Buddhist Fictionalism

Questions regarding what exists are central to various forms of Buddhist philosophy, as they are to many traditions of philosophy. Interestingly, there is perhaps a clearer consensus in Buddhist thought regarding what does not exist than there may be regarding precisely what does exist, at least insofar as the doctrine of anātman (no self, absence of self) is taken to be a fundamental Buddhist doctrine. It may be noted that many forms of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy in particular are considered to offer a quite austere ontology—a rather ‘empty’ account of what exists. Continuing in this vein of ontological austerity, here I will attempt to lay out a relatively novel approach to Buddhist ontology, viz. Buddhist fictionalism.     

Reactionary Fictionalism

Fictionalism is the view that the claims of a target discourse are best seen as being fictional in some way, as being expressed in some pretense manner, or as not being about the traditional posits of the discourse. The contemporary taxonomy of fictionalist views is quite elaborate. Yet, there is a version of fictionalism that has failed to develop and which corresponds to the earliest form of the view found in the history of philosophy, East and West. I call this view “reactionary fictionalism.” I argue that traces of reactionary fictionalism can be found in Classical Daoism, Madhyamaka Buddhism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Reactionary fictionalism is a kind of fictionalism that differs from both the hermeneutic and revolutionary kinds discussed today. Hermeneutic fictionalism says we already treat the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner. Revolutionary fictionalism recommends we all start treating the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner for reasons mostly of social utility. Reactionary fictionalism recommends, by contrast, that only those concerned with obtaining maximal therapeutic release from the pathology of literally asserting genuine beliefs in the claims of a target discourse should react in a pretense manner to inescapable contexts demanding the use of the claims of that discourse. I aim to show that reactionary fictionalism was a technique utilized in premodern skeptical traditions as a means for enduring one's condemnation to near-permanent sociality. I recommend slotting reactionary fictionalism into our present taxonomy once we note that employing fictionalism can have a primarily therapeutic motivation and not merely a semantic, epistemic, or metaphysical one.     

The Inference Objection to Evidence Cases

Philosophia - Chastain (1975) and Sawyer (2012), among others, claim that direct cognitive relations can be initiated in evidence cases. Direct cognitive relations will here include...     

The Standard Objection to the Standard Account

Philosophical Studies - What is the relation between a clay statue andthe lump of clay from which it is made? According to the defender of the standardaccount, the statue and the lump are...     

Fictionalism and Incompleteness

The modal fictionalist faces a problem due to the fact that her chosen story seems to be incomplete—certain things are neither fictionally true nor fictionally false. The significance of this problem is not localized to modal fictionalism, however, since many fictionalists will face it too. By examining how the fictionalist should analyze the notion of truth according to her story, and, in particular, the role that conditionals play for the fictionalist, I develop a novel and elegant solution to the incompleteness problem.     

形而上学中的虚构主义

虚构主义是在过去20年间涌现出来的一种很有竞争力的反实在论理论。这种理论认为,某些领域(如数学、伦理)中的理论言谈所涉及的对象在本体论上是不存在的,因此这些理论言谈实际上都不是真的;然而我们可以把它们作为像虚构作品中的言谈一样继续使用下去。本文介绍和讨论了虚构主义的历史和理念,特别强调了这种理论在语言哲学、模态理论、数学哲学、道德哲学、真理理论等领域中的应用和发展。     

The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.     

Fictionalism and the attitudes

This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place of those arguments, an argument against fictionalism about abstract objects of any kind is presented in the last section. This argument takes the form of a trilemma against the fictionalist.

Fictionalism about musical works

The debate concerning the ontological status of musical works is perhaps the most animated debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of music. In my view, progress requires a piecemeal approach. So in this article I hone in on one particular musical work concept – that of the classical Western art musical work; that is, the work concept that regulates classical art-musical practice. I defend a fictionalist analysis – a strategy recently suggested by Andrew Kania as potentially fruitful – and I develop a version of such an analysis in line with a broad commitment to philosophical naturalism.     

Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality

Modal fictionalists propose to defuse the unwanted ontological commitments of modal realism by treating modal realism as a fictional story, and modal assertions as assertions, prefixed by a fictionalist operator, that something is true in that story. However, consideration of conditionals with modal antecedents raises the problem ofembedding, which shows that the simple prefixing strategy cannotsucceed. A compositional version of the fictionalist strategy isdeveloped and critiqued, and some general semantic morals aredrawn from the failures of both strategies.     

An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism

This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as atheory of what is intrinsically good for us because it impliesthat nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does nothave the psychological capacity for the propositional attitudeof enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacitiesthat humans have.     

The Future Similarity Objection Revisited

David Lewis has long defended an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds. The purpose of this paper is to reevaluate Lewis’s response to one of the oldest and most familiar objections to this proposal, the future similarity objection.     

The Phenomenological Approach to Art Therapy

The present paper discusses the phenomenological approach to art-therapy and suggests an operational terminology for its main theoretical concepts. First we present the general assumptions that underline art therapy. Definitions, leading approaches, and the therapeutic effect of artwork are considered. Next we indicate the need for relevant and particular theories of art therapy. Phenomenological theory is examined as a case in point because of its popularity among art therapists. Despite its philosophical appeal, however, we find phenomenological theory lacking the operational terminology that is essential to form a coherent and distinct school of therapy. In the present paper, we extract from phenomenological theory operational principles, which can be followed and applied by art therapists. In this analysis, we take into consideration Betensky's pioneer attempt to create the bridge between phenomenological theory as applied in verbal psychotherapy and art therapy. We end by discussing the urgent need to operationalize other verbal psychotherapeutic theories so they are relevant for art-therapy practice and may help create greater similarities among art therapists of the same school of psychotherapy.