Age Is Unnecessary

The postmodern process that acknowledges ambiguity and established bias requires the critical perspectives of Disability and Age Studies. When exploring portrayals of age in canonical literature, few characters figure as prominently as Shakespeare's King Lear. The image of the aged monarch in this renowned drama has reinforced stereotypical associations of old age, decline, and senility that reflect critical prejudice more than conclusive textual interpretation. This article argues that King Lear challenges ageist conceptions both by obfuscating boundaries of natural and social constructions of reality and by representing an unstable life trajectory that incorporates a breadth of behaviors that do not correspond to a particular age.     

Necessity and Language: The Gap Is Still Very Real

In my previous paper “Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?” I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper “Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism”. This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour‐grammatical propositions, and the relation between rules and modality.     

Against Unnecessary Duplication of Selves: A Sartrean Argument Against Zahavi

In this article I argue that Zahavi's Sartre-inspired combination of the experiential and narrative self entails an unnecessary duplication of selves. Sartre himself accused Husserl of the same mistake in The Transcendence of the Ego. He claims that Husserl's combination of the transcendental I and the Me is unnecessary, and that we can do without the first. I try to show that Sartre's critique of Husserl also applies to Zahavi. Sartre's critique is based on his idea of impersonal consciousness, which I explain by comparing it to Armstrong's example of the long-distance truck-driver. Furthermore, I explicate how the alternative notion of self that Sartre proposes in the same work avoids unnecessary duplications of selves, and thereby evades further problems concerning how the two selves relate to one another.     

A Posteriori Necessity as Restricted Necessity

I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I take Sidelle’s defence of the conventionalist explanation of a posteriori necessity against the contingency problem as the starting point. Sidelle construes a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity and then argues that a posteriori necessity is to be considered under a fixed convention (meaning) and is thus irrelevant to the contingent nature of our linguistic conventions. I offer a different solution to the contingency problem. I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity based upon a use-based meta-semantic picture. Restricted necessity is contingent in a broader sense and does not conflict with the contingency of conventions. My solution allows conventionalists to explain a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I show that the realist’s arguments for a posteriori necessity are unconvincing in regard to real modal features and a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity. We thus have good reason to continue to accept a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity under the conventionalist explanation.

     

Disinhibition of return: Unnecessary and unlikely

Recently, from data obtained with a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task, Gibson and Egeth (1994) concluded that inhibition of return (IOR; a response time effect that reveals slower responding to targets at previously cued versus uncued locations) reflects impaired perceptual processing. By replotting their data, we demonstrate that the perception of temporal order is influenced only by the facilitatory effect of a cue at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and is unaffected by IOR at long SO As. The target paper proposed that, when extra stimuli are presented at task-relevant locations (i.e., in the TOJ task), IOR is prevented by a hypothetical process that is known as disinhibition of return (DOR). We argue that the assumptions that IOR affects perceptual processing and that DOR exists are unnecessary, as a more parsimonious response-based interpretation of IOR is consistent with their data. Further, we summarize recent results and present new data that demonstrate that DOR is unlikely.     

Applying Philosophy: A Response to O'Neill

abstract   I consider the putative originality of applied philosophy and seek to defend a version of it often called 'bottom up'. I review ways in which imagined cases may cause us to reconsider our normative commitments, and endorse a general attentiveness to the matter of how the world is and how it might reasonably be imagined. This is important if practical philosophers want to form the correct normative judgements, to be able to recognize the sui generis character of some moral theorising in particular domains, practically to enact their considered judgments, and properly to acknowledge how the real world, in the form of institutions, practices and a cultural framework, constrains, or facilitates, practical enactment. Throughout I illustrate my abstract claims by reference to the moral judgement and legal regulation of sexual behaviour .     

'Making Exceptions': A Response to Shue

abstract   In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal .