Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006)

The authors comment on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006) associative-propositional evaluation model of implicit and explicit attitudes by examining the claims that (a) truth value is attached to propositions but not to associations; (b) pattern activation is qualitatively different from syllogistic structure of arguments; and (c) Pavlovian conditioning may be propositional, whereas evaluative conditioning is not. They conclude that despite surface dissimilarities between implicit and explicit attitudes both may be mediated by the same underlying process.     

The Representation of Knowledge in Minds and Machines

Human knowledge can be represented as a propositional network in which the meaning of a node is defined by its position in the network. That is, the relationship between a node and its neighbours determines how this node is used in language understanding and production, i.e., its meaning. The propositions that make up such a network are predicate-argument structures with time and location slots. Schemas, frames, and production rules can be expressed in the same formalism. Implications for this contextual view of meaning are discussed. Since the construction of such a propositional network depends on hand coding and is therefore impractical, an alternative automatic statistical procedure is explored that yields a high-dimensional semantic space. Vectors in this space correspond to nodes in the propositional network, in that the meaning of a vector in the Latent Semantic Analysis space is given by its neighbouring vectors in that space.     

The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes

ABSTRACT— Evidence that human preferences, beliefs, and behavior are influenced by sources that are outside the reach of conscious awareness, control, intention, and self-reflection is incontrovertible. Recent advances in neuroscience have enabled researchers to investigate the neural basis of these implicit attitudes, particularly attitudes involving social groups. From this research, a model with three identified neural components related to the automatic activation and regulation of implicit attitudes is beginning to emerge. The amygdala is implicated in the automatic evaluation of socially relevant stimuli, while the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices are involved in the detection and regulation, respectively, of implicit attitudes. Further support for this model comes from the inclusion of these regions in current models concerning the cognitive regulation of emotion and the detection of conflict. The identification of a putative neural substrate for implicit attitudes has had a direct impact on psychological research into their nature and operational characteristics. We discuss how this emerging neural model has influenced current research on implicit attitudes and describe the importance of such models for directing future research.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

Implicit and Explicit Evaluation: A Brief Review of the Associative–Propositional Evaluation Model

A central theme in contemporary psychology is the distinction between implicit and explicit evaluation. Research has shown various dissociations between the two kinds of evaluations, including different antecedents, different consequences, and discrepant evaluations of the same object. The current article provides a brief review of the associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model, which accounts for these dissociations by conceptualizing implicit and explicit evaluations as the behavioral outcomes of two functionally distinct, yet mutually interacting, mental processes. Whereas implicit evaluations are assumed to be the outcome of associative processes, explicit evaluations are conceptualized as the outcome of propositional processes. Associative processes determine the activation of mental contents on the basis of feature similarity and spatiotemporal contiguity; propositional processes involve the validation of activated mental contents on the basis of cognitive consistency. The APE model includes specific assumptions about mutual interactions between the two processes, implying precise predictions about converging versus diverging patterns of implicit and explicit evaluation.     

Strategic and automatic components in the processing of linguistic spatial relations

The objective of the present study was to determine the extent to which strategies influence the representational format of a linguistic spatial relation. The propositional model assumes that a sentence describing a spatial relation is always represented as a set of propositions, whereas the strategic model claims that a spatial sentence can be represented either as a set of propositions or as a mental image, depending on the strategy (verbal or visual-spatial) an individual follows. Participants read a sentence (spatial or non-spatial) followed by a picture or sentence, which did or did not exemplify the information of the first sentence. In order to examine the involvement of strategic and automatic components the probability (20% or 80%) of the nature (sentence or picture) of the second stimulus was varied. Participants had slower verification RTs for unexpected stimuli than for expected stimuli, but this cost was significantly larger for an unexpected picture than an unexpected sentence. Furthermore, this asymmetric cost for the unexpected visual-spatial stimulus only occurred with spatial sentences and not with non-spatial sentences. Surprisingly, these data do not support a strictly propositional or a strategic model. Instead, we propose a third option: a dual representational model, in which people automatically represent the spatial sentence propositionally. In addition, depending on the context, a pictorial strategy is employed, which results in a supplementary visual-spatial representation.     

