Sociability and susceptibility to the common cold

There is considerable evidence that social relationships can influence health, but only limited evidence on the health effects of the personality characteristics that are thought to mold people's social lives. We asked whether sociability predicts resistance to infectious disease and whether this relationship is attributable to the quality and quantity of social interactions and relationships. Three hundred thirty-four volunteers completed questionnaires assessing their sociability, social networks, and social supports, and six evening interviews assessing daily interactions. They were subsequently exposed to a virus that causes a common cold and monitored to see who developed verifiable illness. Increased sociability was associated in a linear fashion with a decreased probability of developing a cold. Although sociability was associated with more and higher-quality social interactions, it predicted disease susceptibility independently of these variables. The association between sociability and disease was also independent of baseline immunity (virus-specific antibody), demographics, emotional styles, stress hormones, and health practices.     

Exploitation and Workers'Co-operatives: a reply to Alan Carter

ABSTRACT In a recent paper Alan Carter argues that the claim that workers'co-operatives merely replace exploitation by employers with 'self-exploitation'is nonsense: the term 'self-exploitation'is self-contradictory. He maintains that the only form of exploitation to which a workers'co-operative may be said to be subject is 'market-exploitation'by dominant economic actors who are external to the co-operative. I argue that these conclusions are mistaken. While the concept of 'market-exploitation'is not without value, it is difficult to operationalise. While the concept of 'self-exploitation'is, understood literally, incoherent, the claims defended by some of the users of this term can be made conceptually respectable.     

Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear

Puryear (AJP, 2014) develops an objection against a prominent attempt to show that the universe must have a temporal beginning. Here I formulate a reply.     

Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer

In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’ gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but, we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about.     

Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr’s incoherence claim.     

Truth-Making and Analysis: A Reply to Rodriguez-Pereyra

Abstract

The law requires that plaintiffs in fraud cases be ‘justified’ in relying on a misrepresentation. I deploy the accumulated intuitions of the law to defend externalist accounts of epistemic justification and knowledge against Laurence BonJour's counterexamples involving clairvoyance. I suggest that the law can offer a well-developed model for adding a no-defeater condition to either justification or to knowledge but without requiring that subjects possess positive reasons to believe in the reliability of an epistemic source.     

Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka

In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by presenting and defending a different, but related, principle, which he calls the “Principle of Avoidable Blame.” According to this principle, one is blameworthy for performing an act only if one could instead have behaved in an entirely blameless manner. Otsuka claims that although Frankfurt-cases do undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not undermine the Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this brief paper, we offer a critical discussion of the core of Otsuka’s argument, especially the claim that his favored principle cannot be refuted by Frankfurt-cases. We do not believe that Otsuka has offered good reason to suppose that the Principle of Avoidable Blame—and the related incompatibilism—fares any better than the original Principle of Alternative Possibilities.