Psychiatry in the labyrinth: Deconstructing deviancy

Abstract

Deviancy is a key concept in psychiatry and other therapeutic disciplines, because it dramatizes the way in which they depend on the establishment of norms, in order to justify their theory and practice. The writings of Derrida as well as Goethe provide a different view: that “deviation” from a “norm” can be fundamentally important to the well‐being of the norm. Thus deviancy can be viewed not as something to be “corrected” but rather as a creative possibility to be encouraged and shaped in productive ways. As a case of “deviancy” we have selected the writings of John Perceval, whose Narrative provides a critique of the mental‐health establishment of his day, particularly the asylum, and offers an alternative to 19th‐century views of “lunacy.” We see his “schizophrenic” commentary on his “psychosis” and its treatment as analogous to the deconstructive, “schizophrenic” discourse of postmodernity which is similarly critical of the reigning, modernist psychiatric order.     

Further Ado concerning Dasein's “Undifferentiated Mode”: Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday Dasein from the Possibility of Genuine Failure

In this paper, I argue against the interpretive view that locates an “undifferentiated mode” – a mode in which Dasein is neither authentic nor inauthentic – in Being and Time. Where Heidegger seems to be claiming that Dasein can exist in an “undifferentiated mode”, he is better understood as discussing a phenomenon I call indifferent inauthenticity. The average everyday “Indifferenz” which is often taken as an indication of an “undifferentiated mode”, that is, is better understood as a failure to distinguish between the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. Dasein's average everyday self-understanding is indifferent to this distinction, and I show that this is precisely what renders it inauthentic. Recognizing this distinction, however, is not enough to render Dasein authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility of a non-indifferent inauthenticity and what Heidegger calls the possibility of “genuine failure”. To read an “undifferentiated mode” into Being and Time is to misunderstand its methodological progression from Dasein's average everyday, inauthentic self-understanding to its authenticity – “to the thing itself”. A select few passages may at first seem to indicate otherwise. However, Being and Time – like both being in general and Dasein itself – cannot be properly understood “without further ado”.     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

The power of poverty: queer religious agency past and present

ABSTRACT

As a form of resistance against heteronormativity, queer theology has often also been very critical towards colonialism and capitalism. The queer perspective thus became a privileged standpoint of critique of these three levels of oppression. However, it seems that today, capitalism itself has been “queered”: the hierarchy of the heterosexual “core family” has been replaced by a global hymn of diversity and flexibility centred around consumerism. Within the context of neoliberal capitalism, queer theology seems to have lost its queerness. This contribution is inspired by Giorgio Agamben’s book The Highest Poverty (2011), in which he presents the evolution of the Franciscan rule from a “form of life” (forma vitae) to a “rule” that is a form of proto-capitalism. The Franciscan ideal of poverty is corrupted as soon as the hierarchical Church (the instance of power) affirms this rule, thereby taking it up within a discourse of the law: poverty is no longer a theological concept, but an economical one. Following Agamben’s strategy, I will ask how another spiritual movement of around the thirteenth century, the Beguines, attempted to live an alternative life, a vita apostolica, and understand this as a form of queerness. The Beguine model, I will argue, can help us imagine a deepened queer theology today that cannot be captured and rigidified by the logic of capitalism, but continues to be able to critique it.     

Humiliation and Transgender Regulation: Commentary on Paper by Ken Corbett

This commentary reads Ken Corbett's “Boyhood Femininity” alongside the Lawrence King case to examine shame as a means of regulating gender nonconforming boys. Corbett describes the dominant clinical discourse on feminine boys that understands them to be “nonconforming, extreme, and disordered” and notes that such discourse depends on the presupposition that boys must be masculine. This discourse is at once ontological and normative, asserting both that boys are naturally masculine and that they need to become masculine, a paradoxical imperative that may account for the ways in which the discourse is haunted by anxiety about the location, durability, and persistence of masculinity. In responding to the framing of boyhood femininity as a disorder, Corbett inverts the diagnosis; as a response to the reading of gender variant youth as inappropriately arrested in their psychosexual development, he diagnoses the profession itself as suffering from a “developmental lag” and suggests that the diagnosis that condemns a femme boy to psychic stagnation and unhappiness projects its own failure to see beyond normative gender presumptions onto the phenomenological life of the feminine boy. Corbett asks us to consider boyhood femininity as the scene of gender's emergence rather than as the site of its failure.     