Contextual influences on implicit evaluation: a test of additive versus contrastive effects of evaluative context stimuli in affective priming

Drawing on two alternative accounts of the affective priming effect (spreading activation vs. response interference), the present research investigated the underlying processes of how evaluative context stimuli influence implicit evaluations in the affective priming task. Employing two sequentially presented prime stimuli (rather than a single prime), two experiments showed that affective priming effects elicited by a given prime stimulus were more pronounced when this stimulus was preceded by a context prime of the opposite valence than when it was preceded by a context prime of the same valence. This effect consistently emerged for pictures (Experiment 1) and words (Experiment 2) as prime stimuli. These results suggest that the impact of evaluative context stimuli on implicit evaluations is mediated by contrast effects in the attention to evaluative information rather than by additive effects in the activation of evaluative information in associative memory.     

IV—Knowledge of Meaning

The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub-sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information-bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude. ¹ I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers' knowledge of the meanings of words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge.     

Mutual influence of implicit and explicit attitudes

Research and theory distinguish two types of attitude: automatic evaluative reactions and deliberate evaluative judgments, referred to as implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively. Although these attitudes are distinct, they may influence each other. Four studies tested whether implicit and explicit attitudes are both influenced by propositional and associative learning. We also tested whether changes in one kind of attitude mediate changes in the other. Study 1 found that propositional learning about novel individuals directly influenced explicit attitudes and indirectly influenced implicit attitudes through changes in explicit attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this finding and extended it by simultaneously demonstrating that associative learning through Evaluative Conditioning directly influences implicit attitudes and indirectly influences explicit attitudes through changes in implicit attitudes. Study 4 replicated these effects for attitudes toward familiar, rather than novel, targets. These results suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes can share common antecedents and influence each other.     

Parallel processing in visual perception and memory: What goes where and when?

This article begins with reviews of parallel processing models in the areas of visual perception and memory, pointing out kinds of information purported to be processed in each, and the overlap in the physiological substrates involved. Next, some pertinent literature having to do with the linkage between perception and memory is reviewed (e.g., visual memory for what or where), concluding that there exists a serious lack of research and knowledge of how different perceptual processes may lead to facilitated, distorted or impaired memory in different forms of storage. Some possible scenarios are presented concerning how perceptual information might be interfaced with memorial mechanisms, and some working hypotheses are considered. Finally, a new paradigm is outlined that examines the linkage between local and global perceptual processing and explicit and implicit learning. This paradigm combines the global precedence paradigm of Navon (1977; 1981) and the sequence learning paradigm of Nissen and Bullemer (1987). Convincing arguments indicate that global stimuli are mediated more quickly via one perceptual stream (the M-cell pathway), but can be processed more slowly by another (the P-cell system). Local aspects of the stimuli are exclusively mediated by the P-cell system. The results of two experiments employing iterations of stimulus sequence, in which sequence learning is possible and measurable in terms of reaction time changes over trials are presented. The second experiment indicates that information thought to be mediated by the M-cell pathway results in incidental sequential learning, while other information thought to be mediated by the P-cell pathway does not. Spatial filtering of the visual stimuli reveals that low spatial frequencies are necessary for sequence learning to occur. The issue of whether this learning is implicit or explicit is also discussed. Ideas for future research, exploring this new area of interest, are proposed. Current knowledge of perceptual and memorial deficits in special populations are considered in an attempt to identify new areas of investigation.     

The impact of implicitly and explicitly primed ingroup–outgroup categorization on the evaluation of others pain: The case of the Jewish–Arab conflict

Despite the automaticity of affective sharing, many studies have documented the role of top-down effects, such as social categorization, on people’s empathic responses. An important question, largely ignored in previous research, concerns empathy to ingroup and outgroup members’ pain in the contexts of ongoing intergroup conflict. In the present study we examined how implicit and explicit ethnic social categorization of others affects empathy to pain in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To meet this aim, we assessed the evaluation of pain by Jewish and Arab participants who viewed a series of visual stimuli depicting painful and non-painful familiar situations. The stimuli were associated with explicitly or implicitly primed typical names depicting ingroup, neutral outgroup, and adversary outgroup members. Results demonstrate that pain ratings in the explicit priming condition provide support for the ingroup empathy hypothesis, positing that empathy is higher for ingroup than for outgroup members for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Conversely, when the targets’ categories are primed implicitly, results revealed difference in empathy by the two ethnic groups where an ingroup bias was detected only for Palestinian Arabs. This suggests that the activation of ingroup bias on the subliminal implicit level among Palestinian Arab participants might be mediated by the amount of conflict permeating in their daily lives and by deeply rooted cultural values and behavioural patterns.     

