Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

Anosognosia in Alzheimer’s disease – The petrified self

This paper reviews the literature concerning the neural correlates of the self, the relationship between self and memory and the profile of memory impairments in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and explores the relationship between the preservation of the self and anosognosia in this condition. It concludes that a potential explanation for anosognosia in AD is a lack of updating of personal information due to the memory impairments characteristic of this disease. We put forward the hypothesis that anosognosia is due in part to the “petrified self.”     

Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis

In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a “place of mine” (personal autobiographical experience) from a “place” (declarative knowledge). The function of “place of mine” is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.     

Evidence for the self as an imaginal prototype

This study investigated recognition memory of self-photographs which had been previously rated by subjects for their degree of reference to an imaginal prototype of “real self.” The number of false alarms to NEW photographs was found to increase with degree of self-reference to the imaginal prototype with the exception of photographs rated highest in self-reference. Females were reliably superior to males in self-recognition. Males and females also differed in nonverbal behaviors reflecting differences in their image of real self. Results were interpreted as supporting an hypothesis that the self functions as a cognitive prototype which has both imaginal and verbal characteristics.     

The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony

Using the 7-year psychotherapy of a Holocaust survivor, this paper explores the sometimes contradictory aspects of approaches to trauma. Conceptualizing a “self in pain” as an alternative to contemporary conceptualizations of the traumatized person as having a damaged, dissociated or collapsed self leads to a corresponding alternative clinical approach. The paradoxes of traumatic memory and testimony necessitate an adaptational emphasis and the emergence of a “doubled” in contrast to a dissociated self. The decision to respect this “doubled” self involves a privileging of “reality” over “psychic reality” which then, paradoxically enables this patient to develop a phantasy life.     

Episodic feeling-of-knowing relies on noncriterial recollection and familiarity: Evidence using an online remember-know procedure

We examined the hypothesis that feeling-of-knowing judgments rely on recollection as well as on familiarity prompted by the cue presentation. A remember-know-no memory procedure was combined with the episodic FOK procedure employing a cue–target pair memory task. The magnitude of FOK judgments and FOK accuracy were examined as a function of recollection, familiarity, or the “no memory” option. Results showed that the proportion of R and K responses was similar. FOK accuracy and magnitude of FOK judgments were higher for R and K responses than for N responses. FOK accuracy related to R and K responses were above chance level, but FOK was not accurate in the “no memory” condition. Finally, both FOK magnitude and FOK accuracy were related more to recollection than to familiarity. These results support the hypothesis that both recollection and familiarity are determinants of the FOK process, although they suggest that recollection has a stronger influence.     

One Need Not Be a House to Be Haunted: On Enactment,Dissociation, and the Dread of “Not-Me”—A Case Study

This paper examines psychic trauma as experience so shockingly strange that it exceeds the threshold for cognitive processing and begins to flood the mind with unintegratable affect that threatens to disorganize the internal template on which one's experience of self-coherence, self-cohesiveness, and self-continuity depends. A detailed clinical vignette illustrates how the unprocessed “not-me” experience held by a dissociated self-state as an affective memory without an autobiographical memory of its traumatic origin “haunts” the self. It remains a ghostly horror even in an otherwise successful psychoanalysis unless a new perceptual reality is created between patient and analyst that alters the narrative structure maintaining the dissociation as though the past were still a present danger. The analyst's making optimal use of dissociative processes in an intersubjective and interpersonal context enables the patient more readily to self-regulate affect in those areas of implicit memory where trauma has left its mark; the dissociated ghosts of “not-me” are thus persuaded, little-by-little, to cease their haunting and participate more and more actively and openly as self-reflective, self-expressive parts of “me.”     

“Memory of Water” Without Water: The Logic of Disputed Experiments

The “memory of water” was a major international controversy that remains unresolved. Taken seriously or not, this hypothesis leads to logical contradictions in both cases. Indeed, if this hypothesis is held as wrong, then we have to explain how a physiological signal emerged from the background and we have to elucidate a bulk of coherent results. If this hypothesis is held as true, we must explain why these experiments were difficult to reproduce by other teams and why some blind experiments were so disturbing for the expected outcomes. In this article, a third way is proposed by modeling these experiments in a quantum-like probabilistic model. It is interesting to note that this model does not need the hypothesis of the “memory of water” and, nevertheless, all the features of Benveniste’s experiments are taken into account (emergence of a signal from the background, difficulties faced by other teams in terms of reproducibility, disturbances during blind experiments, and apparent “jumps of activity” between samples). In conclusion, it is proposed that the cognitive states of the experimenter exhibited quantum-like properties during Benveniste’s experiments.     

Does category labeling lead to forgetting?

What effect does labeling an object as a member of a familiar category have on memory for that object? Recent studies suggest that recognition memory can be negatively impacted by categorizing objects during encoding. This paper examines the “representational shift hypothesis” which argues that categorizing an object impairs recognition memory by altering the trace of the encoded memory to be more similar to the category prototype. Previous evidence for this idea comes from experiments in which a basic-level category labeling task was compared to a non-category labeling incidental encoding task, usually a preference judgment (e.g., “Do you like this item?”). In two experiments, we examine alternative tasks that attempt to control for processing demands and the degree to which category information is explicitly recruited at the time of study. Contrary to the predictions of the representational shift hypothesis, we find no evidence that memory is selectively impaired by category labeling. Overall, the pattern of results across both studies appears consistent with well-established variables known to influence memory such as encoding specificity and distinctiveness effects.     