Editorial introduction

Abstract

Three views of “self” have emerged as part of the same Zeitgeist: the “self that humanistic psychology salvaged from the reductionisms of behaviorism and psychoanalysis; the “selves” postmodern critics find as they deconstruct hegemonies of modernity; and the “illusion of separate selfhood” of transpersonal theory. The differences and overlaps of these views are examined in an effort to find a coherence without compromising the differences. This examination begins with a recognition of the splitting views as part of the same recent Zeitgeist, and of a longer philosophical history which grounds these. Next, recent critiques of the humanistic sense of self are surveyed, followed by distinction between “self,” “identity,” and “life.” Then a contextualization follows in classical terms of “fate” and “destiny” as well as the values inherent in these views of humanness, notably happiness and fulfillment. Finally, a single example, offered by Bergson, is used to illustrate the compatibility, even necessity of a compatibility, of differences.     

Response to Strenger

Despite certain apparently common values, Strenger's critique is addressed largely to an inaccurate account of my views. It is also internally contradictory in various ways. On one hand, for example, Strenger favors a dialectic of science and the humanities as they bear on psychoanalysis; on the other hand, he declares science to be the exclusive psychoanalytic “metaphysic.” Remarkably, he claims that my critique of technical rationality is tantamount to advocating a passive reflective stance on the analyst's part, precluding anything akin to “coaching” to foster change. But I've written consistently about the dialectic of proactive therapeutic influence and critical reflection on that very influence and its implications. What's unacceptable about technical rationality is its positivist confidence about the effectiveness of prescribed interventions based on allegedly scientific evidence. With his lengthy survey of extra-analytic studies, Strenger evades engaging my specific arguments since they are strictly about the unwarranted privileging of the findings of psychoanalytic process and outcome research relative to clinical experience. He mistakenly equates my repudiation of such privileging with rejection of the value of “science” altogether for psychoanalysis. Finally, Strenger's claim that my “dialectical constructivism” eschews formulating universal truths about human nature ignores my consideration of human potentials for both denying and confronting mortality and the associated challenge of human agency. Embracing that challenge constitutes a moral position for psychoanalysis that is unequivocally opposed to uncritical compliance with culturally shaped demands for various types of therapeutic services.     

The Disarticulation of Time: the Zeitbewußtsein in Phenomenology of Perception

In an effort to reassess the status of Phenomenology of Perception and its relation to The Visible and the Invisible, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's text and his discussion of the “field of presence” in La temporalité are intended to think through the field in which time makes its appearance as one of passage. Time does not show itself as presence or in the present but manifests itself as Ablauf, as lapse or flow, an écoulement that is simultaneously an explosion, an éclatement. Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in these pages is thus legible as recovering the primordial experience of time as a self-differentiating déhiscence in its dual power of articulation and erosion. Time is thus simultaneously the vehicle of the world's appearance and of its “disarticulation”, the passage of a rhythm of affirmation and disintegration.     

Adorno,Ferenczi, and a new “categorical imperative after Auschwitz”

Abstract

Theodor W. Adorno's mature thought can be characterized by the attempt to articulate what he calls a “new categorical imperative after Auschwitz.” By this, Adorno means that theory and praxis must be organized in such a way that the Holocaust does not repeat itself. This article argues that Sándor Ferenczi’s metapsychology is key to understanding Adorno’s attempt to rethink the nature of precisely such a new categorical imperative. One of the key themes of Adorno’s entire corpus is the problem of the “identification with the aggressor” – an idea that originates with Ferenzci rather than, as is commonly thought, Anna Freud. The Ferenczian dimension of Adorno’s thinking becomes particularly clear in Adorno’s thoughts on the question of freedom. In this context, Adorno engages in a psychoanalytically informed critique of the philosophy of freedom and a speculative philosophical critique of psychoanalysis. The fashioning of a “new categorical imperative” after Auschwitz entails a form of education directed towards a new form of Mündigkeit, one oriented towards contradiction, resistance, and a steadfast refusal to “identify with the aggressor.”     

Sur la tête de Gorgias. Le “parler beau” et le “dire vrai” dans Le Banquet de Platon

Rhetoric is at present the object of a rehabilitation on a grand scale, all the more as it overlaps the fields of literature, linguistics, and philosophy. Actually, if philosophy rejects and removes rhetoric, it is nevertheless, as a method of word, wholly impregnated with it. To investigate the complex relationship of mutual implication in which rhetoric and philosophy are involved is part and parcel of this plan of re-evaluation of rhetoric as “discourse art” with a view to a re-definition of its field and functions. In this perspective, rhetoric articulates itself within, in relation to, and with Plato's dialogues in a much more subtle and complex manner than warranted by the process of “anti-rhetoricalness” initiated by philosophy against rhetoric after Plato. Going back to the origins of this conflict and recalling the system of oppositions supporting the official Platonic vulgate, this study begins to pave the way for a micr-reading of the Platonic text regarded as a paradigm of philosophic textuality. It is certainly true that the Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and the Symposium set up a system of oppositions between between rhetoric and dialectrics which are in contrast with each other in the word practices, in the rules and methods of discourse, and which are antinomic in their ends. This system of oppositions always seems to be referable to the opposition between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”. But the strategies and procedures set going in the Symposium, in particular in “Agathon's speech” and in “Diotima and Socrates' speech” betray a much closer connection between the supposed “bad rhetoric” revealed by Phaedrus and the “good rhetoric” which is dialectrics. The search for this connection is conducted through two types of reading of the Symposium. In actual fact, between the paronomasia on the agathoi and that on “Gorgias' head” (this Gorgon of rhetoric) there takes place a speech, Agathon's, whose parodied, exacerbated, and counterfeit rhetoric allows us to gauge Plato's own rhetoric in this artefact which distances itself, more or less openly, from Gorgian rhetoric. This “hyper-rhetoricalness” and “over-grammaticalness” cannot be there with the sole aim of serving as evidence against rhetoric. It is in fact possible to perceive through the web of the text the ends, quite rhetorical themselves, which preside over the structure of Agathon's speech, seen from the viewpoint of the figure of the antithesis. Thus, it is in the play of a “neo-rhetoricalness” where we must, in the last analysis, look for the spring allowing the philosophical discourse to overturn the rhetorical one. And while in Giorgias what clothes the discourse is actually the truth, in Plato it is the antinomy between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”, conveniently set up, which forms the basis of the function of diversion by which Socrates points out — in the complex network of the continuity and discontinuity existing between rhetoric and philosophy — the structures of reversal and the original upheavals which Plato imposes on the relation between rhetorical and dialectric discourse. Actually, dialectrics is found in “Socrates and Diotima's speech”, not as “anti-rhetoric”, but rather as a “transposition” of the rhetorical discourse, thus acquiring the traits of a “neo-rhetoric”. The analysis of this discourse, which constitutes the second reading exercise of the Symposium, allows us to pick out the aversion and inversion strategies that turn dialectrics in an overtuned rhetoric. The founding deed of this “inversion” (rather than “separation”) is recognizable in the alteration it introduces in the first plase in the type of discourse, which from a rhetorical, explicitly addressed, macrological, monological, and continuous discourse turns into a dialectical, brachylogous, dialogic discourse with partners and interlocutors, i.e. into a dialogue; in the second place, the subject of the discourse shifts from the locuteur, author and signer of the discourse to ever-present interlocutors who end up by making room for a talking and knowing speaker in a regime of anonymous subjectivity: this is an extreme alteration of the anthropological and epistemic subject, culminating in the scientific discourse of Euclidean geometry. Finally, the inversion is recognizable in the object of the discourse, whose prâgma slips from being the predicate of a qualified grammatical subject into a process of objectivation and substantivation, thereby moving from the rhetorical question “What is beautiful?” to the philosophical question “What is the beautiful?”. The hypothesis of a “neo-rhetoricalness” of dialectics, underlying this research, is therefore more Platonic than it appears, insofar as between rhetoric and dialectics there has been a tradition which has tried to wipe out the traces of its transmission, but where the neo-rhetoricalness of dialectics shows through quite clearly, taking advantage, without admitting it, from a more ancient rhetoric than it is itself. (A.T.)     

Instructions for Climbing the Ladder (The Minimalism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form.     

Élan Vital Revisited: Bergson and the Thermodynamic Paradigm

The received view of Bergson's philosophy of life is that it advances some form of vitalism under the heading of an “élan vital.” This paper argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Bergson's élan vital as it appears in Creative Evolution (1907) in favor of an interpretation based on his overlooked reflections on entropy and energetics. Within the interpretation developed here, the élan vital is characterized not as a spiritualistic “vital force” but as a tendency of organization opposed to the tendency of entropic degradation. It is then shown how Bergson's view of evolution and living organization resonates with more contemporary scientific approaches belonging to a “thermodynamic paradigm” in theoretical biology in different respects, including the critique of neo‐Darwinism and the positing of a driving force behind evolution. Finally, the special interest that Bergson's philosophical biology bears today is considered in terms of the connection between the concepts of élan vital and duration.     

Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official‐Level Rhetoric

This paper argues that mythical discourse affects political practice by imbuing language with power, shaping what people consider to be legitimate, and driving the determination to act. Drawing on Bottici's (2007 ) philosophical understanding of political myth as a process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in significance, it contributes to the study of legitimization in political discourse by examining the role of political myth in official‐level U.S. war rhetoric. It explores how two ubiquitous yet largely invisible political myths, American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism, which have long defined America's ideal image of itself and its place in the world, have become staples in the language of the “War on Terror.” Through a qualitative analysis of the content of over 50 official texts containing lexical triggers of the two myths, this paper shows that senior officials of the Bush Administration have rhetorically accessed these mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of the “War on Terror.”     

On the self-undermining functionality critique of morality

Nietzsche's injunction to examine “the value of values” can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster's new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche's critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality critique” and raise three problems for it: (i) Is there room within an etiological conception of function for the notion of self-undermining functionality? (ii) If Nietzsche's critique is internal and based solely on the function it ascribes to morality, where does that critique derive its normative significance from? (iii) Does Reginster's account not make out ascetic morality to be more universally dysfunctional than it is, given that some priestly types have done remarkably well out of morality?     

“They Go Too Far”: Reply to Review Essays by Lewes and O'Connor

Kenneth Lewes and Noreen O'Connor share little common ground in their discussions of Lesbian Lives. They agree that it represents, in Lewes's words, “important trends in psychoanalysis and more general intellectual discourse” (“the developing discourse on homosexuality, the ascendancy of feminist ideas within psychoanalysis, … the shift … from classical drive theory to … more … relational approaches, and the influence of postmodern social and literary thought”). But whereas O'Connor welcomes a text she sees as offering “critiques of traditional psychoanalysis's binary theorising of gender and sexuality,” Lewes finds that Lesbian Lives presents “certain questions and difficulties, especially to those who, like myself, espouse theoretical and political allegiances quite different from them.” This article responds to several of Lewes's distortions and misreadings, including his allegations that the authors believe they can “conduct therapy without theory or value” and that they “insist on the essential sameness of people who are heterosexual and homosexual.” Lewes also wrongly attributes to the authors a simplistic belief in “sexual fluidity” and the “multiplicity of selves.” Instead, the text of Lesbian Lives in various ways encourages psychoanalysis to incorporate into its developmental models what it has learned clinically about the multiple dimensions of subjective experience.     

WAYS OF DISCOURSE AND WAYS OF LIFE

In book X of the Republic, Plato famously reports “a quarrel between poetry and philosophy.” The present essay examines this quarrel in book X, along with other relevant parts of the Republic, by understanding “philosophy” and “poetry” as rival ways of life and rival ways of discourse. The essay first explains why, in Plato’s view, poetic discourse weakens one’s power to reason and is at odds with philosophic discourse. Then it shows how poetic discourse is bound up with a way of life that champions the value of freedom. Such a life forms a contrast with the philosophic life, which is marked more by stability and unity than by freedom. The quarrel, however, is not a simple antagonism. The essay hence concludes by discussing why, despite the opposition between the two, philosophy cannot do without poetry.     

“Like sheep for the slaughter”

The primary objective of this article is to investigate how a Lutheran theology supports the soldier’s vocation in war. First, the analysis is made in relation to the concept of larva Dei, second, in relation to “the pastorate” and “technology of power”. By the interaction, I show how Luther’s theology can be used as a critique towards Foucault and vice versa. Through this narrative method, structures of power and liberation are unveiled. The interaction illuminates their diverse views on secular and non-secular order, as well as an immanent and transcendental order. Luther points towards eternity, while Foucault points towards society and its powers. The main outcome is firstly: faith for Foucault is never an explanation of “reality”, but a result of social relations. For Luther, faith is to experience the world as reality; and secondly: larva Dei creates a possibility to overcome suffering by faith, whereas by Foucault’s immanent structure, suffering is understood as “empty” or “meaningless”. Foucault contributes with an important critique of misusing vocation in war. An area for further research is to continue developing critiques of vocation and power in relation to contemporary soldiers’, terrorists’ and anarchists’ masks, since some are used to protect life and others to protect identities.