The Impact of Uncertainty,Threat, and Political Identity on Support for Political Compromise

This work examines the impact of uncertainty and threat on support for political compromise. In Study 1, uncertainty, threat, and support for compromise were measured. Uncertainty increased support for compromise only when paired with positive or neutral affect. Studies 2 and 3 used an experimental design to examine the impact of incidental affect on support for political compromise as a function of political identification. Uncertainty was more likely to increase support for compromise in positive or neutral contexts and for political moderates and liberals. The combination of uncertainty and threat led conservatives to express reduced support for compromise.     

Political conservatism as motivated social cognition

Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r = .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.     

Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity?

Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty- threat model of political conservatism, which posits that psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models, which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only. Study 3 also reveals that resistance to change fully mediates the association between uncertainty avoidance and conservatism, whereas opposition to equality partially mediates the association between threat and conservatism. Implications for understanding the epistemic and existential bases of political orientation are discussed.     

Making Sense of Life: The Existential Self Trying to Deal with Personal Uncertainty

This article is about how people make sense of life and focuses on one core threat that may play a pivotal role in people's lives as existential meaning makers: personal uncertainty. Personal uncertainty is defined as the aversive feeling that you experience when you feel uncertain about yourself. Drawing on an uncertainty management perspective, it is hypothesized that cultural worldviews may provide a means to cope with personal uncertainty and that this may explain why under conditions of personal uncertainty people may respond especially positively to events that bolster their cultural norms and values and particularly negatively to persons and events that violate these norms and values. Findings are reviewed that support the uncertainty management model's predictions. Furthermore, the uncertainty management model may explain why terror management theory is not always about terror, but (at least partly) about personal uncertainty. Finally, conceptual implications, conflicting findings, and loose ends are noted, and testable hypotheses are formulated, which may further insight into the psychological processes pertaining to sense-making, worldview defense, and self-regulation.     

When Ignorance Is Bliss The Role of Motivation to Reduce Uncertainty in Uncertainty Reduction Theory

Three studies were conducted with the goal to articulate and test models for integrating the concept of motivation to reduce uncertainty into the axiomatic structure of uncertainty reduction theory. Multiple models were considered, each model defining motivation to reduce uncertainty in a different way. Motivation to reduce uncertainty was defined as a scope condition (Model 2), as tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3), as a weighted function of uncertainty by its importance (Model 4), and as the difference between one's uncertainty level and one's tolerance for uncertainty (Models 5a and 5b). Each of these models was compared to the baseline model (Model 1) derived from the original presentation of the theory where level of uncertainty, by itself, serves as a determinant of various communication behaviors. Tests of these models in terms of their ability to predict information seeking and attraction reveal that none of the models provides a consistent integration of motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory. Rather, tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3) is one of three determinants of information seeking, while level of uncertainty (Model 1) is one of three determinants of attraction. This inability to integrate motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory can be attributed to the consistent failure to find support for deviance and incentive value as determinants of tolerance for uncertainty, the rejection of Axiom 3 in uncertainty reduction theory (which specifies a positive relationship between uncertainty and information seeking), and the rejection of Theorem 17 (which specifies a negative relationship between information seeking and liking).     

Political tolerance and coming to psychological closure following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: an integrative approach

This study tested hypotheses generated from an integrative model of political tolerance that derived hypotheses from a number of different social psychological theories (e.g., appraisal tendency theory, intergroup emotion theory, and value protection models) to explain political tolerance following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A national field study (N = 550) found that immediate post attack anger and fear had different implications for political tolerance 4 months later. The effects of anger on political tolerance were mediated through moral outrage and outgroup derogation, whereas the effects of fear on political tolerance were mediated through personal threat, ingroup enhancement, and value affirmation. Value affirmation led to increased political tolerance, whereas moral outrage, outgroup derogation, ingroup enhancement, and personal threat led to decreased political tolerance. Value affirmation, moral outrage, and outgroup derogation also facilitated post-9/11 psychological closure and increased psychological closure led to greater political tolerance.     