Factors and fictions in person perception: A reply to lamiell,Foss, and Cavenee1

The systematic distortion hypothesis states that under difficult memory conditions judges infer what “must” have happened from their general model of what the world is like and/or find it easier to retrieve conceptually affiliated memory items. The hypothesis further states that lay conceptual schemes “tend to be innacurate with respect to how behaviors covary, confusing ‘what is like what’ with ‘what goes with what’” (Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979), and that interbehavior correlations derived from memory-based ratings cannot be considered valid evidence for the objective existence of proposed personality traits, factors or syndromes. The systematic distortion hypothesis is clarified with reference to the Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee “critique” (1980). That “critique,” it is argued, is neither a test of the systematic distortion hypothesis nor a critique. What Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee demonstrate is that the validity of the systematic distortion hypothesis does not depend upon the unrealistic assumption that observers are capable of reporting only what they expect to see.     

情绪效价的记忆增强效应:存储或提取优势?

情绪效价和情绪唤醒是描述情绪的两个维度。情绪增强记忆效应表明情绪唤醒事件的记忆往往优于非情绪唤醒事件的记忆,但关于积极情绪记忆和消极情绪记忆哪个在记忆中处于优势仍存在争论。实验以情绪词对和中性词对为实验材料。实验一探讨积极情绪词语或消极情绪词语的记忆优势; 实验二探讨积极情绪环境或消极情绪环境中中性词语的记忆优势。在两种实验条件下,积极情绪下的自由回忆都优于消极情绪下的自由回忆; 多项加工树的存储—提取模型使用实验自由回忆和线索回忆的结果将记忆的存储和提取优势分离开来,结果表明:积极情绪事件记忆优势发生在存储阶段,而积极情绪环境记忆优势发生在存储和提取阶段; 积极情绪事件记忆偏向支持“刺激后编码增强假设”,积极情绪环境记忆偏向支持“唤醒—偏向竞争假设”。     

Helping Children Enter Into Another's Experiences: The Look and Feel of It

The role of focusing 4-year-olds' attention on “feeling” or “looking” was examined in three experiments by testing predictions about children's memory for their interactions with an adult partner as they engaged in a collaborative task. Children made collages with an adult partner, and they were later asked to remember who placed the pieces on the collage. Children were more likely to claim they placed pieces actually placed by their partner (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), unless directed to think about how their partner looked when placing the partner's pieces (Experiments 1 and 3). False claims were observed after children were directed to think about how it would “feel” to perform the actions, whether motoric instructions were focused on the self (Experiment 2, N = 48) or partner (Experiment 1, N = 40, and Experiment 3, N = 24). Furthermore, false claims (referred to as I did it errors) were positively associated with accurate collage memory (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that adopting a perspective during encoding that involves “feeling” movements—whether focused on the self or partner—plays an important role in children's memory for collaboration (in this context, memory for contributions made by children or their adult partners to the completion of a collage). A focus on “feeling” may be a way to “enter into” the experiences of another, promoting anticipation and recoding, which may lead to better learning in both collaborative and non-collaborative contexts.     

Measuring autobiographical fluency in the self-memory system

Autobiographical memory is widely considered to be fundamentally related to concepts of self and identity. However, few studies have sought to test models of self and memory directly using experimental designs. Using a novel autobiographical fluency paradigm, the present study investigated memory accessibility for different levels of self-related knowledge. Forty participants generated 20 “I am” statements about themselves, from which the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th were used as cues in a two-minute autobiographical fluency task. The most salient aspects of the self, measured by both serial position and ratings of personal significance, were associated with more accessible sets of autobiographical memories. This finding supports theories that view the self as a powerful organizational structure in memory. Results are discussed with reference to models of self and memory.     

The Development of the Conceptual Organization of Self

This study posed a cognitive-differentiation hypothesis for the development of the concept of self. Children from kindergarten through sixth grade (N = 112), divided equally between the sexes, were administered a class-inclusion task and two measures of the concept of self. The Imaginary Audience Scale for the Young Child (IAS; Elkind & Bowen, 1979) indexed two aspects of the Jamesian “I,” or self-as-subject. A newly developed instrument, the Part-of-Me Scale (PMS), measured the various constituents of the Jamesian “me,” or self-as-object. The results indicated a sex difference on the IAS subscales and a grade effect for constituents judged as integral to self-definition. The results suggest that a relational concept of self, characterized by individuation from and integration with the external world, may be a developmental achievement not apparent until middle adolescence.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.     

Order of strokes writing as a cue for retrieval in reading chinese characters

Abstract

Chinese characters are composed of a number of strokes, varying from 1 to 23. The strokes of each character have to be written in a precise order, which is codified in a number of rules, and which is learned in the process of literacy acquisition. The present study tested the hypothesis that stroke writing order has been coded in memory as an essential component of the orthographic knowledge of a character, and that this specific motor schema is used as a cue in lexical retrieval. In the first experiment reported here, fragments of Chinese characters consisting of “early” or of “late” strokes (namely strokes which are written first or last during writing) were pre-exposed to target characters to be named as fast as possible. The results indicated that “early” strokes were better retrieval cues for character names than “late” strokes. In the second experiment, subjects were requested to make same-different judgements about two characters which had in common either “early” or “late” strokes. Different characters sharing “early” strokes were more frequently erroneously judged as being identical than characters sharing “late” strokes.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.