Gender Differences in Implicit Processing of Sexual Stimuli

The present studies investigated whether men and women differ in cognitive–motivational processing of sexual stimuli in order to better understand the commonly observed gender differences in sexual outcome variables. Because these processes often operate without conscious control, we focused specifically on automatic stimulus processing. Using a series of implicit tasks, we measured inhibition, attentional orientation, appraisal and approach‐avoidance motivation regarding sexually explicit stimuli in male and female students. Results showed that men were more strongly motivated to approach sexual stimuli than women and were better able to inhibit sexual information as to prevent activation of the sexual response. With regard to attentional orientation, men were more easily drawn by sexual cues than women, yet only when the cues were presented long enough to allow more elaborative processing. No gender differences were found in the implicit evaluation of sexual information, although men and women did differ at the level of self‐reported sexual evaluations. Our results indicate the importance of incorporating information‐processing mechanisms and emotion regulation strategies into the conceptualization of the sexual response and promote further research on the specificity, robustness, predictive validity and malleability of the cognitive–motivational processes underlying sexual arousal. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

A gender role socialization model of explicit and implicit biases in driving self-enhancement

We present a gender role socialization model of explicit and implicit biases in driving self-enhancement. The model proposes that men’s higher levels of driving self-enhancement (relative to women) results from socialization experiences, such as those that idealize driving skill and risk taking as core aspects of male identity. This socialization process produces reasoned explicit (declarative or propositional) associations, but also implicit (automatic, non-conscious) associations between masculinity and driving self-enhancement, and these two processes are theorized to operate relatively independently. Structural Equation Modeling of a large sample of young male (n = 200) and female (n = 200) drivers supported the model, and indicated that (a) gender role identification fully mediated the effect of gender on driving self-enhancement and (b) that this effect occurred simultaneously but relatively independently in both explicit or reasoned belief structures and also in implicit non-conscious associations assessed using the Implicit Association Test. The origins of gender differences in traffic safety behaviour and the implications of our model for shifting conceptions of what it means to be a “real man” with regard to driver behaviour are discussed.     

EPS Prize Lecture. Licking and liking: the assessment of hedonic responses in rodents

Affective processes are a key determinant of behaviour: At its simplest, liked stimuli are approached while disliked stimuli are avoided. Although assessing hedonic responses in nonverbal animals can be difficult, one relatively tractable approach relies on detailed analyses of rodents' consummatory behaviour. Rodents typically produce rhythmic sets of licks that can be grouped into clusters on the basis of the intervals between licks. The mean number of licks in a cluster (cluster size) is directly related to the concentration of palatable and unpalatable solutions. These relationships suggest that lick cluster size might be a useful index of an animal's hedonic reaction to the solution being consumed. I begin by reviewing studies of conditioned flavour preference and aversion that support the idea that lick cluster size can provide useful information about rats' hedonic reactions. I then describe how this methodology has been used to address previously intractable issues in the investigation of contrast effects as well as revealing an analogue of effort justification effects that, in humans, are commonly explained in terms of cognitive dissonance reduction. Finally, I consider how lick analysis might provide information about hedonic responses in animal models of human psychiatric disorders. In all these cases, how an animal did something was particularly informative about why it was doing it.     