Selective interpretation in anxiety: Uncertainty for threatening events

The role of event uncertainty on inferences predictive of threat was investigated in high and low trait anxious individuals. Participants read context sentences predicting threat or nonthreat outcomes. They subsequently named target words that were consistent with or unrelated to prediction. In Experiment 1, with predictability relatively low, anxious participants showed clear threat bias in their inferences: Although nonthreat targets were unaffected by context, shorter naming latencies were found for threat target words that followed a threat predicting context. A low anxiety group showed an opposite effect, that is, facilitation only for nonthreat words, suggesting an avoidance (of threat) bias. In Experiment 2, under higher predictability, this bias disappeared, as both high and low anxious groups performed similarly. The relevance of these data for different models of selective processing in anxiety is discussed. Of particular pertinence is the finding that, with increasing stimulus threat, low anxious participants no longer show avoidance; instead, they infer threat in a way similar to the high anxious. This suggests that the difference between the high and the low anxious persons resides in the threshold at which stimulus threat input is processed.     

Emerging Infectious Diseases: Coping with Uncertainty

The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its center and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this article, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health.

Uncertainty as a Fundamental Scientific Value

The author argues that, though social scientists generally value tolerance for ambiguity, and some even assert a fundamental indeterminacy in human systems, there is still a discipline-wide discomfort with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is argued that this distaste for uncertainty derives from a distorted view of the classical physical sciences, a view that ignores the essentially critical and radical foundations of scientific practice. The drive for certainty, it is argued, is essentially unscientific, in that certain, or adequate, forms of knowledge can only recapitulate the already known and in their dogmatic and institutionalized forms prevent the development of genuinely new knowledge. In contrast, uncertainty is defended as a positive condition, generative of new knowledge because it is open to discovery and to the mystery of the other. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the social sciences can only progress if uncertainty, or mystery, is protected and cultivated through a scientific discourse constituted in local and concrete terms (rather than in general and universal ones) and through a self-reflective and self-critical research praxis.     

The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale: psychometric properties of the English version

Research is now suggesting that intolerance of uncertainty may be very important in understanding worry and may play a key role in the etiology and maintenance of worry. The present study attempted to further our understanding of intolerance of uncertainty by examining the psychometric properties of the English version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), which has already been validated in French. Factor analysis indicated that the IUS has a four-factor structure that represents the idea that uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, uncertainty leads to the inability to act, uncertain events are negative and should be avoided, and being uncertain is unfair. The IUS has excellent internal consistency, good test-retest reliability over a five-week period, and convergent and divergent validity when assessed with symptom measures of worry, depression, and anxiety. Overall, this study suggests that the IUS is a sound measure of intolerance of uncertainty and supports the idea that intolerance of uncertainty is an important construct involved in worry.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

不确定性容忍度、损益概率及延迟风险对延迟选择的影响

研究通过两个实验考查了不确定性容忍度及相关变量对延迟选择的影响,其中实验1采用2（不确定性容忍度：高/低）×2（概率水平：高/中）被试间实验设计;研究2将实验任务设定在有延迟风险情景下中等概率水平,采用单因素（不确定性容忍度：高/低）被试间实验设计.实验1结果表明：不确定性容忍度与概率水平存在交互作用：中等概率时,低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体更偏好延迟选择,高概率时,两者的延迟选择无显著差异,都偏好于选择决策.实验2结果表明：在有延迟风险中等概率时,高、低容忍度个体的决策偏好无显著差异,都偏好选择决策.结论：不确定性容忍度对延迟选择存在影响且受概率水平和延迟风险的调节.     

Conflict, Identity, and Tolerance: Israel in the Al-Aqsa Intifada

This paper explores the impact of the Al-Aqsa Intifada on tolerance orientations of the Israeli Jewish public. We rely upon five surveys carried out between January 2000 and June 2002 to study in a real-life setting the amount and nature of change in political tolerance due to the conflict and the mechanisms behind it. Building on theory and research on intergroup relations in social psychology and political tolerance in political science, we focus upon threat and ingroup identification as the two primary factors in the social psychological processes resulting from conflict and leading to intolerance. We set the trends and explore mediation and interaction processes in the impact of this round of conflict on political tolerance.     

Do individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty affect health monitoring?

Researchers have postulated that individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may affect people's health behaviours. Study 1 (N?=?147 university students) supports this proposition showing that higher IU is associated with higher monitoring (seeking threat-relevant information). Study 2 (N?=?117 university students) experimentally manipulated IU to ensure that the association is not due to other related constructs such as anxiety or worry. Results show that inducing high IU led to increased monitoring as reflected by higher scores on an index of monitoring measures. Wanting information about the health threat in order to reduce their uncertainty was an independent predictor of monitoring and did not mediate the relationship between IU and monitoring. Findings suggest that high IU induces people to increase their monitoring; an adaptive strategy when the health threat can be reduced through this behaviour.     

