of mathematics, §55 to establish the view that all relations are universals. These arguments are shown to be defective. Finally, we consider the connection between Russell's view of relations and wider aspects of his philosophy—in particular, his theories of reference and truth and the gradual break-down of his absolute realism.     

Tolerant enactivist cognitive science

Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.     

Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: a Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching

Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test‐based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, and is illustrated by Community of Philosophical Inquiry. The third, doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth‐value and making judgment, is related to such philosophers as Foucault, and is illustrated by philosophical debate. The analysis shows that although the classical methods applied by the great philosophers appear to be missing from classroom exercises, they do, in fact, remain at the heart of the matter.     

The place of Buddhism in Santayana's moral philosophy

Within the moral philosophy of the Spanish‐American philosopher George San‐tayana (1863–1952), reference to Buddhism becomes an essential feature in his formulation of the notion of post‐rational morality, which is that ‘phase’ of morality which involves an effort to subordinate all precepts to one that points to some single eventual good. Post‐rational morality is synonymous with the spiritual life, an essential feature of which is detachment; and this is why the Buddhists can be said to be the ‘true masters’ of the subject. Santayana's claim that Buddhism “suffers from a fundamental contradiction” can also be seen as an opportunity for us to deepen our own understanding of that philosophy.     

Responsibility Ethics,Shared Understandings,and Moral Communities

Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an “expressive‐collaborative,” culturally situated, practice—based picture of morality, critical of a “theoretical‐juridical” picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the “theoretical‐juridical” model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.     

Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information‐theoretic framework of Dretske (1981) , we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so‐called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so‐called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them.     

Introduction

Policy decisions made in the present are typically based only on considerations of short‐range consequences. However, a number of arguments can be made for attending to the long‐range consequences of policies, especially if they have implications for collective survival. Here, my intention is to articulate a way of contemplating the future that is instrumental to any long‐term goal. The approach taken is based upon the idea of promoting the strategic position of the next time period or generation. It is argued that this strategic principle should be accorded priority in all policy decisions with any bearing upon it.     

Methodology is more than research design and technology

The Society for Computers in Psychology has been at the forefront of disseminating information about advances in computer technology and their applications for psychologists. Although technological advances, as well as clean research designs, are key contributors to progress in psychological research, the justification of methodological rules for interpreting data and making theory choices is at least as important. Historically, methodological beliefs and practices have been justified through intuition and logic, an approach known asfoundationism. However,naturalism, a modern approach in the philosophy of science inspired by the work of Thomas S. Kuhn, indicates that all aspects of scientific practice, including its methodology, should be evaluated empirically. This article examines implications of the naturalistic approach for psychological research methods in general and for the current debate that is often framed as one of qualitative versus quantitative methods.     

Toward a Critical Race Psychology

Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged as an identity‐conscious intervention within critical legal studies and has subsequently developed an interdisciplinary presence. We draw upon CRT perspectives to articulate five core ideas for a Critical Race Psychology (CRP). CRT perspectives (1) approach racism as a systemic force embedded in everyday society (rather than a problem of individual bias); (2) illuminate how ideologies of neoliberal individualism (e.g., merit, choice) often reflect and reproduce racial domination; (3) identify interest convergence as the typical source of broad‐based support for reparative action; (4) emphasize possessive investment in privileged identities and identity‐infused realities that reproduce racial domination; and (5) propose practices of counter‐storytelling to reveal and contest identity‐infused bases of everyday society. In summary, we propose a CRP that consider race not as one domain (among many) for psychological investigation but instead as a conceptual lens through which to analyze all of psychological science.     

Philosophy,Early Modern Intellectual History,and the History of Philosophy

Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic and Aristotelian contemporaries, the article attempts to problematize this notion of pay‐off from an historian's perspective.     

Mister Bixby,Monsieur Bernard,and Some Other 19th Century Scientist–Philosophers on Knowledge-Based Actions

Summary  Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist– philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach – a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy of science. Bixby’s approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection to conceptions of scientific progress.     

BUDDHISM,COMPARATIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY,AND HUMAN FLOURISHING

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross‐cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being‐in‐the‐world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain.     

KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION IN FICTION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Abstract: Autobiographies are particularly interesting in the context of moral philosophy because they offer us rare and extended examples of how other people think, feel and reflect, which is of crucial importance in the development of phronesis (practical wisdom). In this article, Martha Nussbaum's use of fictional literature is shown to be of limited interest, and her arguments in Poetic Justice against the use of personal narratives in moral philosophy are shown to be unfounded. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of mimesis shows that Nussbaum's claims for fictional literature also apply to personal narratives. A case is then made for the importance of personal narratives in developing practical wisdom, and three sub‐genres of autobiography are discussed: (1) the confession, (2) the apology and (3) the testimonial. These sub‐genres exemplify some of the unique features of personal narratives.