A formal account of Socratic-style argumentation

In traditional mathematical models of argumentation an argument often consists of a chain of rules or reasons, beginning with premisses and leading to a conclusion that is endorsed by the party that put forward the argument. In informal reasoning, however, one often encounters a specific class of counterarguments that until now has received little attention in argumentation formalisms. The idea is that instead of starting with the premisses, the argument starts with the propositions put forward by the counterparty, of which the absurdity is illustrated by showing their (defeasible) consequences. This way of argumentation (which we call S-arguments) is very akin to Socratic dialogues and critical interviews; it also has applications in modern philosophy. In this paper, various examples of S-arguments are provided, as well as a treatment of the problems that occur when trying to formalize them in existing formalisms. We also provide general guidelines that can serve as a basis for implementing S-arguments into various existing formalisms. In particular, we show how S-arguments can be implemented in Pollock's formalism, how they fit into Dung's abstract argumentation approach and how they are related to the issue of self-defeating arguments.     

Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47–62, 2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name.     

Enhancing the Conceptualization and Measurement of Implicit and Explicit Affective Evaluations: A Case Study in Disordered Eating

Affective evaluations (i.e., evaluations of affectively evocative stimuli) play important roles in many behaviors, including clinically relevant behaviors like disordered eating. Understanding automatic and controlled affective evaluations can enhance prediction and treatment of more deliberate versus more impulsive clinical behaviors, respectively. However, methodological and theoretical shortcomings cloud the implicit affective evaluation literature, particularly as applied in clinical psychology. This article aims to improve the clinical science of implicit and explicit affective evaluation by capitalizing on theoretical and methodological advancements drawn from implicit social cognition. We recommend three key enhancements to the affective evaluation literature: improve the structural comparability between indirect and direct measures, assess evaluations on both valence and arousal dimensions of affect, and carefully characterize and select stimuli. Additional improvements to analytic approaches (e.g., mixed effects modeling and process dissociation) are also recommended. Such efforts will advance our theoretical understanding of the relative contributions of automatic and controlled processes to clinically relevant affective evaluation, thereby informing assessment and improving intervention. Applying advanced methodologies of implicit cognition to clinical phenomena will also reiterate and reinforce the use of these advances in social psychology.     

Implicit self and the right hemisphere: Increasing implicit self‐esteem and implicit positive affect by left hand contractions

Unilateral hand contraction typically activates the contralateral hemisphere and has led to changes in psychological states and performances in previous research. Based on a right hemisphere model of the implicit self, we hypothesized and found that left hand contraction increases momentary levels of implicit self‐esteem (Studies 1 and 2) and implicit positive affect (Study 3). The findings are discussed with respect to potential differences between the hemispheres in implicit and explicit affective processing and how they can be integrated in the existing literature on hemisphere asymmetries.     

On the malleability of emotional encoding

The encoding of emotional events has sometimes been regarded as automatic, because the processing involved can occur outside awareness. However, this does not mean that emotional encoding cannot be controlled, although it may often be the case that people are unaware of how to do so, or even that such control is possible. Evidence is presented to show that the neural activation associated with fear-related stimuli can be modified by top-down control, and that related instructions can modify emotional vulnerability to stressful events. However, it is further argued that such effortful control is resource limited, and that more robust control might be achieved via repeated practice in accessing positive representations that inhibit competing negative meanings. Studies of attentional and interpretative encoding biases induced by practice show that they have causal effects on emotional vulnerability, by influencing how threatening events are encoded. Experimental investigations are beginning to reveal the critical processes underlying these changes in emotional vulnerability, and it is argued that the same approach is likely to be helpful in addressing questions relevant to therapeutic change.     

The Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Learning: Evidence for Parallel Development

Much research has focused on the separability of implicit and explicit learning, but less has focused on how they might interact. A recent model suggests that in the motor-skill domain, explicit knowledge can guide movement, and the implicit system learns in parallel, based on these movements. Functional imaging studies do not support that contention, however; they indicate that learning is exclusively implicit or explicit. In the experiment reported here, participants learned a motor sequencing task either implicitly or explicitly. At transfer, most of the stimuli were random, but the sequence occasionally appeared; thus, it was not obvious that explicit knowledge could be applied to the task. Nevertheless, participants with explicit training showed sequence knowledge equivalent to those with implicit training, implying that implicit knowledge had been acquired in parallel with explicit knowledge. This result has implications for the development of automaticity and of motor-skill learning.