Uncertainty is associated with increased selective attention and sustained stimulus processing

Uncertainty about future threat has been found to be associated with an overestimation of threat probability and is hypothesized to elicit additional allocation of attention. We used event-related potentials to examine uncertainty-related dynamics in attentional allocation, exploiting brain potentials’ high temporal resolution and sensitivity to attention. Thirty participants performed a picture-viewing task in which cues indicated the subsequent picture valence. A certain-neutral and a certain-aversive cue accurately predicted subsequent picture valence, whereas an uncertain cue did not. Participants overestimated the effective frequency of aversive pictures following the uncertain cue, both during and after the task, signifying expectancy and covariation biases, and they tended to express lower subjective valences for aversive pictures presented after the uncertain cue. Pictures elicited increased P2 and LPP amplitudes when their valence could not be predicted from the cue. For the LPP, this effect was more pronounced in response to neutral pictures. Uncertainty appears to enhance the engagement of early phasic and sustained attention for uncertainly cued targets. Thus, defensive motivation related to uncertainty about future threat elicits specific attentional dynamics implicating prioritization at various processing stages, especially for nonthreatening stimuli that tend to violate expectations.     

The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel

In recent years, political scientists have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one. Yet most studies which examine antecedents of political intolerance ignore the potential role played by "gut feelings" or group-based negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. Moreover, even the few studies that deal with emotions and intolerance concentrate exclusively on the role of groups of emotions (positive vs. negative, dispositional vs. surveillance) or on basic emotions (anger or fear) and ignore the potential influence of more complex discrete emotions like hatred on political intolerance. Hence, the main goal of this study was to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. In order to do so, the relations between political intolerance and three group-based negative emotions (hatred, anger, and fear) were tested by means of four large-scale nationwide surveys. Within the surveys, various intolerance measurement methods were used in various contexts (wartime vs. no-war/routine periods) and among individuals with different levels of political sophistication. Results, obtained via multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling, show that: (1) Group-based hatred is the most important antecedent of political intolerance even when controlling for important intolerance inducers such as perceived threat. (2) Other group-based negative emotions like anger or fear influence political intolerance wholly through the mediation of hatred or perceived threat. (3) The role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.     

不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响及其情景依赖性*

研究以Ellsberg选瓶任务为决策材料,探讨了不同任务特征下个体不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响。结果发现,获益情景下:高概率时高、低容忍度个体对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均偏好模糊规避;中概率时低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体表现出更低程度的模糊规避,前者倾向于模糊中立,后者倾向于模糊规避;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊中立。损失情景下:高概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊寻求;中概率时低容忍度比高容忍度个体更偏好模糊寻求,前者倾向于模糊寻求,后者倾向于模糊中立;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊规避。这表明,不确定性容忍度对模糊决策偏好产生作用,但这种作用会受到损益概率和损益结果的影响,具有情景依赖性。     

Moral Uncertainty and Distributive Sufficiency

According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice (including libertarianism, sufficientarianism, and egalitarianism), a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the optimal balance between the competing moral risks posed by implementing these views. In particular, it avoids the moral risk posed by views like Nozick’s libertarianism, which forbid redistributive taxation even for the sake of helping to provide for people’s basic needs: failing to do the latter, if it turns out that justice does require it, would be very morally wrong. This “uncertainty argument” has the advantage of minimizing reliance on controversial intuitions about distributive justice, helps to specifying a non-arbitrary threshold for sufficiency, and shows that the substantive moral implications of moral uncertainty are not limited to high-stakes applied ethics issues such as abortion and vegetarianism but instead extend to an issue at the heart of political philosophy.

     

Cognitive adaptation to the experience of social and cultural diversity

Diversity is a defining characteristic of modern society, yet there remains considerable debate over the benefits that it brings. The authors argue that positive psychological and behavioral outcomes will be observed only when social and cultural diversity is experienced in a way that challenges stereotypical expectations and that when this precondition is met, the experience has cognitive consequences that resonate across multiple domains. A model, rooted in social categorization theory and research, outlines the preconditions and processes through which people cognitively adapt to the experience of social and cultural diversity and the resulting cross-domain benefits that this brings. Evidence is drawn from a range of literatures to support this model, including work on biculturalism, minority influence, cognitive development, stereotype threat, work group productivity, creativity, and political ideology. The authors bring together a range of differing diversity experiences and explicitly draw parallels between programs of research that have focused on both perceiving others who are multicultural and being multicultural oneself. The findings from this integrative review suggest that experiencing diversity that challenges expectations may not only encourage greater tolerance but also have benefits beyond intergroup relations to varied aspects of psychological functioning.