Knowledge in Action

This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent's beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe you can stop your car by pressing a pedal, then, if your belief is true, you will stop. If it is false, you will not. By considering cases of unintentional actions, actions involving luck and cases of deviant causal chains, I show why knowledge is required. By looking at the notion of causal relevance, I argue that the connection between knowledge and action is causal and not merely conceptual.
"What knowledge adds to belief is not psychologically relevant." ¹ —Stephen Stich     

信念、知识与行为

哲学家休谟曾经发出过这样的感叹:信念“似乎从来是哲学中最大的神秘之一”。[1]休谟的哲学思考,以眼光敏锐,善于发现问题为其特征。在他26岁即已出版的天才著作《人性论》中,因果关系的必然性问题(归纳问题)的提出,事实与价值问题的发现,引发了后来包括康德、罗素等哲学宗师的思考,它们构成了哲学史上影响深远的问题。笔者相信,对这一休谟感到困惑的信念问题进行探讨,当也是一件很有学术价值与意义的事情。由于信念论在国内的知识论研究中,尚未得到应有的关注,因此本文拟首先进行一番理论上的梳理,尤其着重于对休谟与罗素的相关学说的开掘,…     

Action and Knowledge in Alternating-Time Temporal Logic

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a branching time temporal logic in which statements about what coalitions of agents can achieve by strategic cooperation can be expressed. Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic (ATEL) extends ATL by adding knowledge modalities, with the usual possible worlds interpretation. This paper investigates how properties of agents’ actions can be expressed in ATL in general, and how properties of the interaction between action and knowledge can be expressed in ATEL in particular. One commonly discussed property is that an agent should know about all available actions, i.e., that the same actions should be available in indiscernible states. Van der Hoek and Wooldridge suggest a syntactic expression of this semantic property. This paper shows that this correspondence in fact does not hold. Furthermore, it is shown that the semantic property is not expressible in ATEL at all. In order to be able to express common and interesting properties of action in general and of the interaction between action and knowledge in particular, a generalization of the coalition modalities of ATL is proposed. The resulting logics, ATL-A and ATEL-A, have increased expressiveness without loosing ATL’s and ATEL’s tractability of model checking.     

X—Knowledge of Action Without Observation

This paper argues that perception of one's body 'from the inside' provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body 'from the inside' allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over the period of time in which one is doing it.     

Interactions between Knowledge,Action and Commitment within Agent Dynamic Logic

This paper considers a new class of agent dynamic logics which provide a formal means of specifying and reasoning about the agents activities and informational, motivational and practical aspects of the behaviour of the agents. We present a Hilbert-style deductive system for a basic agent dynamic logic and consider a number of extensions of this logic with axiom schemata formalising interactions between knowledge and commitment (expressing an agent s awareness of her commitments), and interactions between knowledge and actions (expressing no learning and persistence of knowledge after actions). The deductive systems are proved sound and complete with respect to a Kripke-style semantics. Each of the considered logics is shown to have the small model property and therefore decidable.Presented by Ewa Orlowska     

Knowing How to Project Objects: Probing the Generality of Children's Action Knowledge

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about trajectories has shown a dissociation between young children's aimed throwing actions, in which they are highly sensitive to the physical laws of motion, and their explicit judgments, in which they exhibit misconceptions. This research investigated the generality of children's action knowledge by having the participants project a ball with a sling. Instead of adjusting sling stretch, and hence sling force, correctly as a function of both the release height and the target distance, 5- and 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, N = 32) and, without flight feedback, even most 7- to 10-year-olds (Experiment 2, N = 96) considered distance only and ignored the height dimension. Similarly, children's judgments of the required sling stretch tended to follow a distance-only rule, especially with children younger than 9 years of age. These results show that young children's action knowledge exhibited in throwing does not generalize to arbitrary means of force production. They further suggest that there is no developmental trend toward such generalization in the age range examined.     

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion,Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account , all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.     

知识的“德”与“真”

西方知识论中的"知识"指的是"科学知识",即"真理"。西方知识论哲学和中西伦理道德学说的运思方式截然不同,它们具有不同的本质属性,属于不同的领域。如果任由西方知识论哲学以逻辑理性解构中西伦理道德学说的基础(诸如西方的宗教信仰或中国的儒家信仰),就会导致社会道德水平大滑坡。而这一点尚未引起中国学界的足够注意。事实上,中国学界在引入西方知识论哲学的过程中,应该立足于中国文化,认真进行"对接"问题的研究,以求在吸收西方知识论哲学精华的同时,规避其对中国社会可能造成的危害。可能的途径之一是创建一种整体意义上的"知识论"。这种"整体知识论"可以将中国伦理学说和西方科学知识论纳入同一体系,有效地规范它们的研究领域和互动关系,并为伦理道德学说保留科学知识论无法干预的空间。     

The Exception and the Rule: Judith Butler's Antigone's Claim

Continental Philosophy Review -     

The Messianic Thought of the Rule of Law

Philosophia - The first segment starts with a definition of two dimensions of the concept of rule of law; related to the notion of sovereignty and as a concept to control arbitrariness on the part...     

Motivation, Cognition, and Action: An Analysis of Studies of Task Goals and Knowledge

This paper begins by analysing the nature of cognition and of motivation, especially as they relate to the operation of the subconscious. The interdependence of cognition and motivation is demonstrated. This interdependence is then illustrated through an analysis of studies on goal setting and task strategies (task knowledge) in relation to task performance. Three types of relationships have been found: direct, separate effects of goals and strategies; interactions between goals and strategies (moderation); and the mediation of goal effects by strategies. It is argued that there is really one underlying model that accounts for all of these findings. There are two paths to performance, one motivated by goals and another motivated by other factors. Each is or can be associated with relevant task knowledge. 'Direct' goal effects occur when the subjects already possess relevant task knowledge, but that knowledge is not measured. (If it were measured, there would be mediation.) Direct strategy effects occur when subjects are motivated to discover or use relevant strategies by (unmeasured) motives that are not a product of the performance goal. Moderation occurs when there is no task knowledge tied to the goals but knowledge derives from other sources, which combines with goals to produce performance. Mediation occurs when goals produce measured task knowledge, which, when controlled, vitiates the goal effect. This model suggests ideas for further research.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

谈行动与道德的关系——兼论孔子的见地

一、笛卡儿的困境 提出心物二元论的人不算少,但以笛卡儿最著名。他推崇的认知方法着眼于对象的分割、形状和运动,这种方法的优点在于倚重自明的观念;不过,笛卡儿很快就知道,有些对象没有可割性、形状和运动可言;于是提出心物二元论,指出对象如果有分割、形状和运动可言,便统称为“物”,否则便统称为“心”;两者都可知,所用的方法和概念却不相同。虽然如此,笛卡儿毕竟没有切断心物之间的联系,他清楚地表明了人由心物两种实体合并而成,承认心通过意念引发行动;如果是这样,行动便有别与笛卡儿所指的物,也有别于他所指的心;那么,行为究竟是物还是心呢?这个问题不好回答,让笛卡儿陷入困境。     

心理学的想象力与行动力

本文由心理学与内卷化问题切入讨论,提出心理学应该具备想象力与行动力.想象力的培养可以借助人类学、历史学、哲学等学科的视野.行动力则需要树立相应的观念,面向社区、生活与人民群众.知行合一或许是可能的选择.